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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
BARTOSZ NAPIERALSKI 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
POLITICAL CATHOLICISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM – THE DEVIANT 
CASE OF POLAND IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
SUMMARY 
The main aim of this thesis is to add to the understanding of how religion interacts with 
politics in modern Europe. It discusses the largely under-researched relationship between 
Euroscepticism and religion and argues that despite the theory of secularisation, which 
assumes an ever-increasing marginalisation of the role of religion in the public sphere, 
religious beliefs still play an important role in the world of politics. 
 
This study firstly analyses the phenomenon of political Catholicism, providing a concise 
definition and identifying the primary and secondary features of this movement. Secondly, 
it discusses how, under certain circumstances, political Catholicism, which in general is a 
movement that strongly supported European integration, can adopt a Eurosceptic stance. 
 
Empirically, this study focuses on the case of Poland, but places the results in the context 
of 15 other European countries. It analyses primary data gathered through documentary 
research (party manifestos, public statements, Church documents) and a number of 
interviews with party members. Additional information was collected from interviews with 
journalists, an expert survey and secondary literature in the field of EU studies and religion 
and politics. 
 
The key argument of this thesis is that Polish political Catholicism is a distinct 
phenomenon in Europe because of its markedly visible Euroscepticism. Its opposition to 
Europe stems from an intrinsic feature of the movement, namely its Catholic-nationalist 
nature. This attribute developed as a result of Polish history, characterised by long periods 
of struggle for independence from alien forces, whereby belonging to Catholicism gradually 
became an essential element of belonging to the Polish nation, helping to define the ‘Us’ 
vs. the ‘Other’. Consequently, Polish political Catholicism started perceiving the EU as an 
organisation based on ‘alien’, secular values, which could endanger Polish national identity, 
Polish society and ultimately the state. 
 
In broader terms, this study contributes to the general discussion on the causality of party-
based Euroscepticism. It also provides a comparative outlook on political Catholicism in 
Europe, arguing that there is a gap between Western and Central and Eastern European 
strands of this movement, resulting mainly from different historical circumstances in which 
the movement developed in both regions. 
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1 Introduction: aims and scope of  the study 
 
1.1 Field of  research, knowledge gaps and objectives 
The relationship between religion and politics has been strong throughout the history of 
most countries in Europe and other parts of the world. Religion and religious beliefs used 
to play an important role in the functioning of societies, both in private and public spheres. 
The situation changed dramatically in the 20th century, when as a result of industrialisation 
and modernisation the societies and states of the ‘Western world’ experienced what seemed 
then a rapid process of secularisation, which led to the separation of the state from 
religious institutions, the decline of religious beliefs and practices, and the marginalisation 
of religion to the private sphere. This process was encapsulated in the theory of 
secularisation, which until the late 1980s was widely accepted across social sciences (Gorski 
and Altinordu 2008). It predicted that the more modernised and industrialised a state and 
society become, the more secular they will be and the less important a role religion will play 
in the public sphere. In this context, it is not surprising that the relationship between 
religion and politics, particularly in the case of Western democracies, gradually started 
attracting less and less scholarly attention. 
However, while the separation of religion from state institutions has been a modern 
structural trend, two other important elements of secularisation theory, the predicted 
decline of religious beliefs and the marginalisation of religion to the private sphere are 
questionable. In fact, there are many cases where the processes of industrialisation and 
urbanisation have not triggered the decline of religious beliefs and practices, but quite the 
contrary have led to the emergence of strong public religions, which started playing an 
increasingly important role in different parts of the polity (Casanova 1994). 
The significance of the gap in the understanding of how religion interplays with politics in 
modern Europe becomes even more apparent when one touches upon a political process 
that had a major influence on politics and policymaking on the continent, that is European 
integration. In fact, it was political Catholicism (in the form of Christian democratic parties) 
that strongly influenced the process of unifying Europe, particularly in its early stages. 
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Political Catholicism is defined in this study as a broad social and political movement which 
draws on Catholic social teaching and moral values, and whose key purpose is to influence 
the decision-making process in order to enshrine these values in law. The pivotal role of 
this movement in driving European integration could be best observed in the way that the 
close links between Christian democrats and the Catholic Church, and the latter’s 
universalistic claims, coupled with a strong Christian democratic belief in mutual 
understanding and reciprocity, translated into a striving for a supranational identity that 
would ensure transnational reconciliation. Christian democratic parties have supported 
European integration and perceived it as a way of ensuring that the important attachment 
of individuals to the ‘nation’ would not transform into raw nationalism fuelled by feelings 
of pride and chauvinism (Bale and Szczerbiak 2006). In other words, the process of 
European integration became strongly rooted in ideological principles whose sources can 
be traced back to the Catholic religion and political Catholicism. 
The limited knowledge of how religion, and in particular political Catholicism, influenced 
party politics in Europe is directly linked to another gap in the scholarly research of 
European politics – the lack of understanding of the relationship between political 
Catholicism and Euroscepticism. In recent years, a significant body of research has been 
devoted to the analysis of popular and party-based Euroscepticism. This discussion has led 
to the creation of a literature on the conceptualisation and causality of Euroscepticism, 
including a significant number of country case studies that aimed at exploring this 
phenomenon. As a result, a broad agreement emerged among scholars that the causality of 
Euroscepticism can be explained either by ideological-programmatic or strategic/tactical 
factors (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Even though research into this issue (e.g. Marks, 
Wilson and Ray 2002) suggested that adherence to a specific party family, which is based 
on ideology (including a religion-rooted one), could explain almost two-thirds of the 
variance in the positions of individual political parties on European integration, the role of 
religion in cueing Euroscepticism was analysed only to a very limited extent (e.g. 
Minkenberg 2009, Guerra 2010). 
In the context of the discussion about the role of religion in European integration and the 
emergence of Euroscepticism, Poland is a particularly interesting case. Firstly, it is not only 
the largest of the new post-communist EU member states, but also the one that has had 
some of the most prominent and electorally successful Eurosceptic parties [the League of 
Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), Self-Defence (Samoobrona), and Law and Justice 
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(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS)] which, between 2005-2007, participated in government. One of 
them (Law and Justice) still enjoyed substantial support as the largest opposition party in 
the Polish parliament at the time of writing. Secondly, it is a country where, as a result of 
historical developments, Catholicism has played a significant role in political, social and 
cultural life, ultimately becoming a core component of Polish national identity (Szczerbiak 
2001, 2004b). Thirdly, political Catholicism, a key player in Polish politics, adopted a 
markedly Eurosceptic stance, which is highly unusual for a political movement traditionally 
supportive of the integration process. 
This is why the aim of this study is to shed more light on the relationship between party 
politics and religion in contemporary Europe. It attempts, firstly, to explore the largely 
under-researched phenomenon of political Catholicism in Europe, providing a more robust 
definition of the movement than the one used so far in the literature. Secondly, this thesis 
tries to understand how, under certain circumstances, political Catholicism can assume a 
Eurosceptic position. To do this, the study offers the first systematic empirical examination 
of political Catholicism in Poland, one of the most prominent cases where opposition to 
Europe has been evident in the party system and where the intrinsic features of Polish 
political Catholicism seem to have led to its adopting a Eurosceptic stance. This thesis will 
also discuss to what extent Polish political Catholicism is the main driver of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland. Finally, in order to place the work in a comparative framework, 
and to examine to what extent this distinct relationship between political Catholicism and 
Euroscepticism differentiates Poland from other cases, this thesis will also examine a 
number of secondary cases where political Catholicism was an important actor.  
It is the key argument of this study that there is a specific example of political Catholicism 
in Poland that adopted a Eurosceptic stance. This contrasts starkly with West European 
cases of political Catholicism (most notably Christian democratic ones), which 
predominantly stayed firmly in favour of European integration. The main reason for 
Eurosceptic political Catholicism in Poland seems to lie in the intertwined relations 
between Catholicism and Polish national identity, whereby the Catholic religion provided, 
for more than two centuries, a framework for the functioning of Polish society. 
Consequently, Polish political Catholicism acquired a Catholic-nationalist trait, making it 
particularly focused on protecting national sovereignty and traditional Catholic values, 
which it perceived as the foundation of social life in the country. At the same time, the EU 
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started to be identified as a promoter of liberal secular values that may not only endanger 
Polish national identity, but also hinder the future development of the country. 
 
1.2 Setting the scene  
Secularisation and the concept of public religion 
Since the end of the Second World War, the issue of the relationship between religion and 
politics has been attracting less and less attention from political scientists, particularly in 
Europe. This was a direct result of the perceived diminishing of the role of religion in 
public life and the establishment of the secularisation paradigm in social sciences, which 
became the theoretical and analytical framework through which many scholars perceived 
the relationship of religion and a modern society. What Wallace (1966) stated about religion 
almost 50 years ago, that ‘the evolutionary future of religion is extinction …. Belief in 
supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as the result of the increasing 
adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge’ (Wallace 1966: 264-265), became widely 
accepted until the mid-1980s when Stark and his collaborators (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 
Stark and Finke 2000, Stark and Iannaccone 1994) heavily criticised the theory of 
secularisation in a series of articles (for details, see a recap on the history and challenges 
faced by the theory of secularisation in Gorski and Altinordu [2008]). The reality of 
growing religiosity in the world – the spread of Pentecostalism in the Southern hemisphere, 
the collapse of secular Communism, the Iranian Revolution, the strong position of 
Christians in the USA, the re-birth of the Orthodox Church in Russia, and continued 
religious conflicts – meant that those predicting the end of religion were soon proven 
wrong. 
In this context, some scholars began arguing that the role of religion in public life was not 
diminishing, but rather changing. One of the most influential works in this genre was 
Casanova’s (1994) case study analysis of four countries (Spain, Poland, Brazil and the 
United States), which led to the establishment of the concept of public religions in the 
modern world – religions which assume, or try to assume, a ‘public’ character, function, or 
role. According to Casanova (2012), one can distinguish three types of public religions at 
different levels of the polity – the state, political society and civil society. At the state level 
one can distinguish mainly established state churches. At the level of political society – 
religions which mobilise institutional resources for political competition through political 
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parties, social movements, or lobbying agencies. Finally, public religions at the civil society 
level can be exemplified by religions which enter the public sphere in order to participate in 
open public debates about public issues, public affairs and public policy choices. 
Casanova’s point of departure was a deep investigation of the theory of secularisation, 
which he described as being made up of three different propositions: secularisation as 
differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms; secularisation 
as decline of religious beliefs and practices; and secularisation as marginalisation of religion 
to a privatised sphere. Casanova’s critique of these three propositions led him to the 
conclusion that insofar as the differentiation of religion from secular spheres and 
institutions was a modern structural trend, the second and third meanings of secularisation 
were questionable as theoretical and empirical propositions. In fact, there were many cases 
where the process of industrialisation and urbanisation did not lead to a decline of religious 
beliefs and practices (including in Poland, the US and Brazil) but, quite to the contrary, 
caused a process of ‘de-privatisation’ of religion and an emergence of strong public 
religions which started playing an increasingly important role in the public sphere, 
influencing politics and policymaking. 
This study adopts a similar view, i.e. that secularisation is not a ubiquitous phenomenon. In 
fact, it may be quite limited, mostly to Western Europe. Even there, however, the role of 
religion in public life has not been rendered completely redundant. For decades after the 
Second World War, political Catholicism shaped European politics. More recently, the role 
of Christian values in European societies’ cultural development and identity building 
surfaced in public debates, e.g. the discussion about the EU Constitutional Treaty and the 
inclusion of the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe in its preamble (Heyward 2005). Religious 
arguments also featured in debates surrounding the issue of the EU enlargement to Turkey 
(Casanova 2006) or immigration, particularly in the context of an alleged cultural clash 
between Islam and European values, based on Christianity (Marranci 2006). 
1.2.1 Political Catholicism as a movement 
A detailed discussion about the nature of political Catholicism will be presented in chapter 
2 of this thesis. However, as a way of introducing the concept, it is necessary to provide 
some basic information. 
The scholarly debate on political Catholicism has been very limited. Nevertheless, one can 
identify attempts to provide a definition and typology of the movement, coupled with 
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some research trying to explain the electoral performance of parties associated with this 
phenomenon. The body of literature on political Catholicism can be divided into two 
groups. The first comprises studies focused on the historical development and role of the 
movement in European politics until the Second World War (e.g. Buchanan and Conway 
1996, Conway 1997, Kaiser and Wohnout 2004). The other group, which analysed political 
Catholicism in post-war Europe, was almost exclusively devoted to the phenomenon of 
Christian democracy (e.g. Fogarty 1957, Hanley 1994, Van Kersbergen 1995, Kalyvas 1996, 
Gehler and Kaiser 2004, Van Hecke and Gerard 2004 and Kaiser 2007). Christian 
democracy, which until the 1960s dominated much of the West European political scene, 
became the best known embodiment of the political Catholic movement. Indeed, the 
success of Christian democracy was so great that it overshadowed the whole family of 
political Catholic movements, and the term ‘political Catholicism’ started to be used 
interchangeably with ‘Christian democracy’. 
Because Christian democracy was relatively well defined and described, political 
Catholicism as such never saw the development of a robust definition that clearly stated its 
nature and listed the main features of the movement. Naturally, scholars describing the 
history of the movement provided descriptions, listing features, ideological beliefs, 
characteristic elements of manifestos; but these elements were rarely brought together to 
form a holistic definition of the movement. The common ground in the existing literature 
seems to be the assertion that political Catholicism finds particularly strong inspiration in 
Catholic social teaching, which is a body of Catholic doctrine concerning social issues such 
as poverty, wealth, economics, social organisation and the role of the state. In terms of its 
reach, political Catholicism is a multi-faceted movement that may include political parties 
as well as social movements and organisations. It also does not restrict itself to movements 
and organisations that were created by or had some authorisation from the Church’s 
hierarchy; quite the contrary, many political Catholic movements sought to assert their 
autonomy from the Church. At the same time, political Catholicism does not simply mean 
a group of Catholics who are active in politics, but rather refers to political action with 
Catholic inspiration (Conway 1996b). 
Political Catholicism as a movement is not homogeneous, and its characteristic feature is 
the fact that it finds different expressions. That is why it is wrong to reduce it to a single 
one of its manifestations in public life, albeit the best known one, that is the Christian 
democratic movement. Political Catholicism as a movement is much broader than a single 
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party family and, in fact, internal divisions have always been intrinsic to the Catholic 
politics of Europe, with the main lines of division running across social classes (e.g. 
Catholic bourgeoisie vs. Catholic workers), regions (e.g. the Ruhr and parts of France and 
Belgium with a strong Catholic working-class tradition vs. rural regions), or generations 
(e.g. those advocating that Catholicism should oppose the ‘evils’ of modern era and those 
trying to find a place within the new industrial, pluralist society) (Conway 1996b). 
In the context of political Catholicism, Poland is a particularly interesting case. Polish 
society is a deeply religious one – more than 90% of Poles identify as Catholics (see Table 4 
for details), with 40% of them attending the Sunday mass every week (ISKK 2014). It is 
not surprising then that political Catholicism in Poland played a significant role, although 
its activity came to an abrupt end after the Second World War when the communists took 
power, gradually eliminating other parties. The movement reappeared after the 1989 fall of 
Communism, assuming an important place on the Polish political scene. However, to the 
surprise of many scholars Polish political Catholicism never took the form of Christian 
democracy, which has always been inherently weak and marginalised. Instead, it was 
replaced by a Catholic-nationalistic movement, focused on safeguarding Polish sovereignty 
as a way of protecting the traditional Catholic moral set-up of Polish society. 
It should be noted that this study uses the term ‘political Catholicism’ in two ways, either to 
denominate the set of ideas associated with the movement (‘political Catholic ideology’) or 
to refer to a group of organisations or movements that form political Catholicism in a 
given country. This approach may be compared to the use of the term ‘Christian 
democracy’, which also can mean either a Christian democratic ideology or a group of 
Christian democratic parties. The context of each use should be clear enough so as to allow 
the reader to distinguish between the two applications of the term. 
In the context of research on political Catholicism, Poland drew some attention from 
scholars, albeit mostly limited in scope to Polish Christian democratic parties. As noted 
earlier, Poland in this respect is a distinct case where despite a predominantly Catholic 
society no successful Christian democratic party has emerged. Bale and Szczerbiak (2008) 
in their analysis of the Polish case, based on the post-war history of West European 
Christian democratic parties, enumerated seven factors associated with Christian 
democratic party success: (i) a substantial Roman Catholic population, (ii) a fear of victory 
by anticlerical and potentially totalitarian left, (iii) support from newly-enfranchised female 
voters, agricultural and middle-class sectors, (iv) potential competitors from the right being 
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delegitimised by participation in totalitarian regimes, (v) a Church hierarchy that provided 
resources to its chosen Christian democratic party, (vi) support for Christian democratic 
parties from civil society organisations, and finally (vii) the ability of a Christian democratic 
party to maintain autonomy from the Church hierarchy. After having analysed the Polish 
political scene, Bale and Szczerbiak observed that only one factor (a substantial Roman 
Catholic population) appeared to have been present in post-1989 Poland, making the 
development of Christian democratic parties unlikely in a longer term. The authors 
concluded that success of Christian democratic parties depended on the interplay between 
social realities, sponsors (i.e. institutions that linked party and society and often provided 
material and other resources) and the institutional and ideological crafting of politicians. 
Building on Bale and Szczerbiak’s research, Grzymala-Busse (2013) tried to understand 
why only a couple of Christian democratic parties in the post-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were electorally successful. A general pattern that 
emerged from her analysis was that in the case of CEE countries, the electoral success was 
not correlated with religious belief or Church attendance. Post-communist Christian 
democracy was most successful where it had positive historical (interwar) legacies. Without 
them, Christian democratic parties did not enjoy initial electoral support and found efforts 
to attract new voters handicapped either by a lack of historical capital or by their alliances 
with the Church. As a result, Christian democracy either failed to arise or, where it did, it 
lost both electoral and parliamentary relevance (and presence). This can also potentially 
explain why there was no successful Christian democracy in Poland and why parties which 
seemed ideologically closest to Christian democracy, like Civic Platform (Platforma 
Obywatelska, PO) or Law and Justice, carefully avoided that label. 
However, the fact that no successful Christian democracy developed in Poland, did not 
mean that, in general, the political Catholic movement did not manage to become an 
important player. In reality, the scholarly focus on Christian democracy often meant that 
other forms of political Catholicism were often overlooked. This study will show that a 
different form of political Catholicism formed in Poland, dominating much of the right 
wing and exerting significant influence on Polish politics. 
1.2.2 Euroscepticism – definition and causality 
The process of European integration has had a significant influence on the party politics in 
Europe, giving rise to support for and, even more so, passionate opposition to the process. 
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As a result, academic research devoted to political parties’ stances on Europe has surged 
over the past twenty years. In particular, the emergence of party-based Euroscepticism in 
Europe as quite a new phenomenon in European party politics attracted widespread 
attention both amongst academic scholars and commentators of European political life. 
This resulted in a number of detailed case studies of particular countries (Evans 2000, 
Henderson 2001, Lees 2002, Riishøj 2007, Spiering 2004 or a number of case studies in 
Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008c), as well as comparative and theoretical contributions, 
predominantly concerning questions such as how to define party-based Euroscepticism and 
what reasons make political parties accept a Eurosceptic position. 
Defining Euroscepticism 
One of the first attempts to provide a comprehensive definition of party-based 
Euroscepticism was Taggart’s conceptualisation of Euroscepticism as an ‘idea of 
contingent or qualified …, as well as outright and unqualified opposition to the process of 
European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366). This definition was broad and incorporated a 
wide range of varying positions, thus it was subsequently refined by Szczerbiak and Taggart 
(2004), whereby the term was broken down into two distinctive types: principled 
opposition to European integration (‘hard’ Euroscepticism) and contingent opposition to 
this process (‘soft’ Euroscepticism).  
Szczerbiak and Taggart defined ‘hard’ Euroscepticism as ‘an outright rejection of the entire 
project of European political and economic integration and opposition to one’s country 
joining or remaining a member of the EU’. Party-based ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, on the other 
hand, was described as the situation ‘where there is NOT a principled objection to 
European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of 
policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a 
sense that “national interest” is currently at odds with the EU trajectory’ (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart 2004: 3). In this context, attitudes to a country’s membership in the EU were used 
by the authors as the ultimate test of whether a party should fall within the ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic group. 
Szczerbiak and Taggart’s conceptualisation became a model successfully applied in many 
analyses concerning both relatively ‘young democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe 
(e.g. Henderson 2001, Bielasiak 2004) or more mature Western European ones (Lees 2002, 
Spiering 2004). It also stimulated a broad academic debate that led to other alternative 
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conceptualisations being developed. One of the most comprehensive ones was the 
definition elaborated by Kopecky and Mudde (2002). These scholars criticised the soft-hard 
Euroscepticism approach on two grounds: firstly, together with other scholars they pointed 
out that ‘soft’ Euroscepticism seemed to have been too all-encompassing, and secondly, 
they stated that the key criterion used to separate the two forms of Euroscepticism – i.e. 
support for or opposition to EU membership – was not the right measure to differentiate 
among critics of European integration. Kopecky and Mudde argued that there should be a 
distinction between principled support for/opposition to the idea of European integration 
on the one hand, and attitudes to the European Union (EU) as the current embodiment of 
this idea and its current trajectory on the other hand. On the basis of this argument, the 
two scholars proposed a new classification of party-based Euroscepticism. 
Table 1: The fourfold model of party-based Euroscepticism 
      
Support for the idea of European integration 
 
  Europhile Europhobe 
Support for the EU and its 
current trajectory 
E
U
-o
pt
im
ist
  
Euroenthusiasts 
(pro-integration and pro-
EU and its trajectory) 
 
 
Europragmatists 
(anti-integration, pro-EU 
and its trajectory) 
E
U
-p
es
sim
ist
  
Eurosceptics 
(pro-integration, anti-
current trajectory) 
 
 
Eurorejects 
(anti-integration and anti-
current trajectory) 
Source: Kopecky and Mudde (2002) 
As shown in Table 1, Kopecky and Mudde’s model was based on two dimensions of 
Euroscepticism. Firstly, the ideological dimension, dealing with the question of European 
integration, wherein the authors distinguished between Europhiles (accepting in principle 
the idea of European integration) and Europhobes (outright rejecting integration, for 
example because of isolationism or liberalism). The second dimension was a strategic one, 
dealing with acceptance of the EU itself, wherein EU-optimists endorsed both the EU 
itself as well as the way it was developing, while EU-pessimists did not support the current 
state of the EU or were critical of the way it was evolving. This led to a fourfold division of 
parties into separate categories in accordance with their stance on European integration: 
Euroenthusiasts (pro-integration and pro-EU), Europragmatists (anti-integration and pro-
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EU), Eurosceptics (pro-integration, anti-EU) and Eurorejects (anti-integration and anti-
EU).  
As a response to this, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) recognised the validity of the main 
arguments put forward by Kopecky and Mudde and agreed that the key variables in 
determining party attitudes to Europe should be: firstly, underlying support for or 
opposition to the European project, rather than a party’s support for or oppositions to 
their country’s membership in the EU, and secondly, attitudes to the current trajectory of 
the EU, including its further actual or planned extension of competencies. As such, the 
authors decided to move away from viewing attitudes to EU membership as the ultimate 
test for whether a party was a case of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, because party 
attitudes to EU membership could be more of an opportunistic choice resulting from 
short-term tactical and medium-term strategic domestic considerations. 
However, while agreeing in general with Kopecky and Mudde’s argument, Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2008b) stressed the inconsistent usage of terminology by the two authors. Firstly, 
they pointed out that Kopecky and Mudde departed from the existing common usage of 
the term Euroscepticism. They found particularly confusing the description of the 
principled opponents to European integration as ‘Europhobes’ or ‘Eurorejects’. This 
problem was clearly visible in the case of the UK Independence Party, which according to 
Kopecky and Mudde’s model would not have been classified as Eurosceptic. 
Secondly, Szczerbiak and Taggart noted that the Europragmatist category seemed to have 
been internally incoherent, as it combined rejection of European integration in principle on 
the one hand with support for the EU on the other, which, regardless of whether it was a 
successful organisation or not, was an embodiment of integrationist ideas in Europe. The 
problem here might be the fact that Kopecky and Mudde failed to develop a coherent 
definition of what a Europragmatic position was. In fact, it seemed that the category was 
created as a label that could be attached to parties which in reality were hard to classify 
because of their unclear and changeable positions (e.g.: the two parties classified as 
Europragmatist – the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Independent 
Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) – had very mixed and at times unspecified attitudes to 
European integration and the EU). 
Finally, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) stated that the Euroenthusiast category seemed to 
have been overly inclusive, and therefore, it faced the same problem as the original 
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definition of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. In other words, Kopecky and Mudde’s classification 
failed to distinguish between different levels of support for integration, which, as in the 
case of opposition to the process, could be both principled and contingent. 
One classification tried to address all the above mentioned issues and distinguish between 
different shades of ‘Eurooptimism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. In his typology, Flood (2002) 
deliberately refrained from using terminology such as ‘Euroscepticism’ or ‘pro-European’, 
resorting instead to terms conventionally applied in political science. Flood’s classification 
comprised six categories: 
a) Maximalist – position in favour of pushing integration as far and as fast as it 
is possible (including progress of overall structures or specific policies); 
b) Reformist – position accepting the advancement of integration, combined 
with constructive criticism. Support for integration is subject to remedying 
the deficiencies of what has already been achieved; 
c) Gradualist – position accepting the advancement of integration, as long as it 
is slow and gradual; 
d) Minimalist – position accepting the status quo but rejecting any further 
advances in integration; 
e) Revisionist – position in favour of returning to an earlier state, usually 
before a major treaty revision; 
f) Rejectionist – position of outright opposition to both EU membership and 
to integration as such. 
One obvious advantage of Flood’s classification was its distinction between different 
degrees of support for the EU and opposition to it. What is also interesting about Flood’s 
attempt at classifying party attitudes to Europe is the lack of ideological presumptions in 
the categorisation itself. Flood and Usherwood argued (2005) that both models discussed 
earlier (i.e. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) and Kopecky and Mudde (2002)) took too 
reductive and too restrictive an approach to the issue of ideology and its influence on party 
alignment on the European issue. As they pointed out, positions of parties were 
multidimensional, broader than simple binary distinctions between ideological acceptance 
or rejection of European integration. 
However, the use of Flood's model faced significant challenges. Firstly, its categories seem 
not to be mutually exclusive and some parties could be classified in more than one of them. 
Secondly and more importantly, the operationalisation of Flood’s model appears to be very 
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difficult, because the more sophisticated and fine-grained the typology, the more difficult it 
is to apply. Flood rightly pointed out that there were many factors influencing party 
position that until then had been overlooked in research. However, taking into account all 
or most of the factors indicated by Flood would require a substantial amount of data that is 
often not available. This is because parties rarely elaborated their positions in enough detail 
to allow for their classification. As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) noted, it was possible to 
circumvent this by deducing party positions on Europe from statements on other policy 
areas or broader ideological positioning, but this in turn led to a higher degree of 
imprecision and second-guessing what party positions really were. In fact, in most countries 
the EU was viewed through the prism of domestic politics, which meant that party 
positions on Europe were elaborated in little detail, even in countries where parties had 
several decades to develop their views on the future trajectory of the EU (see: Lees’ (2008) 
analysis of German party programmes, Henderson 2008, Szczerbiak 2008). 
It seems that out of the discussed typologies, the binary ‘soft’/’hard’ conceptualisation is 
most accepted and used in studies of party-based Euroscepticism. It became particularly 
valuable since its revision following Kopecky and Mudde’s critique and additional analyses 
carried out by the authors. The strengths of this typology become particularly obvious in 
attempts by other scholars to provide alternative conceptualisations, which in many aspects 
use the same categories under different names, particularly if categories used to define pro-
EU opinions are discarded. Indeed, the newly proposed categories of opposition to 
European integration often turned out to be superfluous or created as labels for those 
parties that may be difficult to classify. For example, Kopecky and Mudde’s Eurosceptic 
and Euroreject categories are in essence equivalent to ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism. The 
additional category of Europragmatists, as pointed out by Szczerbiak and Taggart 
themselves (2008b), is internally illogical as it is hard to find parties that would be in 
principle opposed to the idea of European integration but supportive of the EU’s current 
trajectory (the two parties classified by Kopecky and Mudde as Europragmatic simply had 
positions on Europe that made them difficult to classify). In Flood’s typology, the three 
positions opposed to Europe were rejectionists, revisionists and minimalists. Rejectionists 
overlapped with ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, revisionists fell either within ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism, depending on the scale of their attempts to revise treaties (entire 
configuration of the EU or some policy areas), while minimalists were in other words ‘soft’ 
Eurosceptics. A similar situation can be observed when it comes to Zuba’s (2006) threefold 
typology of Euroenthusiasts, Eurorealists and Eurosceptics in Poland, which will be 
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outlined in more detail in the following chapters. Here, Eurorealists again were either 
parties that were difficult to classify because of the changeability of their positions or did 
not develop their European policy in sufficient detail to allow for their classification, while 
Zuba’s Eurosceptics were simply ‘hard’ Eurosceptics. Consequently, Szczerbiak and 
Taggart’s binary classification of Euroscepticism seems to offer the most efficient tool for 
studies of party-based Euroscepticism. On the one hand, it is clear and straightforward 
enough to allow for its operationalisation, even in cases where parties do not elaborate their 
European policies in sufficient manner, and on the other hand, it escapes over-simplicity 
and the creation of artificial groups that include parties that may be difficult to categorise 
otherwise. 
Naturally, no categorisation is perfect and so it is the case with Szczerbiak and Taggart’s 
proposition, where the biggest challenge has always been narrowing down the category of 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism so that it does not encompass too many organisations. However, with 
the gradual refinement of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism definitions, they became 
clearer and more unambiguous in use. 
Keeping all these explanations in mind, this thesis will use the binary definition of 
Euroscepticism proposed by Szczerbiak and Taggart. The term ‘hard’ Euroscepticism 
denotes a party position with ‘a principled opposition to the EU and European integration’, 
while ‘soft’ Euroscepticism can be found ‘where there is NOT a principled objection to 
European integration or EU membership but where concerns on policy areas lead to the 
expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that “national 
interest” is currently at odds with the EU trajectory’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 241). 
This thesis focuses on understanding the relation between political Catholicism and any of 
the two types of Euroscepticism, and whenever the term ‘Euroscepticism’ is used it refers 
to an overall grouping of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties, unless specified differently. 
The causes of party-based Euroscepticism 
Apart from trying to define and categorise party-based Euroscepticism, another major 
challenge facing researchers is the issue of causality. This discussion is important in the 
framework of this study as it outlines key influencers on party attitudes to Europe. 
Many analyses of the causality of party-based Euroscepticism focused on institutional 
aspects of polities that may cue Euroscepticism (Batory and Sitter 2004, Deschouwer and 
Van Assche 2002, Baker et al. 2002). Others pointed to institutional features such as the 
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electoral system, types of legislature and the distribution of power within a polity as 
elements strongly motivating the emergence of Eurosceptic movements (Usherwood 2002, 
Lees 2002). There were also scholars who concentrated on issues of culture, values and 
ideology in the context of party positions on Europe, e.g. Hooghe et al. (2002), who 
analysed the role of ideology on party stances on Europe and argued that parties located 
toward the right and left poles of the political spectrum were significantly more 
Eurosceptic than parties located in the centre. 
In spite of this breadth of research on the causality of Euroscepticism, it seems that one 
can boil it down to the key question of whether party alignment on Europe is a strategy- or 
an ideology-driven issue. In other words, can a party stance on integration be changed 
whenever it is deemed strategically or tactically convenient, or is it based on a more 
profound issue of ideology and as such is less vulnerable to short-term political 
considerations? 
One group of scholars (for example, Batory and Sitter 2004, Deschouwer and Van Assche 
2002, Baker et al 2002) saw party-based Euroscepticism as a question of strategic 
positioning and linked it to the so-called ‘politics of opposition’. This opinion flowed from 
the conviction that political parties were ‘organisations that seek to propel candidates to 
elected office in pursuit of policy goals’ (Sitter 2002: 5). The stress here was on the ‘quest 
for office’ and as this remained the main aim of a political party, the patterns of 
competition shaped the translation of the European issue into party politics. Another set of 
theories pointed to the importance of such features as the electoral system, types of 
legislature and distribution of power within a polity (for example, Lees 2002, Usherwood 
2002, Spiering 2004). 
However, another strand of theories explaining the rise of Euroscepticism focused on 
ideological-programmatic factors (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
2002; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). In this context, it is useful to mention a study by Marks, 
Wilson and Ray (2002), who empirically tested four hypotheses explaining party positions 
on European integration. The authors sought to verify the following theories: 
a) Cleavage theory – which assumes that parties reflect divisions in the social structure. 
From this standpoint, parties are organisations with strongly embedded ideologies 
and have long-standing agendas that do not change significantly with each electoral 
cycle. 
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b) National localisation – which stipulates that parties’ alignment on Europe is an effect 
of national interests of a member state in which a party functions. 
c) Median supporter – which assumes that parties position themselves in such a way as 
to maximise their electoral support. In doing so, they try to locate their policies 
near the position of the median voter. 
d) Strategic competition – which argues that a political party may take a position on a new 
issue to manipulate its salience, with the ultimate goal to differentiate itself from the 
mainstream and to ‘shake-up’ the system by taking extreme positions. 
As a result of a statistical data analysis, the authors concluded that the cleavage theory bore the 
strongest potential for predicting party attitudes to the EU. In fact, adherence to a specific 
party family (which was based on ideological-programmatic positions resulting from 
historical or contemporary cleavages) explained almost two-thirds of the variance in the 
positions assumed by political parties on European integrations. At the same time, more 
strategic considerations – such as left/right extremism, whereby parties at the fringes of the 
left/right dimension were more likely to be Eurosceptic, and the connection between the 
position of a party and that of its median voter – were also very closely associated with 
party attitudes on Europe. 
One of the most influential arguments in discussions on the causes for Euroscepticism was 
Kopecky and Mudde’s typology (2002). As mentioned in the previous section, in their 
categorisation of party-based Euroscepticism, the authors tried to take into account the 
issue of the influence of ideology on party stances on Europe. In their conclusions, they 
stressed that ideology determined broad attitudes to European integration in principle, 
which was a relatively constant factor, while strategy determined whether or not a party 
supported the current trajectory of the EU. 
Finally, there were also attempts to merge the two approaches and suggest that although 
values and ideologies remained an important element in predicting party stances on 
European integration, short-term electoral strategies and coalition-building tactics must 
also be taken into account (Batory and Sitter 2004). 
When summarising this discussion, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) observed that 
Euroscepticism as a broad party position on Europe needed to be differentiated from 
whether and how parties used the issue of Europe in inter-party competition, as these two 
phenomena were driven by different causes. According to the two authors, broad 
underlying party positions on Europe are determined by two factors: the party’s wider 
ideological profile and the perceived interests of its supporters. In this context, more 
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ideological, value-based and goal-seeking parties would be more likely to prioritise the first 
factor, while more pragmatic, office-seeking parties may choose to follow opinions of its 
supporters. What is crucial, however, is the fact that broad underlying positions are, 
according to Szczerbiak and Taggart, quite firmly rooted and relatively fixed, in contrast 
with rhetorical shifts, which may happen more easily. 
To sum up Szczerbiak and Taggart’s argument, a broad, underlying party position on 
Europe are determined by the party’s ideology and the interests of its members. This is a 
relatively constant factor, as ideologies are firmly rooted and cannot be easily changed 
(though this is possible). On the other hand, the issue of party competition, driven by 
electoral strategy and ‘government-opposition dynamic’ (Sitter 2002), determined the role 
and prominence of Euroscepticism attributed by parties in their rhetoric. In this context, it 
is worth mentioning the issue of problematising Europe, i.e. the use of rhetoric that is 
highly critical of the EU for strategic or tactical reasons, while retaining broad support for 
EU integration. 
In essence, the scholarly discussion on the causality of party-based Euroscepticism focused 
on the ‘ideology vs. strategy’ issue (for a recap of the discussion on the causality of party-
based Euroscepticism see Mudde 2012). To what extent are party opinions on Europe 
shaped by its ideological underpinnings, and hence are more stable, unchangeable with 
some party families being more prone to adopt a Eurosceptic stance? Do parties use their 
European policies as an element of inter-party competition, and what is the role of short-
term (electoral) strategic and (coalition) tactical considerations? It seem that what 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) proposed – a distinction between a broad underlying party 
position on Europe, which is determined by the ideological profile, and whether or not a 
party chooses to use its European policy in inter-party competition, determined by 
strategic-tactical factors, is the most rational approach. There are numerous empirical 
examples of the influence of both ideology and strategy on a party’s position on Europe. 
Parties are subject to both types of factors: their strongly embedded ideological profiles as 
well as day-to-day challenges of domestic politics with competition for electoral support 
and institutional or legal frameworks that impact their activities. The importance that 
parties attribute to these factors depends on their character, i.e. on whether they are more 
value-based, ideology-driven parties or office-seeking entities. This research aims to 
contribute to this discussion by assessing the relative importance of the ‘ideology versus 
strategy’ dichotomy in the case of Polish party-based Euroscepticism. It will present the 
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Polish case, which is an example of how the deep-running, underlying positions of parties 
on Europe are driven by ideology, while the use of this position in party rhetoric and inter-
party competition is influenced by electoral tactics and the government-participation 
strategy.  
In fact, Poland seems to be a particularly interesting case in the context of Euroscepticism. 
It was the biggest country in the cohort that joined the EU in 2004, having the clear 
potential to become a significant player on the European political scene. In addition, Poles 
were overwhelmingly pro-EU throughout the 1990s, with political elites almost universally 
sharing the opinion that Polish EU membership should be a key policy objective. 
Nonetheless, criticism of the EU slowly began to surface and, by 2001, 18% of the votes in 
national elections were won by ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties, which openly opposed or were 
highly critical of the Polish accession to the EU. Although the size of the ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic camp significantly decreased in the following years, Euroscepticism remained 
an important element of Polish party politics (Szczerbiak 2008). 
What is, however, most interesting about Polish party-based Euroscepticism is the fact that 
it seems to have been dominated by political Catholic organisations such as the League of 
Polish Families, the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZChN), 
the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (Ruch Odbudowy Polski – RPO), the Polish 
Agreement (Porozumienie Polskie) or Law and Justice, which is a surprising phenomenon and 
largely a new aspect of party-based Euroscepticism. 
1.2.3 Religion and European integration – the deviant case of Poland 
Just as the general issue of the relationship between religion and politics did not attract 
significant scholarly attention in recent years, the role of religion in European politics and 
its influence on parties’ attitudes to European integration also remained a largely under-
researched topic. So far, the limited scholarly discussion in this area mainly focused on the 
role of Christian democracy in driving forward the process of European integration. 
Kalyvas and van Kersbergen (2010) provided a comprehensive review of the scholarly 
research on Christian democracy in Europe, discussing its origins, proving that it is a 
distinctive political movement, and tracing its impact on the process of European 
integration. Their analysis showed a striking relationship between Christian democracy and 
the process of European integration – periods of power or crisis in the Christian 
democratic movement correlated directly with advancements or a decline in European 
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integration. The establishment and rapid growth of European institutions in the 1950s was 
connected with the post-war dominance of Christian democracy in European politics, 
while the European sclerosis of the 1960s and 1970s occurred exactly at the same time as 
the first crisis of Christian democratic parties. The same could be observed in the mid-
1980s, when a rebirth of Christian democracy correlated with the signing of the Single 
European Act and the creation of the EU in the early 1990s. This observation was 
confirmed by Hanley (2008) in his analysis of European transnational parties. When 
describing the Christian democratic transnational party, the European People’s Party 
(EPP), Hanley demonstrated its pivotal role in driving European integration, especially at 
the outset of the process. 
In recent years, there have been some preliminary attempts to analyse the correlation of 
religion and politics in Europe, trying to explain how religion may have impacted upon the 
emergence of Eurosceptic ideas and opinion.  
Boomgaarden and Freire (2009) investigated the influence of religion (religious divides and 
religiosity) on popular attitudes towards the EU. The authors discussed both the direct 
relationships between religion and Euroscepticism, by testing the impact of religiosity and 
faith, and indirect relationships by analysing the influence on Euroscepticism of the two 
mediating factors, attitudes towards immigration and value orientation (the libertarian-
authoritarian dimension). 
Using the European Social Survey 2008 data, Boomgaarden and Freire concluded that 
none of the religion variables (denomination and religiosity) had any significance for 
popular Euroscepticism, but that anti-immigration attitudes and evaluations of the 
government and the economy were the most important predictors of Euroscepticism. 
People who thought negatively about immigration, or were critical of their national 
governments and had a pessimistic economic outlook, were considerably more likely to 
oppose European integration. Furthermore, the authors’ analysis showed that people living 
in Catholic, Orthodox and multi-faith countries were significantly less Eurosceptic than 
citizens of predominantly Protestant countries. 
Boomgaarden and Freire’s study stands in contrast to other analyses (Nelsen et al. 2001, 
Nelsen and Guth 2003, Hagevi 2002), which found a strong influence of religion on 
attitudes towards Europe. One reason for this may be the timespan of almost 10 years 
between the data used in Boomgaarden and Freire’s analysis and previous studies. 
20 
  
However, it seems that the fact that Boomgaarden and Freire included mediating variables 
in the analysis might have blurred the extent to which religion influenced opposition to 
European integration in their study.  
In the framework of the limited research on religion and European integration, Poland 
attracted some attention of scholars as a distinct case in Europe. For example, Minkenberg 
(2009) attempted to analyse to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as 
religious parties and Churches contributed to Euroscepticism. His second question was 
whether a confessional pattern of Euroscepticism could be identified.  
His comparative analysis of different Christian Democratic parties as well as Catholic and 
Protestant Churches across the EU concluded that the core of Christian Democratic 
parties and Churches were overwhelmingly supportive of European integration. There 
were only two exceptions to this rule: firstly, ‘fundamentalist, fringe’ parties in the 
Netherlands and Poland (namely the League of Polish Families), and secondly, the Polish 
Catholic Church, which he described as being decidedly sceptical towards the Polish 
accession to the EU. The author argued that the Polish Church toned down its criticism 
over the years, but then pointed to other Catholic actors in Poland, like the radio station 
Radio Maryja, that remained hostile to the EU, with concerns of moral-cultural shifts and 
threats to national sovereignty being at the core of its opposition to the EU. 
Minkenberg’s analysis showed that where political Catholicism saw European ‘alien, 
cosmopolitan, secular’ values as a threat to national identity, it was likely to assume a 
Eurosceptic position. The study also demonstrated that the Polish Catholic Church and 
political Catholicism deviated from its Western European counterparts in terms of attitudes 
to European integration.  
The interplay between religion and Euroscepticism was also analysed by Guerra (2010), 
who examined the role of Catholicism in opposition to and support for European 
integration in Poland before and after accession to the EU. 
Guerra’s key conclusion was that ‘when the Church meets a radical-right wing party and 
the EU is perceived as a threat in the run-up to accession, the alliance between the two can 
be supported by a convergence of common interests – [protection of] national identity and 
sovereignty’ (2010: 27). She also pointed out that (Catholic) religion as a variable 
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determining support for or opposition to European integration had a positive correlation 
after accession, while before accession it correlated with Eurosceptic attitudes. 
The author developed her argument by noting that the Church or its fundamentalist 
branches could politicise Europe in a Eurosceptic light, but only when it found a useful ally 
in a political party. Such a reliable ally could be a party that posited itself on the fringes of 
the party system (a radical right-wing party) and that protected national identity, values and 
sovereignty threatened by European integration. As an example, Guerra evoked the 
exploitation of the ‘Catholicism against secular Europe’ discourse employed by the League 
of Polish Families, strongly supported by the Catholic broadcaster Radio Maryja. 
What Guerra described as a ‘beneficial alliance’ between the Church and political parties is, 
in effect, a characteristic feature of political Catholicism. This study will show that the fact 
that parts of the Church could find a Eurosceptic party as an ally stems from underlying 
intrinsic features of Polish political Catholicism, which perceived Europe as based on 
liberal, secular values that could threaten Polish national identity.  
Guerra concluded her analysis by stating that ‘religion impacts on Eurosceptic attitudes 
without significance. On the contrary, after accession, Catholicism is likely to become a 
determinant of support’ (2010: 27). However, this thesis will show the importance of 
religiously inspired political Catholicism in driving party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. It 
will also reveal that fifteen years after Polish EU accession, Polish political Catholicism 
remained as Eurosceptic as it was before the accession. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate 
that the Church’s and Polish political Catholicism’s stance on Europe is rather a matter of 
long-term underlying ideological beliefs and not something that could be easily adjusted. 
To sum up, this study contributes to the existing body of research in at least three ways. 
Firstly, it explores the largely under-researched phenomenon of political Catholicism, 
providing a more robust conceptualisation of the phenomenon than the ones developed so 
far by scholars. Secondly, this study enhances our understanding of the important concept 
of Euroscepticism in a large, comparatively new EU member state by shedding more light 
on the relatively new aspect of party-based Euroscepticism, namely its relations with 
religion. This thesis contains the first systematic empirical examination of Eurosceptic 
political Catholicism, which draws on primary sources. Thus, it significantly develops our 
understanding of how religion and politics interact in contemporary Europe and expands 
the knowledge on the causality of party-based Euroscepticism. Thirdly, this study compares 
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the unique manifestation of the movement in Poland, where political Catholicism that 
elsewhere is supportive of the EU turned Eurosceptic, to other Central and East European 
and Western European cases. As a result, it further contributes to our knowledge on the 
development of party systems in Europe, particularly in post-communist states, explaining 
different roles political Catholicism played in European politics.    
 
1.3 Political Catholicism and Euroscepticism – main 
hypothesis and additional explanatory factors 
As mentioned earlier, the main aim of this research on political Catholicism and 
Euroscepticism is to enhance our knowledge of the relationship between party politics and 
religion in contemporary Europe and to understand how, under certain circumstances, 
political Catholicism can adopt a Eurosceptic stance. This aim is translated into the 
following research questions:  
Q1: What is the nature of political Catholicism as a political movement and how does 
the Polish manifestation differ from the Western European one? 
Q2: Under which circumstances can political Catholicism adopt a Eurosceptic stance? 
Q3: To what extent is Polish political Catholicism the main driver of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland?  
The hypothesis to be tested in this enquiry is:  
Political Catholicism is a distinct political movement whose Polish manifestation 
differs significantly from the West European variant because of its Euroscepticism 
and the role it plays as the main driver of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. 
The Eurosceptic stance of Polish political Catholicism results from the intrinsic 
ideological feature(s) of the movement, which lead to the perception of the EU as 
an entity based on the concepts of ‘secularism’, ‘individualism’ and ‘materialism’; 
which, in turn, endanger the core values of Polish national identity. 
The hypothesis assumes that the Euroscepticism of political Catholicism in Poland is not 
merely a result of short-term, strategic considerations. In fact, parties’ decisions to adopt a 
critical stance on the European integration project are not simply the product of a desire to 
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expand their electoral base or to distinguish themselves on the political stage. From this 
perspective, the hypothesis is embedded in cleavage theory, which argues that parties are 
not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or 
constituency pressures, but are organisations with entrenched ideologies. As Hix (1999: 
133) explained, ‘political preferences often derive from deep historical or cultural identities 
such as nationality, religion or language’. In other words, Euroscepticism as a party stance 
stems from ideological underpinnings, shared political values and culture. In the Polish 
context, these ideological and political values are strongly rooted in historical 
circumstances, which led to Catholicism becoming entwined with the notion of Polish 
national identity and culture. Essentially, the hypothesis follows the reasoning of Hooghe et 
al. (2002), Marks and Wilson (2000), and Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) which claims that 
historically grounded paradigms constitute ‘prisms’ through which political parties respond 
to the issue of European integration.  
It would be flawed to maintain that only ideology can drive the Eurosceptic stance of 
parties and movements. In fact, the existing body of research on party-based 
Euroscepticism and its causality outlined above, clearly shows that there is a number of 
strategic/tactical factors that may also drive party-based Euroscepticism. That is why, this 
study will also verify, whether additional factors could explain the adoption of a 
Eurosceptic stance by Polish political Catholicism. These additional explanatory factors 
(AEF) encapsulate non-ideological influences that can lead to a party becoming 
Eurosceptic, although they do not constitute an exhaustive list. 
AEF1: A political party adopts a Eurosceptic stance as a preferred way of making itself 
distinct from other parties and movements on the political scene or as part of 
government-opposition dynamics. 
AEF2: A political party adopts a Eurosceptic stance in order to expand its support base 
by attracting voters that cannot find representation of their Eurosceptic views among other 
parties. 
AEF3: A political party adopts a Eurosceptic stance as a way of limiting political space 
for the emergence of other competitive parties. 
Naturally, almost always there is more than a single factor that influences the development 
of a specific phenomenon – in this case Euroscepticism of Polish political Catholicism. 
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This is why, this research is located within the framework proposed by Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2008b), which specified that a broad underlying party position on Europe is 
determined by the ideological profile, while the fact of whether or not a party chooses to 
use its European policy in inter-party competition is determined by strategic-tactical 
factors. 
In order to provide answers to the research questions and test the hypothesis, this study 
will require a two-stage approach. Firstly, an explanation of the general nature of political 
Catholicism needs to be developed, coupled with a broad perspective on the specificity of 
the Polish case, including the history of the Church-state relations and the relation between 
nationalism and Catholicism in Poland. This will be followed by a cross-country 
comparative analysis of fifteen European countries, identifying key similarities and 
differences between political Catholicism in Poland and its other manifestations in Europe. 
Consequently, this stage of the analysis will provide an answer to the first research 
question, namely: what is the nature of political Catholicism as a political movement and 
how does the Polish manifestation differ from the Western European one? The second 
stage of the study will then focus on analysing party-based Euroscepticism in Poland, 
assessing the role of political Catholic parties in driving this phenomenon. It will also 
identify the reasons behind the Eurosceptic stance of Polish political Catholicism, including 
the search for intrinsic ideological factors cueing its Euroscepticism but also detection of 
other non-political Catholic ideologies or strategic/tactical factors that could impact on the 
movement’s position on Europe. Thus, this part of the study will provide answers to the 
second and third questions, namely: under which circumstances can political Catholicism 
adopt a Eurosceptic stance, and to what extent is Polish political Catholicism the main 
driver of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland?  
One of the aims of this research project is to examine the nature of political Catholicism in 
Poland and discuss its relationship with Euroscepticism. Thus, this study includes in-depth 
analyses of both Polish political Catholic and Polish Eurosceptic parties (with many parties 
falling into both categories). I focus on parties which were represented in the lower house 
of the Polish parliament, the Sejm (e.g. the League of Polish Families, Self-Defence, the 
Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), Solidaristic Poland of Zbigniew 
Ziobro (Solidarna Polska Zbigniewa Ziobro), Law and Justice). However, the study also 
discusses those organisations that are outside of the mainstream politics, but are 
nonetheless important for the analysis of Euroscepticism in Poland (e.g. Union of Real 
25 
  
Politics [Unia Polityki Realnej, UPR]). The chosen parties represent a wide variety of 
ideologies and fall into three groups. Firstly, parties that are assumed to have adopted a 
Eurosceptic stance because of the intrinsic ideological features of political Catholicism (the 
League of Polish Families, Solidaristic Poland of Zbigniew Ziobro, Law and Justice). 
Secondly, parties that are assumed to have adopted a Eurosceptic stance because of other 
ideological influences (Union of the Real Politics). Thirdly, parties that may have adopted a 
Eurosceptic opinion based on short-term tactical considerations (potentially all cases). Such 
a wide range of parties belonging to different political families will allow for tracing the 
development of political Catholic Euroscepticism and its role in driving opposition to the 
EU in Poland. 
In order to draw a complete picture of political Catholicism in Poland, this study will also 
take a closer look at anti-EU Catholic social movements, with particular attention paid to 
the Eurosceptic national radio broadcaster Radio Maryja and its charismatic leader Father 
Tadeusz Rydzyk, whose support has proven crucial for electoral success in Poland 
(Szczerbiak 2004b, 2001). 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This section focuses on explaining the methodological framework of the present research 
project. Firstly, it discusses the concept of a single case study as a research tool, outlining 
the key strengths and limitations of the approach. Next, it moves on to describe the 
methods used to gather data necessary to test the main hypothesis and additional 
explanatory factors: documentary research, semi-structured interviews and an expert 
survey. Finally, the section concludes with a short discussion on available strategies for 
executing a cross-country comparative analysis. 
1.4.1 Case study as a research approach 
This research project is an in-depth analysis of a single case – Poland. Yin (2009) provided 
a definition of a case study, describing it as ‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin: 13). In 
other words, the case study is used as a research methodology to understand a real-life 
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phenomenon in depth, but in a situation where the context is highly pertinent to the 
phenomenon in question.  
This definition clearly explains the advantages of using the case study approach as the 
methodological framework for this project. The relation between religion and politics in 
general, and the role of political Catholicism in Poland in particular, is a multi-layered 
phenomenon, deeply entrenched in the cultural and historical context. The key appeal of 
case studies is that thanks to the focus and depth of analyses, they allow for collecting data 
on a wide range of variables, making it feasible to properly explore even the most 
complicated phenomena (Somekh and Levin 2005).  
What is more, most of the other main research methodologies fall short of being able to 
pay enough attention to the context of the analysed objects or situations: experiments, for 
example, entirely disassociate a phenomenon from its context, analysing only a few 
variables. Historiography, on the other hand, deals with the interplay between a 
phenomenon and context, but it does not examines contemporary events, while a survey’s 
ability is limited to investigating the context because it needs to restrict the number of 
variables to be analysed for the sake of operationalisation (Yin 2009). 
A single-case study – advantages and challenges 
Lijphart (1971) identified six categories of single cases: atheoretical, interpretative, 
hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming, and deviant case studies. This 
study is mainly a deviant case analysis. It investigates a single case – Poland, which is 
known to have deviated from an established generalisation that political Catholicism in 
Europe is supportive of European integration. The aim of this research is to enhance our 
understanding of both the nature of political Catholicism and the relationship between 
religion and Euroscepticism; hence, the case was selected in order to reveal factors not 
previously considered that could lead to the development of Eurosceptic political 
Catholicism.    
The greatest advantage of a single-case study is that it allows for an intensive examination 
of a phenomenon, even when the research resources at disposal are quite limited. It is also 
a crucial tool in an attempt to refute initial hypotheses. As explained by Flyvbjerg (2004): 
‘Falsification is one of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be 
subjected; if just one observation does not fit with the proposition it is considered not valid 
generally’. The single-case study is well-suited for falsifying hypotheses because of its in-
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depth approach, which helps to uncover variables and factors that often may escape the 
attention of researchers in less detailed analyses. 
At the same time, the single-case study approach has a considerable weakness – the 
inability to generate generalisations based on its findings. On the whole, it is not possible to 
generalise from one or a small number of cases or to disprove an established generalisation, 
as a single-case study is unique and does not constitute a representative sample (Foreman 
in David 2006). However, Lijphart (1971) pointed out that, of the six types of case studies 
he identified, the deviant case study (and the hypothesis-generating one) ‘have the greatest 
value in terms of their contribution to theory’ (1971: 692). Not only may it be used to 
refine existing theories, it is also implicitly a comparative analysis, with the analysed case 
forming the ‘experimental group’ (i.e. the group exposed to a stimulus) and the other cases 
constituting the ‘control group’ (i.e. not exposed to a stimulus, constant). In this study, 
Poland is the case exposed to a ‘stimulus’ leading to the development of Eurosceptic 
political Catholicism, while other cases of Western European countries are the ‘control 
group’, in which political Catholicism remained pro-EU and reflects the characteristic, 
traditional features of the movement.  
This study also includes a cross-country analysis of fifteen cases, investigating differences 
between the manifestations of political Catholicism in Poland, other Central and Eastern 
European countries, and Western Europe. Consequently, a single-case study of Poland is 
likely to have a wider theoretical impact than would a mere detailed account of a unique 
case. 
1.4.2 Methods 
The choice of the case study implies the use of certain research methods, the most 
commonly applied of which are interviews and documentary analysis (Somekh and Levin 
2005). 
Documentary research 
One of the key methods used in qualitative case study research is documentary analysis, 
which focuses on two elements, the historiography approach and discourse analysis. 
Historiography can be understood as the ‘writing of history based on the selective, critical 
reading of sources that synthesises particular bits of information into a narrative 
description or analysis of a subject’ (Thies 2002: 351). The historiography approach is 
particularly useful when a researcher wants to place the explanation of political events in 
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context and is less interested in making predictions, but still committed to explaining the 
causality of processes (Steinmo 2008:134).  
This study investigates the interplay between religion and politics in Europe, and 
particularly in Poland, which is a complicated, multi-layered phenomenon that needs to be 
analysed in the correct context. Hence, it applies, to a limited extent, a simplified historical 
analysis of primary materials to build a narrative description of the relations between 
Catholicism, Polish society, state and party politics in order to investigate and explain why 
Polish political Catholicism has adopted a Eurosceptic stance.  
Another, more sophisticated form of document analysis is discourse analysis. It is defined 
as a ‘qualitative method of uncovering some of the ways in which people or groups seek to 
represent their actions in texts and languages’ (Jacobs, 2006: 138). This method is 
particularly useful for tracing the spread of ideologies, since people acquire, express and 
reproduce their ideologies largely by text or talk (Van Dijk 2006). This study will apply a 
method of critical analysis of discourse, which sees documents as vehicles for the 
circulation and transmission of ideologies and focuses on their ideological dimensions 
(Pole and Lampard 2002).  
This thesis will use discourse analysis in at least three instances. Firstly, this study will 
identify political Catholic parties in Poland. In doing so, it will analyse party documents in 
search of elements inspired by Catholic social teachings such as: adherence to the principle 
of protection of human life, a strong attachment to the role of the family and protection of 
its rights, cooperation and solidarity, subsidiarity, acceptance of personalism, and a 
commitment to the capitalist market economy coupled with a readiness to correct its social 
and cultural deficiencies through social policy. Secondly, this study will also analyse a range 
of documents and statements gathered from semi-structured interviews (see details below), 
in search of ideological beliefs that could explain the adoption of a Eurosceptic stance by 
Polish political Catholicism. One of these beliefs, mentioned in the hypothesis, is the 
conviction that European integration endangers traditional Christian values, which form an 
essential part of Polish national identity. The presence or absence of this opinion will help 
to verify the hypothesis. Thirdly, in the cross-country comparison section, discourse 
analysis will be applied in order to identify the position of Polish political Catholic parties 
and organisations in Europe on European integration and the EU. This will be done by 
analysing party manifestos and statements by party leaders.   
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Data sources for documentary analysis 
Vromen (2010) states that the choice of primary materials for documentary analysis must 
be made very carefully in order to avoid selection bias. She named four crucial tasks for 
every researcher to perform when utilizing a document: authenticity – clarify whether a 
document is genuine and has a recognised authorship; credibility – clarify whether a 
document is accurate and reliable; representativeness – clarify whether a document is 
typical of its genre or, if untypical, understand how it relates to other documents; meaning 
– what is the meaning of the document in the social and political context within which it 
was produced. 
This research uses three different types of texts and documents: party materials, official 
Catholic Church documents and existing electoral surveys, the selection of which takes into 
account their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and the context in which they 
were produced:  
a) In terms of party materials, the research is based on a set of key documents that 
allow for an in-depth analysis and understanding of reasons for the Eurosceptic 
stance of Polish political Catholic parties, i.e. party manifestos, policy 
statements, leaders’ commentaries and media statements, and public statements 
by key party members. 
b) The Church documents include those that can be regarded as official 
statements of the Church as an institution, i.e. Episcopate documents, pastoral 
letters, and statements by bishops and archbishops.  
c) The existing opinion polls by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS – 
Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej) and the European Commission 
(Eurobarometer) together with election results are used to build a 
comprehensive picture of the supporters of Polish Eurosceptic parties and 
Polish political Catholicism (particularly Radio Maryja).  
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews are essential sources of case study information. They are targeted, focused 
directly on the case study topic and insightful – providing perceived causal explanations 
(Yin 2009). Thanks to interviews ‘we can learn more about the inner workings of the 
political process, and the machinations between influential actors’ (Lilleker 2003: 208). This 
study applies the semi-structured interview method, where interviewers do not make use of 
a rigid schedule of questions, but rather have explored issues as they arise. This method 
often leads to deep insider accounts of phenomena as it involves open-ended questions 
that allow the interviewees to freely express their opinions. As a result, a researcher can 
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gather a variety of detailed information and identify underlying meanings, processes and 
contexts of events (Pole and Lampard 2002, Tansey 2007).  
Interviewees 
Vromen (2010: 258) identified elite interviewing as interviews with individuals prominent in 
politics, public service, business, or who are active commentators in the public sphere. 
Among groups mentioned in her definition, the following ones were interviewed in the 
framework of this study (a detailed list of interviewees can be found in the bibliography): 
a) Party leaders: it is clear that access to the top party leadership is extremely 
restricted. However, there is a range of (ex) party members who were actively 
involved in or observing the decision-making process, and who are usually 
much more open to being interviewed. For this study, the following (ex) party 
members were interviewed: (a) From Law and Justice: Ryszard Czarnecki MEP, 
Ryszard Legutko MEP, Marek Migalski, Krystyna Pawłowicz MP, Krzysztof 
Szczerski MP, Konrad Szymański, Janusz Wojciechowski MEP; (b) from the 
League of Polish Families: Maciej Giertych and Daniel Pawłowiec; (c) from the 
Christian National Union, Solidarity Electoral Action, Law and Justice and the 
National Movement: Artur Zawisza. 
 
b) The Church hierarchy: here the situation is similar to the case of party leaders – 
the bishops and archbishops of the Polish Catholic Church are quite difficult to 
meet for interviews because of their busy schedules. This is why two senior 
clergymen who were interviewed for this study were already retired, and hence 
were more available for an interview. At the same time, they were, and still are, 
important figures of the Polish Church. Archbishop Henryk Muszyński is the 
Primate Emeritus of Poland and former Archbishop of Gniezno. Even more 
important for this study is that he was Delegate of the Polish Bishops’ 
Conference to the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European 
Community (COMECE) from 1999 until 2005. Tadeusz Pieronek is bishop 
emeritus, who served as secretary general of the Polish Bishops' Conference 
between 1993 and 1998, and as rector of the Pontifical Academy of Theology 
in Kraków from 1998 to 2004. He has been closely following the development 
of Polish-EU relations and is chairman of the organizing committee of a yearly 
conference held in Kraków called ‘The role of the Catholic Church in the 
process of European integration’. 
 
c) Another important group of interviewees for this study were a number of 
observers of the Polish political scene, such as leading Polish journalists: 
Tomasz Bielecki and Katarzyna Wiśniewska – Gazeta Wyborcza, Inga Czerny – 
Polish Press Agency (PAP), Anna Słojewska – Rzeczpospolita, Tomasz Terlikowski 
– fronda.pl, Telewizja Republika and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński – independent analyst. 
These observers of Polish politics provided assistance in gaining new insights 
into the nature of political Catholicism in Poland and proved to be good first 
critical reviewers of preliminary findings. 
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At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of semi-structured 
interviews. Firstly, they are verbal reports and as such are prone to subjectivity and bias of 
interviewees, poor recollection of facts or inaccurate articulation (Yin 2009). In fact, it is 
normal for individuals to have divergent opinions about events; it is also normal for people 
to distance themselves from unfortunate or entirely wrong decisions. Davies (2001: 77–79) 
offered one solution that could safeguard researchers against such pitfalls: triangulation. 
This meant cross-referencing data that has been collected from interviews, firstly with data 
obtained from published first-hand accounts or other documentary sources; and, secondly, 
with published secondary source material. That is why interviews were conducted at a later 
stage, after the analysis of documents and secondary sources had been completed in order 
to build a deeper knowledge of the facts. Consequently, the reliability of the data gathered 
through interviews was increased by being corroborated with information from other 
sources.  
1.4.3 Comparison – the ‘most similar’ design 
The key drawback of a single case study, the fact that it cannot confirm a generalised 
theory potentially applicable to many cases, can also in fact be turned into an advantage. As 
pointed out by Sartori (1991), heuristic case studies are ideal as hypothesis-generating 
inquiries that then can be generalised, at least partially, using a comparative method. That is 
why this study includes a cross-country comparative analysis with a limited scope that 
explains the phenomenon of political Catholicism in the broader context of Central-
Eastern and Western European politics. As explained by Przeworski (1987: 35), 
‘comparative research consists not of comparing but of explaining. The general purpose of 
cross-national research is to understand better.’ 
In general, comparativists apply either the ‘most similar’ or the ‘most different’ research 
method. In the ‘most similar’ strategy, the research brings together systems that are as 
similar as possible in as many features (properties) as possible, with the exception of the 
phenomenon to be investigated. An alternative method is to choose the ‘most different’ 
approach, whereby cases chosen for comparison differ as much as possible in all variables, 
except for the phenomenon under investigation (Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
This research project analyses the deviant case of Poland, which assumes that there are no 
other countries where political Catholicism has had a similar influence on party-based 
Euroscepticism. Consequently, only the ‘most similar’ method can be applied in an attempt 
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to generalise key findings of the enquiry into the Polish case. Therefore, this study will 
include a selection of short case studies of 15 different European countries which met the 
following conditions: firstly, a high percentage (above 60%) of Catholics among the 
population in 2010, and secondly, a vital role played by political Catholicism, as identified 
in the academic literature. The case selection also includes those countries where the level 
of religious practice and membership in the Catholic Church significantly declined, but 
where political Catholicism was or still is an important part of politics. The comparative 
cases are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland. 
The cross-country comparative research was primarily based on secondary data, mainly 
because of time constraints and for feasibility reasons. It used the already existing 
secondary literature, which provided accounts and analyses of the chosen comparative 
cases. However, the key findings of the cross-country comparative analysis, as well as the 
main conclusions of the research, were consulted with national experts by means of an 
expert survey. 
Expert survey 
A number of national experts were thus also contacted in order to verify key findings 
concerning the 15 case studies that formed part of the cross-country comparative analysis 
in this thesis. Their expertise was essential in identifying key similarities and differences 
between the Polish case and the other countries. In particular, the experts were asked if 
they could identify any links between political Catholicism and Euroscepticism in a given 
country and comment on the country analysis. The national experts consulted were: Prof 
Clive Church (Switzerland), Dr Nicolo Conti (Italy), Prof Kris Deschouwer (Belgium), Prof 
Franz Fallend (Austria), Dr John FitzGibbon (Ireland), Dr Simona Guerra (Italy, Croatia, 
Poland), Prof David Hanley (Belgium), Prof Karen Henderson (Slovakia), Dr Michael 
Holmes (Ireland), Dr Alenka Krasovec (Slovenia), Dr Stijn van Kessel (the Netherlands), 
Dr Emanuele Massetti (Italy), Dr Kai Oppermann (Germany), Dr Luiz Ramiro (Spain),  
Dr Maria Meyer Resende (Portugal), Dr Nick Startin (France) and Dr Ingrida Unikaitė-
Jakuntavičienė (Lithuania). 
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1.5 Structure of  the thesis 
The structure of this thesis centres around two key issues: firstly, the nature of political 
Catholicism in general, and secondly, its specific relationship with Euroscepticism in 
Poland. 
Chapter two describes the general nature of political Catholicism as a political movement. 
It shows that political Catholicism was an important phenomenon, also outside of Europe, 
but has remained largely under-researched. The chapter also presents a concise definition 
of political Catholicism and identifies characteristic primary and secondary features of this 
movement – an element that so far was not developed in detail by other scholars. Thus, it 
provides an original contribution to the theory of political Catholicism. This chapter proves 
that political Catholicism is, in fact, a distinct political phenomenon that should not be 
confused with other political ideologies.  
Chapter three discusses the specific case of political Catholicism in Poland, which grew 
into a sizeable political force that differs from more traditional manifestations of the 
movement in Western Europe. It focuses on presenting two elements that had a crucial 
influence on the development of Polish political Catholicism: firstly, the unique role of 
Catholicism as a socio-cultural system in Poland, strongly guiding the cultural, political and 
societal life of the country and, secondly, the formation of a close link between Catholicism 
and Polish national identity. It will show how Polish political Catholicism developed a 
distinct feature – a strong Catholic-nationalistic trait – and how it became successful, 
replacing Christian democracy, which in Western Europe dominated much of the political 
scene and became synonymous with political Catholicism.  
Chapter four discusses the issue of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. It presents an 
overview of research on this phenomenon and outlines three central themes characteristic 
for Polish party-based Euroscepticism: firstly, the fact that Polish political Catholicism with 
its Catholic-nationalist trait is the driving force of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland; 
secondly, the fluid nature of Euroscepticism in Poland; and finally, the important lesson 
not to mistake temporary changes of rhetoric resulting from short-term electoral tactics for 
a fundamental change of political positions on Europe. 
Having discussed both the general aspects of political Catholicism and Euroscepticism, 
chapter five focuses on the key issue of the interaction between the two elements. It 
explains how political Catholicism in Poland adopted a Eurosceptic stance, which stems 
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from two primary factors: firstly, the aspiration to protect Polish sovereignty; and secondly, 
the perceived cultural struggle between the ‘liberal West’ and ‘Catholic Poland’. This 
chapter argues that the Euroscepticism of Polish political Catholicism is not a simple 
matter of short- or mid-term electoral tactics, but it is, in fact, deeply entrenched in the 
movement’s ideological predispositions. 
Finally, chapter six provides a cross-country comparative analysis of 15 case studies of 
European countries with high levels of Catholicism where political Catholicism played an 
important role. Using secondary literature and the results of the expert survey, this chapter 
argues that there are five main differences between manifestations of political Catholicism 
in Western and Central and Eastern Europe: (i) in Western Europe political Catholicism 
played a much more prominent role in shaping political, economic and social systems than 
in Central and Eastern Europe; (ii) the apparent lack of successful Christian democracy in 
most Central and Eastern European countries; (iii) differences between the development of 
political Catholic movements across Europe, whereby in Western Europe it developed 
mainly as a response to the secularisation attempts of public authorities, while in Central 
Europe the movement grew out of the fusion of religion and national identity in countries 
which struggled for independence in the 19th and 20th century; (iv) the growing gap between 
political Catholicism in Western and Central and Eastern Europe, with the gradual 
departure of West European political Catholic parties from direct references to Christian 
values, and, finally, (v) the fact that the majority of political Catholic groupings support the 
process of European integration, while only in two cases – Poland and Slovakia – political 
Catholicism acquired a clearly Eurosceptic trait.   
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2 The nature of  political Catholicism  
 
2.1 Introduction 
A strong relationship between politics and religion has been a fact for centuries in many 
parts of the world. In Europe, it was Christianity and particularly Catholicism that played 
an important role in the public sphere, albeit in different forms, ranging from being an 
object of persecution to close alliances of the throne and the altar, to caesaropapism – the 
idea of combining secular government with religious power. This relation between 
Catholicism and politics is not only a thing of the past. On the contrary, with the 
development of modern democracy, Catholicism as a political actor did not disappear but 
rather flourished in many parts of Europe, transforming itself into a popular movement of 
political Catholicism. Political Catholic parties became a solid feature of politics in 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, culminating in the post-war dominance of 
Christian democracy in Europe, which became the most successful political Catholic 
movement. 
In this context, it is surprising that political Catholicism as an important phenomenon that 
profoundly influenced European politics in the last century has not been researched to 
great depths so far. This lack of scholarly attention perhaps follows the widespread 
acceptance of the theory of secularisation, which predicated the continuous decline of 
religious beliefs and the marginalisation of religion to the private sphere. Key concepts of 
this theory were since then undermined (see: Casanova 1994) and the political implication 
of religion became clear (Grzymala-Busse 2012, Sahliyeh 1990, Appleby 2000, Burleigh 
2007), but our knowledge gap has not been bridged yet.  
The limited understanding of political Catholicism becomes even more apparent when we 
consider a political process that has been of paramount importance for continental politics 
and policymaking, i.e. European integration. In fact, it was political Catholicism (in the 
form of Christian democracy) that shaped the process of Europe’s unification and it is 
thanks to the religious dimension of the Christian democratic movement that European 
integration developed into the system we know today (Kaiser 2007, Kalyvas and van 
Kersbergen 2010). Key concepts underlying the process of integration, like the ideas of 
reconciliation, solidarity, subsidiarity and the fundamental principle of supranationalism, 
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were at the same time at the centre of political Catholicism, firmly inscribed in its ideas and 
programme (for more on the relations between Christianity and European integration see 
Gierycz 2008). 
This chapter aims to describe the nature of political Catholicism. It will argue that political 
Catholicism was an important political movement, inside as well as outside of Europe, but 
remained largely under-researched. In doing so, it will discuss the historical development of 
political Catholicism by drawing on the insightful work of Conway (1996b, 1997). The 
main contribution of this chapter to the existing knowledge in the field is a more robust 
definition of political Catholicism, identifying characteristic primary and secondary features 
of this movement – an element on which political scientists have so far not satisfactorily 
elaborated. Finally, I will show that political Catholicism was a distinct political 
phenomenon that often contrasted other political ideologies. At the same time, it was a 
divergent movement, internally divided, that cannot be qualified as a fully-fledged ideology. 
 
2.2 The evolution of  political Catholicism 
The origins – defence of Catholic interests 
Initially, in the first half of the 19th century, political Catholic action in Europe was limited. 
The religious cleavage did not play a major role in most Western European countries, and 
even the traditional ideological enemies, the liberals, did not pursue anti-Catholic policies. 
Indeed, Catholics and liberals co-operated in many cases (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands), as 
the liberal principle of freedom of religion was more attractive to them than co-operation 
with Protestants, who, although sympathetic to the general aim of maintaining the role of 
religion in society and politics, had a history of conflicts with Catholics (Kalyvas 1996). 
The situation changed drastically in the 1860s with the first attacks on the role and position 
of the Catholic religion and the Church. The attempts of liberals aimed at modernisation, 
centralisation and national unification entailed elimination of those who could object to 
states’ sovereignty and authority, including the Church. In addition, the new anticlericalism 
was expected to benefit liberals by increasing popular support and reducing their internal 
differences (Kalyvas 1996). Thus, the ‘politicisation of Catholicism’ originated from the late 
19th century state-directed discriminatory policies instituted against Catholics in the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany, coupled with anticlerical campaigns by liberal 
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political groups in France, Italy and Spain. Especially the Bismarckian ‘Kulturkampf’ (a series 
of policies introduced by the Prussian government in the 1870s aimed at reducing the role 
and power of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany) made many Catholics aware of 
their collective identity, helping to forge the first Catholic movements. 
Nonetheless, it was not only ‘external’ factors but also Church-internal developments that 
contributed to the emergence of political Catholicism. Specifically, increased levels of 
education, also religious, led to the emergence of Catholic, communal identity, which made 
many believers perceive themselves as a separate community bound by shared values. This 
was particularly visible in countries where Catholics formed a minority, such as the 
Netherlands, Switzerland or Germany. This led to the creation of a dense network of 
Catholic lay associations and movements (women’s groups, youth and educational 
movements, sports associations, co-operatives, trade unions, guilds). Consequently, many 
Catholic groups developed their own ways of living and became increasingly isolated from 
other parts of society, leading to ‘ghettoisation’ or ‘pillarisation’ in which a Catholic 
network of social organisation and religious institutions provided an all-encompassing 
environment for its members (Kaiser and Wohnout 2004). 
In this context, the establishment of confessional parties was a natural step for Catholics in 
Western Europe, starting with the German Centre Party and the Catholic Party in Belgium, 
which aimed at protecting the faithful from discrimination and acted as the guardians of 
Catholic interests in national parliaments. Catholic parties rapidly spread throughout 
Western Europe, becoming key elements of politics in countries like Germany, Austria and 
Belgium. Portugal and Spain were among the few Catholic countries in Western Europe 
that lacked well developed Catholic political organisations (for more on the development 
of political Catholicism in specific countries see chapter 6). 
The role of the Church and papacy in the emergence of political Catholicism 
It is important here to consider the role of the Church and papacy in the development of 
political Catholic action. Contrary to some popular beliefs, Catholic parties in almost all 
cases were not entities controlled by the Church (‘puppets in clergy’s hands’ as Belgian 
liberals typically described confessional parties). In fact, ‘confessional parties were formed 
in spite of and not, as it is often assumed, because of the Church’s intentions and actions. 
They emerged as an unplanned, unpatented and ultimately detrimental by-product of the 
strategic choice the Church made under constraints’ (Kalyvas 1996: 18). Thus, the 
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institutional Church rarely was a driving force behind the establishment of Catholic parties, 
though individual clergymen did participate actively in the movement. Instead, Catholic 
laity played the key role in the creation of those parties, while national Church hierarchy 
and the papacy often looked on them with suspicion.  
Initially, the Church was very mistrustful of independent Catholic political action, as it was 
afraid of losing control over its members and personnel in an era when it actually tried to 
increase centralisation of the Church at the expense of the independence of national 
hierarchies. Consequently, the Church instituted a series of measures aimed at ensuring its 
control over new organisations. Firstly, it was vigorously blocking any attempts at 
independent, autonomous or uncontrolled political Catholic activism. The Church either 
tried to destroy independent organisations, including imposing religious sanctions on their 
leaders, or, later on, applied the strategy of obstruction by attempting to block the 
emergence of such movements. It was not until the late 19th century, when the growing 
attacks on the Church significantly reduced its direct influence, that the Vatican finally 
came to terms with political Catholicism, although it never really encouraged its growth and 
focused on reclaiming its members from the new parties (Kalyvas 1996).  
The main influence that the papacy had on political Catholic movements was in the field of 
doctrine. From the late 1870s, popes devoted increasingly more attention to declarations 
concerning not only faith, but also a wide range of social, political and cultural issues. 
Between 1878 and 1958, there were 185 papal encyclicals issued that slowly established the 
body of Catholic social teaching. Although papal pronouncements were far from being a 
unified and coherent opinion on social matters (in fact, some of them were contradictory, 
while others very vague and open for interpretation), a key message that ran across them 
was the belief that Catholicism offered solutions to problems of the modern world. 
‘Central to this papal message was a commitment to a social order of communities in which 
the anomie and self-interest of liberal individualism as well as the statist collectivism of 
socialism and fascism would give way to a new spirit of personal fulfilment and mutual 
assistance’ (Conway 1996b: 14). Papal declarations also increasingly condemned material 
and social depravation of the working classes. However, socialist and communist ideas for 
the organisation of societies were rejected. The Church tried to articulate a ‘third way’ 
which could reduce the abuses by the capitalist system while retaining the concept of 
personal ownership of property, which the papacy regarded as essential to a just society. 
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Perhaps the best elaboration of this idea was Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno1, in 
which he strongly supported a corporatist organisation of society, with employers and 
employees resolving conflicts in a network of socio-economic corporations (Conway 
1996b). 
Temptations of authoritarianism – the interwar period 
In the first phase of its development, political Catholicism was focused on the protection 
of Catholic interests with anti-liberalism being a defining element of its programme, while 
its growth owed much to clerical leadership. However, the interwar period brought about 
some significant changes. The 1920s saw the establishment of a number of new 
parliamentary democracies, which led to a rapid expansion of mass politics and political 
Catholic parties across Europe wanting to advance their opinions. Catholic politics became 
less dependent on clerical guidance and the rapid development of the movement originated 
in the energy and militancy of well-educated, urbanised Catholic laity. This was a time of 
swift growth of the Catholic Action – a movement of laity under the leadership of clergy to 
re-catholicise ‘modern life’, Catholic trade unionism, Catholic farmers’ leagues, middle-class 
interest groups and Catholic press (Conway 1997). Last but not least, this was the time of 
Pius XI’s encyclical Ubi Arcano Dei, in which the pope proclaimed that the Catholic faith 
must assert its dominance over the values and structures of state and society.  
However, the expansion and democratisation of Catholic politics gave way in the 1930s to 
a new phenomenon – political Catholic support for authoritarianism. Several of the new 
parliamentary democracies created after the First World War were undermined by ethnic or 
nationalist conflicts and deep economic crisis. In this context, many Central and Eastern 
European states turned to authoritarianism with the support of political Catholic 
movements which sought non-democratic solutions in form of corporatist or strong states. 
The new militant and anti-democratic face of political Catholicism was very much an effect 
of economic depression that struck Europe, which led rural and middle classes to perceive 
parliamentary democracy as largely unresponsive to their hardships (Kaiser and Wohnout 
2004). The movement’s sponsorship of dictatorships in Portugal and Austria was a 
distinctive feature of the 1930s, while the beginning of the Second World War saw new 
alliances between Catholic movements and the far-right exemplified by strong and durable 
                                                 
1 Quadragesimo anno – encyclical issued by Pope Pius XI in 1931, discussing the implications of the social and 
economic order. It declared private property to be essential for the development and freedom of the 
individual, called for social order based on solidarity and subsidiarity, condemned communism and, finally, 
described in detail a corporatist social structure in which the government, employers and workers cooperate 
to solve key issues. 
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Catholic influence on the Nazi puppet-regimes of Slovakia and Croatia (the Slovak dictator 
was in fact a Catholic priest).  
During the Second World War, political Catholicism, as throughout most of its history, 
remained a divided movement. In Slovakia and Croatia, new states were established, driven 
by Catholic authoritarian ideas and with prominent figures of the Church and political 
Catholicism occupying important positions in regimes that collaborated with Nazi 
Germany. In France, much of the Catholic laity and the Church supported the Vichy 
regime led by Pétain. However, for most Catholics atrocities committed by German 
authorities and repressive policies introduced by the occupying forces caused them to 
discard authoritarian ideas popular in some parts of political Catholicism in the 1930s. In 
addition, Catholic Resistance became active in many occupied countries, trying to 
counteract the actions and values of the Third Reich (Kaiser and Wohnout 2004). 
Therefore, towards the end of the war instances of Catholic support for the Nazi regimes 
were isolated and greatly outweighed by Catholics who gradually were drawn into active 
opposition to Nazism. 
Post-war years – Christian democratic success and European integration 
Political Catholicism in Europe had a substantial influence on the shape of continental 
politics. In particular, Christian democracy has had a lasting impact during the second half 
of the last century thanks to its prominent role in the post-war politics of Western Europe 
and remarkable ability to form trans-national networks of cooperation, which greatly 
contributed to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and its 
expansion into the European Economic Community (EEC).  
Immediately after the war, it seemed quite unlikely that Christian democracy would re-
emerge as a strong movement. For many, political Catholicism was discredited after some 
of its interwar economic policies were blamed for having aggravated the effects of the 
economic crisis and because of its involvement with clerical dictatorships or fascism. In 
addition, the Catholic Church itself came out of the war morally compromised following its 
support for dictatorships out of fear of communist revolution and, in the opinion of some 
analysts and commentators, failing to take a strong stance against the extermination of 
Jews. 
However, the war significantly altered opinions of many political Catholic activists. 
Discredited nationalist right and totalitarian dictatorships, coupled with Cold War tensions 
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and the effort to reconstruct the European economy meant that ideas and beliefs like 
support for authoritarian political reforms characteristic of the interwar period or the 
notion of truly Catholic states like those of Austria or Portugal, were largely compromised. 
Thus, after the Second World War, political Catholicism experienced a significant evolution 
of its purpose, from being devoted to the protection of specific Catholic interests in public 
life to a new openness and willingness to work with non-Catholic organisations in a 
pluralistic society, paving the way for the remarkable success of Christian democracy in the 
post-war decades. In this context, what were previously minority views, like support for a 
corporatist system under control of parliamentary democracy and the idea of closer 
European cooperation, could only become the main trend of political Catholicism in this 
specific post-war context (Kaiser and Wohnout 2004). 
The rapid post-war growth of political Catholicism in Western Europe in the form of 
Christian democracy was also made possible by the fact that the alternative in the form of 
socialist, communist, liberal or nationalist parties was not appealing to many voters. 
Socialist parties’ support base was largely confined to the working class, influenced by 
Marxism, and thus failing to attract middle-class and rural voters. The liberal electoral base 
had been heavily eroded during the interwar crisis, while its policies based on individual 
freedom and economic liberalism did not resonate well with the post-war feeling of 
collective reconstruction after 1945. Finally, the polarising effect of communism on 
European politics after the war was another element leading to the post-war rise to power 
of Christian democracy in many Western European states, which – in the absence of 
electoral competition from discredited nationalists, clerical and fascist right – became the 
only viable option for anti-communist voters of the middle and rural class, as well as 
religiously oriented voters. This post-war environment, coupled with the ability of Christian 
democracy to go beyond traditional voters from the Catholic milieu by creating a more 
secular and inter-confessional party image, was crucial for the Christian democratic success 
(Kaiser 2007). 
The post-war Christian democratic movements in Germany, Italy, Belgium and France 
were new political organisations set up by younger generations of Catholic politicians 
whose experiences were shaped by the events of the war. They decided to break with the 
old tradition of defensiveness, protection of Catholic ‘ghettos’ and groups, and 
authoritarian sentiments shared by a majority of political Catholicism in the interwar 
period. Instead, the new parties fully embraced parliamentary democracy and a market 
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economy coupled with state intervention and high levels of welfare provisions (the so-
called ‘social market economy’) (Conway 1996b).  
One of the most important aspects of the Christian democratic success in the post-war 
years was its role in shaping the process of European integration. Firstly, it was part of the 
Christian democratic conviction that economic integration was instrumental in solving 
political issues, which meant a general common market was the main objective for the 
Christian democratic movement. Secondly, the supranational concept was a natural 
approach for Christian democracy, as it resembled the strong, transnational authority of the 
Pope and the Church hierarchy. Thirdly, Christian democracy had a general preference for 
combining robust supranational institutions run by experts with a parliamentary dimension 
secured by a chamber of directly elected representatives. Fourthly, Franco-German 
reconciliation, which was strongly rooted in the Christian ideas of forgiveness, drove the 
close cooperation of the two countries. In this context, it was no surprise that the 
constitutional elements of the Treaty of Rome negotiated mostly by Christian democratic 
governments included a federationist objective of an ‘ever closer union’, the introduction 
of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the sole right of legislative initiative for the 
European Commission and the provision for future direct elections to the European 
Parliament (Kaiser 2007). 
Second Vatican Council 
The post-war process of opening up and political Catholicism’s cooperation with other 
movements was fostered by the Second Vatican Council, which in fact became an event 
that defined the Catholic political movement in the post-1960s world, creating a 
discontinuation and a clear division between the pre- and post-Vatican II era. Pope John 
XXIII decided to summon the Second Vatican Council in 1962 to deal with post-war social 
and economic change, which had prompted a continuous decline in levels of religious 
practice in European countries. The Council led to far-reaching theological and 
ecclesiastical changes that had considerable consequences for the nature of political 
Catholicism. The most visible difference that originated from the Second Vatican Council 
was a change of the attitudes of the Church hierarchy to political parties and representative 
democracy in general (Witte 1993). The Church decided to endorse the democratic 
principles of human rights and liberty. In particular, it emphasised the rights of people to 
life and an adequate standard of living, the rights of free assembly and association, free 
conscience and free will. As a result, in the post-Vatican II environment it was a dominant 
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trend for the clergy to abandon efforts to control and direct the political action of the 
faithful and to instead advocate disestablishment of religion and the separation of church 
and state.  
This new approach led to significant changes for almost all West European parties that 
were forming the political Catholic movement. For example, the national churches had to 
accept the modern principle of separation of church and state and the end to the official 
sponsorship by the Catholic Church of any Catholic party or movement. As a result 
bishops stopped instructing Catholics to vote for ‘official’ Catholic parties, while the 
Spanish and Portuguese clergy began to loosen their relations with the authorities 
(Casanova 1994). At the same time, the withdrawal of the Church from attempts to control 
the political activities of Catholics led to the flowering of political Catholic action. In 
particular, trade unions formed their own political allegiances, while Christian democratic 
parties were forced to define their new identities that would help them survive without 
direct support from the Church hierarchy. As a result, the previously Catholic-inspired 
parties gradually evolved to become more centrist groupings, endorsing capitalist 
economics, welfare provisions and European integration (Whyte 1981). 
The Second Vatican Council, coupled with the socio-economic change of the 1950s and 
1960s, brought on the demise of the earlier model of political Catholicism and fostered the 
establishment of the new one. The idea of political Catholicism devoted to the defence of 
particular interests and values of one group (Catholics) was replaced by a new vision of 
Catholics working in cooperation with other non-Catholic parties and movements to 
actively shape the socio-economic set-up of societies (Conway 1996b). At the same time, 
the faithful no longer saw a major connection between their faith and electoral behaviour 
or party allegiance. 
The Second Vatican Council’s influence went beyond Europe and significantly impacted 
Latin America, where it was one of the elements fostering the creation and development of 
liberation theology. 
Political Catholicism and liberation theology 
Lowy (1996) described liberation theology as an expression of a vast socio-religious 
movement that emerged in Latin America at the beginning of the 1960s and reached its full 
potential in the 1970s. The movement involved significant sectors of the Church, lay 
religious movements, ecclesiastic base communities and other popular organisations 
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(women’s clubs, peasants or workers’ unions, etc.). The liberation theology movement 
focused on the notion of a ‘preferential option for the poor’, for solidarity and collective 
commitment, for a Church in which ‘the people of God’ held power rather than the 
bishops and for the pursuit of God’s Kingdom on earth and in society, rather than in 
heaven. In short, the movement amounted to a ‘popular Church’, where the hierarchy was 
only as important as the mass of ordinary members (Haynes 1998). 
In 1968, during a conference convened to discuss the implementation of the Second 
Vatican Council guidelines, Latin American bishops articulated strong criticism of 
contemporary attitudes to social problems, which were described as ‘traditionalist’, and 
‘developmentalist’ (the notion that the performance of a nation’s economy is the central 
source of legitimacy that a regime may claim). The bishops specifically criticised the 
international system of economic dependence in which Latin American nations were 
‘frequently neither owners of their goods nor masters of their economic decisions’. It was 
in this context that the bishops spoke of the need to offer men ‘the possibilities of a full 
liberation’ (Sigmund 1993: 195). 
The Medellin declarations gave theoretical legitimisation to the radicalising tendencies 
among groups of Latin American societies, most notably labour and students, and those 
who worked with them – missionaries and priests. As a result, the 1970s saw a rapid 
development of liberation theology as a religious and socio-political movement.  
One of the most widely criticised elements of the new movement was its heavy use of 
Marxist tools of social analysis to argue that only through the overthrow of capitalism the 
poor could be liberated. The discourse of violence and revolution, glorification of the poor 
and vilification of the rich, as well as calls for a ‘strategic alliance’ with the Marxist left led 
to strong criticism of the movement from the mainstream Church (Sigmund 1993). The 
criticism was reinforced by actions designed to contain the movement during the 
pontificate of John Paul II who, although sympathetic to the general aim of social justice 
and improving the situation of the poor, forcefully opposed any allegiance of the Church 
with Marxism or revolutionary socialism (Haynes 1998). 
As a result of the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and the Vatican’s policy, 
liberation theology declined and stopped playing a major role in Latin American politics, 
economy and religion. However, liberation theology, together with Christian democracy, 
can be described as one of the most influential manifestations of political Catholicism. It 
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was based on a radical programme of social justice, drawing inspiration from the Church’s 
reforms of the 1960s and directly from the Bible. It was deeply Catholic at its roots, but at 
the same time, it distanced itself from the hierarchical Church and developed into an 
independent movement. Liberation theology left a significant legacy in the political, 
ideological and religious spheres of Latin America.  
In terms of political influence, the most prominent effect of liberation theology was a 
network of base Christian communities (comunidades eclesiales de base or CEBs), which formed 
an important force for institutional activism (Haynes 1998). Although many of the four 
million participants of the CEBs directed their attention to devotional ends (prayers, 
baptism, reading of the Bible, etc.), some also had political goals in mind, such as 
participatory democracy, workers’ strikes and organising mass rallies. Many CEBs 
protected groups and individuals suffering from state-organised persecution and produced 
leaders for mass movements, such as trade union and party leaders.  
In ideological terms, the influence of liberation theology could be most clearly observed in 
its ability to affect discourse by creating and stimulating topics of debate in society, politics 
or the Church. In particular, the salience of three issues – human rights, popular 
participation and authority – was greatly enhanced in Latin America by liberation theology. 
Moreover, the members of the movement were actively engaged in political-ideological 
dialogue and articulated a broad critique of injustice and abuses of state power (Levine 
1988). 
Finally, in the religious sphere, liberationist arguments helped to shift the mainstream 
Catholic Church more toward public concern and support for human rights. As a result, 
the discourse of justice and equality rooted in biblical and religious themes became very 
widespread, even among the conservative wings of the Church hierarchy (Levine 1990). 
The case of liberation theology shows that political Catholicism is not an exclusively 
European phenomenon, but can, in fact, thrive in other cultural and political environments. 
In addition, it clearly depicts the flexibility of political Catholicism, which may find links 
not only to right-wing or centrists ideologies, but also can be inspired by the radical left or 
even communism. What is crucial, however, is that political Catholicism, regardless of an 
intellectual approach or specific interpretations it adopts, remains faithful to its two 
primary objectives: to follow Catholic social teaching and to try to ensure that the 
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principles of Catholic social doctrine are embedded in national law, making them a 
framework for social order and the functioning of societies.  
 
2.3 Political Catholicism – distinct political movement or 
ideology? 
When looking at the existing literature on political Catholicism, including the 
abovementioned studies of its development, the lack of a comprehensive definition of this 
phenomenon becomes evident. This seems to result from several factors: firstly, 
heterogeneity and changeability of political Catholicism throughout the 19th and 20th 
century, particularly before and after the Second World War, making it difficult to grasp its 
nature. Secondly, the fact that the scholarly debate on political Catholicism, compared to 
other major ideologies like socialism, liberalism or communism, has been very limited. This 
may partially result from the perception of the political force of Catholicism by historians 
and political scientists in Great Britain and the USA as ‘no more than the dwindling 
manifestations of a Catholic religion which itself was destined to disappear with the gradual 
development of a secular society’ (Conway 1996b: 3). Thirdly, much of European history 
was dominated by grand conflicts between secular ideologies of the right and left – 
communism and fascism/Nazism. This meant that Catholic political action was sometimes 
overlooked or was difficult to categorise within the world of secular politics. Finally, it is 
also true that for many scholars ‘religion’ (in this case ‘Catholicism’) and ‘politics’ are two 
separate realms, which is an idea stemming essentially from a liberal interpretation of 
religion as a matter of the private sphere. However, this view is not shared by the Catholic 
Church nor by many members of the Catholic laity for whom their religious beliefs and 
values form an essential framework for actions in the public sphere (Conway 1996b). 
Nonetheless, one can identify some attempts to provide a definition and typology of the 
movement and to explain the electoral performance of parties associated with political 
Catholicism. Building on the descriptions of political Catholicism in the works of 
Buchanan and Conway (1996) and Liedhegener (2010), I developed a more robust 
definition of political Catholicism: 
Political Catholicism can be defined as a broad social and political 
movement which draws on Catholic teaching and moral values and 
whose key purpose is to influence the decision-making process in order 
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to enshrine these value in a legal system, making them binding for all 
members of a society. 
 
Naturally, political Catholicism has been a diverse movement, both historically, but also 
geographically. It functioned in different national contexts with divergent cultural, socio-
economic and political factors that influenced its development. This meant that internal 
divisions have always been intrinsic to the Catholic politics of Europe, and thus, political 
Catholicism had different manifestations. In the interwar period, many conservative 
political Catholic leaders were opposed to various aspects of the rapid modernisation of the 
19th century, like industrialisation, the secular state, the parliamentary system and 
democracy, while others focused more on social policy as described in the encyclical 
Quadragesimo anno (Kaiser and Wohnout 2004). The main division lines of the movement 
were running across social classes (e.g. Catholic bourgeoisie vs. Catholic workers), regions, 
generations, or those who opposed the modern era and those who were closer to 
industrialisation and urban society. Consequently, parts of the Italian political Catholic 
movement chose to ally themselves with Mussolini, while others stayed loyal to the liberal 
parliamentary system. As a result of this heterogeneity, political Catholicism was rarely 
analysed as a single movement, being instead divided into almost independent, self-
contained groups, for example:  
a) ‘Christian democracy’ – by far the most conspicuous, mainstream embodiment of 
political Catholicism that came to dominate politics in post-1945 Western Europe; 
 
b) ‘Clerico-fascism’ – popular especially in Spain and Italy during the Franco and 
Mussolini eras, characterised by explicit support for dictatorships;  
 
c) ‘Ultramontane Catholicism’ – tried to act as a counterbalance to growing powers of the 
state in Europe, emphasising the prerogatives of the Pope and looking for direct 
guidance on socio-economic and moral issues from the Vatican; 
 
d) ‘Catholic-nationalism’ – present in countries where the Church and the Roman 
Catholic religion became strongly intertwined with notions of national identity (e.g. 
Poland and Ireland); 
 
e) ‘Catholic trade unionism’ – could be characterised as a Catholic working-class 
movement demanding a reorientation of Catholic political priorities towards a 
concern for the working class. 
These categories were not always clear, and at times superfluous. More importantly, they 
led some analysts to prioritise Christian democracy as a separate political tradition, often 
overlooking other expressions of political Catholicism. However, it is wrong to associate 
political Catholicism exclusively with its Christian democratic manifestation, even though it 
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was the one that dominated post-war European politics. In fact, it is not uncommon for 
some commentators to use the term ‘political Catholicism’ as a synonym for Christian 
democracy, which is restrictive and may be misleading. Political Catholicism as a movement 
is much broader than a single party family. 
Despite this complexity and variety, political Catholicism has had a distinct identity and 
enough common elements to render it a coherent political movement. This powerful 
identity emerged as a result of two key factors: firstly, transformation and rapid growth in 
popular piety and devotion in the 19th century, and secondly, a new, centralised Church 
order. Catholicism of the 19th century was heavily influenced by new mass forms of piety, 
such as pilgrimages, missions, relics, indulgences, the devotion to Mary and the Sacred 
Heart of Jesus, shrines, visions, apparition and miracle cures, coupled with frequent 
communion and intensified religious training. Together with increased piety came growing 
solidarity and political-cultural interaction, particularly in response to state-introduced 
discriminatory policies. The Church itself also underwent significant administrative 
changes. From the end of the 19th century there were growing efforts directed at 
strengthening the formal organisational structures of the Church, together with the efforts 
of the papacy to limit autonomy of national Church hierarchies in favour of the central 
Vatican authority (Kaiser and Wohnout 2004).  
This common and distinct identity of political Catholicism manifested itself first and 
foremost in a commitment to the defence of Catholic values, religion and the Church in 
public life, which became a shared element among all political Catholic movements, 
particularly until 1945. The vision of a new social order, a ‘third’ way between capitalism 
and socialism – based on communitarian principles, whereby individualism and free market 
economy would be offset by enhanced social bonds and welfare systems – was another 
characteristic element of the political Catholic movement. The movement could also be 
defined through two additional elements: firstly, it defined itself in opposition to all other 
major ideologies, like socialism, liberalism, communism or more right-wing politics. 
Secondly, it was an explicit awareness of a distinctive body of Catholic thinking, social 
principles and political ideas that formed the basis of the movement (Conway 1996b). After 
the Second World War, and particularly following the social changes of the 1960s and the 
Second Vatican Council, political Catholicism in Western Europe reformulated itself, 
moving away from being an agent of Catholic self-defence towards more centrist politics 
and a ‘catch-all’ formula, but it still remained a distinctive movement. 
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A discussion on how to define political Catholicism would not be complete without 
considering the case of single-issue movements. There is a whole plethora of robust 
organisations based on Catholic values and teachings which are committed to issues of 
abortion, euthanasia or in-vitro fertilisation, lobbying for legislation supporting a particular 
point of view. It is true that they can often be very influential actors, especially in the US. 
However, they do not approach the idea of enshrining Catholic values in legal systems in a 
comprehensive manner, cannot be described as a holistic political action, and thus, only 
partially meet the definition criteria of political Catholicism. As such, single-issue 
organisations should not be considered part of political Catholicism, although they certainly 
contribute to the overall vitality of the movement. 
The analysis of the material presented above enables me to identify the primary features of 
political Catholicism as a social movement:  
a) strong inspiration drawn from the Catholic social teaching, which is a body of 
Catholic doctrines based on communitarian values and concerning social issues 
such as poverty, wealth, economics, social organisation and the role of the state; 
b) activity in the public sphere to ensure that Catholic moral values are not only 
protected but also enshrined in law, making them legally binding for the whole 
society; 
The secondary features characteristic of post-1945 political Catholicism were: 
a) a multi-faceted character, including political parties as well as social movements and 
organisations; 
b) independence from the Church, despite close cooperation; 
c) strong anchoring in local and regional politics, while maintaining the ability to 
develop effective transnational networks of cooperation with movements in other 
states or regions; 
d) acceptance of the Catholic idea of universalism (the idea of seeing humanity as a 
whole, rather than in terms of different groups, nations, races) and thus approval of 
supranationalism and a centralised authority outside of the nation state; in Europe 
therefore supportive of European integration; 
e) in Western Europe most successful in the form of Christian democracy; 
f) political action with Catholic inspiration and not simply a group of individual 
Catholics who are active in politics. 
Political Catholicism as an ideology? 
Conway (1996b) pointed out that the dominant interpretation of history showed European 
politics as an arena of conflicts between secular ideologies of right and left, which offered 
alternative models of economic, political and social organisation of states and societies. 
However, political Catholicism did not fit comfortably within this scheme and as a result 
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was often subsumed awkwardly into the conventional political categories. Hence, before 
concluding the discussion on the phenomenon of political Catholicism, it is worth 
addressing the question: is it really a distinct political movement or is it in essence a form of 
conservatism? Christian democracy, the most successful part of the political Catholic 
movement, often faced this issue, with scholars stating that ‘in many cases it is difficult to 
distinguish conservative parties from Christian Democratic parties’ (Lane and Ersson 1991: 
108) or that ‘support for the Church is so important among conservatives that in some 
countries they include the term Christian in their name’ (Steiner 1986: 30, cited in van 
Kersbergen 1994). The issue of distinctiveness is even more pertinent in the case of 
political Catholicism, as this phenomenon is even less known and analysed than Christian 
democracy.  
To reiterate, political Catholicism draws inspiration from Catholic social teaching, which 
contain opinions and guidelines regarding the major fields of human activity. There is no 
unified set of principles of Catholic social teaching. However, the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (2005) identified the following seven themes of Catholic social 
teaching: 
a) Life and dignity of human beings – this is the founding principle of Catholic 
social teaching, proclaiming that human life, from natural conception until 
death, is sacred. Hence the objection to abortion, euthanasia and the death 
penalty.  
 
b) Family, community and participation – this principle considers each person as a 
part of different communities. Marriage and the family are considered the 
central social institutions that need to be protected. People also have a right and 
duty to participate actively in society, working for the common good. 
 
c) Rights and responsibilities – human rights needs to be protected, while 
responsibilities need to be met. Every person has a right to life and a right to 
those things required by human decency. However, rights carry with them also 
responsibilities – for one another, for families and society.  
 
d) Consideration of the poor and vulnerable – divisions between rich and poor 
should be bridged and the needs of the poor and vulnerable should be put first. 
 
e) Dignity at work and the rights of workers – the key aspect here is the belief that 
economy must serve the people, not the other way round. The basic rights of 
workers, including the right to productive work, to decent and fair wages, to 
organisation and joining of unions, to private property and to economic 
initiative need to be protected. 
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f) Solidarity – human beings cannot exist completely independently of each other, 
but instead are interdependent. At the core of this theme is the pursuit of 
worldwide justice, peace and reconciliation. 
 
g) Care for God’s creation – including care for the Earth, protection of people 
and the planet. 
These themes were often translated by post-war political Catholicism, particularly by 
Christian democracy, into a doctrine of personalism, which is perhaps the easiest way to 
show the distinctiveness of political Catholicism as a set of ideas. In opposition to 
liberalism, personalism sees society composed not of individuals, but persons. The person 
is a sociable being who is not focused on competition (as in liberalism) but on existence 
and cooperation in different types of communities: the family, church, work place or 
nation. The intrinsic features of this thinking are solidarity and potentially anti-capitalism, 
which translated into pro-welfare policies so well associated with Christian democracy 
(Hanley 1994). 
Another good way to show the distinctiveness of political Catholicism is its attitude to the 
main social changes which have been underway since the 19th century and were described 
as a shift from Gemeinschaft (‘community’) to Gesellschaft (‘society’). Dierickx (1994) showed 
how these traditional concepts reflected the differences between main political ideologies 
and their approach to the evolution of societies towards a large, impersonal Gesellschaft. 
Both liberalism and socialism are at the Gesellschaft end of the spectrum, striving to 
emancipate individuals from traditional and allegedly oppressive communities like the 
Church, village or family. Nationalism and ecologism are at the Gemeinschaft end, 
questioning the creation of societies consisting of highly independent individuals focused 
on their own aims and objectives. Political Catholicism, as a result of the societal changes 
of the 1960s, suffered a split, with more progressive Catholics, particularly in Western 
Europe, seeing the new Gesellschaft as an opportunity for a renewed effort to grow, while 
others, like the Polish manifestation of the movement, remained firmly in favour of the 
Gemeinschaft. This may also be a result of the distinct intertwined relations between national 
sovereignty, nationalism, national identity and Catholicism, leading to the preference for 
the communitarian approach. 
Dierickx (1994) also provided a useful description of how the division between Gesellschaft 
and Gemeinschaft worked in practice in four crucial policy areas: the family, education, work 
relations and social systems. Although his works specifically focused on Christian 
democracy, most of his conclusions can be applied to political Catholicism overall. Family 
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policy is salient for political Catholicism; attempts to strengthen and protect the family are 
perhaps the clearest example of the distinctiveness of its ideological principles, as liberals 
and socialists tend to privatise this issue. What is more, other Gemeinschaft ideologies tend to 
focus on other types of communities than the family. In the area of education, liberals 
focus on caring for procedures and the quality, and are willing to leave the content of 
education to its consumers. Socialists see the educational system as an instrument to 
combat social injustices and inequality. Political Catholicism is more inclined to impose on 
schools the task of communicating specific philosophical and religious meaning. This is 
particularly true of Catholic schools, which can also be required to uphold cultural and 
national identities. When it comes to work relations, the positions of most ideologies are 
well-known. Socialists prefer self-management by workers, liberals believe that 
entrepreneurs should have full authority to manage their companies, while political 
Catholicism is in-between, following Catholic social teaching and its focus on corporatism 
and favouring cooperation between workers and entrepreneurs who should meet in 
institutionalised negotiations, both at central and local levels. Finally, in social policy, 
liberals believe in the principle of equality of opportunity, while socialists stick to the 
principle of equality of results. In this context, political Catholicism emphasises the 
principle of solidarity, which makes them sensitive to economic disparities. This directs 
attention to one of the most characteristic political Catholic policies, advocated mostly by 
Christian democracy, namely the social market economy. This idea brings together a 
commitment to the capitalist market economy and a readiness to correct its social and 
cultural deficiencies through a social policy intended as a safety net, designed to protect 
those threatened by market forces (van Kersbergen 1994).  
It is clear that political Catholicism is a political movement distinct from other major 
ideologies. The question remains whether it could be called an ideology. Political 
Catholicism has rarely been described as an ideology; instead, it was rather referred to as a 
‘political movement’ (Buchannan and Conway 1996), as a precursor to post-war Christian 
democracy or ‘a coalition of different social groups under the umbrella of the joint defence 
of Catholic religious, social and political interests’ (Kaiser and Wohnout 2004: 3). The 
reason may be that the concept of ideology itself has not been fully determined, with 
numerous definitions appearing over the years. Hamilton (1987) consulted as many as 
eighty-five formal definitions and general discussions of the concept of ideology, 
identifying as a result no less than 27 different definitional criteria of the concept. After 
close analysis, he proposed the following definition of an ideology: ‘a system of collectively 
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held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular 
pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular 
pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain’ 
(1987: 38). What is essential is that a fully developed ideology should have a holistic 
opinion on all aspects of policy-making in all major spheres, such as the organisation of 
society, economics or international relations, and should be able to identify problems, set 
objectives, and define the issue of power and conflict (Dierickx 1994). 
Initially, it may seem that political Catholicism fulfils the key criteria identified by 
Hamilton. It possesses a set of ideas on what social relationships should look like and a 
pattern of conduct that it promotes. What is more, these ideas and opinions are distinctive 
when compared with other major ideologies. However, political Catholicism is divergent 
and can be translated into different programmes, which can sometimes fundamentally 
differ on key issues. The best examples of the divergent nature of political Catholicism here 
would be Polish political Catholicism and its Western European counterparts with differing 
approaches to European integration and the role of the state in economy and society, or 
the use of Marxist tools of social analysis by liberation theology, to name just a few of the 
most apparent disagreements. In fact, the split of political Catholicism between those who 
embraced the new Gesellschaft and those who prefer more traditional ‘communities’ means 
Catholic social teaching does not provide a coherent enough framework to ensure 
consistency of political Catholic ideas and programmes. The Catholic social teachings are 
prone to interpretation and have to be expanded on in areas where they do not take a 
strong position. Therefore, it seems that it is difficult to classify political Catholicism as a 
holistic ideology, but it does possess enough distinctiveness and coherence to be seen as a 
fully independent political movement in its own right. 
 
2.4 Conclusions – the changing face of  political Catholicism 
This chapter argued that political Catholicism, despite being an important political 
movement that profoundly impacted the social and political life of Europe, remains a 
relatively under-researched area. Therefore, I aimed to bridge this knowledge gap by 
presenting a more robust definition of political Catholicism that so far has not been 
sufficiently developed. In order to further explore the nature of political Catholicism, this 
chapter discussed historical developments and the role of political Catholicism. 
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This chapter also showed how political Catholicism was a distinct political phenomenon 
that could be clearly contrasted with other political ideologies. However, despite offering a 
wide ideological framework for political activism, it fell short of being qualified as a full-
fledged ideology, mainly because it was not specific enough and prone to differing 
interpretations leading into divergent political programmes with different outlooks on such 
fundamental issues as the role of an individual in society, the role of the state in regulating 
the life of society or the state-Church relations.  
As the chapter tracked the historical development of political Catholicism in Western 
Europe, the movement’s apparent transformation became obvious. The grand social and 
cultural changes of the post-war years, which rapidly gained momentum in the 1960s, 
meant that political Catholicism in Western Europe could never be the same again. The 
Church stopped issuing guidance to the faithful to vote for Catholic parties, while a newly 
strengthened uniform Catholic identity and an idea of shared interests gave way to religious 
and political pluralism. The decreasing level of religious practice meant that traditional 
electoral bases of the movement started eroding. This forced political Catholic parties to 
stop relying on confessional loyalty and develop new ways of attracting electorate (Conway 
1997). In many cases, it led to the crisis of traditional Christian democracy, which lost 
much of its support in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In response to this new trend, Western European political Catholicism and particularly 
Christian democracy began a process of moving away from the Church and deemphasising 
religion, with voters becoming the parties’ only source of support and legitimisation. After 
some success in the 1980s, the 1990s brought once more significant declines of electoral 
support for Christian democracy, prompting quite a few political commentators to declare 
‘the end of Christian democracy’. This statement was not entirely ill-founded, as the 
Christian democratic movement indeed suffered one of its greatest failures in the 1990s. In 
the Netherlands, the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA) and 
its predecessor had been part of ruling coalitions since 1917, only to be pushed out of 
government in 1994. Belgian Christian democrats were sent into opposition for the first 
time in 40 years, while the coalition of the German Christian Democratic Union (Christlich 
Demokratische Union, CDU) and its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (Christlich 
Soziale Union, CSU) lost the elections in 1998 after 16 years in power. Last but not least, 
Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) – the largest Italian party between 1948 
and 1992 – disintegrated in a rather spectacular fashion in the early 1990s. However, the 
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death of Christian democracy was announced too early. In 2002, the German CDU/CSU 
returned to power, the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) became the 
largest party in Austria for the first time since 1966, the Christian Democratic Appeal 
returned to power in the Netherlands providing the prime-minister, and the European 
People’s Party gained the relative majority as a result of the 1999 European Parliament 
elections for the first time since 1979, when direct elections to the European Parliament 
were introduced. Despite the successful revival of Christian democracy in many countries 
in the 2000s, the distance between the parties and the Church grew stronger and the policy 
of deemphasising religion continued. For example, since the 1990s, the CDU/CSU 
refrained from publicly referring to God or Christian values with similar trends in Belgium, 
where francophone Christian democrats abandoned references to Catholicism in order to 
attract non-Catholic voters (Van Hecke and Gerard 2004). 
Consequently, contemporary political Catholicism in the form of Western European 
Christian democracy retained certain religious labels and sometimes awkward links to the 
Church, but otherwise it became an entirely secular movement, functioning in a secular 
environment, remaining, however, a separate, distinctive political group that did not evolve 
into typical conservatism. It became centrist and ‘catch-all’, characterised by a unique 
political perspective that included moderation, subsidiarity, appeal across cleavages, support 
for mediation, social market economy and the welfare state. This strategy proved effective, 
as despite declining Church attendance in Western Europe, many Christian democratic 
parties remained successful (e.g. Germany, Austria, Belgium) (Kalyvas 1996). 
The changing face of Western European political Catholicism prompts the question as to 
what extent it still is political Catholic, i.e. whether it bases its policies on the principles of 
Catholic social teaching and still is ready to entrench these principles in binding legislation, 
despite a clear detachment from religious values in its rhetoric. This analysis falls outside 
the scope of this research, but is an important issue to be examined in order to deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between religion and politics in the modern world. What 
is essential to note, however, is that Western European Christian democracy is not the only 
face of modern political Catholicism. In fact, Polish political Catholicism and its apparent 
and growing difference from Western European manifestations of this movement stand 
out. Both phenomena were always different because of divergent national environments in 
which they developed. With the changing face of Western European political Catholicism, 
characterised by the growing detachment from religion, however, Polish political 
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Catholicism with its strong focus on Christian values, its close relations with the Church 
and its goal to protect the role of Catholicism in public life, becomes increasingly divergent. 
This phenomenon will be described in more detail in the following chapters.  
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3 Political Catholicism in Poland 
3.1 Introduction  
In the context of political Catholicism, Poland is a particularly interesting case. It is not 
only the largest of the ten post-communist states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, but 
also a country where as a result of historical developments Catholicism has been playing a 
significant role in political, social and cultural life, ultimately becoming a core component 
of Polish national identity (for more on the distinct role of Catholicism in Poland see: 
Davies 2005, Eberts 1998, Koseła 2003, de Lange and Guerra 2009, Mach 2000, Majka 
1980, Morawska 1984, Osa 1989, Szajkowski 1983, Zuba 2006). The vital role of 
Catholicism in Poland has already been well established and described by scholars. The 
nature of Polish political Catholicism, however, did not attract so much scholarly attention, 
despite its distinctiveness. As this chapter shows, political Catholicism in Poland bears 
many distinctive features that differentiate it significantly from its Western European 
counterparts, making it an especially interesting case to study, not only adding to our 
understanding of how religion and politics interact in modern Europe but also contributing 
to scholarly knowledge of political Catholicism as a whole. 
This chapter will focus on presenting two elements that had a crucial effect on the 
development of Polish political Catholicism: firstly, the unique role of Catholicism as a 
socio-cultural system in Poland which strongly influenced the cultural, political and societal 
life of the country; and, secondly, the formation of intertwined relations between 
Catholicism and Polish national identity. These two elements led to Polish political 
Catholicism growing into a sizeable political force that differed from more traditional 
representatives of this movement by displaying a strong Catholic-nationalistic trait and by 
the fact that it became successful in a form other than Christian democracy, which 
dominated political Catholicism in post-war Europe.  
The first section of this chapter will briefly present a history of relations between 
Catholicism, the Catholic Church, Polish society and the state in order to describe how 
religion and national identity were gradually combined together in a unique socio-cultural 
system. Then the chapter will move on to describe the development of political 
Catholicism in Poland, with special attention given to the role of a Catholic broadcaster – 
Radio Maryja – and the influence of the Catholic Church on Polish politics. It will conclude 
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by answering the question of how different political Catholicism in Poland is from Western 
European manifestations of the movement. 
 
3.2 The unique role of  Catholicism in Poland 
Polish Catholicism is quite broadly regarded as a distinct phenomenon in Europe, 
especially in the context of its influential role in public life (e.g. Mach 2000, Eberts 1998, de 
Lange and Guerra 2009, Zuba 2006, Koseła 2003, Szajkowski 1983, Osa 1989). This 
uniqueness stems from the historic, cultural and political environments that influenced its 
development. 
The relation between the Catholic Church, Polish society and the Polish state was well 
captured by British historian Davies (2005: 152):  
‘The Roman Catholic Church has always been part of the world of Polish 
politics. Not only in its corporate existence as a wealthy, ancient, and 
respected institution, but also through the actions and attitudes of its priests 
and people, it has exerted a powerful political influence on all political 
developments. What is more, the history of the Roman Catholic Church 
provides one of the very few threads of continuity in Poland’s past. 
Kingdoms, dynasties, republics, parties and regimes have come and gone; 
but the Church seems to go on forever.’  
In other words, it is impossible to understand political and social dynamics in Poland 
without taking into account the power and role of the Church in Polish society. It is, of 
course, a complex network of unique circumstances and intertwined events which cannot 
all be extracted and analysed in this study. Some crucial elements, however, are outlined 
below. I start by providing a brief historical account of Church-state relations in Poland 
and explain how the notion of Polish national identity and Polish statehood became 
strongly entangled with Catholicism. 
3.2.1 Catholicism, the Polish state and Polish national identity –  
a historical perspective 
Catholicism in Poland – 966 until the 18th century partition of Poland 
It was at the outset of Polish statehood when Catholicism started playing an important role 
in political and social life. In order to protect his lands from the Holy Roman Empire of 
the German Nation, Prince Mieszko I converted to Christianity in 966, knocking out the 
59 
  
Empire’s main argument for its expansion to the east, which was to convert pagans to 
Christianity, if need be by force. From then until the partition of Poland at the end of the 
18th century, the attitude of state authorities to the Church was fundamentally positive and 
directed at its strengthening. As a result, the Church hierarchy played an active part in the 
development of Polish statehood (Jusiak 2009). 
The deep connection between the sense of ‘Polishness’ and Catholicism, which exists to 
this day, would not have been possible if it had been based solely on close co-operation 
between the Church and the state and its authorities. The Catholic Church in Poland was 
integrated strongly with Polish society as a result of its role in preserving Polish culture and 
tradition during difficult historical times. One of the first instances of the Church being 
perceived as a defender of the Polish nation was the disastrous Swedish invasion of the 
1650s, marked by a heroic defence of the Jasna Góra sanctuary, which was one of the few 
strongholds in Poland that the Swedish army failed to capture. Although historians disagree 
on the importance of the defence of Jasna Góra for the course of war, it became a symbol 
of Polish resistance (Jusiak 2009). 
In 1791, the Polish Constitution of May 3rd, which was an attempt to reform the failing 
state, declared in its first article Catholicism to be the national and state religion, while at 
the same time guaranteeing tolerance for other non-Catholic faiths. Following the 
intervention of the Russian Empire, efforts for constitutional reforms that might have 
ensured Poland’s survival were abandoned and, as a result, Poland disappeared from the 
map of Europe in 1795. 
The partition period (1795–1918)  
The partition of Poland between Prussia, Austria and Russia marked a period when the 
Church became the only Polish institution common to all the partitioned parts of the 
country that could support Polish culture, language and tradition. The new authorities 
quickly realised the important role of the Church and instituted a range of policies directed 
at weakening it. For example, the Russian authorities prohibited any contact between 
Polish bishops and the Vatican in an effort to subordinate the Church to the new rulers. At 
the same time, churches across the country became places of patriotic demonstrations, 
which were often combined with Masses and other religious events. As a result, the 
Russian imperial army raided and desecrated many places of worship in an attempt to 
suppress growing patriotic sentiments. The role of the Catholic Church was further 
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strengthened by the fact that the conflict with two of the invaders also had a strong 
religious dimension, with the Tsar being the head of the Russian Orthodox Church and 
Prussia being dominated by Protestantism (Zarycki 2007). 
The Church not only provided a haven for those trying to restore Polish independence, but 
many priests and monks took an active part in the armed resistance and uprisings. The 
results of this activity were quite severe, as the Russian authorities increased their pressure 
on the Church by sending many priests into exile in Siberia, dissolving dioceses, banning 
public displays of religious activities and ordering that the liturgy be celebrated in Russian 
(Jusiak 2009). 
The fact that the Catholic Church was the main institution preserving Polish culture and 
traditions during the partition period – and, as a result, suffered persecution – led to the 
amalgamation of Catholicism with Polish national identity. For national elites, but even 
more strongly for ordinary Poles, the Catholic faith became a form of statement used to 
underline the difference between what was Polish and what came from the Prussian and 
Russian authorities. It was at this time that the well-known stereotype of a ‘Pole-Catholic’ 
emerged and became widely accepted among Poles. The role of the Church in 19th century 
Poland was so important that the archbishop of Warsaw, Aleksander Krakowski, was 
nominated as one of three members of the Regency Council formed in 1917 by Germany 
and Austria-Hungary in the occupied Polish territories. The Council took over the 
administration of the judicial system together with education, and in 1918, after 123 years 
of the non-existence of the Polish state, declared Polish independence. 
The interwar period and the Second World War (1918–1945) 
The role of the Catholic Church during the partition period translated in the interwar 
period into its very strong position not only among Poles, but also in the legal framework 
of the newly recreated Polish state. The constitution of 1921, although establishing 
complete freedom of religion, mentioned only one religion directly, Catholicism, and 
Article 114 guaranteed the Catholic Church a supreme position among all faiths (Primus 
inter pares) (Krukowski 2002). In addition, in 1925 the Polish state concluded a concordat 
with the Holy See, which regulated the legal framework of the Church’s activities in 
Poland. It guaranteed the Church complete independence in the management of its 
properties and internal affairs (including the organisation and nomination of priests and 
bishops) and granted it a number of financial privileges (Kuk 2004). After the 1926 coup, 
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when Józef Piłsudski and the Sanacja movement took power, the situation of the Church 
did not change significantly, even though Piłsudski supported the separation of state and 
Church, had a history of personal conflicts with senior Catholic clergymen and, for a brief 
period of time, converted to Protestantism (Rogalska 2014). Piłsudski, however, 
maintained formally good relations with the Church in public life – the Polish left in 
general was conciliatory towards the Church and soon both institutions reached a certain 
level of compromise (Kuk 2004). 
In general, the interwar period further cemented the influential position of the Catholic 
Church in Poland. The Church, being fully aware of its pivotal role during the partition 
period, demanded explicit recognition of its rights in the state’s legislation and put forward 
postulates that would base the organisation of society on Catholic moral values and 
teaching. The fact that about 75% of the Polish population at the time belonged to the 
Catholic Church provided only an additional argument for strengthening the Church’s 
position (Jusiak 2009). 
In 1939, the brief period of Polish independence came to an abrupt end with the beginning 
of the Second World War. It was obvious to the German and Soviet invaders that the 
Church was an essential element upholding the existence of the Polish nation and, thus, 
they implemented a range of actions aimed at neutralising and, in long-term, destroying it. 
In the Polish territories that were incorporated into the Third Reich, the structures of the 
Polish Church were dissolved and German clergy replaced Polish priests. In the occupied 
part of Poland (the General Government), the Nazis instituted a complex system of 
persecution aimed at significantly reducing the influence of the Church on society. In 
eastern Poland, the USSR imposed its already well-developed policies of forced 
secularisation and started an open fight with religion. Any religious activities were rooted 
out through arrests, deportations to the Siberian labour camps of the GULAG, or death 
penalties (Jusiak 2009). 
The devastation of the Second World War touched all aspects of Polish statehood: the 
economy, culture and society, including the Catholic Church. However, the end of the war 
did not markedly improve the situation of the Church. As a result of the Yalta Conference, 
Poland, together with other Central and Eastern European countries, fell into the Soviet 
sphere of influence, and soon a totalitarian communist government was established in the 
country. The underlying Marxist philosophy of the new government was based on strong 
opposition not only to the Church, but also to any religious beliefs in general, and any form 
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of unauthorised public activity. Consequently, the Provisional Government of National 
Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej) declared the pre-war concordat null and void as 
early as 1945. The following Stalinist period (until 1956) was a time of full frontal attack on 
the Church with an intense use of the state's security apparatus and propaganda. 
Struggle against the communist regime (1945–1989) 
The period of the communist regime in Poland was marked by a dualistic relationship 
between the Church and the state. On the one hand, the ruling party accepted Marxist 
ideology with its opposition to any form of religious beliefs, but on the other hand, it was 
aware of the special role of Catholicism in Poland and the Church’s influence in Polish 
society. The 1952 constitution guaranteed the freedom of religion, but the state’s 
authorities used administrative means to weaken the Church. Religious lessons in state 
schools were gradually limited until their full elimination in 1961. Schools, hospitals, caring 
facilities and charities run by the Church were taken over by the state. The Church’s right 
to worship, which was formally granted by the constitution, was significantly limited, 
confining it to churches and sanctuaries only (Krukowski 2002). The situation of the 
Catholic Church in Poland during the communist regime was marked by periods of high 
repression: the Stalinist period 1946–1956, the last years under First Secretary W. Gomułka 
(the end of the 1960s) and during the martial law period (1981–1982). However, these 
attempts to contain and weaken the Church had the opposite effect, rallying popular 
support for the Church as the symbol of resistance and thereby solidifying its authority 
among Poles (Jusiak 2009). 
From the mid-1970s, the struggle against the communist authorities was gaining strength 
and churches around the country were used as a refuge for opposition leaders. They also 
became forums for open discussions, where people could freely express their political 
opinions and criticise the authorities. Public masses and the presence of priests among 
protesters during the ‘Festival of Solidarity’ in the summer of 1981 were unambiguous 
proof of the Church’s role in the struggle against communism. Indeed, a picture of Holy 
Mary pinned to Lech Wałęsa’s lapel became a clear exemplification of Catholicism’s 
position during those days. 
The beginnings of the 1980s showed how the Church began to function as a repository of 
the legitimacy granted by Polish society which, by that time, communists were almost 
completely deprived of. The Church’s authority spanned beyond the spiritual and moral 
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domains and entered directly into the sphere of politics and socio-cultural life (Walaszek 
1986). Many Poles perceived the Church and religion as a political category rather than a 
spiritual one, emphasising the Church’s association with survival, culture and continuity. 
The Church was elevated to a symbol of Polishness and of resistance to a political system 
that was imposed by foreign and historically hostile forces (Szajkowski 1985). As a Polish 
student described it at the time: ‘For us the Church signifies patriotism, tradition, 
continuity and stability’ (Weschler 1982: 20). 
In this context, Morawska (1984) described the Church as the main public spokesperson 
for Polish society and pointed out that the Church’s persistent support for sovereignty and 
the self-governance of the Polish nation was the backbone of its political role in the years 
leading up to the fall of communism.  
From democratic breakthrough until EU membership (1989–2004) 
In 1989, with the collapse of the communist regime, the Church found itself in a 
completely new environment. The rapid political and socio-economic transformation of 
Poland on the one hand created new opportunities for the Church to normalise its relations 
with the state or even assert certain privileges. On the other hand, the Church was faced 
with new challenges and had to reinvent its position vis-à-vis the key elements of the 
political, social and economic life of Poland. 
In the 1990s, during the first decade of the transformation, the Church was able to 
capitalise on its widespread popular support and the important role in the struggle against 
communism – it not only maintained the national culture and the national community, but 
it actively participated in the process of democratisation in the 1980s (Borowik 2002). The 
new constitution adopted in April 1997 did not mention ‘the separation of the state and 
churches’ but rather talked about autonomy and ‘cooperation for the individual and 
common good.’ The constitution also specifically mentioned the Catholic Church, 
declaring that its relations with the state would be established and governed by a separate 
international agreement – the Concordat (Article 25.4 of the Constitution of Poland (DU 
1997)). 
The Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland was signed in 1993 and 
ratified in 1998. It reconfirmed the autonomy of the Church and conferred upon it many 
rights, such as the freedom of the Church to maintain relations with the Holy See and 
other churches (Article 3), the liberty to exercise its mission publicly, the right to govern its 
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internal affairs in line with the canon law (Article 5), the recognition of canonical marriages 
by civil authorities, the introduction of religious education in kindergartens and public 
schools with the right of the Church to nominate teachers and develop the curriculum 
(Article 12), the right to establish and manage educational institutions and research 
institutes (Article 15), and last but not least, the right to broadcast religious programmes on 
public radio and television (Article 20). 
After 1989 and the fall of the communist regime, the universally accepted social prestige of 
the Church started to diminish. Some perceived it as one of the main beneficiaries of the 
democratic transformation because of its growing official standing, the rights conferred 
upon it by the state and the partial restitution of properties previously confiscated by the 
communists (Zdaniewicz and Zaręba 2004). Daniel (1995) pointed to the historical 
background of Church-state-society relations in Poland and described a more general 
tendency that indicated the dependence of the Church's legitimacy and standing in society 
on the condition of the state. Whenever the Polish state went through a serious political 
crisis, the significance of the Church rose and society gathered around it. The reverse was 
also true: the growing legitimacy of the democratic state after 1989 contributed to the 
decrease of the Church's image in society. 
However, Polish Catholicism was not subject to a major secularisation process and the fact 
that it was widely regarded by large parts of Polish society as an important, if not the most 
important, social actor could be attributed to its amalgamation with Polish culture. 
The Church and its influence on contemporary Polish politics (2004 – present) 
Since 1989, the Church has found it difficult to adjust its role in a new sovereign and 
independent state. Smolar (1998) noticed that the Church tried directly influencing the 
political choices of its faithful by unambiguously supporting Catholic parties. The hierarchy 
also tried to influence appointments to high government posts and intervened in the 
process of granting radio and television licences. Following the failure of these attempts to 
directly influence the public sphere, weary of the political world, the Church withdrew 
from direct intervention in politics. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, former secretary general of 
the Polish Episcopate, explained this as follows: ‘I think the influence [of the Church on 
Polish politics] remains, in spite of all, significant. Not because of the Church's direct 
participation in political life … because it tries to remain non-political … but thanks to its 
authority’ (Interview with T. Pieronek 2013). Thus, the Catholic Church maintained its 
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influential role after the 1989 fall of communism in Poland, but gradually moved away 
from a direct participation in politics and expressing open support for chosen politicians 
toward a more nuanced, indirect approach. Nonetheless, occasionally the Church returned 
to its more direct relation with the Polish public sphere (e.g. the presidential and 
parliamentary campaign in 2005), which showed that it still had not fully decided on its role 
in a sovereign and democratic Poland. As Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek summarised the 
situation in 1997: ‘Among the personnel of the Church there is still a great temptation to 
enter areas that do not belong to them. And this discussion is still going on’ (Gazeta 
Wyborcza 1997). 
At the same time, the Church and Catholicism remained in the background and a point of 
reference for many aspects of political life. Analyst Piotr Kaczyński noted that the Church 
is an important element not only for political Catholic parties, but also for those whose 
identity is built on opposition to the Church’s role in Polish life, such as Palikot’s 
movement (Ruch Palikota) ‘[The Church exerts influence] on all political parties. Without 
the Church there would be no Palikot[‘s movement], without the Church Law and Justice 
would find it difficult’ (Interview with P.M. Kaczyński 2013). Tomasz Terlikowski, a 
Catholic journalist, underlined that ‘[the Church] co-defines, to a certain extent and not as 
the only institution, the overall framework for Polish politics. In this sense its influence is 
not marginal …. However, its impact on everyday politics is small …. The reality in Poland 
is that the Church defines certain civilisational frameworks,[as well as] the people's world-
view and mind-sets’ (Interview with T. Terlikowski 2013). Anna Słojewska, a Brussels-
based correspondent of the daily Rzeczpospolita, also noted that the Polish Catholic Church 
and Christian values provided general guidelines for Polish parties in the moral-cultural 
sphere and became a frame of reference: ‘The influence of the Polish Church on EU 
policies [of Polish parties] comes down to the ideological-moral sphere …. All parties in 
Poland care about the Church's opinion. Not only Law and Justice, but also Civic Platform’ 
(Interview with A. Słojewska 2012). 
The fact that the Church did not directly influence Polish politics, but rather played a role 
in establishing a broad value framework of party positions was not only confirmed by the 
Polish hierarchy and commentators of the public life whom I interviewed, but also by 
politicians representing the political Catholic milieu. It is striking that whenever asked 
about the role of the Church in contemporary Polish politics, and in particular its bearing 
on their own parties, most politicians gave the same type of answer, which was well 
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summarised by Janusz Wojciechowski, MEP of the largest political Catholic party in 
Poland – Law and Justice: ‘[Law and Justice] listens to the voice of the Church … but we 
don't go actively to the Church asking how we should behave in specific situations. It’s 
more about our attachment to Christian values and not about consultations [with the 
Church] on regular basis. You definitely can't say that we are under political influence of 
the Church’ (Interview with J. Wojciechowski 2012). 
It is clear that the impact of the Catholic Church on contemporary Polish politics is 
indirect and, if at all, can be observed in the background of public life, providing a 
framework of reference and ideological guidance. As Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek explained: 
‘I think that generally the accusations that the Church meddles in politics are ill-founded 
…. Politics … is [defined as] a prudent concern for common good, and in this sphere the 
Church has the right and duty to speak out …. The Church has [also] the right and duty to 
preach the gospel, and if there is something that contradicts it in the political sphere, the 
critical voice of the Church is justified. It's not a direct intervention in politics’ (Interview 
with T. Pieronek 2013). 
3.2.2 Polish Catholicism – a distinct socio-cultural system 
The short historical account of the Church-state-society relations provided above clearly 
shows that the Church in Poland was a key national institution for centuries. It represented 
not only a system of religious beliefs but also the embodiment of Polish culture and 
tradition. The long historical association of Polish Catholicism and Polish ethnicity has 
resulted in a deep integration of the Church and nationalism. Consequently, many Poles 
perceived any threat to the Church as a threat to their national identity (Szajkowski 1985). 
Although Poland accepted Christianity in the 10th century mainly for political reasons, the 
religion soon started to fight for its independence from the state. In popular perception, 
the Church often played the role of the moral opposition and the defender of the 
oppressed, by reprimanding rulers’ misconduct. The separation of the state’s authority 
from that of the Church (limited by today’s standards but quite unusual at the time) is best 
exemplified by the so-called ‘preaching’ activity of the clergy during the 17th and 18th 
century, which was almost entirely critical of social and political abuses by the King and the 
nobles, siding with the oppressed people. The disjunction between the state and the 
Church became entirely obvious during the period of partition of Poland when, on the one 
hand, the invading countries identified themselves with Christian beliefs other than 
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Catholicism and, on the other hand, the Church provided refuge and a place to nurture 
Polish culture and identity.  
Catholicism in Poland entered the public sphere not only to protect its own freedom, but 
also to protect the freedoms and rights of a democratic society in resisting the authoritarian 
state. It strengthened its role when state power that lacked legitimacy, be it the Russian and 
Prussian authorities during the 19th century or the communist regime after 1945, tried to 
enforce a split of the Church from the state and national identity. This had the opposite 
effect, one of popular resistance as a form of social opposition to illegitimate state power, 
in effect, strengthening the Church even more. 
The specific role of the Catholic Church in the relations between society and the state 
authorities was described by Morawska (1984), who argued that the amalgamation of Polish 
Catholicism and nationalism created a distinct ‘Polish civil religion’. According to 
Morawska, a civil religion is ‘a set of religiopolitical symbols and rituals regarding a nation’s 
history and destiny’ (Morawska 1984: 29). The emergence of civil religion in Poland in the 
19th century and its persistence until 1989 was the nation’s response to the fundamental 
crises resulting from the loss of political sovereignty. As Morawska explained, ‘its major 
function was not to legitimate, but to delegitimate the state of affairs by rallying Polish 
society around a counterview of a past and future free, independent Poland’ (Morawska 
1984: 29). In other words, the civil religion ideology in Poland helped to maintain the 
polarisation between state and society, reinforcing the alienation of society from the state. 
Following the severe curtailing of freedom of organisation, education and publication by 
foreign rulers and communist authorities, religious practices were the only occasion for 
Poles to publicly display and reaffirm their national community and identity in a non-
violent way. In addition, the romantic ideals representing the Polish nation as a sufferer 
together with Christ, which became dominant in Poland during the partition period, 
facilitated the merging of religious ceremonies with civil national traditions. As Morawska 
(1984: 19) explained,  
‘Every Easter, the traditional celebration of the death and resurrection of 
Christ provided an occasion for the commemoration of Poland’s 
“crucifixion” and her “descent into the tomb,” and for public prayers for 
her redemption. Every Christmas, around the country, churches displayed 
the main themes of the national romantic faith: the Polish eagle (the ancient 
national symbol) wearing a crown of thorns; […] the insurrectionists from 
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successive uprisings; blood, chains, and patriotic duty; heroic death; and 
trust in God.’ 
In order to be able to mobilise support and protect freedoms and rights, the Polish Church 
had to free itself from involvement with state authorities, and turned toward citizens and 
their striving for freedom and truth. The Polish Catholic Church had undergone such a 
transformation, firstly, in the partition period, and secondly, during the communist regime 
when it became one of the main pillars of anti-communist resistance. This meant that the 
phenomenon of religiously (Catholic) inspired struggle against communism in Poland was 
not a simple repetition of the pattern of religious mobilisation that had been at work in 
Poland for centuries. It was not a residue of a traditional, backward society, but rather it 
resulted from new processes that transformed the Polish Catholic Church and opened it up 
to the democratic struggle of Poles (Rogaczewska 2006). 
At the same time, it is clear that the separation of religion and state in Poland after the 
Second World War was not a result of the Catholic Church’s active policy, but rather was 
forced upon it by the communist regime. What is more, there is a range of counter-
arguments, according to which the religiously inspired resistance to communism in Poland 
can be characterised as a mass, collective and ritualised movement, without space for 
pluralism or differing interpretations. This may explain why, after 1989, the Catholic 
Church – until then open to peoples’ desire for freedom and democracy, maintaining a 
distance to the authorities and inspiring a plethora of activities within civil society – and the 
state grew closer together. Political parties, with the acceptance of many bishops, started to 
place it in the centre of political debates and to use public power to assert its privileged 
position (e.g. the introduction of the Catholic religion courses in state schools without 
public consultations in 1990). As the Church’s role of people’s representative in relations 
with the oppressive state ceased, it started co-operating more closely with authorities. It 
gained an important place in the public sphere, which prompted some analysts to call it an 
‘unfulfilled state church’, wishing to mobilise society with the same means as the state 
(Rogaczewska 2006: 71). 
While describing the Catholic Church in Poland as an ‘unofficial state Church’ may not be 
entirely justified, the fact that Catholicism in Poland was much more than a religion is 
certain. The Catholic religion and the notion of national identity became intertwined at the 
time when the Church existed as the only authentically indigenous institution in Polish 
society that was present across the Prussian, Russian and Austrian partitions of Poland 
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(Byrnes 2002). This amalgamation progressed even further when the 19th century romantic 
nationalism and messianism found support in the core Christian belief of redemption 
through suffering (and death) for the sins of others (Casanova 1994). 
To sum up, there were two most important historical factors that shaped Polish 
Catholicism: its role in consolidating Polish culture and national identity during the 
partition of the country and the Second World War, and the role of the Church in the 
struggle against the communist regime (Darczewska 1989). As a consequence of these 
circumstances, for generations, it was counter-intuitive to think about Poles who did not 
belong to the Catholic Church. Membership in the Church was, and often still is, perceived 
as one of the most important features of belonging to the Polish nation. In fact, the 
stereotypical expression ‘Pole-Catholic’ seems to be deeply embedded in history and the 
national consciousness. A 1994 survey showed that for 55% of Poles, membership in the 
Catholic Church was perceived as an important criterion for belonging to the Polish nation 
(Daniel 1995). As a result of particular historical circumstances and the actions it took, 
Polish Catholicism has fused with Polish culture to create a uniform socio-cultural system 
(Majka 1980). 
 
3.3 Political Catholicism in Poland – development and 
composition 
3.3.1 The historical development of political Catholicism in Poland 
The history of the modern Polish party system began in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
taking a fuller shape in the inter-war period. Several of today’s political organisations make 
references to the inter-war period of Polish politics and the divisions between the socialist 
movement led by Józef Piłsudski and National Democracy of Roman Dmowski, using 
them as a source of legitimisation of their political aspirations (Kubiak 1999). 
Consequently, before describing contemporary Polish political Catholicism, it is important 
to provide a brief history of the development of political Catholicism in Poland. 
Catholic-nationalism vs. Christian democracy 
At the end of the 19th century, a number of Polish parties that made references to Christian 
values and Catholic social teaching appeared. However, at this time, there was a fairly clear 
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political division emerging in the Polish territories across all three partitions that would 
shape Polish politics until 1939 and was not without repercussions for the contemporary 
Polish political scene. The division between the political right, represented by the National 
Democracy (Narodowa Demokracja, Endecja) led by Roman Dmowski, and the political left, 
embodied by the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) under the leadership 
of Józef Piłsudski. One of the main differences between the two political camps was their 
attitude towards religion and the Catholic Church. Dmowski wanted to build an ethnically 
and culturally homogeneous Polish nation state based on Catholicism and the Church. He 
expressed his ideas in the seminal 1927 book ‘The Church, Nation, and State’: ‘Catholicism 
is not an addition to Polish culture … but to a large extent it is its essence. To attempt to 
separate … Catholicism from Polish culture … is to destroy the very essence of the nation’ 
(Dmowski 2002: 21). Contrary to Dmowski’s views, Piłsudski made references to a 
multicultural Polish republic and supported a clear separation of state and religion (Zarycki 
2007). Consequently, the Polish political scene after 1918 became dominated by the 
nationalist movement (Endecja), the agrarian parties and the socialist movement. This also 
meant that Christian democracy as a distinct political movement never enjoyed widespread 
support, nor were Christian democratic parties particularly influential during the interwar 
period (Bender 1985). 
The largest of the fairly unsuccessful Christian democratic parties in Poland was the Polish 
Christian Democratic Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Chrześcijańskiej Demokracji, PSChD or chadecja; 
between 1920 and 1925 called Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe Stronnictwo Pracy). It was initially 
established in 1919 in Cracow and slowly merged with similar groups from other parts of 
the country. The party was most active during the first half of the 1920s (in the 1922 
elections, it won 44 seats out of 444 in the lower chamber and 7 out of 111 in the Senate), 
when the major split in public opinion and fragmentation of the Parliament meant that the 
party was more influential than could have been expected. Following the 1926 coup d’état 
by Józef Piłsudski, the party went into decline, resulting in splits and defections in the 
1930s and it ultimately becoming a Silesian regional party. One of the reasons for the 
failure of Christian democracy in Poland in the interwar period was the lack of support 
from the Church, which did not want to tie itself to one (minor) party when there was a 
number of groups seeking its acceptance and ready to support its points of view. In 
addition, during the Second Polish Republic, almost all political groupings, apart from the 
marginal communist movement, either declared respect for religion and the Church, 
claiming Catholicism and Christian values as an important source of inspiration for their 
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programmes – like Endecja – or maintained good relations with the Church (the Left) (Kuk 
2004). Thus, Polish political Catholicism in the interwar period became dominated by the 
nationalist movement Endecja, which underlined its strong attachment to Catholicism and 
its readiness to defend the rights and interests of the Church, and pursued a programme 
for the creation of a Polish Catholic nation state. In an environment where the Catholic 
Church was perceived by Poles as one of the main pillars of the state, social order and 
Polish national identity, it was no surprise that Catholic-nationalist Endecja gathered most 
support and grew to become the strongest element of Polish political Catholicism in the 
interwar period. 
Key actors of post-war political Catholicism in Poland until the 2000s 
The Second World War and the establishment of the communist regime completely 
reshaped the Polish political scene. Most of the pre-war political divisions became obsolete 
and only a fraction of interwar political thinking reappeared after the war. In terms of 
political Catholicism, there were a few pockets of Catholic activists, grouped mostly around 
the ‘Znak’ (‘Sign’) movement and ‘Tygodnik Powszechny’ (‘Universal Weekly’), which were 
only partially independent and tightly controlled by authorities (Bale and Szczerbiak 2008). 
However, during the climax of the anti-communist struggle under the Solidarity movement, 
activists inspired by Catholic social teaching and Christian values became a more important 
element, exemplified by such figures as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first non-communist 
Polish prime minister after 1945, or Wiesław Chrzanowski, the Marshal of the first post-
communist democratically elected Sejm. There was also the pro-communist PAX 
association, which was a lay Catholic organisation created in 1947 with the intention to win 
over Polish Catholics to communism and break their links with the Vatican (Davies 2005). 
However, this can hardly be regarded as independent political action and thus was not part 
of political Catholicism.  
After the collapse of the communist system in Poland in 1989, the Polish political and 
party system underwent a complete makeover. The 1989 elections were not fully 
democratic, as at least 65% of seats in the Sejm were guaranteed for representatives of the 
communist parties. This changed in 1991, when, in the first fully democratic elections, 
almost 111 parties competed and 29 won seats. These elections also marked the end of the 
unified anti-communist bloc, which split into many parties and organisations. The high 
fragmentation of the 1991 parliament made the political situation quite unstable, with a 
number of attempts to create governing coalitions. The next elections were held in 1993, 
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and following the introduction of the 5% electoral threshold, only 6 electoral committees 
secured seats in the Sejm, with the communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) forming a government coalition with the Polish Peoples’ Party 
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL). The 1997 elections saw the emergence of a large coalition 
of post-Solidarity parties – Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS) – 
which won the elections and created a government for the next four years. 
After the 1989 fall of communism, a whole plethora of parties and movements which 
wanted to enshrine Christian values and Catholic social teaching in the Polish legal system 
emerged. What was most characteristic of them was their strong focus on national-patriotic 
themes and a perception of Catholicism and Christian values as the basis for the 
functioning of state and society. 
Clearly, one of the most important and electorally successful political Catholic parties of 
the 1990s was the Christian National Union. Following the 1991 parliamentary elections, it 
led the third-largest parliamentary grouping, named Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza 
Akcja Katolicka). The party’s manifesto and policy proposals were based on Christian 
values, with family rights placed on top of the agenda. The party also did not hide its close 
links with the Catholic Church. In fact, in the October 1991 parliamentary elections, the 
hierarchy gave a strong impression that it was supporting the party (Bale and Szczerbiak 
2008). 
The Christian National Union’s manifesto did not only draw from Catholic social teaching 
but also provided for the strengthening of the Church’s influence on public life in Poland 
so that the state would have an explicitly Catholic character. It believed that capitalist 
economy in Poland should be based on subsidiarity, social justice, solidarity and common 
good (Paszkiewicz 2004).  The party’s ideology was also characterised by a strong emphasis 
on national-patriotic themes (Bale and Szczerbiak 2008) and a certain degree of 
Euroscepticism, mitigated by the fact that Europe was not a salient issue in the beginning 
of the 1990s. This was in stark contrast to political Catholicism in Western European 
democracies, which was traditionally pro-European and more universalistic than 
nationalistic. 
In the context of Polish political Catholicism, Solidarity Electoral Action and the Social 
Movement for Solidarity Electoral Action (Ruch Społeczny AWS, RS AWS) need to be 
mentioned. The Solidarity Electoral Action was a coalition of centre-right and right-wing 
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parties established in 1996, and contained a large group of political Catholic actors. It won 
the parliamentary election in 1997 with 33.4% of votes, establishing a government that 
stayed in power from 1997 until 2001 under the leadership of Jerzy Buzek. Solidarity 
Electoral Action proved to be a very heterogeneous alliance of trade unionists, Catholic 
nationalists and conservatives, although it was largely dominated by Christian democratic 
views (Kowalczyk 2014). Insofar as the Solidarity Electoral Action included various 
political entities and its classification as fully political Catholic may be difficult, the 
classification of the Social Movement for Solidarity Electoral Action is less problematic. 
This party was set up in 1997 as the political wing of the Solidarność trade union to allow 
unionists to be active in politics. It also included a number of politicians who did not 
belong to any of the AWS coalition members. Its programme was in line with the Solidarity 
Electoral Action, but it put much stronger emphasis on the role of Christian values in 
society. In fact, the aim of the movement was to promote Christian values in education, 
economy and public life. In its manifesto, the state was described as a common good of all 
citizens, based on Christian values and Catholic social teaching. The party believed that the 
functioning of society and economy should be founded on subsidiarity, co-responsibility 
and social solidarity (Paszkiewicz 2004). Despite its initial success, the coalition 
disintegrated before the 2001 elections mainly as a result of diverging political interests of 
its component parties, while the Social Movement for Solidarity Electoral Action failed to 
re-enter parliament. 
The Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum) was a political Catholic party established in 
1990 by Jarosław Kaczyński. Initially, the party was rather eclectic, combining liberal, 
agrarian and Christian democratic views. After a period of consolidation, its main aim was 
to become a modern Christian democratic party, similar to the German CDU. It was one 
of the more important political organisations in the early 1990s. The party declared that its 
activities would be based on Christian ethics and the natural law, with a strong attachment 
to Christian values and Catholic social teaching. It also wanted to ensure that the 
transformation of Polish economy would be accompanied by social protection 
programmes, protecting the most vulnerable members of society, particularly families. The 
party opted for an economic system, which would give equal chances for affluent life to all 
members of society (Paszkiewicz 2004). The party supported the unique role and high 
authority of the Catholic Church in Poland, although it was eager to maintain the state’s 
independence from the Church. It suffered numerous splits, but also became a member of 
the Solidarity Electoral Action coalition. In 2001, Jarosław Kaczyński set up a new political 
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organisation – Law and Justice – in order to capitalise on the growing popularity of his twin 
brother Lech, who became minister of justice in the Solidarity Electoral Action 
government. As a result, most Centre Agreement members moved to the new party. 
The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland was a political Catholic party created in 
1995 to capitalise on Jan Olszewski’s relatively good result in the presidential elections 
(6.86%). Its main aim was to ‘shape political life of the nation based on Catholic social 
teaching’ (Paszkiewicz 2004: 132-133), with Christian ethics regarded as the basis for the 
functioning of the state. The party decided to stay out of Solidarity Electoral Action 
coalition, mainly as a result of its relatively high popular support (16% in June 1996) 
(Paszkiewicz 2004). However, following the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action, the 
party’s support started dwindling and consequently, it won only 6.56% of votes in the 1997 
parliamentary elections. In 2001, the party started co-operating with the League of Polish 
Families, but a year later the two MPs of the movement that entered the Sejm as candidates 
of the League of Polish Families left the party. In 2005, the Movement failed to win any 
seats in parliament and became marginalised. 
Naturally, no description of Polish political Catholicism can go without mentioning one of 
the best-known Polish political Catholic parties – the League of Polish Families. The party 
was established shortly before the 2001 elections and is an excellent example of the 
importance of political Catholicism in Poland, and its ability to mobilise significant electoral 
support (8% in the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections respectively and 16% in the 2004 
European elections) and to realise its agenda through legislation and public policies. The 
history of the party also introduces two more important actors in the circle of Polish 
political Catholicism – Radio Maryja and Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, a charismatic leader of an 
influential Catholic media conglomerate, which is described in section 3.3.3. The party was 
created under the auspices of Father Rydzyk and Radio Maryja. As noted by Daniel 
Pawłowiec, an ex-member of the League of Polish Families: ‘Radio Maryja was an 
important political component of the League of Polish Families. It supported the League 
for many years’ (Interview with D. Pawłowiec 2013). The League grouped around 20 
organisations, which declared their strong attachment to Catholic, national, and patriotic 
values – an approach sometimes defined as Catholic-nationalism. The party leadership 
believed that the family deserved the particular protection of the state. They opposed 
abortion, euthanasia, and promoted policies aimed at financially helping large families 
(Paszkiewicz 2004). Before the 2001 elections, the party started co-operating with other 
75 
  
political Catholic movements like the Polish Agreement, the Catholic-National Movement, 
and the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland. The party’s electoral lists were 
supported by 7.87% of the electorate, but soon after the elections, many MPs started 
leaving the party, setting up separate parliamentary groups. In the 2005 elections, the party 
maintained its share of the votes and in May 2006 joined Law and Justice in a coalition 
government. Following the growing tensions inside the party, and the conflict with Father 
Rydzyk who transferred his support to Law and Justice, the party suffered a number of 
splits and eventually did not pass the 5% electoral threshold in the 2007 elections. 
Other political Catholic parties of the 1990s 
Similarly to other post-communist parties, the Polish party system of the 1990s was 
characterised by high fluidity, with many political organisation being created, divided, 
combined or abandoned altogether. Most of them did not manage to make a lasting mark 
in the politics of Poland, exerting only minimal influence on public policies. Below, I 
briefly outline a number of smaller and less impactful political Catholic parties that existed 
in Poland in the first decade after the fall of communism. 
The Movement for the Republic (Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej) was created in 1992 as a platform 
for cooperation between Christian democratic, Catholic-nationalist, agrarian, and 
conservative parties. It was founded by members of the Centre Agreement, who left the 
party over a disagreement about its co-operation with the opponents of Jan Olszewski’s 
government (1991-1992). The party aimed at building ‘a democratic Polish state, based on 
the strong family, social solidarity, local and professional self-governance’ (Paszkiewicz 
2004: 121-122). The party was rather ephemeral and underwent a number of splits and 
conflicts over its leadership, remaining for most of the 1990s outside of parliament. 
The Conservative People’s Party (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe, SKL) was a party set up 
in 1997 with an aim to represent a ‘modern Right’ in the political centre. It combined 
conservatives, liberals and agrarian politicians, so it is hard to classify it unequivocally as 
political Catholic. However, its manifesto declared the party’s willingness to combine ‘a 
thousand-year old Christian and national heritage’ with a ‘modern, effective and wealthy 
Poland.’ It placed the family, religion and the state at the top of its list of values, and 
declared respect for Christian ethics in public life. It also wished to maintain the national, 
religious and cultural identity of Poles, particularly in the context of Polish EU 
membership. The party was a member of the Solidarity Electoral Action and in 2001 began 
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cooperating with Civic Platform, with the party’s candidates placed on Civic Platform 
electoral lists. In 2002, it suffered a split and a large number of its members joined Civic 
Platform (Paszkiewicz 2004). 
The Catholic-National Movement (Ruch Katolicko-Narodowy) was a rather small party 
established in 1997 as a result of a split within the Movement for the Reconstruction of 
Poland. It was formed by politicians centred around Antoni Macierewicz. Paszkiewicz 
(2004: 127) described the party as national-independent, strongly stressing its good 
relations with the Catholic Church. Its main aim was to introduce ‘a Catholic social-
economic project’ that is a state rooted in the national and Christian traditions of Poland. 
The movement was a member of the Solidarity Electoral Action, before it formed an 
alliance with the League of Polish Families, and finally, started cooperating with Law and 
Justice in 2007. 
The Polish Agreement was established in 1999 by former politicians of the Catholic 
National Union, who left the party (or were expelled), and a number of smaller 
organisations. Jan Łopuszański, an ex-member of the Catholic National Union, became the 
leader of the new organisation. The key element of the party’s manifesto was its 
disapproval of Polish EU membership and the party positioned itself in opposition to the 
Solidarity Electoral Action, which supported Polish accession to the EU. In the 2000 
manifesto ‘Programme for independent Poland’, it demanded that the Polish constitution 
should include in its preamble an invocation to God, which would give the state ‘stable 
foundations for the system of law … and for the ethical system of [the state’s] public 
service’ (PP 2000). In 2001, the party started cooperating with the League of Polish 
Families, but in 2002 two Polish Agreement MPs chosen from the League’s electoral list 
left its parliamentary club. In the 2005 election the party did not enter the Parliament.  
Apart from the already mentioned parties of the political Catholic movement, the 1990s 
saw an abundance of other small parties that belonged to the family. They included the 
Christian Democracy of the Third Republic of Poland (Chrześcijańska Demokracja III 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej), Christian Democracy – the Labour Party (Chrześcijańska Demokracja – 
Stronnictwo Pracy), Polish Christian Democratic Forum (Polskie Forum Chrześcijańsko-
Demokratyczne), the Christian Labour Party (Chrześcijańska Partia Pracy), the Agreement of 
Polish Christian Democrats (Porozumienie Polskich Chrześcijańskich Demokratów) and the Party 
of Christian Democrats (Partia Chrześnijańskich Demokratów). None of them, however, was 
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able to secure any significant electoral support and they quickly faded into obscurity (for 
more details on the development of Christian democracy in Poland see Sozańska 2011). 
3.3.2 Contemporary political Catholicism in Poland 
Contemporary Polish political Catholicism is a varied and very dynamic movement. It 
consists naturally of political parties but also includes other social movements. It is 
impossible to identify and describe all its component parts, but using the definition and key 
features of political Catholicism described in chapter 2, one can easily detect the most 
important political Catholic actors in contemporary Poland. 
Before describing the key actors of contemporary political Catholicism, it is useful to 
outline the political context of the 2000s. First of all, it is important to note the progressing 
consolidation of the Polish political scene, which can be clearly contrasted with the first 
half of the 1990s. Secondly, the 2001 elections marked a significant change on the Polish 
political stage with the collapse of the Solidarity Electoral Action and the emergence of 
Law and Justice and Civic Platform, which slowly dominated much of Polish politics in the 
following years. The 2001 elections were won by the communist successor Democratic 
Left Alliance with a large majority of votes (41%), but also saw two ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
parties – the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence – enter parliament. Following the 
significant decline of the Democratic Left Alliance, Law and Justice won the 2005 
elections, forming a government coalition with the League of Polish Families and Self-
Defence in May 2006. The coalition broke up within two years, and in the 2007 early 
elections, Civic Platform took power, forming a coalition with the Polish Peasants’ Party. 
Civic Platform went on the win the 2011 elections, the first time in modern Polish history 
that any party won two elections in a row, and continued to govern with its junior partner, 
the Polish Peasants’ Party. 
Law and Justice – driving political Catholicism in Poland 
Among the major political parties present in the Sejm, Law and Justice was definitely at the 
centre of political Catholic activity in Poland. Law and Justice was formed in 2001 by 
Jarosław Kaczyński, largely in order to capitalise on the popularity of his twin brother 
Lech, gained during his brief term as minister of justice (June 2000-July 2001 in the 
Solidarity Electoral Action-led government), during which he became known for his tough 
policy on crime and his focus on reforming the penal code by increasing penalties for 
criminal offences. As the name suggests, the party chose to focus on law and order issues 
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and built an image as an opponent of crime and corruption, which, at the time, resonated 
well with the electorate. The party gained 9.5% of votes in 2001, followed by 27% in 2005, 
32.1% in 2007 and 29.9% in the 2011 elections. 
Between 2006 and 2007, the party formed a governing coalition together with the League 
of Polish Families and Self-Defence of Andrzej Lepper. This was often considered a 
turning point in the party’s ideological and programmatic approach. While in coalition, Law 
and Justice significantly strengthened its links with Radio Maryja and was able to replace 
the League of Polish Families as the political party that received the station’s support. 
Following the end of the coalition, Law and Justice took over large parts of the League’s 
electoral base during the 2007 electoral campaign, pushing its old coalition party out of the 
Polish parliament. This, however, meant that in order to maintain influence over its newly 
acquired voters, Law and Justice had to move closer to more radical Catholic-nationalist 
positions and became careful not to lose the endorsement of Father Rydzyk. 
Without a doubt, the party can be classified as political Catholic. Its 2014 European 
elections manifesto clearly showed that it met both primary conditions of political Catholic 
action, i.e. strong inspiration from Catholic social teaching and activity in the public sphere 
to introduce principles of Catholic social teaching in national law. The 2014 Law and 
Justice manifesto was based in many aspects on Catholic social teaching, often using the 
same language and terms. The first six pages of the document listed some of the party’s key 
values, which were closely related to the key principles of Catholic social teaching 
mentioned in section 2.3, e.g. the right to life, freedom, solidarity, equality, justice and 
community. The party declared its opposition to abortion and euthanasia, underlined that 
each individual could only reach its full potential by belonging to different communities 
(the family, local communities, society and the nation) and strongly endorsed the principles 
of solidarity. In the sphere of economy, Law and Justice declared its opposition to social 
exclusion and economic disparities. The party believed that ‘social advancement and wealth 
creation should be in accordance with moral rules and respect for every human’ (PiS 2014: 
8). The 2014 manifesto also made direct references to Catholic social teaching by quoting 
papal encyclicals (PiS 2014: 7-9). The party furthermore stressed the role of Catholicism 
and the Church in the struggle against the communist regime and the fact that ‘the 
teachings of the Catholic Church, the Polish tradition and Polish patriotism join strongly 
together, creating the political identity of the nation’ (PiS 2014: 10). Finally, the manifesto 
supported the important position of the Church in Polish society and the state, declaring 
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that in Poland the only alternative to Catholic moral teaching was nihilism, while ‘attempts 
to destroy and unfairly attack the Church are dangerous for the shape of social life’ (PiS 
2014: 11). 
Civic Platform – not so politically Catholic 
Civic Platform is another party that has to be taken into consideration when describing 
Polish political Catholicism. Similarly to Law and Justice, the party was established in 2001, 
following the disintegration of the Solidarity Electoral Action. It was formed as a liberal 
conservative party, initially under the leadership of three politicians – Andrzej Olechowski, 
Maciej Płażyński and Donald Tusk. However, it later became entirely dominated by 
Donald Tusk, who turned into its unquestioned leader. The party narrowly lost the 2005 
parliamentary and presidential elections and remained in opposition until 2007, when it 
formed a coalition government with the Polish Peasants’ Party (Szczerbiak 2012). 
Originally, the party had a core liberal electorate, but in an effort to broaden its appeal it 
embraced more conservative and Christian democratic views, which meant that the party 
developed a more religiously informed dimension of its ideology and programme (Bale and 
Szczerbiak 2008). As a result, Civic Platform became a rather broad gathering of politicians, 
ranging from conservatives, to Christian democrats to liberal and centrist politicians, which 
made it difficult to be classified as a part of Polish political Catholicism. At most, a faction 
within the party could be deemed part of the political Catholic movement, e.g. the so-called 
‘conservative wing’ of the party centred around Jarosław Gowin and Jacek Żalek. 
In its 2011 electoral manifesto, the party defined itself as the ‘New Centre’, declaring that it 
was in favour of a citizen’s state which ‘did not impose beliefs on citizens, did not instruct, 
and did not exclude anyone’ (PO 2011: 11). Although the manifesto made references to 
such values as co-operation, social dialogue and solidarity, in most part it was not inspired 
by Catholic social teaching, which further justifies its exclusion from Polish political 
Catholicism.  
The fringes of Polish political Catholicism – Solidaristic Poland, Poland is Most 
Important, Poland Together and The Right-Wing of the Republic 
There were also a number of smaller parties – splinter groups from Law and Justice like 
Solidaristic Poland of Zbigniew Ziobro, founded in 2012, and Poland is the Most 
Important (Polska Jest Najważniejsza), created in 2010 – or a group that separated from Civic 
Platform – Poland Together of Jarosław Gowin (Polska Razem Jarosława Gowina), 
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established in 2013. Their main political strategy was to develop an electoral base in-
between Law and Justice and Civic Platform, trying to build on the sentiment of ‘PO-PiS’ 
(a word play using the Polish acronyms of the parties’ names that means ‘a show’ or ‘a 
display’), a grand coalition between the two main parties that was widely expected after the 
2005 elections. The programmes of the first two parties were rather difficult to distinguish 
from that of Law and Justice, as their main reason for defecting from Kaczynski’s 
movement, apart from personal ambitions of their leaders, was to tone down the conflict 
around the causes of the Smolensk air crash in Russia, in which President Lech Kaczynski 
and many other prominent Polish politicians died while travelling to the commemorations 
of the Katyń massacre.2 Both splinter parties remained socially conservative, with a strong 
attachment to Catholic values and pursuing policies based on them. In its ‘Ideological 
Declaration’, Solidaristic Poland stated that ‘the moral bases of the Polish national 
community were shaped by Catholicism’ and that in accordance with the teachings of Pope 
John Paul II, solidarity should always take precedence over divisions and should include all 
members of the community, also those most vulnerable and defenceless. The party 
furthermore declared its opposition to abortion and euthanasia (Solidarna Polska 2014).  
When it comes to Jarosław Gowin’s party, it in fact tried to build its programme on 
economic liberalism, which it claimed Civic Platform lost, and social conservatism. The 
party stated its strong support for the family and declared that the Ten Commandments 
were the foundation of European civilisation (Polska Razem 2014). Following an 
unsuccessful attempt to secure electoral support in the 2014 European elections, 
Solidaristic Poland (3.98% in the 2014 European elections) and Poland Together (3.16%) 
created a common parliamentary group called Just Poland (Sprawiedliwa Polska) in 2014 and 
entered in an electoral coalition with Law and Justice. 
The Right Wing of the Republic (Prawica Rzeczypospolitej) was a party created in 2007, after a 
split in Law and Justice following a conflict over a constitutional amendment introducing 
the protection of pre-natal life. Its manifesto titled ‘A strong Poland for the civilisation of 
life’ declared that the Christian life of Polish nation was the most important element of its 
well-being. The party’s main aim was to reintroduce Christian conservative politics in 
Poland, which it claimed was the only ideology capable of finding a solution to key 
problems of the country, like the demographic crisis, a ‘counterculture of death’, the 
                                                 
2 The Katyń massacre (Polish: zbrodnia katyńska) was a mass execution of Polish citizens, including army 
officers, carried out by the Soviet secret police, NKVD, in April and May 1940. The number of victims is 
estimated at 22,000. 
81 
  
economic crisis, and build a real European policy (Prawica Rzeczypospolitej 2014). 
Following a fiasco in the 2011 parliamentary elections, when a coalition centred on the 
party won 0.24% of votes, the Right Wing of the Republic entered in an electoral coalition 
with Law and Justice in 2014. 
Other political Catholic movements 
Political Catholicism in Poland was, of course, much broader than the parties briefly 
described above. There were a number of groups and associations which drew from 
Catholic social teaching and attempted to influence the decision-making process in order to 
enshrine Christian values in the Polish legal system. One should mention here: firstly, 
Radio Maryja, which is described in detail below, and Fronda, a quarterly which attracted a 
number of Catholic activists forming a visible community, the Catholic Association ‘Civitas 
Christiana’, whose aim was to ‘prepare lay Catholics for the service to the Church and the 
nation’; or Catholic Action in Poland (Akcja Katolicka). There were also a number of single-
issue movements, which as such did not form part of political Catholicism. They do, 
however, deserve to be mentioned here as they exemplify the vitality of Catholic 
movements in Poland. Among the many organisations, some of the most important were 
the Polish Federation of Movements for the Protection of Life (Polska Federacja Ruchów 
Obrony Życia), the Polish Association of the Human Life Defenders (Polskie Stowarzyszenie 
Obrońców Życia Człowieka), or ‘Contra In Vitro’. These single-issue groups focused usually 
on the issue of abortion and in-vitro fertility treatments and had a rather limited ability to 
influence lawmakers not associated with political Catholicism.  
3.3.3 Radio Maryja – the éminence grise of Polish political 
Catholicism? 
Radio Maryja and Father Rydzyk have already been mentioned several times in this chapter, 
showing their important role for political Catholicism in Poland. Hence, it is necessary to 
analyse this phenomenon in detail. 
Father Rydzyk is the head of several Catholic media outlets, of which Radio Maryja is the 
best-known and the biggest Catholic radio station in Poland. Other media outlets include a 
TV channel called Telelwizja Trwam (TV I persist), a national daily called Nasz Dziennik (Our 
Daily) and other smaller media and publishing enterprises. 
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Radio Maryja’s importance does not just lie in its success as a media outlet but rather in its 
remarkable ability to build a highly loyal, engaged and devoted group of supporters (the 
Radio Maryja Family – Rodzina Radia Maryja). The ability of this media conglomerate to 
influence public Catholic opinion and the political scene has become apparent not only in 
this research, but has also been acknowledged by other scholars (Grabowska 2008, Guerra 
2010, Krzemiński 2009, Szczerbiak 2001b, 2004, Wysocka 2008). 
Before presenting a detailed account of Radio Maryja and its role in Polish political 
Catholicism, it should be noted that, first and foremost, Radio Maryja is a Catholic 
broadcaster and that a large majority of its programming is devoted to religious content. 
Regular elements of the radio station’s schedule include daily transmissions of masses, the 
breviary, the Angelus or recitations of prayers. The programme also contains catechesis, 
transmitting the news service of the Vatican Radio and playing substantial amounts of 
religious music. However, this section focuses on the social and political influence of the 
radio station; hence, it will not relate to the religious programming of the radio, though 
there is no intention to dismiss or limit its spiritual role. It should also be mentioned that 
Father Rydzyk and his radio are regarded as controversial (Eaglin 2008) and have been 
accused of anti-Semitism, xenophobia and extreme nationalism (De Lange and Guerra 
2009). 
Radio Maryja – development and organisation 
Radio Maryja was created in 1991 by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk who, building on experience 
gathered during his stay in West Germany, decided to set up a Catholic radio station. Three 
years later Radio Maryja gained a countrywide broadcasting licence and by the second half 
of the 1990s developed into one of the most successful Catholic media outlets in Poland. 
Slowly, the broadcaster became a centre for a conglomerate of activities, associations and 
other media outlets. This included loosely formalised associations like the local bureaus of 
the radio station and circles of Radio Maryja friends (Koła Przyjaciół Radia Maryja), a 
grassroots movement created in many parishes focused on supporting the radio and 
distributing publications, or the Family of Radio Maryja (Rodzina Radia Maryja) with more 
than 135,000 members in 31 countries (data from 2007 in Burdziej 2008). There are also 
organisations formally and financially connected with the station, like the foundations 
Servire Veritati (National Institute of Education, Instytut Edukacji Narodowej) or Lux 
Veritatis, the owner of Radio Maryja’s higher education institution, the College of Social 
and Media Culture (Wyższa Szkoła Kultury Społecznej i Medialnej). In 1998, Father Rydzyk 
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founded the national daily ‘Our Daily’ (‘Nasz Dziennik’) and in 2003 a TV station called ‘TV 
I persist’ (Telewizja Trwam), which complemented his media group, ensuring a presence on 
all key communication channels. Together, they all formed a Radio Maryja milieu – a group 
of institutions and organisations closely joined together by a formal and informal network 
of relations with Tadeusz Rydzyk as the leader, followed by a loyal group of supporters. 
Although this section mostly focuses on Radio Maryja, the analysis of this phenomenon 
and the conclusions presented below apply also to other institutional entities of this milieu. 
A highlight of Radio Maryja’s activities is the yearly pilgrimage to the sanctuary in Jasna 
Góra, Częstochowa which can attract as many as 200,000 people, as it did in 2008 when 
the invited guests included the leader of Law and Justice Jarosław Kaczyński. In addition, 
the radio station organises annual meetings in December at its headquarters in Toruń to 
celebrate the anniversaries of its creation (Grabowska 2008). 
In 2014, Radio Maryja was the fifth largest radio station in Poland with about 700,000 
listeners (RadioTrack by MillwardBrown SMG/KRC 2014) and was closely aligned with 
the Nasz Dziennik newspaper, whose circulation is difficult to assess but has been estimated 
to reach around 150,000 copies (Uniwersytet Zielonogórski 2007). The role of Radio 
Maryja was sometimes described as that of a catalyst of ‘a non-liberal civil society’ (Burdziej 
2008: 18), which gave a voice to those parts of Polish society that were largely under-
represented in public discourse, i.e. the elderly, those with only a primary education or 
vocational training, those living in the countryside and regular church-goers. They form a 
separate social group, which shares a similar worldview and common activities, and for 
whom the radio acted as their perception filter, allowing certain messages to reach the 
audience while discarding others. This is confirmed by Ireneusz Krzemiński, a Polish 
sociologist, who, in 2009, published a monograph devoted to the analysis of Radio Maryja 
(Krzemiński 2009) and pointed out that Father Rydzyk managed to create a separate 
identity of Radio Maryja listeners. According to Krzemiński, Radio Maryja listeners were 
no ordinary audience, but rather an organised community – a group characterised by 
following all three media outlets of Father Rydzyk (Radio Maryja, TV Trwam, the daily 
‘Nasz Dziennik’) and a strong feeling of identification with the station and Father Rydzyk. 
Events like meetings of local radio support groups in parishes or pilgrimages strengthened 
the group identity, giving it the features of a real social movement with its own activities, 
values, rules and political opinions. At the same time, Krzemiński (2009) described a sect-
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like approach, with Father Rydzyk becoming a revered leader and symbol of ‘appropriate’ 
Catholic-national values. 
‘Information – formation – organisation – action’: Radio Maryja’s political and 
social activism 
The characteristic features of Father Rydzyk’s media operations are: their interactivity, close 
connections with their audience, and an ability to mobilise their supporters. The radio 
station and the affiliated media work according to a coherent formula, described by Father 
Rydzyk himself in four words: ‘information – formation – organisation – action’ 
(Gendźwiłł and Stasik 2008). Radio Maryja was one of the first radio stations to allow 
phone calls from listeners to be broadcasted on air, which gave its audience an opportunity 
to share opinions and views. An interesting phenomenon here is a daily programme called 
‘I can, I want to help’ (Mogę, chcę pomóc), where followers can call and offer to give away 
used items like furniture, clothes or baby prams, making the radio a place to exchange 
information – a role which for younger people is now fulfilled by the internet (Burdziej 
2008). Consequently, the radio informed, provided patterns for self-organisation and 
served as a place to exchange information on how to get involved with its activities. 
The ability to mobilise its supporters is at the very core of Radio Maryja’s activity. 
Mobilisation – be it religious, social or political – is often contrasted with the indifference 
of non-engaged people, as explained by Father Rydzyk: ‘The worst thing is indifference 
(…) Evil grows thanks to supposedly-good being asleep’ (in Gendźwiłł and Stasik 2008: 
34). The social role of the radio was well summarised by Jarosław Gowin who said in an 
interview conducted in 2005, ‘Christian civil society, like any other civil society, needs to be 
created bottom-up. Here, the Family of Radio Maryja, like the radio station itself, is a role 
model when it comes to its ability for self-organisation’ (Michalski 2005). 
What has always caused the greatest controversy is the radio’s political involvement, which 
can be seen from the very outset of its activity. In the 1990s, the radio supported right-
wing parties in presidential and parliamentary elections. In 1997, around 30 politicians 
recommended and supported by Radio Maryja entered the Polish Sejm (Pokorna-
Ignatowicz 2003). In 2001, the radio facilitated the creation of the League of Polish 
Families and provided strong support for the party in the parliamentary elections, resulting 
in the League winning 38 seats in the Sejm after only four months since its creation. The 
next party to receive Radio Maryja’s support was Law and Justice in 2005, with the shift of 
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the station’s sympathies contributing to the demise of the League of Polish Families in 
2007. 
Radio Maryja’s political activism could be compared to the American religious right, which 
had the ambition to represent and organise conservative Christians in the public sphere. 
Radio Maryja gave voice to those groups of Polish Catholics who could not find support 
elsewhere for their opposition to the moral-cultural changes that had been taking place in 
Poland since 1989. Similarly to the religious right in the US, the station had the ambition to 
represent its listeners in the public sphere via its channel, and sometimes in politics through 
selected politicians and political parties (the League of Polish Families, Law and Justice) 
(Grabowska 2008). 
All in all, the strength of Radio Maryja’s influence on Polish politics seems to result from at 
least three elements. Firstly, although the radio is Catholic and is owned by the religious 
order of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer (known as Redemptorists), it has 
always been independent from the Polish Church hierarchy. Despite some attempts to curb 
its political involvement in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when a special commission of 
the Polish Episcopate was set up to monitor its activities, the broadcaster was able to 
benefit from the strong support of some of the Polish bishops and a lack of the 
Episcopate’s unanimity regarding the assessment of its actions. In 2007, Jarosław Gowin 
(2007: 11) described the relationship between Radio Maryja and the Church hierarchy as 
follows: ‘Among bishops of dioceses it may be a few people, among their deputies many 
more. I assume that in total one-fourth of the [Polish] Episcopate supports Father Rydzyk.’ 
The patronage of some bishops, coupled with the radio’s financial independence and ability 
to rely on a loyal support base, consolidated its autonomous position. 
Secondly, although the direct reach of Father Rydzyk’s media is fairly limited and estimated 
at only 2.3% for Radio Maryja (700,000 listeners) (RadioTrack by MillwardBrown 
SMG/KRC 2014), the potential for the political mobilisation of this group seems much 
larger. According to a survey conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS 
– Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej) on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Radio Maryja 
(CBOS 2011), 17% of the channel’s listeners declared their interests in politics to be 
significant, while 47% identified them to be average. This is more than the average for the 
rest of the Polish population (12% for significant interest in politics, 43% for average, 45% 
not interested). This increased interest in politics leads to a greater participation in 
elections, an important element for political parties which try to secure Father Rydzyk’s 
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support. According to the same study by CBOS, 71% of the radio station’s listeners said 
they had voted in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections in Poland (compared 
to 66% among the non-listeners), while 72% of those who listened to the programme said 
they had voted in the 2011 parliamentary elections, compared to 58% of those who did not 
listen to Father Rydzyk’s radio station. 
Mobilisation is different from shaping electoral preferences. Here, the broadcaster’s 
influence should not be over-estimated, although its impact has been steadily growing over 
the years (see Table 2 below). In 2001, 42% of the channel’s listeners followed Father 
Rydzyk’s advice and supported the newly created League of Polish Families, but almost 
60% voted for other parties, e.g. 14% for Self-Defence, with Law and Justice and the 
Freedom Union (Unia Wolności, UW) each receiving 8% of ‘Radio Maryja votes’. In 2005, 
when the station supported Law and Justice, 40% of its audience followed its preference, 
but again 60% voted differently (for example 16% for the strongly criticised Civic 
Platform, 12% for the League of Polish Families, 7% for the Polish Peasants’ Party or even 
5% for the communist successor Democratic Left Alliance). In both the elections of 2001 
and 2005, in which the radio had a clear favourite (the League of Polish Families and Law 
and Justice respectively) and a clear enemy (the Democratic Left Alliance and Civic 
Platform respectively), the majority of listeners deviated from Radio Maryja’s 
recommendations. At the same time, the ability of the channel to shape the electoral 
choices of its listeners is proven by the switch of support from the League of Polish 
Families to Law and Justices in 2005, when 40% of its audience decided to vote for Law 
and Justice (compared to 8% in 2001). 
Sociological data showed that listening to the broadcaster significantly increased the 
chances of voting for Law and Justice, while it reduced chances of supporting Civic 
Platform. This was confirmed by the 2007 parliamentary election results, when 62% of 
radio station’s listeners supported Law and Justice, following the broadcaster’s 
recommendation (Grabowska 2008). All in all, it is clear that Father Rydzyk and his media 
outlets did not only have the clear ability to mobilise their supporters to vote, transforming 
political preferences into political action, but could also convince a certain part of its 
listeners (in 2001 and 2004 around 40%, in 2007 60%) to vote for its preferred parties like 
the League of Polish Families in 2001 and Law and Justice since 2005. This phenomenon 
was also noted by Polish politicians like Daniel Pawłowiec, an ex-member of the League of 
Polish Families, who stated that ‘[the strength of Radio Maryja comes] from the loyalty of 
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its listeners. You need to remember that for the listeners of Radio Maryja and readers of 
‘Our Daily’, these two media outlets are the only media [that they follow]. They are directly 
linked with Father [Rydzyk] and he has complete control over them’ (Interview with D. 
Pawłowiec 2013). 
Table 2: Radio Maryja listeners and their electoral behaviour 
 
Declared 
listenership of 
Radio Maryja  
Participation in 
elections of Radio 
Maryja listeners 
Electoral support from Radio Maryja’s 
listeners 
2001 6% 70% 
42% - League of Polish Families  
14% - Self-Defence 
10% - Electoral Action Solidarity of the 
Right 
8% -   Freedom Union  
8% -   Law and Justice  
2005 16% 65% 
40% - Law and Justice 
16% - Civic Platform 
12% - League of Polish Families 
11% - Self-Defence 
7% -   Polish Peasants’ Party  
5% -   Democratic Left Alliance  
2007 12% 67% 
62% - Law and Justice 
20% - Civic Platform 
8% -   Polish Peasants’ Party 
3% -   League of Polish Families 
3% -   Self-Defence 
Source of opinion poll data: Grabowska (2008) 
The third reason for Radio Maryja’s noteworthy influence on Polish politics is the 
significant role of political programming in Father Rydzyk’s media. According to 2003 
media monitoring conducted by the Polish National Council of Radio and TV (Krajowa 
Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji), 19% of the total programming of Radio Maryja was devoted to 
‘current affairs’ programmes (programy publicystyczne), with 8% being the required minimum 
specified in the station’s broadcasting license (KRRiT 2003). The words of Jarosław 
Kaczyński can serve as a very good summary of the channel’s political role: ‘You can’t win 
elections without Radio Maryja. Once I wanted to do it differently. Porozumienie Centrum 
[Centre Agreement] … was an attempt to rely on the centre electorate. This failed’ 
(Karnowski and Zaremba 2006). The high attention Radio Maryja paid to political affairs 
meant that its ability to influence the political behaviour of listeners was above average. 
This relatively high politicisation translated into an important role played by Radio Maryja 
in the political mobilisation of Catholics in Poland. 
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Radio Maryja’s role in Polish political Catholicism 
The significant involvement of the radio station and associated media in Polish politics may 
be attributed to a specific type of ‘Catholicism’ that it subscribes to, which combined 
passion for the Catholic faith, the Church and Poland. This phenomenon was noted 
already in 1981 by Touraine, who conducted sociological research concerning the Solidarity 
movement in the 1980s and discovered a group driven by strong feelings of nationalism 
and affirmation of national identity, mixed with religious values and motivations 
(Grabowska 2008). In his analysis, Krzemiński (2009) noticed that, in the broadcaster’s 
discourse, (Catholic) religion and faith were inextricably linked with Polish national identity, 
whereby care for religion was synonymous with care for Poland. Radio Maryja tried to 
promote a form of an ‘alternative culture’ that stood in opposition to (neo-)liberal values 
allegedly supported by most other media and political elites. Radio Maryja attempted to 
create and maintain ‘a truly Polish culture, rooted in the best features of the national 
tradition’ (Gendźwiłł and Stasik 2008). According to this approach, the social order was 
entirely embedded in the moral order, which meant that a necessary requirement to solve 
problems was to impose one value system on the whole of society. Borkowska (2008) 
identified this as ‘tribalism’ – an attempt to bring back a situation in which social life was 
considered constant and independent from human choices and rules. 
Since the mid-2000s the influence of Radio Maryja’s milieu has started to decline 
somewhat. Nevertheless, it is still regarded as an important actor. According to Marek 
Migalski of Poland is the Most Important (previously Law and Justice), ‘Father Rydzyk is 
an important element in the right-wing electoral competition [between Solidaristic Poland 
and Law and Justice] … and this may influence the election results. He is not a decisive 
broadcaster, but he can add or remove some thousands of votes’ (Interview with M. 
Migalski 2012). The view of Radio Maryja as the source of a loyal, active voter base is 
broadly shared among commentators. Inga Czerny, the Polish Press Agency (Polska Agencja 
Prasowa – PAP) correspondent in Brussels, noticed that ‘[Radio Maryja] is very important, 
because … it [offers] a stable electorate’ (Interview with I. Czerny 2012). Tomasz 
Terlikowski said that ‘the right needs [Radio Maryja] in order to be able to take over 
eventually; however, [the station] is a burden sometimes …. It can secure 3% to 5% of 
votes in elections, which can tip the scale’ (Interview with T. Terlikowski 2013). Politicians 
appreciated the potential voters that Radio Maryja can ensure, but also saw Father Rydzyk’s 
media conglomerate as a very useful communication tool. Ryszard Czarnecki MEP, a 
prominent Law and Justice politician, declared that ‘Radio Maryja is a very important media 
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channel … because, in the light of a very low turnout, their calls for participation in 
elections have a significant importance’ (Interview with R. Czarnecki 2013). A similar view 
was shared by Janusz Wojciechowski MEP, who particularly appreciated Radio Maryja as a 
forum open to Law and Justice politicians, which was willing to make its broadcasting 
studios available for discussions of topics suggested by the party (Interview with J. 
Wojciechowski 2012). In addition, some of the Polish Catholic Church hierarchy, like the 
quoted Archbishop Muszyński, agreed that ‘[Radio Maryja] has a significant influence [on 
politics] …. It is unambiguously associated with one of the Polish parties [i.e. Law and 
Justice]’ (Interview with H. Muszyński 2013). 
While there seems to be a broad agreement on the existence of Radio Maryja’s impact on 
the Polish political scene, the assessment of the strength of this phenomenon is a much 
more contentious issue. Piotr Kaczyński, a political analyst, noted that ‘Radio Maryja is a 
group that spreads [its views] to Law and Justice and the Church. The Church without 
Radio Maryja would be different; there would be more internal discussions [about Europe]’ 
(Interview with P.M. Kaczyński 2013). However, people associated with the political 
Catholic milieu are more prone to describing the station’s influence as limited or even 
minimal. For example, Tomasz Terlikowski pointed out that ‘naturally, [Radio Maryja] is a 
pressure group that … can exert significant pressure … but only on their “own” parties 
such as Law and Justice or the Polish Peasants' Party’ (Interview with T. Terlikowski 2013). 
The same could be said about political Catholic parties, which were eager to assert their 
ideological independence from Radio Maryja. For example, when the League of Polish 
Families started losing Father Rydzyk’s support, its leaders decided not to bow to pressure 
by the radio station and instead maintained their political line, despite the transfer of the 
channel’s support to Law and Justice (Interview with D. Pawłowiec 2013). Naturally, this 
did not preclude minor compromises and tactical movements designed to bring parties and 
Radio Maryja closer3. Overall, the channel’s influence was clear, but it should not be 
overestimated in terms of its magnitude. 
 
                                                 
3 E.g. Law and Justice’s support for the efforts by ‘TV I persist’ to secure a digital TV bandwidth that would 
allow it to broadcast nationwide or the decision of the Law and Justice controlled National Fund for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management to grant Father Rydzyk’s foundation Lux Veritatis 
financial subsidies for the exploration of geothermal waters. 
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3.4 How different is political Catholicism in Poland? 
The distinct role of Catholicism in Polish history and culture, the amalgamation of the 
Catholic religion and Polish national identity and the lack of significant secularisation 
processes have made political Catholicism in Poland a strong movement with significant 
influence in the political arena. At the same time, it is one of the main hypotheses of this 
research that Polish political Catholicism differs significantly from its Western European 
counterparts, making it a deviant case. 
Chapter 2 explained the definition of political Catholicism as a movement, presenting its 
primary features:  
a) strong inspiration drawn from Catholic social teaching; 
b) activity in the public sphere to ensure that Catholic moral values are not only 
protected but also enshrined in law, making them legally binding for the whole of 
society; 
and secondary features of post-1945 political Catholicism: 
a) a multi-faceted character; 
b) independence from the Church, despite (close) co-operation; 
c) strong anchoring in local and regional politics, while maintaining the ability to 
develop effective transnational networks of cooperation; 
d) in Western Europe, most successful in the form of Christian democracy and 
supportive of European integration; 
e) not simply a group of individual Catholics who are active in politics, but rather 
political action with a Catholic inspiration. 
Polish political Catholicism naturally meets the key criteria that make it a part of the 
political Catholic movement. Above all, it is deeply concerned with protecting Christian 
moral values in the public sphere and tries to ensure that legislation is either based on them 
or at least is not contradictory to them. The position of political Catholic parties in Poland 
on issues such as abortion, euthanasia, family rights and family policy, the introduction of 
civil partnerships or the Church’s public image serve here as the best examples. ‘My 
responsibility is to ensure that Poland remains on its [Christian] foundations, which, at the 
same time, will ensure that the Polish state continues to exist. There is no [Poland] without 
the cross. You may think this is bigotry, but this is history’ (Interview with K. Pawłowicz 
2013) – this statement by Krystyna Pawłowicz, one of the Law and Justice MPs, epitomises 
the strong attachment of Polish political Catholicism to Christian values and its belief that 
Catholicism provides the basis for the proper functioning of Polish society. Given the close 
relationship between Polish national identity and Catholicism, as well as the strong position 
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of the Church as one of the institutions upholding Polish traditions and nurturing the 
feeling of national identity, it is not surprising that Polish political Catholicism regards the 
Church and Christian values as the foundations for state and social order to a much higher 
degree than its contemporary Western European counterpart. As Tomasz Terlikowski, 
Catholic publicist and commentator of Polish politics, poignantly observed, ‘the language 
of Christianity [the Christian narrative] is the only one available in Poland …. This language 
was used by both secular and religious opposition during communism …. Everything in 
Poland revolves around this language and [the Christian values] system’ (Interview with T. 
Terlikowski 2013). Some of the Polish political Catholic politicians went as far as to define 
the protection of ‘conservative values’ as being in Poland’s best interest ‘because 
strengthening values like the family,[and] freedom of religion … is a European and Polish 
matter. It is definitely in the Polish national interest that these values are not ousted. 
Poland is largely built on these values …. If we lose them in Europe, it will be more 
difficult to maintain them in Poland – one thing is closely related to the other’ (Interview 
with J. Wojciechowski 2012). They also perceived the protection of conservative and 
Christian values as a ‘fundamental dimension for [their party’s] policy’ (Interview with K. 
Szymański 2013). Indeed, the role of Christian values in Polish politics seems to be 
regarded by some commentators as a strong focus of Polish parties, particularly Polish 
political Catholicism. For example, when talking about the EU policy of Law and Justice, 
Tomasz Bielecki, a Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent in Brussels, noticed that Polish 
politicians pay particular attention to issues connected to morality, marriage, and gay rights 
(Interview with T. Bielecki 2012). 
In terms of economic policies, parties like Law and Justice, Centre Agreement or the 
Christian National Union advocated the need for social justice and social protection 
programmes that would shield the most vulnerable in society from adverse effects of 
transformation to capitalist economy. They stressed that economic growth should be based 
on social solidarity and justice that would help to avoid social exclusion. 
Similar to West European political Catholicism, the Polish version of the movement was 
also eager to assert its independence from the institutional Church, despite having often 
closely co-operated with it. The best illustration of this feature seems to be the League of 
Polish Families, whose creation was greatly facilitated by Radio Maryja, but which ensured 
its independence and opposed direct influence by Father Rydzyk on the party’s 
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functioning. This ultimately proved to be one of the elements that contributed to the 
transfer of Radio Maryja’s support to Law and Justice. 
Here, however, similarities between Polish political Catholicism and its West European 
counterparts end. The first, although not the most important, differentiating factor is a lack 
of strong sub-national, regional anchoring of Polish political Catholicism. Quite the 
contrary, political Catholic groups in Poland were fervently concerned with national unity 
at the state level and supported a unitary, centralised Polish state without significant 
devolution of power to regional authorities. What was more, it often perceived regional 
identities and culture as a threat to Polish national identity and saw it as a way of weakening 
the state. For example, Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of Law and Justice, referred to a regional 
Silesian party, the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Śląska), which advocated 
autonomy for this region, as a ‘secretly pro-German’, suggesting that it wished to separate 
Silesia from Poland and incorporate it into Germany (Krzyk 2011).  
Nonetheless, the most striking feature of Polish political Catholicism is the fact that since 
the inter-war years, it was strongly dominated by a Catholic-nationalistic trait. As a result of 
the entangled ideas of Catholicism and Polish national identity, most Polish citizens, 
including national elites, regarded the unique role of the Church and the fact that the 
actions of the Church and the state were closely tied together as axiomatic (Kuk 2004). 
This meant that political Catholicism, which combined in its ideology and programme 
Catholicism with nationalism, attracted much more support than Christian democracy 
focused on solidarity, reconciliation and co-operation. 
This led to another remarkable feature of Polish political Catholicism – the non-existence 
or failure of Christian democracy in Poland, at least in its archetypical manifestation. Bale 
and Szczerbiak (2008) identified seven factors necessary for the successful development of 
Christian democratic parties. They concluded that only one of them – a substantial share of 
practicing Roman Catholics in the population – was present in Poland, with other factors 
being either absent or very limited. The authors attributed the fact that no self-declared 
Christian democratic party had been successful in Poland to a mixture of agency, 
contingency and structural factors. Although my research does not contradict Bale and 
Szczerbiak’s findings, it shows that the failure of Christian democracy in Poland stems 
rather from the fact that its traditional characteristics (focus on transnational cooperation 
and reconciliation) did not resonate with Polish society, where a deep connection between 
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Catholicism and Polish national identity created a space for political Catholicism with a 
strong Catholic-nationalist trait. 
The Catholic-nationalist trait is best exemplified by Radio Maryja and the type of religiosity 
that it promotes, whereby religion and faith are inextricably linked with Polish national 
identity and where care for religion is synonymous with care for Poland. Throughout the 
past 20 years, Radio Maryja and its supporters were active political actors, fostering the 
formation of political parties or contributing to their demise, as was the case with the 
League of Polish Families. The radio station also created a separate social group, the Family 
of Radio Maryja, with a distinct identity, based on shared values and a combination of 
concerns for religion and concerns for Poland – a form of national-religious patriotism. A 
good example of how Catholic-nationalism affected the electoral success of political 
Catholic parties in Poland is the Centre Agreement, which in the 1990s attempted to 
position itself closer to Christian democratic ideals and ultimately failed. 
This Catholic-nationalist characteristic and Euroscepticism also means that Polish political 
Catholicism finds it difficult to co-operate transnationally with other political Catholic 
parties. The Law and Justice’s history in the European Parliament exemplifies this situation 
best. The party initially had an observer status with the European People’s Party, but as a 
result of the EPP’s federalist stance and the disputed role of Erika Steinbach, leader of the 
German Federation of Expellees and a member of the German Christian Democratic 
Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), Law and Justice joined the now 
defunct ‘Union for a Europe of Nations’ group and since 2009 was a member of the 
European Conservatives and Reformists group which comprises of Eurosceptic British 
Conservatives and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS). 
Political Catholicism in Poland as described above emerged as a strong actor on the Polish 
political scene and had a significant influence on decision-making and legislation. It either 
spearheaded or was an essential part of governing coalitions from 1991 to 93, 1997 to 
2001, and 2005 to 2007. Since then, political Catholic parties have formed the largest 
opposition group. However, the important role of political Catholicism has sometimes 
been overlooked, mainly because of its unique nature in Poland, the fact that it did not 
develop strong Christian democratic parties and its markedly Eurosceptic character, which 
stand in contrast to political Catholicism typical elsewhere in Europe. 
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The widespread criticism of European integration processes is the final element that needs 
to be mentioned when discussing Polish political Catholicism. As shown in the previous 
chapter, historically Catholics have not only been in favour of the integration process, but 
Christian democracy was a driving force behind it. This observation, however, seems not to 
apply to Polish political Catholicism, which is markedly Eurosceptic. The European Union 
and the integration process is often criticised by Polish political Catholicism, which 
positions itself as the defender of Christian values against the perceived threat that the 
laicised EU allegedly poses for Polish national identity. This issue will be analysed in detail 
in the following chapters. 
Western European Christian democracy as an empty vessel – the perception of 
Polish political Catholicism 
It is not only that external observers and analysts, including the author of this study, 
described Polish political Catholicism as different from other manifestations of this 
movement. Polish political Catholicism also clearly defined itself as fundamentally separate 
and distinct from Western European movements of this type. 
Representatives of Polish political Catholicism across the spectrum saw West European 
political Catholicism in its best-known form of Christian democracy as an ideologically 
empty vessel. Krzysztof Szczerski, Law and Justice MP, explained that ‘Christian 
democracy is an empty slogan nowadays… [The European People’s Party (EPP)] is a 
pragmatic party of the centre …. There came a moment of verification – the call of John 
Paul II [to include] Christianity in the [European] constitution, and a significant part of 
Christian democrats in the EP rejected that in a vote. There was [also the case of a 
Commissioner candidate Rocco] Buttiglione, who was not defended …. Schuman would 
not find a place in today’s EPP …. There is nothing left from his vision’ (Interview with K. 
Szczerski 2013). Ryszard Legutko, MEP of the same party, agreed: ‘[Now] you don’t know 
what Christian democracy is. If you call the EPP a Christian democratic party, it [sounds] 
funny’ (Interview with R. Legutko 2013). The self-perception of Polish political 
Catholicism as fundamentally different from its Western European counterpart is so strong 
that, according to Ryszard Czarnecki MEP, ‘comparing [Law and Justice] to Western 
European Christian democracy could be regarded as offensive, because nowadays, they 
often do not differ very much from socialist parties’ (Interview with R. Czarnecki 2013). 
Others followed suit. Daniel Pawłowiec, ex-member of the League of Polish Families, 
declared that ‘the adjective “Christian” does not suit them [Western European Christian 
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democratic parties] – it’s an empty slogan …. In this respect Central and Eastern European 
parties are different, they look differently at Christian values’ (Interview with D. Pawłowiec 
2013). Maciej Giertych of the same party also said that European Christian democracy is an 
ideologically empty shell that has departed from Christian roots (Interview with M. 
Giertych 2013). Even in the more toned-down statements of Konrad Szymański MEP, one 
can find similar sentiments: ‘Today, truly Christian democratic thinking does not exist …. 
[Christian democracy] has been tainted with different ideologies that are currently 
fashionable …. We can find different inclinations there: liberal, ecologic, or social-
democratic. [Today] Christian democracy is able to accept anything. Some say it’s a great 
advantage that it can adapt to different needs. In my opinion it's a weakness. The 
ideological backbone of this movement has been broken’ (Interview with K. Szymański 
2013). A similar view was shared by a non-political protagonist. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek 
noted that the ‘opinions and beliefs of many people [in the EPP], who declare themselves 
to be Christian, seem odd. [The EPP] has become a conglomerate without deep [Christian] 
values …. [Christian democrats in Europe] no longer fight for [Christian] values, but they 
fight for power’ (Interview with T. Pieronek 2013). 
Naturally, the perceived lack of the EPP’s focus on protecting Christian values is not the 
only argument for Polish political Catholicism to perceive itself as different. The diverging 
approaches to national sovereignty surfaced as another important element in how Polish 
political Catholicism distinguished itself from Western Europe. As Konrad Szymański MP 
emphasised, ‘I don't know what this term [Christian democracy] means today …. 
According to its traditional definition, [Law and Justice] is not [a Christian democratic 
party] … because the traditional model included a relaxed approach to national sovereignty 
… while we [Law and Justice] do not want to relativise [the role of national sovereignty], 
even in the context of Christian universalism …. The party believes that Christian 
universalism does not entail neglecting the role of the state. On the contrary, states can 
support the growth of Christianity in societies that accept this. The state is not an enemy of 
Christian universalism’ (Interview with K. Szymański 2013). Janusz Wojciechowski MEP 
shared this view, saying that, ‘What makes us different from the EPP … is [our stance on] 
the issues of national interest, sovereignty, [and] opposition to federalism’ (Interview with 
J. Wojciechowski 2012). One of the very few concessions Polish political Catholicism was 
prepared to make when comparing itself to Western European Christian democracy was 
admitting that, in the words of Ryszard Legutko MEP, it could only be described as 
Christian democratic in the sense of ‘classic post-war Christian democracy [of the 1950s 
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and 1960s]’ (Interview with R. Legutko 2013), when the movement was still strongly 
attached to Christian values. 
The self-perception of Polish political Catholicism as something fundamentally different 
from its Western European counterparts is the final element that completes the picture of 
Polish political Catholicism. It is not only features identified clearly through external 
analyses that make Polish political Catholicism different; it is also its self-awareness and 
self-identification which underline the distinctiveness of Polish political Catholicism from 
West European manifestations of this movement. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to describe the nature of Polish political Catholicism by identifying its 
key features and comparing them with the already established definition of the 
phenomenon. 
The departure point of the analysis was defining the archetype of political Catholicism as a 
broad movement, based on Catholic teaching and moral values, whose key aim was to base 
the societal set-up on these values and enshrine them in a legal system. The previous 
chapter had already identified some essential elements of traditional political Catholicism in 
Western Europe, like: the dominant position of Christian democracy as the most successful 
manifestation of the movement, an eagerness to assert independence from the hierarchical 
Church, a strong anchoring in sub-national, regional and local politics, and, last but 
definitely not least, acceptance of the concept of supranationalism and playing a pivotal 
role in driving European integration. 
In order to describe the nature of political Catholicism in Poland, it was necessary to 
explain the unique role of Catholicism in Poland and its amalgamation with a feeling of 
national identity. As described above, the unique role of Catholicism in Poland resulted 
from the particular historical circumstances of its development. Because it had been an 
opposition to state authorities in most recent history and had not relied on a caesaro-papist 
relationship, Catholicism in Poland has never been used as a justification for political and 
social oppression or military conquests. On the contrary, it played an important role in the 
defence of national and religious values, which have integrated so much that a betrayal of 
one of them was treated as a betrayal of both. 
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As explained by Tomasz Terlikowki and Krzysztof Szczerski in interviews cited earlier in 
this chapter, Polish Catholicism has close ties not only with the culture of the nation at the 
societal level, but it also provided a framework for the lives of ordinary people, whereby 
many of the key events in lives of individuals were marked by religious ceremonies (e.g. 
baptism, the first communion, marriage, funeral) and helped to ensure national 
identification and cultivate traditions. Catholicism provided a reference point in life, 
defining what is right and wrong, and most importantly offered consolation to people as 
well as to the nation as a whole during difficult times. 
Thus, the feeling of Polishness slowly integrated with Catholicism, following the Church’s 
role in preserving Polish national identity during the partition period and protecting those 
persecuted under communist rule. In particular, during the second half of the 20th century, 
the Church acquired great moral and social power, being at times at the centre of political 
activity (Majka 1980). At that time, Polish Catholicism developed its broad view of religion 
as encompassing not only pastoral activity but also areas outside of the religious sphere. 
This was clearly expressed in the 1980s, when attending a mass became a form of political 
rebellion and it was not unusual for atheists or religiously indifferent people to connect 
with the Church as a place of shelter and protection (Borowik 2002). 
It is not surprising that the strong presence of Catholicism in Polish history and culture has 
produced an influential political Catholic movement in Poland. Parties and groups 
associated with the movement were important actors in the early 1990s, were part of the 
coalition government from 1997 to 2001, formed the government from 2005 to 2007 and 
since then have spearheaded the opposition in Poland. Even though Civic Platform, which 
has been in power since 2007, could not be qualified as political Catholic, there was a 
markedly strong attachment to Catholicism within some of the factions of the party as well. 
The fact that political Catholicism has been an important actor in Polish politics may have 
been often overlooked because of one of its features – the lack of successful Christian 
democratic parties. This is in stark contrast to Western Europe, where Christian democracy 
became almost a synonym for political Catholicism, also among scholars. 
The non-existence of Christian democracy in Poland is connected to a characteristic feature 
of Polish political Catholicism, that is its Catholic-nationalistic character, which stems from 
the close connection between Catholicism, Polish national identity and struggles for Polish 
sovereignty, in which the Church played an important role. Thus, Polish political 
98 
  
Catholicism is not rooted in the concepts of reconciliation and supranationalism 
characteristic for Western European Christian democracy. Instead, it is markedly ‘Gaullist’, 
if not nationalist at times, with a strong focus on the protection of Polish sovereignty and 
national interests.  
A good example of this Catholic-nationalist trait is Radio Maryja with its characteristic 
fusion of care for the Catholic religion, the Church and Poland, all inexorably linked 
together. This ‘specific type of Catholicism’ combined nationalism and affirmation of 
national identity with religious values and motivations, which led to the creation of a 
paradigm according to which being Catholic was a crucial and necessary element of being 
Polish. 
The distinctiveness of Polish political Catholicism can be confirmed not only by means of 
an external analysis. The striking self-separation of Polish political Catholicism from its 
Western European counterparts powerfully shows why political Catholicism in Poland is a 
deviant case. It is not only the intrinsic features of Polish political Catholicism, like its 
Catholic-nationalist trait, but also its self-identification based on the rejection of traditional 
West European political Catholicism (in the form of Christian democracy), which it sees as 
an ideologically empty vessel, that underline its distinctiveness. 
Finally, the most unusual feature of Polish political Catholicism has surfaced in this 
chapter: its Euroscepticism. In this context, the close relations between Polish national 
identity and Catholicism are crucial. The Polish debate on Europe has often been based on 
the dichotomy between those who believed that ‘the EU was the embodiment of the 
Enlightenment, human rights, liberalism and individualistic values’ versus those who 
thought that ‘Europe only made sense when it was Catholic, or at least Christian’ (Góra 
and Mach 2010: 240). 
The next chapters will take a closer look at the issue of Euroscepticism within Polish 
political Catholicism and will analyse how under certain circumstances political Catholicism 
can develop a Eurosceptic position.  
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4 Party-based Euroscepticism in Poland and 
the role of  political Catholicism 
4.1 Introduction 
With the EU enlargement to ten Central and East European countries, together with Malta 
and Cyprus in 2004 and 2007, new cases for extended research on the impact of European 
integration on national party systems emerged. Eight out of ten new member states that 
joined the EU in 2004 were at the time undergoing deep economic, social and legal 
transformations from centrally commanded communist economies to free-market liberal 
democracies. One of the most important, if not central, actors in these processes was the 
EU which, through its pre-accession recommendations and requirements, provided many 
states with a general sense of direction. At the same time, this very role of the EU and 
concerns about the general trajectory of European integration gave rise to a wave of 
contestation and opposition. 
Among the new member states, Poland seems to be a particularly interesting case. It was 
the biggest in the cohort that joined the EU in 2004, clearly having the potential to become 
a significant player on the European political scene. In addition, Poles were 
overwhelmingly pro-Europe throughout the 1990s, with political elites almost universally 
supporting Polish EU membership. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s opposition to 
Europe started growing, which allowed ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties to win 18% of votes in 
the 2001 national elections. Although, the size of the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic camp significantly 
decreased in the following years, Euroscepticism remained an important element of Polish 
party politics (Szczerbiak 2008). 
This chapter will discuss party-based Euroscepticism in Poland and will focus on 
presenting three key themes characteristic to Polish party-based Euroscepticism. Firstly, the 
fact that Polish political Catholicism with its Catholic-nationalist trait is the driving force of 
party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. Secondly, this chapter will outline the fluid nature of 
Euroscepticism, where some Polish parties have changed their attitudes towards European 
integration quite decisively. Finally, it will focus on the important lesson that emerges from 
the Polish case not to mistake temporary changes of rhetoric resulting from short-term 
electoral tactics for a fundamental change of political positions on Europe. 
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In order to set the scene for the following analysis, the chapter will start with a brief outline 
of the history of Polish-EU relations in the context of domestic politics. Section three will 
then describe attitudes to European integration held by the key Eurosceptic parties: Law 
and Justice, the League of Polish Families, the Polish Peasants’ Party, Self-Defence and the 
Union of Real Politics. Naturally, the Polish party system encompassed more Eurosceptic 
parties. However, for the sake of clarity, this chapter will mainly focus on those that either 
won the most votes in the 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections (the first 
four), or represented a unique strand in Polish party-based Euroscepticism (the Union of 
Real Politics) and, as such, need to be included in this analysis. To provide a 
comprehensive picture of party-based opposition to and critics of European integration in 
Poland and its historical background, the chapter will also briefly discuss three Eurosceptic 
parties that were active in the 1990s: the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, the 
Polish Agreement, and the Christian National Union. Section four will present an analysis 
and conceptualisation of Polish party-based Euroscepticism based on the gathered material.  
 
4.2 Poland-EU relations in the context of  domestic politics 
As a result of the 1989-1991 fall of communism, Polish foreign policy was entirely 
reoriented from close relations with the Soviet Union toward stronger economic and 
military co-operation with the West. Immediately after the Polish 1989 partially democratic 
elections, there was no space for real debate about future objectives in terms of European 
integration, but once the fully democratic system was established in 1991, the European 
issue entered political discourse and began featuring in party programmes (Zuba 2006). In 
fact, EU (and NATO) membership became a top priority of Polish foreign policy, largely 
dominating any other objectives in foreign relations. 
During the 1990s, Poland had one of the highest levels of popular support for EU 
membership among the post-communist candidate states, which was matched by a political 
consensus in favour of the EU (Szczerbiak 2004). Initially, the discussion about the Polish 
role in European integration was framed as a historical opportunity to ‘return to Europe’, 
whereby European integration was seen as a way to anchor Poland within the Western 
democratic world, to ensure economic modernisation of the country and increase political 
stability. Opposing views were marginal and did not have significant influence either on the 
public debate or on public opinion. 
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The first formal step on the way to Poland’s EU membership was the signing of the 
association agreement between Poland and the EU in 1994, known as the Europe 
Agreement. Following the 1993 Copenhagen European Council summit, where the 
political-economic criteria for the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to 
the EU were defined, the government of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish 
Peasants’ Party filed an official Polish application for EU membership in 1994. The 
accession negotiations commenced in March 1998 under the government of Solidarity 
Electoral Action and the Freedom Union. Although Poland was usually in the middle of 
the table of states that opened negotiations with the EU in 1998 in terms of ‘closed’ 
negotiation chapters, in the beginning of the 2000s, the impression arose that Poland was 
lagging behind other countries. On the one hand, Poland was the biggest of the 10 
candidate countries and from the beginning, it was clear that it was going to be difficult for 
the EU to accommodate a 38-million people state. On the other hand, the Solidarity 
Electoral Action government of 1997-2001, during which much of accession negotiations 
took place, was caught up in internal struggles, caused by the ideological and programmatic 
heterogeneity of the government. An important part of Solidarity Electoral Action was a 
political Catholic party, the Christian National Union, on which the government relied for 
its parliamentary majority. The Christian National Union was a Eurosceptic party, which 
forced the government to maintain a ‘tough’ negotiating stance on some particularly 
sensitive issues like the transition periods for the right of foreigners to buy land in Poland 
(Szczerbiak 2002). 
During the 1990s, there was very little serious debate about the potential costs and benefits 
of Polish EU membership. With progressing accession negotiations, however, it became 
clear that adjusting the Polish economy to EU norms would be costly and that Poland 
would need to make concessions in the negotiations. This portrayed the European issue in 
a rather negative light, causing a gradual decline of public support for membership from 
80% in June 1994 to 55-60% in the middle of the 1990s and the growth of opponents to 
20-25% of Poles (CBOS 2014). 
Although the importance of the European issue grew steadily in Polish politics with the 
progress of the negotiations, it was not until 1999, when the parliamentary group Our 
Circle (Nasze Koło) and later the Polish Agreement party were created, that the question of 
Polish EU membership became a more important aspect of party activity. The Polish 
Agreement believed that support for or opposition to Polish EU membership should be a 
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central cleavage in Polish politics, even more important than the traditional left-right 
dimension (Zuba 2006). But the party quickly faded into obscurity, failing to make a mark 
on Polish politics and public opinion.  
Nonetheless, during the 2001 parliamentary elections the new Eurosceptic bloc of voters 
that emerged at the end of the 1990s fed into the emergence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
groupings, with two parties openly hostile to Polish EU membership: the Catholic-
nationalist League of Polish Families, which won 7.9%, and the agrarian-populist Self-
Defence with 10.2% of votes (Szczerbiak 2004). 
After the 2001 elections, the pro-EU Democratic Left Alliance and the agrarian Polish 
Peoples’ Party formed a governing coalition. The new government was committed to 
adopting a more flexible negotiating stance, particularly when it came to the lower level of 
direct farm subsidies that would be paid to Polish farmers and the right of foreigners to 
purchase land. As a result, negotiations progressed faster and in April 2003, Poland and the 
EU signed the Accession Treaty. 
To complete the accession process, Poles were to vote on Polish EU membership in a 
referendum, which was scheduled for June 2003. The initial referendum campaign started 
by the government in 2002 (officially an ‘EU information campaign’) met with criticism 
and did not provoke much of a debate on the issue. The campaign only gathered some 
momentum after the signing of the Accession Treaty. The Yes camp ran several parallel 
campaigns, out of which the most visible was the campaign organised by the then SLD-
backed Polish President, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. In addition, there was an official 
campaign by the Polish government and separate campaigns by some Polish parties and 
civil society organisations. While almost all of the Polish political establishment supported 
the Yes camp, the No campaign was run by the League of Polish Families. The No camp 
made a rational decision to focus its rhetoric on the possible negative economic impact of 
Poland’s EU membership, but in the end, it failed to make a significant impact as it often 
resorted to emotional and ideological issues, which, at the time, could mobilise only a 
fraction of the electorate. In addition, the No camp was crippled by the fact that it had 
significantly fewer resources at its disposal and limited access to the publicly owned media. 
The only mass medium that provided strong backing to the No campaign was the radical 
Catholic-nationalist broadcaster, Radio Maryja, which, however, came under strong 
pressure from the Polish Church hierarchy to tone down its Euroscepticism. Once Pope 
John Paul II apparently spoke out in favour of Poland’s EU membership in May 2003, the 
103 
  
Catholic-nationalist critique of the EU became even more difficult. Consequently, the real 
issue for the Yes campaign was not convincing Polish citizens to vote for accession, as 
public support for the EU was already quite high, but to ensure a turnout of above 50% of 
the electorate. Poles had quite a poor record of electoral participation (less than 50% voting 
in the three preceding parliamentary elections and even lower turnout in national 
referendums), while a turnout above 50% was a legal condition for the referendum to be 
declared valid (Szczerbiak 2004). Finally, the EU referendum on Polish EU membership 
was held on 7 and 8 June 2003. With turnout at 58.85%, 77.45% of voters favoured and 
22.55% opposed Polish accession to the EU. 
Soon after accession, the coalition of Law and Justice, Self-Defence and the Eurosceptic 
League of Polish Families formed a new government after the 2005 national elections, 
adopting more Eurosceptic rhetoric than previous governments, with Law and Justice 
assuming an explicitly anti-federalist position and accentuating its support for the ‘Europe 
of Nations’ idea. One of the signs of this approach was Law and Justice’s opposition to the 
Constitutional Treaty, coupled with demands for the introduction of references to 
Christian values in its preamble and the continuation of the Nice system of Council voting, 
thought to be more favourable to Poland. After the 2007 elections, both the League of 
Polish Families and Self-Defence were marginalised and did not enter the Polish Sejm, while 
Civic Platform formed a new government coalition with its junior partner, the Polish 
Peasants’ Party. The new government withdrew from the Eurosceptic rhetoric of its 
predecessor and tried to move the country more to the centre of European politics by 
aligning itself closely with Germany and adopting a strongly pro-EU stance. 
 
4.3 Polish Eurosceptic parties – an overview 
The very first unambiguously ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party in Poland, the Union of Real 
Politics, gained 2.26% of votes in the first fully democratic parliamentary election in 1991, 
winning 3 seats in the Polish Sejm. In the following elections of 1993, the combined result 
of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties grew to 6%,4 although none of them secured any seats in the 
parliament following the introduction of the electoral threshold of 5%. It was not until 
1998 that ‘hard’ Eurosceptic MPs appeared again in the Polish parliament, followed by the 
2001 elections, when ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties won 18%. In fact, 2001 represented for 
                                                 
4 Union of Real Politics 3.2%, Self-Defence 2.8%  
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some commentators (e.g. Reed 2001) a ‘Eurosceptic backlash’ in the overwhelmingly pro-
EU Polish political arena (Szczerbiak 2008). ‘Hard’ Eurosceptics were now represented by 
two parties: the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence together won 18% of votes 
and 91 seats in the Sejm. The 2005 elections marked a highpoint of ‘hard’ party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland – the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence gathered 19% 
of votes and won 90 seats (data based on Zuba 2006). What followed this success was a 
significant remodelling of the Polish political scene, which resulted in the ultimate 
disappearance of ‘hard’ Eurosceptics from the Polish parliament in 2007, with Law and 
Justice becoming the leading (‘soft’) Eurosceptic party in Polish politics. 
The following section will focus on presenting the European policies of the most 
important Eurosceptic parties in Poland, that is: Law and Justice, the League of Polish 
Families, Self-Defence, the Polish Peasants’ Party and the Union of Real Politics. As a 
historical background, this section will briefly present three Eurosceptic parties that were 
active in the 1990s, namely the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, the Polish 
Agreement and the Christian National Union. 
Beginnings of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland – the Christian National 
Union, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and Polish Agreement 
The presentation of Polish Eurosceptic parties starts with some information on three 
groupings that were active in the 1990s and formed part of the early stages of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland. 
The Christian National Union, founded in 1989, was the first party of the political Catholic 
category that played an important role in the development of Polish party-based 
Euroscepticism. The party was Catholic-nationalist in its nature and closely followed the 
Catholic Church’s position on such issues as abortion, the family and the role of religion in 
public life. It participated successfully in the 1991 and 1993 parliamentary elections by 
spearheading two electoral coalitions: Catholic Electoral Action in 1991 with 8.7% of votes 
and the Catholic Electoral Committee ‘Fatherland’ (Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy ‘Ojczyzna’) in 
1993, which won 6.4% of votes. In 1997, the Christian National Union joined the grand 
coalition of right-wing parties called Solidarity Electoral Action. After 2001, the party did 
not manage to enter the Polish Sejm and gradually ceased to function. 
In general, the party’s European policy could be classified as ‘soft’ Eurosceptic, but it is 
also an example of the fluidity of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. One can clearly 
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distinguish two periods – before 1999, when the party was more radical (e.g. voting against 
the ratification of the Europe Agreement between Poland and the EU in 1992), and after 
1999, when the more extremist politicians left the party and it joined the coalition of 
Solidarity Electoral Action, where it had to adjust its policy to the more pro-EU 
programme of the coalition. Zuba (2006) pointed out that much of the party’s 
Euroscepticism stemmed from its perception of the EU as a culturally alien organisation, 
which threatened Polish national identity based on Christian values. As a former member 
of the party Artur Zawisza explained, ‘the Christian National Union’s position [on Europe] 
was set out already in its 1989 programme. In short, it was: “For European integration, but 
against a European federation” …. For the party, the most important moments in the 
European debate were the discussions about religious, Christian, and moral aspects. The 
opinion that Christian inspiration should be [a part of] European integration was more 
dominant in the party than [were demands to] isolate [Poland] from the EU’ (Interview 
with A. Zawisza 2013). 
Following the breakup of the Christian National Union in 1999, radically anti-EU 
politicians centred around Jan Łopuszański formed a new party – the Polish Agreement. 
This organisation was the only Polish party that was close to being classified as a single-
issue anti-EU party (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004). Its programme was based on the belief 
that the left/right division of the Polish political scene was obsolete in face of the 
progression of European integration (Zuba 2006). Indeed, opposition to Poland’s 
membership of the EU and NATO formed the main element of the party’s activity. In 
2001, the party joined the newly created League of Polish Families. This co-operation 
ended in 2003. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the party did not enter the legislature. 
The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland was established by Jan Olszewski in 1995 
as a conservative party advocating high levels of social protection with a programme based 
on Christian values. It is yet another example of a political Catholic party of a Eurosceptic 
nature in Poland. It gained 5.5% of votes in the 1997 parliamentary elections and entered 
the Sejm with six MPs. Initially, its stance on the EU and Polish EU membership was 
ambiguous. The party tended to remain silent about the matter. During the 1997-2001 
parliamentary term, the party was described as ‘Euro-realist’ and a supporter of a ‘Europe 
of Nations’. However, gradually, the movement’s policy evolved into a more radical anti-
EU position. Before the 2001 elections, it joined the League of Polish Families. In 
subsequent years it heavily criticised the accession negotiations conducted by the 
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Democratic Left Alliance government, and finally stated its ‘boundary conditions’ of Polish 
EU membership in 2002. They included: declaring Polish sovereignty as inviolable, banning 
land acquisition by foreigners – at least until prices in the EU and Poland would equalise – 
and ensuring full direct subsidies for Polish farmers. In reality, these conditions meant the 
rejection of the European integration process by the party (Zuba 2006). In 2002, two of the 
Movement’s MPs that entered the Sejm as candidates of the League of Polish Families left 
the party. In 2005, the Movement failed to win any seats in the parliament and became 
marginalised. 
Law and Justice  
Law and Justice is the primary example of two central themes that run through Polish 
party-based Euroscepticism: the importance of political Catholic Euroscepticism in Poland 
and the fluid nature of this phenomenon in Polish politics. The party was created by 
Jarosław Kaczyński in 2001 to capitalise on the popularity that his twin brother, Lech, had 
gained while serving as minister of justice in the AWS-led government. 
The party’s European policy underwent several changes. In the initial period, Law and 
Justice underlined the need for Poland to anchor itself in Europe, at the same time pointing 
out various risks that European integration may pose for the Polish economy and culture 
(Kaczyński 2003). In the pre-accession referendum period, the party strongly criticised the 
conditions of Poland’s EU membership negotiated by the Democratic Left Alliance 
government led by Leszek Miller, going as far as to threaten to support a ‘No’ vote if the 
accession conditions were not improved during the last round of negotiations at the 
Copenhagen summit (Szczerbiak 2008). Ultimately, the party decided to support Poland’s 
accession to the EU, despite a significant internal rift on the issue, with openly anti-EU 
opinions expressed by a large faction built around the former members of the Christian 
National Union. 
Following the EU accession referendum, Law and Justice’s leadership made a strategic-
tactical decision to accentuate doubts its members had about the integration process and 
became more explicitly anti-federalist, defining its new EU stance as ‘Euro-realist’ 
(Szczerbiak 2012). One of the clear manifestations of the party’s new approach was its 
strong opposition to the EU Constitution Treaty. The party declared that it could support 
the new treaty only if it included clear references to Christian values, maintained the Nice 
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system of voting in the Council of the EU, and did not contain statements about the 
primacy of EU law (PiS 2004). 
The next step in the evolution of Law and Justice’s European policy was the period from 
2005 to 2007, when it formed a coalition government together with the League of Polish 
Families and Self-Defence. Here, it is important to note the apparent difference between 
the party’s rhetoric and the real policy choices it made. Artur Zawisza pointed out that Law 
and Justice’s opinion on the EU after the 2004 referendum ‘began to evolve in some 
aspects but not in others …. Law and Justice significantly sharpened its rhetoric, making 
90% of its public discourse Eurosceptic …. However, in reality, Law and Justice remained 
faithful to its original line: the EU “Yes”; distortions “No”. A clear example of this was the 
party’s vote in favour of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty’ (Interview with A. Zawisza 
2013). After gaining power, the party declared that it would significantly ‘reorient’ Polish 
European policy, in order to ‘reclaim’ it from a post-1989 establishment, which it saw as 
overly conciliatory and faint-hearted when it came to protecting Polish national interest. 
However, as Szczerbiak (2012) noted, the European policy of the Law and Justice 
government was a continuation or even strengthening of Polish support for European 
integration in various areas (e.g. foreign and defence policy). 
Following the fall of the Law and Justice coalition government and the loss of power in 
2007, the party once again decided to strengthen its Eurosceptic rhetoric by returning to 
‘Euro-realism’ and support for the Gaullist idea of a ‘Europe of Nations’. As explained by 
Ryszard Legutko, Law and Justice MEP, ‘the main difference [between Law and Justice and 
other parties] is its support for a “Europe of Nations”. All the federalist models … it's not 
something that we like here. For example, a motto of Prime Minister [Tusk] “More Europe 
in Europe” is not a motto that Law and Justice members would enthusiastically subscribe 
to’ (Interview with R. Legutko 2013). A similar view was shared by Ryszard Czarnecki 
MEP, who stated, ‘We believe that it would be harmful for Poland if one European state 
was created. We believe that, for Poland, the ideal situation is the development of the EU 
as a “Europe of Nations”. We don’t want to transfer more power to Brussels’ (Interview 
with R. Czarnecki 2013). In its criticism of the EU, the party focused on threats to national 
sovereignty posed by the integration process and defence of Polish national interests. ‘A 
belief that sovereignty is an important dimension of statehood is a key element of the Law 
and Justice [EU] policy’, declared the party’s MEP K. Szymański (Interview with K. 
Szymański 2013). Another characteristic feature of the party’s Eurosceptic rhetoric was its 
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anti-German trait. Piotr M. Kaczyński, a Brussels-based analyst of Polish politics, noted 
that Germany was the main theme of anti-European rhetoric of Law and Justice: ‘[For Law 
and Justice] Brussels is a slightly more distant Berlin …. They threaten [Poles] with 
Germany’ (Interview with P.M. Kaczyński 2013). Ryszard Czarnecki, a prominent Law and 
Justice MEP, said that ‘“More Europe” is a covert way of saying “More Germany in 
Europe”’ (Interview with R. Czarnecki 2013). Another important Law and Justice politician 
Janusz Wojciechowski MEP noted that ‘Federal Europe, but dominated by the German 
vision of Europe, is not attractive to us …. We don't want a European federal republic of 
Germany …. I don’t know of a matter [in the EU] that was settled contrary to the wishes 
of the Germans … We will need to accept that what is good for Germany is good for 
Europe and I'm not convinced [about that]’ (Inteview with J. Wojciechowski 2012). 
Finally, an important element of the party’s European policy was the protection of 
Christian values as the basis of Polish national identity and social order, which the party 
saw endangered by liberal values represented by the EU (Interviews with K. Szczerski 
2013, J. Wojciechowski 2012, R. Czarnecki 2012, R. Legutko 2013). As noted by Anna 
Słojewska, a Brussels correspondent of the daily Rzeczpospolita, ‘Law and Justice has a “less-
Europe” approach. It wants a greater degree of state sovereignty. This is related to [their] 
perspectives on sovereignty and independence. It is also related to moral-ideological issues, 
i.e. [Law and Justice’s] objection to the harmonisation of EU law, which could violate the 
Catholic spirit of Poland and the Catholic-nationalist tradition in Poland’ (Interview with 
A. Słojewska 2012).  This point is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
League of Polish Families 
The League of Polish Families was created in June 2001, only three months before the 
September parliamentary elections, as a coalition of smaller right-wing parties, including 
inter alia the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe), All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska) 
and the People’s Party ‘Patrimony’ (Stronnictwo Ludowe ‘Ojcowizna’). Radio Maryja, a national 
Catholic broadcaster, and its charismatic leader Father Tadeusz Rydzyk played an 
important role as a catalyst in the formation process of the party (Interviews with D. 
Pawłowiec 2013, M. Giertych 2013). The League was a clerical-nationalist party, merging 
Catholicism with nationalist rhetoric and drawing extensively from the heritage of an 
interwar nationalist party called National Democracy, whose leader Roman Dmowski 
created the foundation of the modern Polish nationalist movement. The League is the best 
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example of how political Catholicism in Poland, with its distinct Catholic-nationalist 
character, became the key element of ‘hard’ Euroscepticism in Poland. 
In terms of its European policy, the League of Polish Families was probably the most 
Eurosceptic party in Poland. Criticism of the EU and the complete rejection of Polish EU 
membership formed a cornerstone of the party’s programme (Załuska 2001). Zuba (2006) 
noted that the importance of Euroscepticism for the League had not been matched by any 
other Polish party. Indeed, out of seven key programmatic points presented during the 
2001 election campaign, three referred to the European Union and the party’s opposition 
to it (LPR 2001). The League made a strategic decision to focus its criticism on the 
economic aspects of Poland’s EU membership: ‘Initially, the anti-EU rhetoric [of the 
League] focused on value issues like “Poland” and “sovereignty”. In the end, it focused 
more on numbers … we will lose that much, we will gain this much, so much is under 
threat, etc.’, said former member of the party, Daniel Pawłowiec (Interview with D. 
Pawłowiec 2013). However, as Szczerbiak (2012: 162) noted, the party’s ‘anti-EU stance 
was not based simply on an instrumental economic cost-benefit analysis. Rather it was 
more ideologically and axiologically underpinned by fundamental objections to European 
integration as a threat to Poland’s continued statehood.’ Much of the League’s ideological 
opposition to the EU was based on a perceived threat to Christian values allegedly posed 
by the EU. ‘Poland is a country built on Christian values … [but] it was meant to join an 
organisation based on different, liberal values – focused on fighting with Christianity – 
which carried with them moral hazards that we wanted to avoid’ (Interview with D. 
Pawłowiec 2013). As the most radical anti-EU party, the League spearheaded the ‘No’ 
campaign before the Polish accession referendum in 2003. 
Following the referendum, which approved Polish accession to the EU, the party declared 
it would accept the results, underlining at the same time its anti-federalist stance and 
support for the EU as a union of fully independent states. D. Pawłowiec of the League of 
Polish Families explained the situation as follows: ‘Then [after the Polish EU accession in 
2004] … we decided that we would stop demanding that Poland should leave the EU, and 
try instead to establish contacts with Eurosceptic forces in Europe and gain influence in 
Polish politics allowing us to reduce the damages associated with EU membership’ 
(Interview with D. Pawłowiec 2013). After the 2005 elections, the party joined the coalition 
government formed by Law and Justice as a junior partner and then rarely spoke about 
European policy (Zuba 2009). Indeed, Law and Justice not only demanded that the party 
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would not criticise the foreign (and European) policy of the government, but it also 
deprived the League of any influence on the EU policy of the Polish government 
(Szczerbiak 2012). 
After the collapse of the coalition government in 2007, the League renewed its 
commitment for a strong position of Poland in the EU and opposed the introduction of 
the euro during the parliamentary election campaign. However, as a result of a conflict with 
Father Rydzyk, who wanted to exert more direct control over the party (Interview with M. 
Giertych 2013), the League was denied the support of Radio Maryja, whose listeners were 
encouraged to vote for Law and Justice instead. Consequently, the party lost most of its 
electoral base and did not re-enter the parliament, ultimately disappearing almost entirely 
from the political scene in Poland. 
Self-Defence 
Self-Defence started as a farmers’ union in the early 1990s. It was set up by Andrzej Lepper 
as a protest movement against farmers’ debt foreclosures and soon became notorious for 
its road blockades, for emptying freight wagons with imported cereals directly on railway 
tracks and spraying manure on Police forces that tried to intervene. The Self-Defence of 
the Republic of Poland party (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej) was registered in November 
1999 as a sign of the growing political aspirations of the movement. Capitalising on his 
popularity as the ‘tribune of the people’ gained through years of leading protests and using 
anti-establishment rhetoric, Andrzej Lepper and his party emerged as the third strongest 
political force in the 2001 parliamentary elections (10.2% of the votes and 53 seats in the 
Sejm). The party continued its successful electoral performance by securing 11.4% of votes 
in the 2005 parliamentary elections (56 seats), though the biggest surprise was Andrzej 
Lepper’s third place with 15.1% of votes in the presidential elections held the same year. In 
2006, the party entered the coalition government with Law and Justice and the second 
junior partner, the League of Polish Families. In the 2007 elections, however, the party 
suffered a slump in its electoral support and did not manage to win enough votes to pass 
the 5% threshold. Consequently, the party disintegrated and moved to the fringes of Polish 
politics. 
In terms of its attitudes to European integration, Self-Defence was perceived as 
Eurosceptic, but is also yet another illustration of the fluidity of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland, whereby the Polish parties could significantly change their 
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attitudes to the EU. Its criticism of the EU focused on the allegedly asymmetrical and 
exploitative economic relations of Poland with the EU. This was in contrast with the 
League of Polish Families, whose stance on Europe had a strong axiological and ideological 
basis. In reality, however, Self-Defence was a protest movement without any strong values, 
ideology or even a well-developed programme (Szczerbiak 2012). Zuba (2006) described 
three key features characterising Self-Defence’s European policy. Firstly, a lack of stable 
and principled stance on Europe, which meant that its EU policy was highly inconsistent. 
Secondly, the fact that Self-Defence’s policy on European integration was entirely shaped 
by its leader, Andrzej Lepper. Thirdly, the lack of an expert base and intellectual 
underpinning for the development of its foreign policy. A good example of this was ‘The 
programmatic assumptions of the movement Self-Defence’ published in 1999 
(Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1999). The chapter devoted to European policy 
titled ‘We are in Europe’ was written by Witold S. Michałowski, an engineer specialising in 
pipeline construction. Undoubtedly, his professional background led him to conclude that 
Poland did not have to join the EU, as it was Europe that needed Poland in order to 
transport natural resources from the East via Polish rail and road networks (Zuba 2006). 
The inconsistency of Self-Defence’s EU policy was quite evident during the parliamentary 
term from 2001 to 2005, when it occasionally described the process of integration in 
positive terms (Pszczółkowska 2002), or during the accession referendum campaign, which 
it conducted under a very enigmatic slogan ‘The Choice is Yours’ (although in reality its 
programmatic document contained strong criticism of the EU and left little doubt as to the 
choice Self-Defence supporters should make). After 2006, like the League of Polish 
Families, the party withdrew from the European debate and did not have an influence on 
the government’s European policy (Szczerbiak 2012). 
Polish Peasants’ Party 
The Polish Peasants’ Party was formed in 1990 as a direct successor of the communist 
satellite United People’s Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe – ZSL). In 1991, the party 
entered the Sejm with 8.7% of votes (48 seats) and doubled its support in 1993 to 15.4%, 
when it created a coalition government with the Democratic Left Alliance for the first time. 
Following this success, the party suffered a significant loss in voters’ support and won only 
27 seats (7.3% of votes) in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Since then, the party’s 
performance in national elections oscillated between 6% and 9%, with repeated doubts of 
commentators over its ability to pass the 5% threshold. In 2001, the party joined the 
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Democratic Left Alliance as a junior partner in the second coalition government of the two 
parties, which lasted until 2003. It returned to government as a junior partner in 2007 by 
forming a coalition with Civic Platform. 
The Polish Peasants’ Party had an ambivalent but also changeable attitude towards 
European integration. Initially, it was in favour of tough negotiations with the EU and 
during the 2001 election campaign declared its position to be ‘Euro-realist’. This was partly 
a consequence of the fact that its electoral constituency, farmers, was the least enthusiastic 
about the EU, with many surveys describing it as the only professional group whose 
majority opposed Poland’s accession to the EU. During its time in the 2001-2003 coalition 
government, the party very reluctantly gave its consent to some of the government’s 
negotiation terms concerning agriculture, and reacted very critically to the European 
Commission’s proposal regarding the limitation of direct farm subsidies for the new 
member states (Szczerbiak 2012). The party supported a rather loose model of European 
integration and ‘conditionally’ agreed to Polish EU membership, following the 
government’s fulfilment of many of the farmers’ demands. After the accession referendum, 
the Polish Peasants’ Party limited the European aspect of its rhetoric and programme, and 
ultimately withdrew from its critical position. Consequently, the party began to support 
Polish EU membership, pointing to the many opportunities and benefits enjoyed by Polish 
farmers thanks to the Common Agricultural Policy (Zuba 2009). The change of the party’s 
position could be partially attributed to the fact that farmers were the group that drew 
significant and most direct benefits from EU membership, becoming very supportive of 
the integration process (Szczerbiak 2012). 
Despite its withdrawal from Eurosceptic positions, the party retained some of its 
cautiousness – it was very reserved about the prospects of introducing the euro in Poland 
and it criticised the Constitutional Treaty. At the same time, it was in favour of a stronger 
common European foreign and defence policy, a common energy policy and further 
expansion of the EU (Kaczyński 2008). 
Union of Real Politics 
The Union of Real Politics was registered as a party in 1990 and as such was a very specific 
entity in the Polish party system that merits some analysis, particularly in the context of 
Polish party-based Euroscepticism. The party’s programme – whose character it owed to 
its highly controversial leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke – was based on a radical version of 
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conservative liberalism (Zuba 2006). It is also one of the very few examples of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland that was not political Catholic. 
In terms of political performance, the party almost always existed on the fringes of Polish 
politics with only one brief period during which three of its candidates were elected to the 
Polish parliament in 1991 (the party received 2.26% of votes). In the 1993 elections, the 
party improved its result and obtained 3.2% of votes, but because of the introduction of 
the 5% threshold, no members entered the Sejm. 
One of the most interesting features of the Union of Real Politics was the consistency of 
its stance on European integration and the distinctiveness of its European policy. The party 
retained its opposition to Polish EU membership, using a similar set of arguments from the 
beginning of Polish transformation in 1989 until Polish accession to the EU in 2004, which 
makes it quite exceptional in comparison with other Polish political actors. 
The party’s criticism of the EU stemmed from its support for libertarian values, 
understood as maximal (almost limitless) freedom of an individual and a free market based 
on non-intervention of the state. In its programme, the party called for the radical 
reduction of state intervention in the economy, the lowering of taxes and the scrapping of 
social protection programmes: ‘Social security programmes should be carried out by private 
organisations, charities, Church organisations, and in particular by private individuals (who 
are helped by the state that leaves money in their pockets)’ (UPR 2004). 
Indeed, the party focused its criticism of the EU on the economic dimension of the 
integration process and rarely evoked threats to national sovereignty that were accentuated 
by other parties. It perceived the EU as a ‘socialist’ and ‘bureaucratic’ institution that tried 
to impose socialism on its member states: ‘the Union [of Real Politics] sees a threat inter alia 
in the bureaucratised model of European integration, which tried to impose socialism 
through the supranational level on the nations of Europe’ (Najwyższy Czas 1993). 
According to the party, the most grievous threats associated with the EU were related to 
the economy and the European economic setup. In addition, the Union identified the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an element threatening the Polish national 
interest, since it could jeopardise Polish relations with the US (UPR 2003). In contrast to 
other Eurosceptic parties (most notably the League of Polish Families), which were 
concerned about liberal values of the EU endangering Polish national identity based on 
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Christian values and Catholicism, the Union of Real Politics did not regard this as an 
important argument against Poland’s membership in the EU (Gierycz 2003). 
The final aspect of the Union’s European policy that is worth mentioning here is the 
alternative to the EU membership that the party was proposing. In fact, the party was 
offering three alternatives: the preferred one was the Polish accession to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a free-trade area consisting of the US, Canada 
and Mexico. The party used the example of Mexico, which joined NAFTA in 1994 and 
experienced economic growth, as the strongest argument for its proposal (Marczuk and 
Sommer 2003). Another alternative was Poland’ accession to the European Economic Area 
(EEA). As Marczuk and Sommer, two commentators associated with the party, explained: 
‘[this alternative] is advantageous because it allows simultaneous free trade with almost all 
countries of Europe, freedom of movement and settlement in the EU, and exclusion from 
the Common Agricultural Policy – the stupidest agricultural regime in the world’ (2003: 
19). The third alternative, finally, was the creation of a transatlantic free trade area, an 
American-European free trade zone.  
At the end of the 2000s, the party underwent a series of changes in its leadership, resulting 
in a breakup and the withdrawal of Janusz Korwin-Mikke from the party. Korwin-Mikke 
went on to create a new party, which ultimately adopted the name Congress of the New 
Right. This new entity participated in the 2011 parliamentary elections, gathering 1% of 
votes, and in the 2014 European elections, in which it received 7.1% of votes, winning four 
seats in the European Parliament to the surprise of many observers of Polish politics. The 
party’s European programme remained largely unchanged when compared to Korwin-
Mikke’s previous party. Its objective was the disbanding of the current form of the 
European Union by reducing it to a simple free trade zone. The party opposed any 
interventionism, etatism or taxation at the EU level and promised to significantly reduce 
the number of European regulations and norms (KNP 2014). 
 
4.4 Describing party-based Euroscepticism in Poland 
The brief overview of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland presented in the previous 
section allows us to identify two key themes characteristic to the Polish manifestation of 
this phenomenon. Firstly, the distinct relationship between party-based Euroscepticism in 
Poland and political Catholic parties. The strongest and most ideologically rooted current 
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of Polish Euroscepticism can be identified among such parties as the League of Polish 
Families, the Christian National Union, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland or 
the Polish Agreement. Perhaps the only party that is different in this respect is the Union 
of Real Politics, which based its Eurosceptic approach on an ultra-liberal ideology. 
Secondly, the fluidity of Polish party-based Euroscepticism, whereby parties moved 
between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic positions or, in their rhetoric, between a pro-EU 
stance and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. 
In this section, I will attempt to provide a concise description of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland, drawing on key studies of this phenomenon carried out so far. 
The analysis will start by discussing the proportion between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic 
parties in Poland in order to verify the strength of Polish party-based Euroscepticism. 
Having discussed the base issue of Polish party-based Euroscepticism, I will move on to 
examine the fluid nature of this phenomenon in Poland, and discuss the issue of not 
mistaking short-term changes in party rhetoric for fundamental adjustments of party 
positions. The section will conclude with a discussion of the role of political Catholic 
parties in driving Euroscepticism in Poland. 
4.4.1 ‘Hard’ vs. ‘soft’ Euroscepticism in the Polish party system 
Before describing Polish party-based Euroscepticism, a look at how this phenomenon was 
defined by other scholars is necessary. In two seminal works on party-based 
Euroscepticism Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004) and Kopecky and Mudde (2002) 
respectively analysed Central and Eastern European countries, among them Poland, 
categorising Eurosceptic parties. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004) identified three ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic parties (the Polish Agreement, Self-Defence, the Union of Real Politics) and 
three ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties (the Christian National Union, the Polish Peasants’ Party, 
the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland). They also concluded that Poland, similar 
to other established states of Central and Eastern Europe, had low levels of party-based 
Euroscepticism and ‘hard’ party-based Euroscepticism was significantly less evident than 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism. This was true at the time of writing the article (late 1990s/early 
2000s). ‘Hard’ party-based Euroscepticism was limited at the end of 1990s, but it soon 
grew in strength gaining 18% and 19% of votes in the 2001 and 2004 parliamentary 
elections respectively. Following the 2005-2007 Law and Justice government, which as of 
2006 included the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic League of Polish Families and Self-Defence as junior 
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partners, the latter two lost the 2007 elections, with a significant part of their electorate 
being taken over by their senior ‘soft’ Eurosceptic coalition partner. 
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) analysed the location, type and electoral strength of party-
based Euroscepticism in the then four candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
– the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In the Polish case, the authors 
classified the parties as follows: (i) Euroenthusiasts: Civic Platform, the Polish Peasants’ 
Party, the Democratic Left Alliance and Freedom Union, (ii) Eurosceptic: Solidarity 
Electoral Action, Law and Justice, (iii) Eurorejects: the League of Polish Families and Self-
Defence. There were no Polish parties identified in the fourth category, Europragmatists. 
The classification of the Polish Peasants’ Party by the authors as Euroenthusiast is quite 
surprising, given the history of its doubts regarding the integration process, which were 
prevalent elements of the party’s attitude to Europe until Poland’s EU accession. The 
classification of Polish Eurosceptic parties was also another example of the redundancy of 
the Europragmatist category – no party of this characteristic could be found in Poland in 
the late 1990s. 
In their analysis of Euroscepticism and the emergence of political parties in Poland, 
Markowski and Tucker (2010) identified two Eurosceptic parties, the League of Polish 
Families and Self-Defence. They consciously decided not to include both Law and Justice 
and the Polish Peasants’ Party, because they regarded the change of Law and Justice’s 
rhetoric after 2004 to a more Eurosceptic one as ‘an electoral device rather than a serious 
programmatic goal’ (Markowski and Tucker 2010: 528). While not including the Polish 
Peasants’ Party among Eurosceptic parties because of the changeable nature of its 
European policy could be understandable, the exclusion of Law and Justice seems not to 
be entirely justified. The party’s Eurosceptic rhetoric, as will be shown by this study, was 
not simply a short-term strategic rhetorical choice, but rather a deeply entrenched 
ideological predisposition, stemming from intrinsic features of political Catholicism in 
Poland. Naturally, the party’s character and position on Europe might not have been clear 
in the first years of its existence. From 2004 onwards, however, its ‘soft’ Euroscepticism 
has become more obvious. 
In the context of the discussion on classifying Polish Eurosceptic parties, it is worth 
spending more time on the classification developed by Zuba (2006) in his monograph on 
Polish Euroscepticism. The author provided a detailed analysis of both popular and party-
based Euroscepticism in Poland, offering a new classification of attitudes to European 
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integration, which was developed based on the Polish case. The author’s point of departure 
was the analysis of the most influential typologies of Euroscepticism by Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2004), Kopecky and Mudde (2002) and Flood (2002). Zuba agreed with Kopecky 
and Mudde’s criticism of the ‘hard’/’soft’ typology that any classification should look at the 
issue from all perspectives, not only at opposition to European integration. He also 
concurred with other researchers who criticised Kopecky and Mudde’s model for 
describing Eurosceptics as supporting European integration, which clashed with the deeply 
rooted understanding of this term. Moreover, he dismissed Flood’s typology as too difficult 
and complex to be a useful analytical tool. Consequently, Zuba (2006: 55) proposed a 
three-dimensional typology of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland: 
Figure 1: Typology of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland 
Euroenthusiasts 
for integration 
Eurorealists 
ambivalent attitude 
Eurosceptics 
against integration 
Source: Zuba (2006) 
Euroenthusiasts is a rather self-explanatory category. When it comes to Euroscepticism, the 
category was defined as meaning opposition to European integration, manifested as 
support for the withdrawal of a country from the EU or as opposition to joining the union. 
The author believed that the distinction between support for the idea of European 
integration and support for its current embodiment, the EU was of limited practical use. 
According to him, it resulted from the lack of an intermediate category that encapsulated 
ambivalent attitudes to the EU. Zuba observed that some parties may in principle be in 
favour of integration, but their proposals for alternative ways of integrating Europe may be 
entirely unrealistic. In such cases, parties should be unambiguously defined as Eurosceptic. 
However, if parties put forward proposals that were directed at reforming the EU in its 
current form and not creating a new organisation instead (e.g. returning to the idea of a 
‘Europe of Nations’), they should be defined as Eurorealist. In other words, Zuba’s 
Euroscepticism was limited to the ‘hard’ Euroscepticism of Szczerbiak and Taggart, while 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism was moved to the Eurorealist category. 
Eurorealism, according to Zuba, was the key element within his framework. This category 
encompassed not only a considerable number of parties, organisations, citizens’ initiatives, 
but also individuals, becoming much more prominent than the category of Eurosceptics. 
Eurorealists were those actors who in general accepted European integration, but 
questioned its elements or the direction of its development. The main feature of this 
category was ambivalence and resulting heterogeneity and changeability. In fact, the 
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category included ‘soft’ Euroscepticism and ‘soft’ Euroenthusiasm. Zuba noticed that this 
category may seem too all-encompassing and may include opposing views, but according to 
the author, it best reflected the reality of politics. Eurorealist organisations were, for 
example, parties with both pro- and anti-EU factions or a large part of members with no 
specified opinion. Eurorealism was also typical of parties for which European integration 
was a secondary issue, making European policy a highly changeable element that could be 
treated instrumentally, in line with the needs of short-term political strategies. As the 
electoral base of Eurorealist parties was divided on the issue of European integration, they 
could switch their attitudes on Europe from ‘soft’ Euroenthusiasm to ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism, depending on internal factors (e.g. conflict between factions) or external 
factors (inter-party competition). In contrast, Euroenthusiast and Eurosceptic parties 
found this type of behaviour more difficult, as their positions were rooted in ideological-
programmatic elements, and as such could not be easily changed (Zuba 2006: 56-57). 
Zuba (2006) classified as Eurosceptic the League of Polish Families, the Polish Agreement, 
the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, Self-Defence and the Union of Real 
Politics. In the Eurorealist category he placed the Polish Peasants’ Party, Law and Justice, 
the Christian National Union, Solidarity Electoral Action and other historical and largely 
defunct organisations, like the Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms (Bezpartyjny Blok 
Wspierania Reform, BBWR), the Centre Agreement and the Confederation for an 
Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, KPN). 
Zuba’s categorisation seems to face the same problems as the classification by Kopecky 
and Mudde. Rather than solving the key problem of categorisation, it developed a 
redundant, too all-encompassing group of Eurorealism. In the words of the author, it not 
only covered ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, but also ‘soft’ Euroenthusiasm. Firstly, it seems wrong 
to combine parties who in general were in favour of integration (what Zuba called ‘soft’ 
Euroenthusiasm) with ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties. Secondly, this category owes its existence 
to the changeable and fluid nature of Euroscepticism, whereby parties moved between 
different degrees of Euroscepticism, occasionally moving to pro-EU positions. This 
category seems to overlook the importance of ideology in shaping the underlying positions 
on Europe and put too much emphasis on electoral tactics, which may result in temporary 
shifts in party positions on Europe. Thirdly, the Eurorealist category, as the author himself 
confirmed, was yet another attempt at classifying parties which were simply difficult to 
categorise as they did not elaborate their European policies in enough detail, treating it as a 
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secondary issue. However, it seems unnecessary to create categories to describe something 
that was unclassifiable. In reality, the Eurorealist category seems superfluous to the already 
established ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ division of Szczerbiak and Taggart. The ‘soft’ Eurosceptic 
category already encompassed organisations which may in principle be in favour of 
European integration, but criticise one or more policy areas. 
By drawing on the results of scholarly analyses outlined in this section and descriptions of 
Eurosceptic parties’ programmes, it is now possible to present in a concise way ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties in Poland. In doing so, I will apply Szczerbiak and Taggart’s 
definitions and present ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties by years in which Polish 
parliamentary elections were held between 1991 and 2011. The analysis will focus on those 
parties which won more than 1% of votes in elections, while also including the Polish 
Agreement. This party did not participate in elections and was formed as a parliamentary 
group by MPs of Solidarity Electoral Action in 1998, but it was the first Polish party that 
made the European issue a key element of its programme and the first party in the Polish 
parliament after 1993 with a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic stance. 
Table 3: Eurosceptic parties in Poland and their electoral performance. 
Hard 
Eurosceptics 
Union of 
Real Politics 
(2.3) 
Union of 
Real Politics 
(3.2) Polish 
Agreement 
1998-2001 *** 
League of 
Polish 
Families 
(7.9) 
League of 
Polish 
Families 
(8) 
League of 
Polish 
Families 
(1.3)  
Self-
Defence 
(2.78) 
Self-
Defence 
(10.2) 
Self-
Defence 
(11.4) 
Self-
Defence 
(1.5) 
Year 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 
Soft 
Eurosceptics 
Christian 
National 
Union 
(8.74*) 
Christian 
National 
Union 
(6.37**) 
Movement for 
the 
Reconstruction 
of Poland 
(5.56) 
Law and 
Justice 
(9.5) Law and 
Justice 
(27) 
Law and 
Justice 
(32.1) 
Law and 
Justice 
(29.9) Polish 
Peasants’ 
Party  
(8.7) 
Polish 
Peasants’ 
Party  
(15.4) 
Polish 
Peasants’ Party 
(7.3) 
Polish 
Peasants’ 
Party 
(9) 
The table shows % of votes in national parliamentary elections. Non-parliamentary parties marked in grey. 
*Electoral Catholic Action (coalition formed around Christian National Union), **Catholic Electoral 
Committee ‘Fatherland’ (coalition formed around Christian National Union), ***Polish Agreement created in 
September 1998 as a parliamentary group by 7 MPs of Solidarity Electoral Action; in 2001 ran in elections 
together with the League of Polish Families. Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
The data presented in Table 3 clearly show the following trends. Firstly, the fluid nature of 
party-based Euroscepticism in Poland, meaning certain parties, such as the Polish Peasants’ 
Party, moved from a Eurosceptic position to a pro-EU stance. Secondly, a clear difference 
between the 1990s, when ‘hard’ Euroscepticism was largely marginalised, and the period 
from 2001 to 2007, when it gained a strong foothold in the Polish parliament. Thirdly, the 
strong role of political Catholic parties with Catholic-nationalist traits in driving party-based 
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Euroscepticism in Poland. In fact, two out of four ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties – the League 
of Polish Families and Polish Agreement – represented Polish political Catholicism. In 
addition, three out of four ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties claimed political Catholic inspiration: 
the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, the Christian National Union and Law 
and Justice. 
In this context, it is important to note the relative electoral strength of Polish party-based 
Euroscepticism. That is why Figure 2 presents the combined electoral performance of 
selected ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic (see Table 3 for the list of selected parties). Naturally, 
a party’s share of the votes is not an entirely precise tool, mainly because of the low level of 
salience of the European issue in inter-party competition and the limited role European 
policy plays in determining voters’ behaviour (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b). This is why I 
will use the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties only as a rough indication of the 
importance of Euroscepticism in the Polish party system.  
Figure 2: Combined electoral strength of selected Eurosceptic parties in Poland 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
The first observation is that the period of the strongest presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
parties on the Polish political scene was between 2001 and 2007. This was the consequence 
of significant support for Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families, which together 
gathered 18% of votes in 2001 and 19.4% in 2005. The highpoint for Eurosceptic parties in 
Poland was naturally the period between 2006 and 2007, when ‘soft’ Eurosceptic Law and 
Justice formed a coalition government with two ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties – Self-Defence 
and the League of Polish Families. Paradoxically, the influence of both junior partners on 
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European policy was almost completely extinguished, and the government’s European 
policy was shaped by Law and Justice, which used a Eurosceptic rhetoric but in reality 
toned down its criticism of the integration process (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2012). 
Following the 2007 elections, ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties disappeared from the Polish 
parliament and eventually were completely marginalised. It should be noted, however, that 
the 2014 European Parliament elections in Poland saw a new Eurosceptic entrant – the 
Congress of New Right of Janusz Korwin-Mikke, which won 7.1% and 4 seats in the 
European Parliament. It remains to be seen what impact this party will have on domestic 
Polish politics. 
In terms of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, the upward trend visible from 2001 onwards was mainly 
the effect of the growing electoral success of Law and Justice. Even though the Polish 
Peasants’ Party moved away from its Eurosceptic attitude between 2001 and 2005, and thus 
its share of votes was removed from the total value, support for ‘soft’ Euroscepticism 
continued to grow as a result of the increasing vote share of Law and Justice. 
Naturally, in the case of almost all parties, apart from the League of Polish Families, 
Euroscepticism should not necessarily be treated as the main element driving their electoral 
success. In addition, the European policies of Self-Defence, Law and Justice and the Polish 
Peasants’ Party before the Polish EU accession were not aimed at the substance of the 
European project, but were rather about problematising Europe: they were criticising the 
conduct of the accession negotiations and the conditions of Polish EU membership and 
not questioning the principle or trajectory of the integration project (Szczerbiak 2008b). 
However, it is clear from the data presented above that Eurosceptic parties have been an 
important feature of Polish politics, gathering roughly 20 to 30% of votes since the 1990s. 
What is also characteristic of the Polish party system is the fact that it had low levels of 
party-based Euroscepticism and ‘hard’ party-based Euroscepticism was significantly less 
evident than ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. In addition, there were no single-issue anti-EU parties 
in all Central and Eastern European countries (although the Polish Agreement came close 
to this category), which marks a stark contrast to Western Europe with the presence of 
such parties in Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004). 
The emergence of stronger party-based Euroscepticism in Poland coincided with a radical 
swing of the Polish political system towards the right. Since 2005, parties of the right began 
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to dominate Polish politics, with Civic Platform and Law and Justice together accumulating 
around 70% of votes cast in the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections (although since 
2007 Civic Platform became increasingly centrists). Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004) observed 
that there was a tendency for Eurosceptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe (including 
Poland) to be more on the right of the political spectrum than in Western Europe. 
Szczerbiak and Taggart noticed that there was a strong tendency for the right to be more 
nationalist than its Western counterparts, hence more natural affinity between Eurosceptic 
rhetoric and the Eastern European right. This is why, in the Polish case there was no left-
wing Euroscepticism. Parties at the left end of the political spectrum – most notably the 
communist successor Democratic Left Alliance – were strongly and unequivocally not only 
pro-EU, but also in favour of a federal Europe. It goes beyond the remits of this study to 
analyse Polish Europhile parties, but in the case of the Democratic Left Alliance, support 
for the EU was seen as a way of building the new party’s image and legitimising its 
transformation to a modern democratic party (Szczerbiak 2012). 
The heyday of ‘hard’ Euroscepticism in Polish politics came to an abrupt end with the 2007 
parliamentary elections. The League of Polish Families and Self-Defence were marginalised 
and in reality stopped participating in the public debate. The growing popular support for 
the EU following the 2004 accession reduced space for ‘hard’ Eurosceptics, while Law and 
Justice took over most of the remaining Eurosceptic electorate. 
This section showed that in quantitative terms, Euroscepticism did play a significant role in 
Polish party politics and that it is an important phenomenon to study. At the same time, it 
is clear that the European issue often had limited salience and Europe was rarely a 
realigning issue for Polish politics. Particularly in the post-accession period, Europe had 
limited influence on parties. For example, Szczerbiak and Bil (2009) found that there was 
very little evidence of the European topic significantly influencing inter-party competition 
in Poland. Indeed, no party focused considerably on European issues in any election 
campaigns. In addition, the authors did not find a significant impact of European 
integration and of relations with European party-federations on Polish parties’ 
organisation. 
Finally, when it comes to the qualitative impact of Euroscepticism on policy-making, the 
situation is more complicated. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2012) analysed the 2006-2007 
coalition government of Law and Justice with two ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties – Self-
Defence and the League of Polish Families. They concluded that the Eurosceptic parties’ 
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participation in government and their impact on European policy of the government was 
‘medium’, with a mixed track record in both dimensions. For Law and Justice and Self-
Defence, they observed a significant toning down of Eurosceptic rhetoric as a result of 
government participation. The participation of Eurosceptic parties also had an effect on 
the government, as it adopted a European policy that would vigorously defend Polish 
national interests, declaring a major break with the line taken by the previous government. 
However, the authors pointed to the difference between the Eurosceptic rhetoric of the 
new government and actions it actually undertook, with support for large EU budgets, a 
stronger agricultural policy, common energy and defence policies and a strengthened 
Commission. In addition, Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families in reality had 
very little – if at all – impact on the European policy of the government, as Law and Justice 
ensured that both junior coalition partners were excluded from shaping European policy 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak 2012). What should be, however, noted is that support for large 
EU budgets or stronger co-operation in certain sectors was, according to the Law and 
Justice government, in line with the Polish national interest. Therefore these policies did 
not automatically mean that the party became decisively pro-integration or non-
Eurosceptic. 
4.4.2 The fluid nature of Polish Euroscepticism 
The fluid nature of Polish party-based Euroscepticism, whereby Polish parties changed 
their attitudes towards European integration quite markedly, has been mentioned already 
several times in this chapter, so it is time to look more closely at this phenomenon. Firstly, 
a certain important change between the pre- and post-accession periods needs to be 
observed. In the 1990s, there was an overwhelming consensus not only among Polish elites 
but also among ordinary citizens about the need for Poland to join the EU. This period 
was marked by ‘Return to Europe’ rhetoric and the perception of the EU as a necessary 
step for Poland on its way to modernisation, to becoming a Western, fully democratic and 
capitalistic state. 
The first Polish parliament that was elected in entirely democratic elections in 1991 
contained only one unambiguously ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party – the Union of Real Politics. In 
the following years, other Eurosceptic parties marked their presence in Polish politics, such 
as the Christian National Union, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the 
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‘hard’ Eurosceptic Polish Agreement, but their influence on the European policy of the 
government or public opinion was quite limited. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, in the pre-accession referendum period, the situation 
changed markedly. Public support for the Polish EU membership dropped to the level of 
53% in July 2001, while Euroscepticism reached between 20% and 30% in the early 2000s 
(CBOS 2014). As a result of political non-representation of a large part of the (Eurosceptic) 
electorate, two ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties appeared on the Polish political scene: the League 
of Polish Families and Self-Defence (Markowski and Tucker 2010), gaining 18% of votes in 
the 2001 parliamentary elections (although in the case of Self-Defence, the impact of its 
Euroscepticism on voters’ behaviour was rather limited because of its focus on anti-
establishment rhetoric). 
The early 2000s marked the departure from the homogeneity of opinions on European 
integration that was characteristic of the 1990s. Euroscepticism found a permanent place 
among Polish parties. Indeed, unlike in Western Europe, in Central and Eastern Europe 
there was no disincentive for mainstream parties to express views opposing European 
integration – in Poland, the Eurosceptic rhetoric was used both by parties in government 
as well as those in opposition (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004). Only the post-communist 
Democratic Left Alliance seemed to remain unequivocally Europhile (Szczerbiak 2012), 
while other parties resorted to some sort of Euroscepticism, starting with Law and Justice – 
which during the 2005-2007 period in government set a new agenda of a radical break with 
pre-2004 politics and focused on the protection of national interests – to the obviously 
Eurosceptic League of Polish Families and Self-Defence, to the pro-EU Civic Platform 
with its famous ‘Nice or death’ episode.5 
In this context, it is worth discussing the Polish Peasants’ Party in more detail, as it is the 
only party that moved away from a (‘soft’) Eurosceptic position to a more pro-EU stance. 
Batory and Sitter (2004) analysed the attitudes of agrarian parties towards European 
integration in Western and East Central Europe. Their main conclusion was that, as a 
whole, agrarian parties had a propensity toward Euroscepticism as a result of the centre-
periphery and urban-rural cleavages, where ‘Brussels’ was often seen as ‘distant, 
                                                 
5 In September 2008, one of Civic Platform’s most prominent politicians, Jan Rokita, made a statement in the 
Polish Sejm launching the catchphrase ‘Nice or death’ as a symbol of the party’s ambition to defend the 
provision of the Niece Treaty concerning the distribution of votes in the EU Council, which was deemed 
more favourable for Poland than the double majority-voting introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon (Szczerbiak 
2012). 
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cosmopolitan government’, removed from the rural interests, and the source of centralised 
bureaucracy. However, the authors identified significant variations to this, depending on 
the relations between the European issue’s impact on more long-term factors such as 
parties’ economic and value-/identity-based preferences (party identity and policy) on the 
one hand, and short-term electoral strategies, inter-party competition and the quest for 
office on the other hand. In the case of Poland, the Polish Peasants’ Party used rhetoric 
which associated European integration with foreign domination and centralisation 
remaining, however, generally supportive of Poland’s EU membership. Nonetheless, the 
party found its attitudes towards the European issue particularly difficult to handle. On the 
one hand, the growing popularity of Euroscepticism in Poland, especially among farmers, 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s provided a compelling reason to adopt a strong 
Eurosceptic position. On the other hand, the party faced significant competition for the 
Eurosceptic electorate from the centre-right parties (the Christian National Union, a 
member of Solidarity Electoral Action), as well as Self-Defence and the League of Polish 
Families. It also attempted to expand its electoral appeal beyond its core agrarian 
constituency, hence it settled for an uneasy choice: Eurosceptic rhetoric to please its 
traditional constituency and general support for the Polish EU membership so not to 
discourage potential voters in the centre. Finally, in the context of the wide-ranging elite 
consensus on Polish EU membership, the need to be a viable coalition partner and the 
growing support for the EU among farmers required toning down its Euroscepticism, 
which significantly impacted the Polish Peasants’ Party. Consequently, by 2005 most 
Eurosceptic elements of its programme and Eurosceptic attitudes of its agrarian electorate 
were gone (Markowski and Tucker 2010). 
4.4.3 ‘Strategy’ vs. ‘ideology’ – political Catholicism as the driving force 
of Polish Euroscepticism 
The fluid nature of Polish party-based Euroscepticism is evident – the parties moved 
between different degrees of Euroscepticism, some pro-EU parties occasionally resorted to 
Eurosceptic rhetoric, and in one case a party moved from a Eurosceptic position to a more 
pro-European one (the Polish Peasants’ Party). Nonetheless, it is also important not to 
mistake a simple change in rhetoric, which usually results from inter-party competition, for 
a fundamental change in party positions on Europe. 
Gaisbauer (2007) and Dakowska (2010) analysed Polish party-based Euroscepticism in the 
aftermath of the 2003 EU membership referendum and the parliamentary elections of 
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2005, when Eurosceptic parties gathered significant electoral support (19% combined share 
of votes for the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence). Gaisbauer tried to assess the 
extent and causality of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland and to establish whether it 
was a matter of party tactics or rather stemmed from ideological convictions. In doing so, 
he modified the original model developed by Kopecky and Mudde by breaking up the 
Eurosceptic category into Szczerbiak and Taggart’s ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic 
dichotomy. Based on party positions on the Constitutional Treaty, he classified their 
attitudes to Europe in 2001 as follows: Civic Platform and the Democratic Left Alliance 
were marked as Euroenthusiasts; the League of Polish Families as Euroreject; Law and 
Justice and the Polish Peasants’ Party as ‘soft’ Eurosceptic; while Self-Defence fell into the 
‘hard’ Eurosceptic category. Following the accession referendum and the 2005 elections, 
Gaisbauer identified some significant changes in party attitudes towards Europe: Civic 
Platform and Self-Defence became ‘soft’ Eurosceptic, while Law and Justice and the Polish 
Peasants’ Party were ‘hard’ Eurosceptics. Based on these movements, which occurred 
mostly within the ‘strategic’ dimension of the typology (the strategic axis ranging from ‘pro-
EU’ to ‘EU-critical’), Gaisbauer concluded that Eurosceptic positions of Polish parties 
were largely tactical in nature and resulted from inter-party competition. 
Dakowska (2010) analysed the use of the issue of European integration by Polish 
conservative and radical parties (mainly Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families) 
to modulate their relationship to other parties, contributing to the ideology vs. strategy 
discussion among scholars. Dakowska pointed out that the conservative Law and Justice 
party’s position on Europe shifted significantly between the time when it was in opposition 
and when it was in government. She also noticed some ambiguous changes in the League 
of Polish Families’ seemingly ‘hard’ Euroscepticism. The author’s main argument was that 
if party positions on Europe were underpinned by ideological considerations anchored in 
deeply rooted cleavages, sudden and quick changes seemed unlikely. Consequently, 
according to Dakowska, the stance on European integration was used by Polish parties as 
an expression of strategic calculations – a tool to distinguish itself from other political 
parties, to differentiate mainstream from protest parties or parties which competed for a 
similar electorate. 
As support for her hypothesis, Dakowska drew on examples of Polish parties’ affiliation 
with European party federations, where political strategy seemed to have played an 
important role. For example, the Freedom Union leaders decided to leave the EPP and join 
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the European Liberals in 2003 mostly as a result of domestic inter-party competition. 
Before the 2004 European elections, Law and Justice affiliated itself with the Union for 
Europe of the Nations, following its domestic discourse focused on such issues as 
‘sovereignty’, ‘national interest’ and ‘patriotism’, even though Law and Justice MEPs had 
had experiences with the EPP and ‘claimed general convergence between their priorities 
and those of other Polish MEPs situated on the right wing of the EPP’ (Dakowska 2010: 
261). Dakowska referred also to domestic politics, describing how the European policy of 
Law and Justice changed when the party was in government (toning down its 
Euroscepticism) and later toughening its position as an attempt to attract the League of 
Polish Families and Self-Defence electorates in the 2007 elections and to reposition itself as 
an anti-establishment party. Another example used by the author was the process of 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the rhetoric adopted by Civic Platform, with the 
famous ‘Nice or death’ slogan which resulted from competition between Law and Justice 
and Civic Platform, whereby both organisations were fighting to be seen as pragmatic 
parties, able to defend Polish national interests and tackle citizens’ demands. 
Dakowska (2010) and Gaisbauer (2007) found that changeability of party opinions on 
Europe suggested a tactical nature of Euroscepticism in Poland. However, both authors 
seem to treat temporary changes in party rhetoric (e.g. Law and Justice’s period in 
government, the ‘Nice or death’ period of Civic Platform) as evidence of fundamental 
changes in party positions on European integration. What they overlooked is precisely the 
distinction between underlying party position on Europe and the use of the European issue 
in inter-party competition, both of which have different causal mechanisms and should not 
be confused. 
So what does the issue of ‘strategy’ vs. ‘ideology’ look like in the case of Polish Eurosceptic 
parties? Szczerbiak (2012: 185) noted that Self-Defence was ‘essentially a protest party, and 
its approach to European issues was always instrumental and contingent on the current 
political situation’, with its attacks on the EU being linked to anti-establishment rhetoric. 
Contrary to Self-Defence, the League’s Euroscepticism was much more strongly 
underpinned by ideological objections to the EU, which it saw as a threat to the Christian 
foundations of Polish national identity and key values that were necessary to guarantee the 
successful development of Polish society and state. 
The Polish Peasants’ Party, as an office-seeking party, seemed to have developed its 
opinion on European integration more out of strategic-tactical reasons than any other 
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political grouping. Its attempts to be perceived as a viable coalition partner and the strong 
competition it was facing for the votes of a Eurosceptic rural electorate from other, more 
radically anti-European parties (Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families) led to it 
playing up its Euroscepticism in the pre-accession period. Following the changing attitude 
of Polish farmers, who became the most direct beneficiaries of EU funds during the first 
years of Poland’s EU membership, the party re-positioned itself as more pro-European.  
Finally, Law and Justice’s Euroscepticism is more difficult to grasp, particularly during the 
first years of its existence, as initially its European policy was rather uncertain. Once it 
emerged as ‘soft’ Eurosceptic, its position on Europe, particularly during the 2006-2007 
coalition government, was subject to some changes. At that time, the party restrained its 
Euroscepticism in order to give its government room for manoeuvre at the Treaty of 
Lisbon negotiating table (Szczerbiak 2012). Law and Justice, however, always retained a 
Eurosceptic line, broadly in favour of a ‘Europe of Nations’ and anti-federalist in nature. 
What is most remarkable, however, is that a number of parties, like the League of Polish 
Families, the Christian National Union, the Polish Agreement or the Movement for the 
Reconstruction of Poland, which displayed the ‘hardest’, most unequivocal Euroscepticism, 
were political Catholic in nature with a strong Catholic-nationalist trait. Together with the 
‘soft’ Eurosceptic Law and Justice party (but with the exception of the Union of Real 
Politics), these parties seem to have based much of their criticism of the EU on their 
concerns for the protection of Christian values as a key element of Polish national identity 
and social order in Poland. This means that the Euroscepticism of Polish political 
Catholicism is a phenomenon much more strongly embedded than a simple short- or mid-
term tactical choice. Superficially, the changes in rhetoric and accents of European polices 
may seem to indicate the prevalence of political strategy and calculations, but if analysed 
over a longer period of time, the position of Polish political Catholic actors reveal their 
strong ideological underpinnings and the fact that they are historically and culturally rooted. 
In the following chapter, which analyses the causality of political Catholic Euroscepticism 
in Poland, the strong role of well-embedded values in driving parties’ opposition to Europe 
will become more evident. 
The unique role of Catholic-national parties outlined above was already noticed by other 
scholars. For example, this phenomenon was clearly reflected in Gierycz’s model (2003) of 
Polish party-based Euroscepticism. According to his typology, there were two main strands 
of Polish party-based Euroscepticism: conservative-liberal and national-Catholic. National-
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Catholic Eurosceptic parties put emphasis on Polish national politics and national interest, 
based on the traditional morality of Poles and the fundamental role of Christianity. In fact, 
at the ideological level the EU was unacceptable for national-Catholic parties because of 
the moral-cultural sphere. Such issues as the access to abortion, gay civil partnerships or 
marriages, the lack of references to Christianity in the EU Constitutional Treaty were the 
most important elements driving the opposition of this group to the EU. As a result, 
national-Catholics were closer to the concept of looser and limited co-operation between 
states exemplified by the Council of Europe rather than the deeper integration process as 
present in the case of the European Union. These parties supported co-operation of fully 
sovereign states with independent economic and social policies. They also expressed strong 
opposition to any supranational European institution, rejected the current trajectory of 
European integration, while remaining in favour of European co-operation. This position 
could be summed up as wishing to return to the pre-integration status quo. In addition, 
national-Catholic parties seemed to advocate a strong presence of the state in the economy 
(in contrast with support for individual property and capitalism in the first strand) and were 
in favour of duties, subsidies and protectionism (Gierycz 2003). 
Zuba (2006) also concluded his monograph on Polish Euroscepticism with the observation 
that the Catholic-national current of Euroscepticism is a characteristic feature of Polish 
party politics. This leads to further discussion of the relationship between Euroscepticism 
and parties which find inspiration in Catholic social teaching and are greatly concerned 
about the role and place of Christian values in public life, i.e. political Catholicism. The 
following chapters will discuss the development of the Eurosceptic approach among Polish 
political Catholic parties in detail and will try to describe to what extent Polish political 
Catholicism differs from Western European manifestations of this phenomenon. 
Euroscepticism outside of political Catholicism – the case of Union of Real Politics 
In order to complete the analysis of the role of political Catholicism in driving party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland it is necessary to verify the impact of non-political Catholic 
Euroscepticism on opposition to Europe in Poland. The only example of such a party is 
the Union of Real Politics. 
Section 4.3 described Polish Eurosceptic parties in detail, including the Union of Real 
Politics and its position on European integration. It is enough then to reiterate here the key 
aspects of the Union’s European policy. Firstly, the consistency of its ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
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stance, which the party owed to its charismatic leader Janusz Korwin-Mikke, could not be 
matched by any other political force of post-1989 Polish politics. The party opposed 
European integration, including Polish membership of the Council of Europe, from the 
beginning of the democratic transition in 1989. Secondly, the party focused much of its 
criticism of the EU on the economic aspects of integration. The Union of Real Politics was 
a party based on libertarian values – namely, maximised personal liberty and non-
intervention of the state not only in the economy, but also in many aspects of social order 
– calling for a radical reduction of taxes, the scrapping of social protection programmes 
and the privatisation of the health care system (UPR 2004). It perceived the model of 
European integration as bureaucratised, ‘socialist’ and over-regulated. The 2014 
programme of Korwin-Mikke’s new party, a programmatic continuation of the Union of 
Real Politics called the Congress of New Right, stated that the party’s objective was the 
disbanding of the current form of the EU by reducing it to a simple free trade zone, 
opposition to interventionism, etatism or taxation and over-regulation at the EU level 
(KNP 2014). This form of Euroscepticism, based on libertarianism and worries about the 
economic impact of European integration was fairly unique in Poland and stood in contrast 
to the concerns of political Catholic parties about the liberal values of the EU endangering 
Polish national identity based on Christian values and Catholicism. It should, however, be 
noted that the Union’s electoral performance and its ability to impact on policy making was 
extremely limited. The party entered the Polish parliament only once in 1991, winning 3 
seats, but failed to secure enough votes in the next elections in 1993. Since then until the 
2014 European elections, the party remained on the fringes of Polish politics with minimal 
support. The situation changed in 2014, when the Congress of New Right won 7.15% of 
votes and 4 seats in the European Parliament. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to describe Polish party-based Euroscepticism as an empirical 
phenomenon. On the basis of the analysed material, it identified three important features 
characteristic of Euroscepticism in Poland. Firstly, the fluid nature of Euroscepticism, 
where some Polish parties changed their attitudes to European integration quite decisively, 
while others resorted to Eurosceptic rhetoric on numerous occasions. In fact, the only 
party that stayed unequivocally pro-European was the post-communist Democratic Left 
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Alliance, while others voiced Eurosceptic arguments, including parties that were in 
government, which usually acts as an element that tones down anti-EU rhetoric. 
Secondly, Polish political Catholicism was not only markedly Eurosceptic but, more 
importantly, dominated party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. What is more, parties 
associated with Polish political Catholicism formed the strongest and ideologically rooted 
current of Polish Euroscepticism. Organisations such as the League of Polish Families, the 
Christian National Union, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland or the Polish 
Agreement displayed a range of Eurosceptic views and opinions. Perhaps the only 
exception here were the parties of Janusz Korwin-Mikke like the Union of Real Politics or 
the Congress of New Right, which based their Eurosceptic approach on an ultra-liberal 
ideology. 
Thirdly, the chapter showed that although Polish party-based Euroscepticism was 
changeable, extra care should be taken not to mistake temporary modifications of rhetoric 
resulting from short-term electoral tactics for a fundamental change of the party’s position 
on Europe. This study is another argument in favour of the distinction described by 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) between long-term party positions on Europe, which are 
shaped by the underlying ideology and cannot be easily adjusted, and short- or medium-
term changes in how Euroscepticism is used in intra-party competition and government-
opposition dynamics. 
This chapter also showed the importance of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. In 
quantitative terms, its influence on politics was clear, with ‘hard’ Eurosceptics winning as 
much as 18% and 19% of votes in the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections respectively. 
When it comes to its policy influence, the situation is more complicated. Studies cited 
above proved that the influence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties on the government’s 
European policy was rather limited. The League of Polish Families and Self-Defence, for 
example, were kept away from foreign policy issues by Law and Justice. Nonetheless, the 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism of Jarosław Kaczyński’s party clearly impacted government policy, at 
least affecting how its position on Europe was portrayed in contrast to the previous 
governments, which it described as failing to secure Polish national interests in the EU. 
What is, however, distinctive and most interesting about the Polish case of Euroscepticism 
is not necessarily its role in party politics, but the relationship between religion, namely 
Catholicism, and opposition to Europe, which was clearly shown in this chapter. The next 
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chapter will closely analyse how this interlinked relationship contributed to the fact that a 
typically pro-European movement of political Catholicism became in the Polish case 
Eurosceptic.  
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5 Political Catholicism and Euroscepticism – 
the deviant case of  Poland? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Typically, West European political Catholicism has been markedly pro-integrationist. 
Indeed, Christian democracy, the most prominent embodiment of political Catholicism in 
Western Europe, has been a driving force behind European integration, fostering such 
basic foundations of the process like the idea of reconciliation, transnational cooperation, 
supranationalism and subsidiarity, together with the notion that economic integration is 
instrumental in solving political issues. 
However, political Catholicism in Poland differs significantly from its West European 
counterpart when it comes to attitudes towards European integration. A comparative 
analysis of different Christian democratic parties and Catholic and Protestant churches 
across the EU (Minkenberg 2009) showed that the core of them were overwhelmingly 
supportive of integration. There were only two exceptions to this rule: firstly, 
‘fundamentalist, fringe’ parties in the Netherlands (Protestant parties) and Poland (the 
League of Polish Families), and secondly, the Polish Catholic Church, which was decidedly 
sceptical about Poland’s accession to the EU. In other words, the nature of Polish political 
Catholicism – with its distinctive, sceptical attitude to European integration – put it at odds 
with the political Catholic movement in Western Europe. 
This chapter aims to look at this phenomenon in more detail and answer the key question: 
under which circumstances can political Catholicism adopt a Eurosceptic position; to what 
extent is the Eurosceptic stance of Polish political Catholicism driven by intrinsic features 
of the movement, strategic/tactical consideration or perhaps other (ideological) influences? 
In doing so, this chapter analyses mainly primary data in the form of semi-structured 
interviews conducted with 18 representatives of the most important Polish political 
Catholic parties, as well as experts, commentators of Polish politics and journalists (see the 
full list of interviewees in the bibliography). 
This chapter will argue that the Euroscepticism of Polish political Catholicism stems from 
two primary factors: firstly, the aspiration to protect Polish sovereignty; and, secondly, the 
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perceived cultural struggle between the ‘liberal West’ and the ‘Catholic Poland’. Both 
elements are strongly linked and derive from the close connection between Catholicism 
and Polish national identity, leading to the formation of a distinct Catholic-nationalist trait 
of political Catholicism in Poland. As a result, political Catholicism in Poland sees Christian 
values as the framework of the social order in Poland and is concerned about the potential 
impact of European integration, because Western European societies are based on 
culturally different secular values that can potentially contribute to unwanted social and 
religious changes in Poland. As such, the chapter will argue that the Euroscepticism of 
Polish political Catholicism is not a simple matter of short- or mid-term electoral tactics; 
rather that is, in fact, deeply entrenched in the ideological predispositions of Polish political 
Catholicism. 
Much of this chapter’s discussion is devoted to Law and Justice because it is the most 
important political party of the political Catholic movement in Poland, dominating the 
right of the political spectrum for the past 10 years. Nonetheless, this chapter also includes 
some empirical evidence from other political Catholic parties (such as the League of Polish 
Families, Poland is the Most Important, and the now defunct Christian National Union), 
non-party political Catholic actors and the Catholic Church hierarchy. 
 
5.2 The issue of  national sovereignty  
Chapter 3 described how, as a result of a turbulent history marked by periods of bitter 
struggle for independence from foreign rule, Catholicism and Polish national identity 
became combined in a strongly inter-woven relationship. This ‘Catholic nationalism’ meant 
that political Catholicism started displaying strong concerns for protecting the sovereignty 
of the Polish state. It is quite a distinct feature compared with post-1945 West European 
manifestations of this movement, which felt at ease with the concept of supranationalism 
and the pooling of sovereignty, leading to the process of European integration. This strong 
aspiration of Polish political Catholicism to protect national sovereignty is a crucial element 
of its Eurosceptic position. 
Sovereignty and European integration 
Sovereignty is a key principle that established nation states and became a foundation of the 
international system. De Benoist (1999: 99) defined it as ‘supreme public power, which has 
135 
  
the right and, in theory, the capacity to impose its authority in the last instance.’ The 
original concept was developed in the 16th and 17th century by Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who were concerned with maintaining domestic order and 
focused on establishing the legitimacy of a single hierarchy of domestic power – in this 
sense, sovereignty denoted ‘supreme power’. However, political practice redefined the 
original meaning of the concept. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty 
Years War in Europe, was a milestone in the history of sovereign states since it established 
national self-determination as a principle for the formation of a state, recognised monarchs’ 
freedom from external interferences and introduced formal equality between rulers of 
different countries. Thus, sovereignty began to mean a state’s formal independence from 
foreign powers and exclusive jurisdiction and supremacy over its territory and inhabitants. 
As a result, the principles of non-intervention in domestic affairs and formal equality 
between states developed in modern international law (Miyoshi 2009). 
Currently, the notion of national or state sovereignty consists of four key aspects: territory, 
population, authority and recognition (Biersteker and Weber 1996). This is a reflection of 
the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States signed on 26th December 1933, 
whose article 1 provides that ‘the State as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, 
and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other States.’ At the same time, the second 
half of the 20th century witnessed strong trends aimed at restraining national sovereignty, 
which could be observed in three main fields. Firstly, the development of international 
organisations, whereby states accepted that a supranational organisation may take decisions 
they no longer have a decisive influence on. Secondly, the establishment of international 
judicial institutions, where states accept the institutions’ jurisdiction over their inhabitants, 
particular in human rights issues. Thirdly, the area of conflict and foreign intervention, 
where states seemed to accept infringements on territorial sovereignty in order to protect 
individuals from serious human rights violations (Miyoshi 2009). 
In the context of this research, the integration processes in Europe are, of course, the most 
relevant. The progressing economic integration based on the agreement of EU member 
states to pool their sovereignty is a clear example of a situation in which nation states lose 
control over significant aspects of their functioning. Monetary policy, which expanded 
immediately after the Second World War, providing states with new tools to exert their 
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autonomous authority (Keynesian economics6), changed completely after the establishment 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the euro, depriving 
some EU states of autonomous control over their currencies and budget deficits (Krasner 
2001). Tight economic interdependence created by the European integration process led to 
a ‘spillover’ effect, expanding integration into the non-economic areas. It is exactly this 
process that caused sceptical attitudes to the EU expressed by adherents of Polish political 
Catholicism, who are deeply worried about further encroachments by the EU on the 
autonomy of the Polish state. Such a sovereignty-based Euroscepticism is defined not by 
utilitarian concerns about a lack of economic benefits, but rather by a reluctance to increase 
the competencies of the EU and weaken national sovereignty (Sorensen 2006). 
Polish political Catholicism and sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
Polish-EU relations were viewed primarily by proponents of Polish political Catholicism 
through the paradigm of maintaining Polish sovereignty and securing Polish national 
interests. In March 2014, while presenting candidates for the 2014 European elections, 
Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of Law and Justice, said: ‘We want to be in the EU and we want 
the EU to endure. However, under no circumstances does this statement contradict 
another one, the most basic one for our identity and our direction of action – that it is 
worth being Polish and it is worth for Poland to endure …. The EU cannot become a 
superstate, because it would be a civilisational and cultural disaster. [To create a superstate] 
could be an aim only of ideological madmen or cynical players who would like to 
manipulate people without identity, separated from their culture’ (Kaczyński 2014). This 
statement exemplified the attitudes of Law and Justice to the EU, which was based on the 
need to protect sovereignty and identity, coupled with opposition to further transfers of 
national decision-making powers to the EU. For example, Ryszard Czarnecki, Law and 
Justice MEP, defined the EU policy of his party as being critical of the fact ‘that more and 
more decisions are taken outside of Poland … [and] that the EU is departing from the 
[founding] principle of economic cooperation … [, which did not include] the process of a 
gradual takeover of [national] competences’ (Interview with R. Czarnecki 2013). 
Concerns about protecting Polish sovereignty meant that there was no enthusiasm in 
Polish political Catholicism for widening and deepening the integration process in most 
areas. This approach was often defined, in the words of Ryszard Legutko, Law and Justice 
                                                 
6 Keynesian economics relate to the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, who believed that, in a recession, the 
economy can be made to grow and unemployment reduced by increasing government spending and making 
reductions in interest rates. 
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MEP, as ‘support for a Europe of Nations’, and was based on the belief that ‘the idea of a 
nation state has not diminished …. It's an idea that functions very well’ (Interview with R. 
Legutko 2013). Some of Law and Justice’s politicians went even further and declared that 
Polish EU membership was unconstitutional as it deprived the Polish nation of its rights as 
a sovereign state. For example, Krystyna Pawłowicz, Law and Justice MP, stated: ‘Polish 
accession to the EU was a breach of the Polish constitution, because article 4 [of the 
constitution] specifies that the Polish nation is sovereign … while the essence of successive 
[European] treaties was the transfer of sovereignty to the EU …. This means that the EU 
institutions become sovereign [at the expense of the nation]’ (Interview with K. Pawłowicz 
2013). In an interview for one of the Polish internet news portals Pawłowicz added: 
‘What’s most important is that after the EU’s collapse, Poland would regain its sovereignty’ 
(Nizinkiewicz 2012). 
The defence of Polish national interests in the EU is another sign of the major importance 
assigned by proponents of Polish political Catholicism to the protection of national 
sovereignty. As Janusz Wojciechowski MEP explained, ‘Law and Justice is and was for 
Polish EU membership, but an equal membership. [The party] objects to any 
discrimination against Poland, emphasising [the need to protect] national interests’ 
(Interview with J. Wojciechowski 2012). Point 5 of the Prague Declaration of the European 
Conservatives and Reformists, a political group in the European Parliament of which Law 
and Justice is also a member, identified support for the sovereign integrity of the nation 
state, opposition to EU federalism and a renewed respect for true subsidiarity as key 
elements of its political programme (ECR 2014). Law and Justice often perceived 
European politics as a ‘zero-sum game’, where the fight for national interests was the most 
important determinant of all activities. This was exemplified by Krzysztof Szczerski MP, 
one of the Law and Justice politicians responsible for shaping its foreign policy, who 
described the nature of politics at the European level as ‘rivalry, competition, hierarchy, 
[and] building dependencies [between nations] …. EU membership needs to serve the 
development of Poland; everything should start from a question: where does Polish 
national interest lie?’ (Interview with K. Szczerski 2013). 
In the context of relations between states at the EU level, it is important to point out the 
very traditional understanding of sovereignty held by Law and Justice. As mentioned 
above, one of the foundations of international law was the principle of equal treatment of 
states, regardless of their size or economic power. Law and Justice’s attachment to this 
138 
  
principle in the context of the EU is very characteristic and of a high priority for the 
biggest Polish political Catholic party. For example, in a press interview, Janusz 
Wojciechowski MEP noted that ‘we are not treated equally in the European Union …. 
There is a lot to do, we need to ensure equal and proper treatment’ (Wojciechowski 2014). 
This approach was confirmed by the already mentioned Prague Declaration of European 
Conservatives and Reformists, which Law and Justice supported, in which ‘respect and 
equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small’ (ECR 2014) was 
enshrined as one of the key principles. This rather traditionalist view of the idea of 
sovereignty put Polish political Catholicism in close proximity to some of Europe’s 
nationalist parties rather than other West European political Catholic (mostly Christian 
democratic) groupings. 
The aspiration to defend sovereignty and the perception of EU politics as a competition 
between states was also related to a preference for intergovernmentalism. Law and Justice 
frequently stressed that the source of EU legitimacy were the decisions of member states, 
which conferred upon this organisation certain objectives to be fulfilled. As a result, the 
party often casted doubts on the role of the European Parliament in the EU institutional 
setup and favoured a more important role of the Council of the EU, representing the 
governments of member states. This was confirmed by Konrad Szymański MEP, a Law 
and Justice politician who explained that ‘sovereignty is an important dimension of 
statehood and a key element of Law and Justice policy …. [National sovereignty] is also a 
matter of democratic legitimacy. I don't agree that you can replace democratic legitimacy at 
the nation-state level with any supranational democratic legitimacy, because there is no 
European demos’ (Interview with K. Szymański 2013). In an interview for the Polish daily 
Rzeczpostpolita Szymański added: ‘I believe that [to ensure] democratic control [in the EU], 
the Council of the EU, i.e. the governments of member states, suffices. They have a 
democratic mandate and are controlled by national parliaments’ (Słojewska 2014). Janusz 
Wojciechowski, Law and Justice MEP, stated: ‘Essentially, the EU is a game of national 
interests, and you need to emphsise them …. [Our focus is on a] strong defence of Polish 
national interests …, opposition to federalist tendencies in the EU, [and] maintaining the 
sovereignty of member states’ (Interview with J. Wojciechowski 2012).
One good example of the role the issue of national sovereignty played in the EU policy of 
Law and Justice was the case of negotiations on, and the introduction of, the so-called 
Fiscal Compact (formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
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Economic and Monetary Union). This international treaty was signed as a response to the 
failure of the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure manageable levels of sovereign debts in 
the EU. As a result of the global financial crisis, the eurozone countries decided it was 
necessary to strengthen fiscal coordination and introduced new measures to counteract 
excessive state borrowings (above 3% of GDP). Initially, the new provisions were to 
become a part of the acquis communautaire. After the British veto, however, an international 
agreement was developed, compulsory for the eurozone members and open to other EU 
states. Finally, the treaty was signed by 25 out of the then 27 member states (all except for 
the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic), including Poland, whose government saw it 
as a way to improve its financial standing in the international markets and to ensure that it 
was not excluded from vital economic discussions and decision-making that could 
eventually lead to the creation of a two-speed Europe. 
Law and Justice fervently opposed the treaty on the grounds that it limited Polish 
sovereignty, while not offering any significant benefits in return. Jarosław Kaczyński 
declared, ‘[w]e are dealing with a far-reaching attempt … to limit our sovereignty and hence 
to limit our democracy. Our status as citizens, after the adoption of such regulations, will 
be much weaker than it currently is. The impact of our voice as voters will be limited – it 
will be adjusted by an external factor’ (Kaczyński 2011). Tomasz Poręba, Law and Justice 
MEP, further developed this opinion: ‘The Fiscal Compact is a serious blow to our 
sovereignty in the area of social and economic decisions …. This document may adversely 
impact the economic growth of Poland and lead to the loss of sovereignty in the decision-
making process concerning key areas of the economy’ (Poręba 2013). Once the agreement 
was ratified by the Polish Sejm and the President, Law and Justice filed a complaint to the 
Constitutional Tribunal, stating that ‘the Fiscal Compact limits in an arbitrary way the 
ability of the state to decide about its budget, taxation, finance …. It changes the 
relationship between the Polish political system, the constitution, national law and external 
law’ (Szczerski 2013). 
The predominant concern for the defence of sovereignty and the protection of national 
interests as a source of Eurosceptic views was also evident in the case of the party that 
made references to Christian values a key feature of its identity, that is: the League of 
Polish Families. Daniel Pawłowiec, at the time one of the most prominent members of the 
League and former secretary of state in the Office of the Committee for European 
Integration (from 2006 to 2007), declared that sovereignty was the most important value 
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for the party: ‘We believed that the EU model was harmful for Poland …. We believed that 
losing sovereignty would not bring Poland anything in exchange, no benefits’ (Interview 
with D. Pawłowiec 2013). This was further reinforced by Maciej Giertych, a League’s MEP 
during 2004-2009 and its 2005 presidential candidate, who, when questioned about the 
main reasons for the Eurosceptic programme of his party, answered that it ‘was the 
traditional independence of Poland. We didn’t leave the Warsaw Pact and [gain political 
independence from] Russia only to become subordinate to the EU …. We as a nation, as a 
state, can stand on our own two feet and not listen to external directives’ (Interview with 
M. Giertych 2013). 
The concern to preserve national sovereignty was also a feature of the position of the party 
that, contrary to the League of Polish Families, did not reject Poland’s EU membership 
outright, but favoured a more nuanced approach – the now defunct Christian National 
Union. The Christian National Union was a significant political player throughout the 
1990s, forming government coalitions and fairly successful electoral coalitions (e.g. 
Catholic Electoral Action, which gathered 8.7% of votes in the 1991 parliamentary 
elections). Artur Zawisza, a former Secretary General of the party, defined its approach to 
the EU as being ‘In favour of European integration, but against a European federation’ 
(Interview with A. Zawisza 2013). Later a leading figure in the extreme right-wing National 
Movement (Ruch Narodowy, RN), Zawisza also stressed his new party’s concerns about the 
relationship between Polish sovereignty and the process of European integration and called 
for a new European treaty to be signed – a ‘sovereignty treaty’, providing for the return of 
prerogatives to national capitals. 
National sovereignty was an important element for political Catholicism in Poland. It was a 
striking feature, as typically parties of this genre in post-1945 Europe subscribed to 
supranationalism as well as the idea of transnational cooperation and refrained from using 
nationalistic rhetoric. In many instances described in this chapter, the EU and its decision-
making process were viewed by Polish political Catholic politicians with suspicion, while 
relations between member states were seen from a traditional, if not crude, perspective of 
power politics. In the words of Jarosław Kaczyński: ‘Are we to be reduced to the role of 
abused peripheries of the EU? This could be our only role in a federalised Europe …. The 
rules of European and world politics, even though more civilised, have not changed. 
Stronger [states] win, take over, sometimes exploit. If we look today at the social and 
economic life, we can easily see this phenomenon’ (Baliszewski 2013). 
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What is also worth noting in this discussion is the attachment of Polish political 
Catholicism to the traditional understanding of sovereignty, defined by the principle of 
exclusive supremacy over a territory and formal equality between states in the international 
arena. The strong focus on national sovereignty and the role of states in international 
relations meant that proponents of Polish political Catholicism were also distrustful of 
supranationality and had a strong preference for intergovernmentalism. 
These two elements, the aspiration to protect national sovereignty and the preference for 
intergovernmentalism, were at the core of the Eurosceptic approach of Polish political 
Catholicism. The situation can perhaps best be summarised with the words of Artur 
Zawisza: ‘The dominant right wing in Poland [before the war] was the Christian-national 
camp …. Today, it does not exist in the same form …, but this way of thinking remains. 
Polish Christian-social thought is intrinsically national-patriotic, more so than in any other 
European country. A Polish Catholic has a very strong tendency towards Euroscepticism, 
while a German Catholic has a tendency towards pro-European attitudes’ (Interview with 
A. Zawisza 2013). However, the question remains why political Catholicism in Poland was 
so concerned about national sovereignty and, in this respect, differed significantly from 
other traditional manifestations of the movement in Western Europe. It is a central 
argument of this chapter that the strong focus on maintaining sovereignty was part of 
another, larger feature of Polish political Catholicism, namely its Catholic-nationalist trait, 
which made it perceive Christian values as an essential element of Polish national identity 
threatened by the liberal values of the West. 
 
5.3 The perceived threat of  European integration to the 
Church and Christian values as a repository of  national 
identity  
There are two most significant characteristics of Polish political Catholicism, which drive 
its aspiration to protect national sovereignty and thus lead to its Eurosceptic stance. Firstly, 
the belief that the Catholic Church is a repository of national values and that Christian 
ethics provide the basis for the proper functioning of Polish society. Secondly, the 
perception that the EU – as an organisation based on secular, liberal values – may threaten 
the role of Catholicism in Polish society. Previous chapters outlined how Polish national 
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identity became entangled with Catholicism as a result of historical events: the dissolution 
of the Polish state in the 18th century, a bitter struggle for independence throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries, and almost 45 years of communist rule. During that time, the 
Church steadily grew in its role as one of the few institutions upholding Polish traditions 
and nurturing the feeling of national identity. Hence, it is not surprising that Polish political 
Catholicism regards the Church and Christian values as a bedrock of social life, valuing it 
probably to a much higher degree than its contemporary Western European counterpart. 
The following words by Krystyna Pawłowicz, a Law and Justice MP, epitomised this 
feature of Polish political Catholicism. ‘There is no Poland without Catholicism and 
Christian values …. My responsibility is to protect Christianity as the fundamental basis of 
the Polish nation. This is not bigotry, this is history’ (Interview with K. Pawłowicz 2013). 
This opinion was widely shared across Polish political Catholicism, as well as by people 
outside of politics and Church sympathisers, such as Tomasz Terlikowski, Catholic 
journalist, head of the Catholic internet portal fronda.pl and a commentator of Polish 
politics. He observed that ‘the language of Christianity [the Christian narrative] is the only 
one available in Poland …. This language was used by both secular and religious 
opposition during communism …. Everything in Poland revolves around this language and 
[the Christian values] system’’ (Interview with T. Terlikowski 2013). Prof. Andrzej 
Zybertowicz, sociologist and Law and Justice MEP, similarly stated: ‘As a researcher, I say: 
to distract Poles from the [Catholic] Church is to deprive us [Poles] of the most vital juices 
of Polishness’ (Zybertowicz 2014). 
The fact that Polish political Catholicism identified Christian values as the framework for 
the functioning of Polish society was perhaps not so surprising for a movement of this 
kind. What was, however, extraordinary in this context was what seemed to be a rather 
widespread belief among representatives of Polish political Catholicism that European 
integration and the institutions of the EU, at least to some degree, discriminated against 
Christian values, trying to eradicate them from public life and thus threatening the 
foundations of Polish society. 
In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to outline the history of the Polish 
Catholic Church’s attitudes towards Poland’s EU membership and the institution’s 
influence on Euroscepticism among proponents of Polish political Catholicism. The role of 
Radio Maryja is of paramount importance in this context and needs to be examined before 
analysing how the perceived cultural struggle between the EU’s ‘liberal’ values and Polish 
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‘traditional values’ translated into Euroscepticism within the political Catholic movement in 
Poland. 
5.3.1 The Catholic Church and Polish EU membership 
After the collapse of communism in 1989-91, not only the external environment in which 
the Catholic Church in Poland was operating changed, but the Church also evolved 
internally. One of the signs of this evolution was the fact that it ceased appearing as a 
monolith in its opinions on socio-economic life. The Polish Church has never voiced a 
single opinion on European integration. This is hardly surprising, considering the size of 
the Polish Church with its almost 34 million registered faithful (out of 38 million Polish 
citizens), 9,505 parishes, 56,325 clergymen and the great number of functions and roles this 
institution plays (ISKK 2012). This heterogeneity was especially noticeable in the case of 
the European integration process, where the Church’s opinion in the pre-accession period 
varied significantly. 
The Polish Catholic Church, for most of the time, was anxious about the ‘moral-cultural’ 
influence of EU membership on Polish society, which also ultimately affected political 
Catholicism in Poland. In particular, the Church voiced concerns about the possible effects 
of European integration on traditional Christian values and the way Polish society 
functioned. 
In the early 1990s, the prospects of Poland’s EU membership were rather vague and the 
magnitude of the process was unclear to many, including the Polish Church, which was 
largely positive about Polish attempts to join the EU. At that time, integration was equated 
mostly with its economic dimension and any moral-cultural aspects of the process that 
could potentially change the role of the Polish Church and traditional Christian values in 
Polish society were ignored (Jackowska 2003). The Church also did not participate in the 
EU membership debate because it was fully aware of the enormously varied opinions 
among its clergy and the faithful. At the same time, concerns about the accelerating 
processes of secularism, consumptionism and individualism were common and there was 
no disagreement in the Church as to their existence. The discussion focused rather on the 
question whether secularisation was directly linked to European integration and if EU 
policies generated or strengthened the unwanted social trends (Zuba 2006). 
The period between 1994 and 1997 was characterised by fear of the liberal and immoral 
Europe, which was feeding the Eurosceptic position of many clergymen (e.g. the homily of 
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Primate Józef Glemp in Jasna Góra on 15 August 1995). Bishop Pieronek, an important 
member of the Episcopate at the time, blamed this on the lack of understanding and 
knowledge of the essence of European integration among priests. In addition, some of the 
concerns voiced by Pope John Paul II about moral values and civilisation choices of 
Western Europe were over-interpreted by the Polish Church, driving its opposition to 
Poland’s EU membership (Zuba 2006). 
The year 1997 marked a noticeable shift in the opinion of the Church on European 
integration toward a more pro-EU stand, which was a direct result of the visit of Polish 
bishops in Brussels in November 1997. Although the Church’s authorities adopted a more 
favourable attitude towards integration, they also accepted opposing views within the 
Church and did not attempt to pacify them (Zuba 2006). 
Polish primate Józef Glemp is perhaps the best example of the evolution of the Church’s 
opinion on the EU. Initially, Glemp was reluctant and distrustful of the integration process. 
However, his position slowly evolved to reach the acceptance stage around the year 2000. 
Glemp never became a strong supporter, but he clearly disassociated the process of EU 
integration from secularisation. Although the Church remained divided on the issue, 
Glemp’s authority meant that his voice was perceived as the official position of the Church, 
while it also influenced other more sceptic senior clergymen to tone down and eventually 
change their sceptical approach (Zuba 2006). 
Until the early 2000s, the official Church position remained unchanged, with 59% of 
priests declaring support for the European integration process (Kolarska-Bobińska 2003). 
With the advancement of Polish accession negotiations, however, the full extent of the 
possible influence of EU membership on Poland became obvious, including the impacts 
on national law and progressing liberalisation of the ‘moral-cultural’ sphere. Although the 
Episcopate expressed its acceptance of Poland’s plans to join the EU, the bishops warned 
that the European integration process may lead to ‘the dissemination of the kind of lifestyle 
as if there was no God’ and demanded that the process would not entail ‘the renunciation 
of national, political and cultural sovereignty, including religious identity’ (Polish 
Episcopate 2002). The Episcopate also pointed to indirect links between European 
integration and secularisation: ‘[The process of secularisation] remains closely linked with 
the materialistic and secularised lifestyle, which is endorsed and promoted [in Western 
Europe]’ (Machaj, Białas-Zielińska 2014: 4). 
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Similar worries about maintaining Poland’s cultural heritage, national and religious identity 
in addition to protecting Christian values as the basis of Polish society were repeated in 
other documents by the Polish Episcopate. In ‘The Word of Polish Bishops regarding the 
Polish EU accession’ (Polish Episcopate 2003), the Church supported Polish EU 
membership, but warned that Polish cultural heritage and national identity must be 
protected in the process. In two documents7 published in March 2004, two months before 
Polish accession to the EU, bishops once again pointed out that the most serious threat 
brought about by the integration process was the growing secularisation of Europe. They 
asked that Polish society resisted certain Western influences, such as growing disrespect for 
the religious dimension of public life. The main theme of both documents was the concern 
of the Polish Church for the preservation of Christian values as the basis of European 
culture and society (Machaj, Białas-Zielińska 2014). Archbishop Henryk Muszyński, the 
first representative of the Polish Episcopate to the Commission of the Bishops’ 
Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), described the situation as follows: 
‘To put it simply, many senior clergymen link this [negative ethical and religious changes] 
with the EU. Since [Polish accession to] the EU there has been greater laxity in terms of 
social mores’ (Interview with Archbishop Muszyński 2013). Despite a rather positive 
opinion of the Church on the EU, it remained focused very much on concerns rather than 
opportunities that integration could create. The Church’s position was described by Bishop 
Kazimierz Nycz as ‘yes, but – with an emphasis on the “but”’ (GW 2002). A clear example 
would be the Church’s demands for a declaration to be attached to the Polish EU 
accession treaty stating the supremacy of Polish law in the field of abortion and 
safeguarding the rights of the family defined as a relationship between a man and a woman. 
Following EU accession, the Polish Church continued to voice its concerns about the 
impact of the European integration process on traditional Christian values. For example, in 
a 2011 statement of the Polish Episcopate on the occasion of the first Polish presidency of 
the EU Council, the bishops emphasised the need for Poland to promote family values, 
religious freedom and the protection of life from natural conception (Polish Episcopate 
2011). In addition, one of the most contentious issues was the inclusion of Invocatio Dei (a 
reference to God) in the draft Constitutional Treaty. The bishops continuously expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the fact that the document did not mention Christianity as a 
                                                 
7 ‘Christian Responsibility for the Country. The Appeal of Polish Bishops for Responsibility for the Future of 
Poland and Europe in the Face of Poland’s Accession to European Union Structures’ (Polish Episcopate 
2004a) and ‘The Word of Polish Bishops on the Occasion of Poland’s Admission to the EU’ (Polish 
Episcopate 2004b) 
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source of European identity and that it did not make sufficient references to the principles 
of Catholic social teaching (Machaj, Białas-Zielińska 2014).   
The Polish Church hierarchy also remained anxious about the role of the Church and 
religion in Polish public life, as stated in May 2014 by Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, 
President of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate: ‘The [Polish] state and the Church 
are not simply two institutions living next to each other, with their own, autonomous lives. 
These are two institutions that rely on each other, and they rely on each other in a similar 
way as the body and the soul. The Church, if it is authentic, must be the soul of the state. 
Without spiritual values that the Church provides, the body of the state withers away. For 
some, this may sound provocative, but it is true’ (Gądecki 2014). 
It is clear that the position of the Polish Church on the EU was difficult to grasp and quite 
nuanced. Some commentators, like Tomasz Terlikowski, believed that ‘the Catholic Church 
hierarchy in Poland would say that they don't want to speak out on this matter [European 
integration], because they take a lot of money from the EU. This is why they are unwilling 
to critisise the EU. However, the position [of the Church] is not Euro-enthusiastic …. 
Currently [the Polish Church] is rather Eurosceptic or Euro-realist, and not Euro-
enthusiastic’ (Interview with T. Terlikowski 2013). It seems that the Church’s attitude 
towards the EU was best summarised by Catholic journalist Marek Zając, who said that 
although bishops were often sceptical about the integration process, they generally believed 
that it was better to be a critical member of the EU than an applicant excluded from the 
process (Zając 2009). This was confirmed by Bishop Pieronek, who said, ‘If we had not 
been in the EU, would it have been any better? Not at all’ (Interview with Bishop Pieronek 
2013). What is, however, crucial in the context of this study is the fact that concerns about 
the impact of Poland’s EU membership on the moral-cultural framework of Polish society, 
secularisation and the role of the Church in public life, were clearly visible themes that 
characterised the opinion of the Polish Church on European integration.  
What was the impact of the Church’s opinion about the EU on Polish political 
Catholicism? Chapter 3 already showed that the overall influence of the Church on Polish 
politics was limited to an indirect impact, resulting from the strong authority of the 
Church. This seems to have been the case as well in the field of Euroscepticism. Tomasz 
Terlikowski, a Catholic journalist, noticed that, ‘[the Church's Euroscepticism] influences 
Catholic public opinion in Poland [more than it does political parties]’ (Inteview with T. 
Terlikowski 2013). Polish political Catholicism, a movement that declared its respect for, 
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and attention to what the Church had to say in the matter of European integration, was, at 
the same time, eager to assert its independence in shaping its European policies. For 
example, Konrad Szymański MEP declared that ‘there are no institutional links [between 
the Church and Law and Justice]…. However, this is important – the Church not only 
represents a large part of Polish society, but also is a national institution …. We try to listen 
attentively to the opinion of the Church [on European integration]’ (Interview with K. 
Szymański 2013). This view was shared by other Law and Justice politicians, like Ryszard 
Czarnecki MEP. In answer to the question ‘Does the opinion of the Catholic Church have 
any influence on the Law and Justice EU policy?’, he firmly stated ‘None’ (Interview with 
R. Czarnecki 2013). Other parties that formed part of Polish political Catholicism also 
declared that their EU policy was not directly affected by the opinion of the Church. 
Daniel Pawłowiec pointed out that the League of Polish Families’ policy on Europe was 
only partially in line with the opinion of the Polish Church. ‘When it comes to the issues of 
faith and morality … the Church was for us the ultimate authority …; however, in politics 
we were independent …. The voice of the Polish Church was for us an important source 
of advice, but not a decisive one’ (Interview with D. Pawłowiec 2013). This was expressed 
even more decisively by Maciej Giertych, the League’s 2005 presidential candidate: ‘In 
political matters, we [the League of Polish Families] have been free of the Church’s opinion 
…. The national movement was never a tool of the Church, and politically we were 
independent’ (Interview with M. Giertych 2013). Marek Migalski, MEP of the Poland is the 
Most Important party, also stated that ‘[today,] the opinion of the Church’s hierarchy in 
political matters is less and less important’ (Interview with M. Migalski 2012). This agreed 
with the statement of Artur Zawisza, former member of the Christian National Union, 
who pointed out that ‘the Church’s opinion [on the EU] has been changeable …. For a 
long time the Church had no coherent position; thus, it was not a good source of 
inspiration [in terms of building the party’s EU policies] …. However, what really mattered 
was not what the bishops would say, but the opinion of Pope John Paul II’ (Interview with 
A. Zawisza 2013). 
The Church’s concerns about European integration focused on the cultural struggle and 
the protection of traditional Christian values as the basis of Polish society, culture and 
politics. This was noticed by Katarzyna Wiśniewska, a Gazeta Wyborcza journalist, who 
stated that ‘the concerns [of Polish bishops regarding European integration] are related to 
moral-cultural issues. They are afraid of homosexual marriages and adoptions, which they 
link [with the EU] …. Most bishops share these concerns’ (Interview with K. Wiśniewska 
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2013). The moral-cultural revolution which, according to some clergymen, was fuelled by 
Poland’s EU membership, as set out earlier in this section, was the main source of the 
Eurosceptic sentiment within the Polish Church. This position seems to have had an 
indirect influence on political Catholic groupings in Poland, for whom the main concern 
remained maintaining Polish national sovereignty, with the protection of traditional, 
Christian values mentioned as a second-order issue. Naturally, these two elements – the 
protection of national sovereignty and the moral-cultural struggle – cannot be artificially 
separated, as they are interwoven with each other. Defending the traditional Catholic 
framework of Polish society was quite often seen as a way to preserve elements of Polish 
sovereignty. 
5.3.2 Radio Maryja – fusion of passion for the faith, the Church and 
Poland 
Zuba (2006) noted that one can speak only about tendencies or streams within the Church, 
both pro- and anti-EU, as the Church’s position was incoherent and evolved over time. 
One of the most prominent of these ‘streams’ was Radio Maryja and its milieu. This is why, 
in the context of the Polish Church’s concerns about EU influence on the Christian basis 
of Polish society, it is essential to analyse the media conglomerate of the charismatic Father 
Tadeusz Rydzyk in more detail. Radio Maryja, a TV station, Telewizja Trwam (TV ‘I persist’) 
and the national daily Nasz Dziennik (‘Our daily’) were the most vocal parts of the Polish 
Church pointing at a direct link between Polish EU membership, the process of 
secularisation in Poland and a threat to Polish national identity. 
Chapter 3 described a relatively high politicisation of Radio Maryja, and the ‘specific’ type 
of Catholicism it subscribed to: a fusion of passion for the Catholic faith, the Church and 
Poland. This meant that Radio Maryja and associated media believed that the social order 
in Poland was entirely embedded in the Catholic moral order, which needed to be 
protected and upheld in order to guarantee the development of Polish society. In this 
context, Euroscepticism among Radio Maryja’s followers was not surprising as, in its 
discourse, Western Europe was quite often depicted as a source of cultural threats 
endangering the (Catholic Christian) moral foundations of the Polish nation. Piotr Maciej 
Kaczyński, a Brussels-based analyst, pointed out that a characteristic feature of the radio 
station’s Euroscepticism was the link that it constructed between Poland’s EU membership 
and the accelerating process of secularisation in Poland (Interview with P.M. Kaczyński 
2013).  
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Eurosceptic opinions, the charisma of Father Rydzyk and the power of his media all came 
together in the early 2000s, when Radio Maryja’s influence on the Polish political scene 
became particularly important. Szczerbiak (2001, 2004b) noted that had it not been for the 
support of Radio Maryja, the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic League of Polish Families would not have 
been able to gather so many supporters in the 2001 parliamentary elections, making the 
radio station’s support crucial for the electoral success of the party. This is how Daniel 
Pawłowiec described the early 2000s and the formation process of the League of Polish 
Families: ‘This was the time when Solidarity Electoral Action was in complete disarray … 
[and] many groups started leaving it …. These groups were looking for their own place, 
which Radio Maryja became for them … Under the patronage [of Radio Maryja], these 
groups [started co-operating]’ (Interview with D. Pawłowiec 2013). In the words of Maciej 
Giertych, ‘Radio Maryja proposed the combination of different [political] groups into one 
formation called the League of Polish Families …. Radio Maryja encouraged some smaller 
groups to reach a [political] agreement’ (Interview with M. Giertych 2013). Another good 
illustration of Father Rydzyk’s role in Polish politics was, as Szczerbiak (2001) observed, 
Jan Łopuszanski’s October 2000 presidential bid, for which he failed to secure Radio 
Maryja’s backing and received a minimal share of vote. 
The assessment of the radio channel’s influence on the Eurosceptic position of Polish 
political Catholicism naturally varies depending on analysts’ affiliations and sympathies. For 
example, Piotr Maciej Kaczyński described the radio station as the main inspiration not 
only for Law and Justice, but for the whole of the Polish Church when seeking to 
understand how European integration impacts the role of Christian values in public life in 
Poland (Interview P.M. Kaczyński 2013). Contrary to this view, Tomasz Terlikowski, 
Catholic journalist, believed that ‘the role of Radio Maryja [in driving Polish 
Euroscepticism] is over-estimated. Naturally, Radio Maryja represents the more 
Eurosceptic milieu of the Polish Church, but I don't think that it is [the view] of the 
majority. There are many more shades of Euro-realism in the Polish Church’ (Interview 
with T. Terlikowski 2013). It is clear that Radio Maryja was an important element of Polish 
political Catholicism. As explained in chapter 3, its ability to mobilise and, to a certain 
degree, shape the political preferences of its listeners was a significant tactical factor that 
parties took into consideration. At the same time, the radio station’s influence on Polish 
politics was limited, just as its follower base was also limited, with Polish political 
Catholicism being eager to assert its organisational and ideological independence. The 
strength of the channel’s power was further mediated by the fact that its Eurosceptic views 
150 
  
were declared not to have a direct effect on parties’ programmes and rhetoric. Politicians 
like Krzysztof Szczerski MP and Ryszard Legutko MEP described the radio station and its 
supporters inside the party as either ‘not shaping the European policy of Law and Justice’ 
(Interview with K. Szczerski 2013) or not being sizable enough for a party to exist based on 
its support, asking, ‘How big is the listenership of Radio Maryja? …. The party Solidaristic 
Poland of Zbigniew Ziobro was created, which tried to capitalise [on Euroscepticism and 
Radio Maryja] … and what support do they have? Two percent?’ (Interview with R. 
Legutko 2013). Maciej Giertych, a prominent politician of the League of Polish Families, 
when asked about the influence of Radio Maryja on the League’s Eurosceptic position, 
used the word ‘convergence’ to describe the interaction between the party and the radio 
station’s world views (Interview with M. Giertych 2013). Daniel Pawłowiec, ex-member of 
the same party, said ‘Radio Maryja was Eurosceptic …, and between us [the party and the 
radio station] there were no problems about this; we were complementary…. These were 
parallel processes. The radio station reached its [Eurosceptic] position in its own way, while 
the League had its own way to Euroscepticism’ (Interview with D. Pawłowiec 2013). Very 
similar words were used by Krystyna Pawłowicz MP, while speaking about Law and 
Justice’s EU policy: ‘There is no connection [between Radio Maryja’s opinion and the Law 
and Justice EU policy]. Law and Justice looks closely at public opinion [, which has become 
more Eurosceptic] …. We are simply heading in the same direction [and] care about the 
same values’ (Interview with K. Pawłowicz 2013). 
Perhaps what was most curious about Radio Maryja was the specific type of Catholicism 
the radio station supported, based on the amalgamation of religion with the feeling of 
national identity and on the integration of care for the faith with care for Poland, which – 
coupled with a perceived cultural struggle between ‘Catholic Poland’ and the ‘liberal West’ 
– drove its Euroscepticism. 
5.3.3 The cultural struggle between Catholic Poland and the ‘liberal 
West’ 
The problem of the ‘endangered Polish identity’ in the context of European integration 
formed the key argument for EU opponents, making the cultural and identity dimension of 
the EU debate in Poland the most heatedly discussed and controversial point (Styczyńska 
2012). The anxieties of most Eurosceptics focused very much on the unique role of 
Catholicism in Polish national identity and a possible advancement of secularisation 
processes caused by Poland’s EU membership. In the pre-accession period, many 
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Eurosceptics were concerned that, as a result of European integration, a new kind of 
identity would emerge that would overtake the current form of Polish national identity and 
lead to the loss of Polish cultural identity (Mach and Niedźwiecki 2002). EU opponents 
resorted to a rhetoric which presented Polish society as traditional, healthy and based on 
morality, contrary to the Western European identity, which was secular, libertarian and 
morally relativist (Zuba 2006). 
Section 3.4 outlined how Polish political Catholicism regarded West European 
manifestations of this movement as an empty ideological shell. The perception that West 
European political Catholicism departed from its Christian roots led to the logical 
conclusion that the EU as a whole, having been driven for many years by Christian 
democracy, moved away from its Christian origins. Katarzyna Wiśniewska, journalist of 
Gazeta Wyborcza specialising in state-Church relations, pointed out that ‘[the Euroscepticism 
of Polish political Catholicism] stems from the belief that the EU departed from its 
[Christian] roots …. I think that many Catholics and Christians share the belief that the EU 
departed from its Christian roots, that it was supposed to be something completely 
different than [it is] now’ (Interview with K. Wiśniewska 2013). This opinion was 
supported by Krystyna Pawłowicz MP, who said that ‘in the beginning, the founding 
fathers … wanted to create a structure … that would allow [countries] to trade and find 
markets without conquering anyone. They did not want to liquidate the idea of a nation 
and create a European nation, [or to] liquidate nation-states and create a European state, a 
European flag, [or] a European currency …. The EU has become the main source for 
financing … the moral-cultural revolution’ (Interview with K. Pawłowicz 2013). Similarly, 
Maciej Giertych noticed that ‘today, [West European Christian democracy] is not steered 
by Catholics …. Schuman, Adenauer, and de Gasperi were people who wanted to create 
something in the spirit of Christianity and Catholicism. This [approach] has completely 
evaporated from the Union. [The EU] is governed by liberals and the left …. Today’s EU 
does not have the face of Adenauer …. Today, there are no important Catholic statesmen 
in the EU’ (Interview with M. Giertych 2013). This view was also shared by senior 
clergymen of the Polish Catholic Church. For example, Archbishop Henryk Muszyński 
said, ‘Today, I have serious doubts as to what extent Western European Christian 
democracy is able to protect authentic Christian values’ (Interview with H. Muszyński 
2013). For Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek ‘the EU has clearly moved away from [its Christian 
foundations] …. The beginning was very idealistic …; however, the building of this grand 
structure [the EU] had to start from coal and steel, and nuclear energy. These were all very 
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pragmatic actions …. It all rather focused on the economy, while the spirit was forgotten 
… and lost’ (Interview with T. Pieronek 2013). 
It seemed to be a quite widely shared opinion among Polish representatives of political 
Catholicism that the events of 1968 in Western Europe marked a turning point in the role 
Christian values played in the process of European integration. Ryszard Legutko MEP 
described the situation as follows: ‘[The Christian democrats of today are different] – the 
old generation was almost entirely Catholic, heavily involved in religion, [and] two of [the 
founding fathers] are in the process of being beatified. [They had] different educational 
backgrounds and [had] the horrible experience of the war. Today, [Christian democrats], 
who use the pro-integration rhetoric, are the aging generation of 1968. Their formative 
experience is 1968 and the contestation of reality …. When they think of “Europe”, they 
think of 1968, while [the founding fathers] … thought not only about Christianity, but also 
about the Roman Empire, [and] the fact that everybody spoke Latin and read the same 
books’ (Interview with R. Legutko 2013). Krystyna Pawłowicz MP depicted the situation in 
a similar way. ‘For some time, the generation of 1968 has been controlling the EU … and 
has been implementing [its ideas] – equality based on sameness [and] the blurring of natural 
law in relations between men and women …. They [the 1968 generation] believe that they 
need to take over institutions and make law, so that they won’t have to ask for anything 
from anyone’ (Interview with K. Pawłowicz 2013). 
However, the Polish political Catholic movement not only felt that the EU had departed 
from its Christian roots, it also believed that European integration and the institutions of 
the EU, at least to some degree, discriminated against Christian values, trying to eradicate 
them from public life and thus threatening the foundations of Polish society. For example, 
an ex-member of the League of Polish Families, Daniel Pawłowiec, noted that ‘the law of 
the EU and customs of Western Europe have shown that Christianity is discriminated 
against in the sense that laicism or other religions have been privileged’ (Inteview with D. 
Pawłowiec 2013). This point was also emphasised by Krzysztof Szczerski MP: ‘It’s not only 
about [protecting] Christian values – it is about [protecting] the social order, because in 
Poland the social order is based on Christian values …. The EU is responsible for this 
[trying to change the traditional social model in Poland]. There are many initiatives that 
promote a different social model using EU money’ (Interview with K. Szczerski 2013). 
Another example of this phenomenon was the statement of Krystyna Pawłowicz MP: ‘The 
EU has become the main source for financing the moral-cultural revolution, [replacing 
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Christian values with liberal ones,] because this is the last obstacle on [the way to] subjugate 
the [Polish] state. [This revolution] is a threat to the Polish state and every Catholic nation’ 
(Interview with K. Pawłowicz 2013). 
Fears of the impact of EU membership on Polish society seem to have been fostered by 
the spreading opinion that the EU actively pursues a policy to diminish the role of 
Christian values in public life in order to remodel the Christian foundations of Polish 
society. The concerns of the Church hierarchy in this respect and the strong Eurosceptic 
rhetoric of Radio Maryja further contributed to this feeling. For example, Krystyna 
Pawłowicz MP declared that ‘there is a total war against the [Catholic] Church’, adding that 
there was strong ideological lobbying on the part of the EU. She stated, for example, that 
‘the acquisition of EU funds is often subject to changing the [traditional, Catholic] moral 
setup [of Polish society] …. De-Christianisation is one of the features of the EU’s 
functioning …. The EU has become an ideological project and not an economic one’ 
(Interview with K. Pawłowicz 2013). This view was largely shared by other political 
Catholic politicians, like Krzysztof Szczerski MP, who stated, ‘I start to notice that … the 
integration process has become significantly ideologised …. I am more inclined to agree 
with the claim that the EU is partially responsible for promoting anti-values [anti-Christian 
values] in Poland’ (Interview with K. Szczerski 2013). Another prominent Law and Justice 
politician, Konrad Szymański MEP, agreed with this opinion stating that ‘the deal at the 
beginning of the accession process [was that European] integration would not have 
anything to do with attempts to change the moral set-up of Polish society via European law 
or the policies of European institutions …. The EU is not standing by its part of the deal’ 
(Interview with K. Szymański 2013).  
The Church hierarchy is also concerned about the role of the EU in advancing social 
change in Poland. Archbishop Henryk Muszyński said: ‘Theoretically, in ideological and 
moral issues [Poland and the EU] are autonomous, but in reality there is a great deal of 
lobbying [on the EU side] …. We need to take care of our historical, national identity, 
[while] being at the same ready to compromise …, but not in matters like the family or 
marriage, where compromises are impossible’ (Interview with H. Muszyński 2013). 
 The cultural struggle between the ‘liberal’ values of West European societies and more 
traditional set-up of Polish society, based on Christian values and the high authority of the 
Catholic Church, is important for this analysis. It clearly exposes an intriguing 
phenomenon – a Catholic-nationalist trait of Polish political Catholicism, which is based on 
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the conviction that the Catholic Church and Christian values are crucial for maintaining 
Polish culture and traditions. This fusion of nationalism and religion is not only a feature 
that distinguished it from the post-1945 political Catholic movements in Europe, which 
since the Second World War shied away from nationalist rhetoric. Besides concerns for 
sovereignty, it was also the element which drove the Euroscepticism of the Polish 
manifestation of this movement. The feeling that European integration endangered 
Christian values as the foundation of Polish society, clearly depicted in the statements 
presented above, led to a significant level of opposition to the EU. This observation was 
confirmed by Archbishop Henryk Muszyński, who agreed that, in the case of Poland, the 
protection of Christian values was often translated into Euroscepticism, with these two 
phenomena overlapping (Interview with Archbishop Muszyński 2013).  
Euroscepticism rooted in concerns for maintaining national identity is not uncommon as 
proven by academic research (Carey, 2002, McLaren 2002, 2004, Hooghe and Marks 2004). 
In such cases, Euroscepticism is less about distrust of European institutions or utilitarian 
concerns about economic losses, but has more to do with fears about threats to the 
national community. Indeed, many experiments clearly show that identity is important for 
people and that they can become protective even of those identities which were artificially 
created in laboratory conditions (McLaren 2007). 
Hooghe and Marks (2005) examined the question of how communal (national) identity can 
cue Euroscepticism. They concluded that national attachments can be a more powerful 
influence on scepticism toward European integration and can override other, more 
utilitarian factors (such as economic ones). In other words, European integration did not 
only yield economic benefits or losses, but it also provoked a strong feeling of threat to the 
Polish identity among defenders of the nation and those opposing multiculturalism. This is 
confirmed by a wide range of scholarly research. In her analysis of types of Euroscepticism, 
Sorensen (2006) cited the study of British Euroscepticism conducted by Smith (2005), who 
defined public support for the EU as being either utilitarian or ideological, while scepticism 
generally meant ‘an emotional detachment from particular claims, doctrines and ideals’ 
(Smith 2005: 1). This means that opposition to the EU stemmed from a lack of 
‘compatibility’ between the integration process and people’s identity, values and emotional 
attachments. McLaren (2002) found that ‘antipathy toward the EU is not just about 
cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilisation … but about fear of, or hostility 
toward other cultures’. If identification with the national community is constructed in an 
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exclusive way, it tends to further strengthen the perception of European integration as a 
threat to the national identity (Kriesi and Lachat 2004). 
The research mentioned above points to the strength of Euroscepticism based on identity. 
In the Polish context, national identity coupled with religious identity seemed to be a 
particularly significant factor influencing the development of Euroscepticism. The feeling 
of a ‘mismatch’ between the values of the Polish society and Western Europe, and a belief 
that the EU pursued anti-Christian policies, posing a threat to Polish national identity, 
came together to create a detachment from European claims and ideals and, in effect, 
provided a fertile ground for the development of Euroscepticism. The intertwined relations 
between Catholicism and Polish national identity led to the formation of a distinctly 
Catholic-nationalist political Catholicism, which was concerned about the potential impact 
of European integration, based on culturally different secular values that could potentially 
contribute to unwanted social and religious changes in Poland. 
 
5.4 Non-Eurosceptic political Catholicism? 
In order to complete the analyses of the Eurosceptic stance of Polish political Catholicism, 
one needs to verify, whether there was, in fact, a non-Eurosceptic political Catholicism in 
Poland? Firstly, it is necessary to examine Civic Platform – a party, where a number of 
politicians claimed attachment to Christian values. Secondly, a brief look at the Tygodnik 
Powszechny milieu will be presented.   
Civic Platform was formed in 2001 as a liberal conservative platform, with Donald Tusk 
becoming its sole leader in 2003. The party narrowly lost the 2005 parliamentary and 
presidential elections, but won the 2007 elections and formed a coalition government with 
the Polish Peasants’ Party. Regarding the party’s EU policy, it initially found it difficult to 
take a clear stance on the European issue as it criticised the left-wing government for its 
allegedly uncritical support for European integration on the one hand, while on the other 
hand forcefully distancing itself from other Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, the party 
joined the ‘Yes’ camp in the accession referendum. Since then, Civic Platform had periods 
during which it adopted a more critical stance on the European integration process, 
particularly when it came to the EU Constitutional Treaty, which contained EU Council 
voting provisions less favourable for Poland than those of the Nice Treaty. However, 
despite this Eurosceptic episode, the party remained largely pro-EU, in some aspects even 
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supporting deeper integration. Particularly when Law and Justice came to power in 2005, 
the party began to favour a more open, consensual approach to the EU, in contrast to the 
governing party (Szczerbiak 2012). 
Over the years, Civic Platform grew by absorbing different politicians and becoming a 
more eclectic, ‘catch-all’ party of the centre than it had originally been in 2001. This meant 
that a group of politicians that claimed attachment to Christian values and the Polish 
Church also became active within the party, represented by such politicians as Jan 
Olbrycht, Róża Thun or Jarosław Gowin (who left the party in 2013). Why is it then that 
these politicians remained pro-EU and pro-integration, despite being devout Catholics? 
Why did they not necessarily see the EU as a threat to Polish Catholicism and national 
identity? It seems that they tended to separate their Catholicism and moral values from 
politics and chose to focus on those fields where the EU had a direct influence such as the 
economy. This compartmentalisation is well illustrated by Róża Thun MEP, who said in an 
interview for weekly Poliyka ‘I cannot create a law that would be dictated by my personal 
worldview, because it should apply to everybody …. We confused our worldviews 
(światopogląd) with politics …. Herman van Rompuy is a devout Catholic … but does it 
show in his statements? Never. Instead, he works tirelessly to reach agreements, he 
searches for solutions, leads to accords. The best example for me is one of the EU’s 
founding fathers, Robert Schuman …. He was a very religious man, starting each day with 
a mass … but he never said that people ought to go to church every Sunday and that you 
can’t have homosexual marriages. He did not intervene in these spheres and until this day, 
the EU leaves it to member states. When it comes to the state, we should consider whether 
the sphere of worldview (strefa światopoglądowa) should be included in politics and to what 
extent, or whether it should be left, for example, to the Church…’ (Paradowska 2014).  
Such a separation of values and beliefs from acts in the public sphere means that this 
approach cannot really be classified as a political Catholic one, since it is a breach of one of 
the characteristic features of the movement – the willingness to include principles of 
Catholic social teaching in the body of law, making them binding for all members of a 
society. Nonetheless, it clearly explains why certain groups of politicians in Poland, who 
were strongly involved with Catholicism and the Church, did not assume Eurosceptic 
positions – they clearly differentiated between areas where the EU had real decision-
making power, leaving the moral-cultural sphere out of politics. Consequently, they did not 
assume that European integration could potentially have an impact on the secularisation 
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process in Poland and threaten the role of Catholicism in Polish society. Even if it did, they 
would not try to counteract it by political means, because they separated their beliefs from 
their activity in the public sphere. Indeed, those Civic Platform members who thought 
differently and were willing to enshrine Christian worldviews in Polish law – like Jarosław 
Gowin, Jacek Żalek and John Godson – left the party, with conflicts over the role of 
Christian values in law-making playing an essential role in their departure. 
Finally, in the context of the discussion about the non-Eurosceptic political Catholicism, 
‘Universal Weekly’ (Tygodnik Poszechny) and a small pocket of Catholic intellectualist 
clustered around it need to be mentioned. This weekly magazine was created in 1945 in 
Kraków. Its role in communist Poland cannot be easily overstated – until 1989 it was the 
only of the media outlets in Central and Eastern Europe that remained semi-independent 
from, but tightly constrained by, the communist authorities. Despite harassment and 
persecution, it endured as an open voice of the anti-communist opposition, even though it 
had to carefully phrase its message to avoid the communist censorship. Following the 1989 
fall of communism in Poland, the magazine’s readership and its ability to influence Catholic 
public opinion started slowly deteriorating, which forced a number of reorganisations and 
changes in the editorial content (Kolasa 2001).  
Since 1989, the Weekly’s opinion on European integration was stable and did not change 
significantly. It presented a pro-EU approach, supporting in the pre-accession period quick 
integration of Poland with the EU. The Weekly’s editing team and the group of 
intellectualists associated with the magazine believed that the place of Poland was in the 
Western civilisation, of which the EU was the main component. This milieu also opposed 
the view that the EU somehow transformed and gradually merged national identities into 
one European identity. According to the Weekly, the issue was not the alleged threat that 
European integration posed to Polish national identity, but the ability of Poles to adjust to 
the modern world and global economy. This view strongly contrasted with the opinions of 
more traditional and integrist parts of the Polish Church, which voiced concerns about the 
influence of European integration on Polish traditions, culture and national sovereignty 
(Staszczyk, Jartyś 2002).  
As mentioned before, the role of the Weekly in public life started diminishing significantly 
after the fall of communism. Its circulation dropped from 100 000 copies in 1989 to 30 000 
in the early 1990s (Kolasa 2001). In 2014, it sold, on average, 17 thousand copies monthly, 
making it one of the smallest of national weeklies in Poland. As a result, the Universal 
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Weekly and its millieu became rather marginalised. In addition, those who supported the 
views of the magazine and identified with its opinions never developed into an organised 
civil society network. As a result, their influence remained quite limited, particularly when 
compared to Radio Maryja and other Catholic media outlets of Father Rydzyk.  
 
5.5 Why is Polish political Catholicism Eurosceptic? 
Having analysed different aspects of the Eurosceptic stance of Polish political Catholicism, 
it is now time to answer the main research question: under what circumstances can political 
Catholicism assume a Eurosceptic stance? The hypothesis assumed that the intrinsic 
ideological features of the Polish political Catholic movement drove its Eurosceptic stance, 
leading it to perceive the EU as an entity based on the concepts of ‘secularism’, 
‘individualism’, and ‘materialism’, which in turn endanger the core values of Polish national 
identity. The design of this study also indicated that there may be other, non-political 
Catholic ideologies or electoral tactics (the alternative explanatory factors mentioned in 
section 1.3) influencing the Euroscepticism of the Polish political Catholic movement. 
Analyses in this chapter identified two key factors underpinning the Eurosceptic stance of 
political Catholic parties in Poland: firstly, the aspiration to protect national sovereignty, 
and secondly, the perceived need to respond to the cultural struggle between traditional, 
Christian values of the Polish society and liberal values of Western Europe, which 
threatened Polish national identity. It is a central argument of this chapter that both 
elements driving the Eurosceptic position of political Catholicism in Poland are, in fact, 
intrinsically ‘ideological’ features of this movement and feed into the phenomenon of 
Catholic-nationalism – a distinct fusion of Catholicism and Polish national identity. This 
characteristic feature of Polish political Catholicism grew out of the centuries-long 
relationship between Catholicism and Polish national identity, leading to the creation of a 
Catholic-nationalist trait, which made the movement see Catholicism and Christian values 
as a framework for the functioning of Polish society. This, in turn, drove its 
Euroscepticism, since the EU was perceived as an organisation based on secular, liberal 
values that may endanger Polish society.  
Consequently, the influence of political Catholicism on the development of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland was of significant importance. It provided the basis for a 
Euroscepticism focused on combating the moral-cultural changes that, as a result of 
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Poland’s EU membership, exerted stronger pressures on the traditional moral set-up of 
Polish society, but also fuelled concerns for the protection of national sovereignty. 
Defending the state and its prerogatives was seen as a way to secure the primary role of 
Christian values in Polish politics, culture and society and to slow down the undesired 
processes of secularisation in Poland, which according to Polish political Catholicism, 
threatened the development of the country. This phenomen can be clearly observed in the 
following statement by Artur Zawisza: ‘There are two types of [Eurosceptic] arguments [in 
Poland]: those based on sovereignty or those based on Christianity. Naturally, at the end of 
the day, they can significantly overlap …. One type is: Poland should be sovereign, one way 
or the other but sovereign, and the EU won’t impose anything on us …. The other type of 
thinking is [focused on] Christian values: the EU may interfere here and there, but hands 
off Christianity; Christianity needs to be respected …. Not everyone may be convinced by 
the sovereignty-type arguments … but when we talk about Christian values they have no 
choice. [The EU] may ask us to recycle garbage but they can’t force us to [accept] abortion. 
The argument of protecting Christian values has been a common element of the whole 
political scene …. [Protecting the] Christian identity of Poland as a condition for Polish 
participation in European integration has become a constitutive element of the whole 
political scene’ (Interview with A. Zawisza 2013).     
The integration of care for the Catholic faith, the Church and Poland, so clearly 
exemplified by Radio Maryja, was the essence of Polish political Catholicism, and stemmed 
from the unique role Catholicism has played throughout Polish history in nurturing Polish 
culture and traditions. Since Polish political Catholicism perceived the EU as an 
organisation based on liberal, secular values, it identified it as a potential threat to the role 
of Christian values in the functioning of Polish society which, in turn, drove its 
Euroscepticism. Therefore, it seems that Euroscepticism is a strongly embedded, 
underpinning feature of Polish political Catholicism and not a result of short-term tactical 
considerations. 
At the same time, this study listed three additional explanatory factors (AEFs) of 
strategic/tactical nature that may have influenced Euroscepticism of Polish political 
Catholicism. In general, the design of this research suggests the possibility that a party may 
adopt a Eurosceptic stance to make itself distinctive on the political stage or as a result of 
government-opposition dynamics, to expand its electoral base or limit the political space 
for rival parties. However, the primary data collected here indicated that none of these 
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considerations was the most important element in the context of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland, though they did play a certain role. 
First and foremost, popular support for Poland’s EU membership remained at very high 
levels in the country and Poles were quite enthusiastic about European integration. In fact, 
support for the EU not only remained extremely high, but grew within five years of 
accession from 64% in April 2004 to 85% in April 2009. At the same time, public opinion 
polls showed the proportion of Poles believing that Poland gained more than it lost as a 
result of its EU membership growing from 39% in February 2004 to 65% in April 2009, 
with the number of those who thought the opposite dropping from 38% to 13%. Similarly, 
according to the 2013 Eurobarometer survey (EB 79.5), 78% of Poles believed that their 
country benefited from EU membership (the second best result after Lithuania with 80%), 
while 53% felt that the Polish EU membership was something good compared to 10% 
who thought otherwise. Consequently, the electoral rewards for adopting a Eurosceptic 
position was fairly limited in Poland and seemed not to be sustainable as the foundation for 
the electoral success of a political party. Ryszard Legutko MEP described this situation as 
follows: ‘If somebody is rational, s/he knows that it is impossible to build, in the 
foreseeable future, a strong anti-EU right-wing party in Poland. You can politically 
capitalise on combating the euro …, [but] without saying that you are generally for or 
against the EU’ (Interview with R. Legutko 2013). What seems to transpire from this short 
statement is the fact that Polish political Catholicism did not assume a Eurosceptic position 
to attract voters but quite the contrary, it appeared to tone down its rhetoric in order not to 
limit its potential electoral base. 
At the same time, some commentators of Polish public life cited the fact that the EU 
policy of Law and Justice, the largest political Catholic actor in Poland, changed from a 
pro-EU to more Eurosceptic as proof that tactical reasons and inter-party rivalry played a 
role in shaping its EU policies. This seems to be true to a certain extent, particularly when 
considering government-opposition dynamics and the competition between Law and 
Justice and Civic Platform. For example, Krzysztof Szczerski MP explained that the EU 
policy of Law and Justice and its development should be placed in the broader context of 
EU-Poland relations. ‘Initially, we had [a period of] preparations for EU membership, and 
EU membership was an autonomous aim of Polish foreign policy …. Then there was a 
turning point – Poland joined the EU and … Law and Justice took over the power. Our 
first years in the EU were a time of a realistic discourse. We are in the EU, but what for? 
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… [The post-2007] transition of [the EU policy of] Law and Justice to a more critical 
position … is rather a sort of reaction to a very EU-enthusiastic policy of Donald Tusk’s 
[Civic Platform] government’ (Interview with K. Szczerski 2013). The last sentence 
indicates that although strategic/tactical factors were not the main reason to adopt a 
Eurosceptic position, they did have some influence, in particular on the strength of the 
anti-EU discourse as a way to differentiate a party from the ruling grouping. Konrad 
Szymański MEP pointed out that ‘[Law and Justice] tries to listen to everybody … we are 
trying to represent as broad a spectrum of views as possible. Contrary to many parties in 
Poland, we believe that people and groups who have doubts about the European 
integration process should be listened to attentively …. We don't believe that they should 
be excluded from the public debate’ (Interview with K. Szymański 2013). This also shows 
that the willingness to attract Eurosceptic voters may have played a certain role for Law 
and Justice in adopting a sceptical stance on European integration. 
One should consider in this context the role of Radio Maryja and its impact on parties’ 
position on Europe. Most commentators underline the willingness of right-wing parties 
such as Law and Justice or Solidaristic Poland of Zbigniew Ziobro to maintain close 
relations with Father Rydzyk in order to secure the votes of his supporters. Piotr Maciej 
Kaczyński explained that Law and Justice was so close to Radio Maryja, ‘mainly because it 
did not want any rival party to appear further to the right [of the political scene]’ (Interview 
with P.M. Kaczyński 2013), and used the followers of Father Rydzyk as a potential support 
base. Tomasz Bielecki, a correspondent of Gazeta Wyborcza in Brussels agreed. ‘[Law and 
Justice and] Kaczyński often resist the raging Euroscepticism [of Radio Maryja] …. [The 
party’s relationship with] Radio Maryja is a cynical, tactical alliance with someone who can 
generate a few percentage points in elections …. Kaczyński has never spoken and will not 
speak [about European integration] using Rydzyk’s words’ (Interview with T. Bielecki 
2012). Inga Czerny, Brussels correspondent of the Polish Press Agency, followed suit: 
‘[Radio Maryja] is so important, because … it [offers] a stable electorate [a group of loyal 
supporters]’ (Interview with I. Czerny 2012). This assessment of the situation is partially 
confirmed by Ryszard Czarnecki MEP, who said that ‘when Solidaristic Poland was 
established, Law and Justice was concerned that … they would try to take over the support 
of Radio Maryja. [This] could have led to a certain hardening [of the party’s EU policy]. 
However, this is a thing of the past, because Solidaristic Poland … is no longer a threat, … 
thus, Law and Justice … has relaxed its policy and rhetoric’ (Interview with R. Czarnecki 
2013). He also pointed out that it is likely that ‘in the European elections [of 2014], Law 
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and Justice will have a more Eurosceptic programme than in the [national] parliamentary 
and presidential elections. This is because … Poland has the third lowest turnout in the 
European elections after Lithuania and Slovakia. [This means that] our electorate has to 
participate in elections and our hard-core electorate is more Eurosceptic [and] Euro-realist’ 
(Interview with R. Czarnecki 2013). Marek Migalski MEP agreed: ‘Father Rydzyk is an 
important element in the electoral competition on the right [between Solidaristic Poland 
and Law and Justice] … and this may have an influence on the election results. He is not a 
decisive broadcaster but he can add or remove thousands of votes’ (Interview with M. 
Migalski 2012). Migalski, who used to be a member of Law and Justice, may not be an 
entirely reliable source when it comes to criticising his old party. Artur Zawisza, an ex-
Christian National Union member, however, went in the same direction, providing the 
bluntest description of the situation: ‘The great plan of Kaczyński was to become the leader 
of the right wing [in Poland] by adjusting his rhetoric to the beliefs of the electorate, 
without changing his real political direction …. Kaczyński started using various tricks, 
trying to attract the right-wing electorate …. He decided to take over Radio Maryja's 
support from the League of Polish Families and started using sharper rhetoric. This was an 
element of his strategy [to dominate the right-wing in Poland]’ (Interview with A. Zawisza 
2013). 
This means that Law and Justice may have taken a tactical decision to align itself closely 
with Radio Maryja, as it brought the party significant benefits in the form of electoral 
support while limiting the scope for potential political competition. It is worth noting that 
the leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński, for many years kept his distance from 
the Church and, while acknowledging the importance of Catholicism throughout Polish 
history, opted for a strong state with a clear separation of the state from the church, which 
is well exemplified by his famous statement ‘The shortest road to the de-Christianisation of 
Poland leads through the Christian National Union’, referring to the more clerical position 
of this party (Dudek 2013). Another clear example that points to pragmatism in Law and 
Justice’s EU policy choices was its changeability. Law and Justice was significantly less 
Eurosceptic during its period in government than before or afterwards in opposition. 
Finally, the political competition from the Law and Justice breakaway party, Solidaristic 
Poland of Zbigniew Ziobro (SP), which also tried to secure Radio Maryja’s support, was 
also mentioned as one of the factors influencing Law and Justice’s position on the EU and 
its strategic alliance with Radio Maryja. 
163 
  
Thus, it seems that party-based Euroscepticism in Poland may have been fuelled by a 
degree of electoral tactics focused on ensuring support from the Radio Maryja milieu. 
However, this fact does not preclude stronger, ideological influences on the development 
of the Eurosceptic stance of political Catholicism. In fact, Radio Maryja was a constitutive 
part of the political Catholic movement in Poland and its impact on the Polish political 
scene exemplified the close connection between political Catholicism and Euroscepticism 
in Poland. As Anna Słojewska explained, ‘a part [of the Law and Justice] political 
programme results from the actual beliefs of [party] members, while a part is there for 
tactical reasons …. However, ultimately, Law and Justice is simply like that [most of its 
policies are ideologically based]’ (Interview with A. Słojewska 2012). This is confirmed by 
statements by the interviewed politicians presented earlier, who declared that the 
Eurosceptic programmes of Polish parties were not a result of electoral tactics, such as 
attempting to secure Father Rydzyk’s support, but developed separately and were rather a 
convergence of similar views. Attempts to ensure Radio Maryja’s support should not be 
regarded as the main factor shaping party-based Euroscepticism in Poland, but should 
instead be seen as an element that drove the intensity of the Eurosceptic rhetoric, which 
varied depending on the role a party plays on the political stage (government vs. 
opposition), potential threats from rival parties (Law and Justice vs. the League of Polish 
Families and Solidaristic Poland) or the proximity of elections and the expected turnout. 
Tomasz Terlikowski observed that ‘Clearly, Radio Maryja has a certain political influence, 
but I would not overestimate it …. It can secure 3% to 5% of votes in elections … and this 
electorate is constantly decreasing … [it includes] mostly elderly people, who do not have 
significant political influence’ (Interview with T. Terlikowski 2013). It is obvious that 
attempts to woo this group did play a role in shaping Euroscepticism within Polish political 
Catholicism, but this tactical consideration was fairly limited. 
All in all, it is clear that tactical considerations, encapsulated in alternative explanatory 
factors, were not the main driver of political Catholic Euroscepticism in Poland. They 
rather influenced the intensity of the Eurosceptic rhetoric and the distribution of accents 
within the established political discourse. The Eurosceptic stance of Polish political 
Catholicism seems to have been developed independently and in parallel with different 
parts of the movement, and subsequently converged into a similar worldview. 
Consequently, Polish political Catholicism is a movement with a strongly embedded 
ideology and has had a long-standing Eurosceptic agenda that did not change significantly 
with each electoral cycle and is not merely a result of short-term electoral tactics. This 
164 
  
finding corroborates the conclusions of Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2008b) comparative 
study of party-based Euroscepticism in Europe. Having presented a number of country 
case studies, the authors stated that, in the case of policy-seeking parties, underlying party 
positions on Europe should be distinguished from how parties use this issue in inter-party 
competition, as both phenomena are driven by different causal mechanisms. A party’s 
long-term policy on Europe is determined by a blend of ideology and what it perceives the 
interests of its members to be. Whether or not the party uses its position on Europe in 
inter-party competition is a matter of short-term electoral strategy, and coalition-formation 
and government-participation tactics. 
The evidence presented in this chapter reiterates that the fusion of nationalism and religion 
make Polish political Catholicism a specific case compared to Western Europe. As 
explained in previous chapters, traditional political Catholicism had at its core such values 
as the idea of forgiveness, co-operation between nations and support for the supranational 
concept, which resemble the strong, transnational authority of the Pope and the Church 
hierarchy. The emphasised concern for national sovereignty was a more characteristic 
feature of right and far-right movements, which are strongly based on the ideas of 
nationalism, independence, self-rule, and occasionally outright xenophobia or chauvinism. 
This is why, in the Polish context, a distinct form of political Catholicism can be identified 
– a movement based on the fusion of national-patriotic elements with the need to protect 
Christian values as the foundation of society. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter served a twofold purpose: firstly, to identify and understand the relationship 
between political Catholicism and Euroscepticism; and, secondly, to complete the 
description of political Catholicism in Poland, including the causes of its Eurosceptic 
approach. Euroscepticism is a striking feature for a movement of this type as, historically, 
political Catholicism has been supportive of European integration. Political Catholicism in 
Western Europe (mainly in the form of its best-known manifestation – Christian 
democracy) has had a lasting impact during the second half of the twentieth century, thanks 
to its important role in post-war politics and its remarkable ability to form transnational 
networks of co-operation, which led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel 
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Community, its expansion into the European Economic Community, and, finally, the 
creation of the European Union. 
This is why the surprising phenomenon of Euroscepticism displayed by political 
Catholicism in Poland became the focal point of this research. In this chapter, I attempted 
to understand ‘the Polish deviant case’ – to identify the roots of Euroscepticism within 
Polish political Catholicism, and to establish whether it resulted from an intrinsic 
‘ideological’ feature of political Catholicism in Poland, or parties’ strategic/tactical choices. 
By analysing primary data in the form of semi-structured interviews and a selection of 
relevant secondary data, it was established that the sceptical opinions of Polish political 
Catholicism on Europe are driven by two primary factors: firstly, the aspiration to protect 
Polish sovereignty, and secondly, the perceived cultural struggle between the ‘liberal West’ 
and ‘Catholic Poland’. What is, however, most interesting is that both elements fed into a 
characteristic feature of Polish political Catholicism – a Catholic-nationalist trait. As a result 
of the inter-twined histories between Catholicism and Polish national identity, Polish 
political Catholicism formed its distinct ‘national-religious patriotism’. It believed that 
social and economical development in Poland was only possible if Christian values 
preserved their importance in Polish society and was concerned about the potential impact 
of European integration, which allegedly promoted secularisation. 
This Catholic nationalism was a consequence of the Polish history and the special role that 
the Catholic religion and the Catholic Church played in upholding and nurturing the feeling 
of Polish identity throughout the past two hundred years. The strong emphasis on national 
sovereignty and the need to rely on internal potential and resources for the development of 
the country, coupled with ‘national-religious patriotism’ are factors that clearly 
differentiated Polish political Catholicism from other manifestations of this movement in 
Europe and drove its Euroscepticism. 
I also argued in this chapter that the Euroscepticism of Polish political Catholicism was a 
deeply entrenched, underpinning characteristic of the movement, rather than a result of 
electoral strategy or tactics. This phenomenon is well exemplified by Radio Maryja and the 
type of religiosity that it promoted, where religion and faith were inextricably linked with 
Polish national identity, and where care for religion was synonymous with care for Poland. 
Over the past 20 years, Radio Maryja and its supporters were an active political force, 
fostering the formation of political parties or contributing to their demise, as was the case 
with the League of Polish Families. In essence, the approach represented by Radio Maryja 
166 
  
identified the development of Poland to be conditional upon the maintenance of Catholic 
values at the core of Polish society and, as a result, led to Euroscepticism due to Western 
Europe (and the EU) being perceived as the source of a civilisational threat that 
endangered the (Catholic Christian) moral foundations of the Polish nation. A 
characteristic feature of this type of Euroscepticism was the link that it established between 
Polish EU membership and the acceleration of the secularisation process in Poland. 
I did discover certain tactical considerations that may have played a role in shaping 
Euroscepticism within Polish political Catholicism. However, they rather influenced the 
intensity of the Eurosceptic rhetoric, but did not constitute its main cause. This confirmed 
Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2008b) conclusion that an underlying party position on Europe 
needs to be distinguished from temporary changes in rhetoric caused by intra-party 
competition and coalition participation tactics. 
Anna Słojewska stated that ‘Polish Christian democracy is located much further to the right 
than the Western European one …. I don't think that [the right being more Eurosceptic 
than the left] is very specific to Poland. It is a Europe-wide phenomenon’ (Interview with 
A. Słojewska 2013). This may be true, but what is different in the Polish case is the fact 
that it is not just any right – it is the traditionally pro-integrationist movement of political 
Catholicism that has become Eurosceptic in Poland. The movement is fully aware of its 
distinctiveness from other, similar European groupings – as a deviant case in the political 
Catholic family. 
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6 Political Catholicism and European 
integration – a comparative perspective 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters described a distinct relation between political Catholicism in Poland 
and Euroscepticism. They noted that the strongest trait of party-based opposition to 
Europe in Poland can be found in parties of political Catholic provenance, such as the 
League of Polish Families, the Christian National Union, the Movement for the 
Reconstruction of Poland or the Polish Agreement. In addition, one of the two main 
parties which dominated the Polish political scene since the early 2000s – Law and Justice – 
also combined a political Catholic background with (‘soft’) Euroscepticism. This sceptical 
opinion of Polish political Catholicism regarding Europe was driven by two main factors: 
firstly, by concerns for the defence of national sovereignty and secondly, by the perceived 
cultural struggle between the traditional Catholic moral-cultural setup of Polish society and 
liberal, secular values of the West. Both of these elements stemmed from the closely 
intertwined relationship between Catholicism and Polish national identity, leading to Polish 
political Catholicism acquiring a distinct Catholic-nationalist trait. 
I also argued that Polish political Catholicism and its Eurosceptic stance are distinct 
compared with other manifestations of this movement. As discussed before, political 
Catholicism was a key actor in Western European politics throughout the 20th century. It 
gave birth to one of the most influential political families, Christian democracy, which 
shaped the social and political framework of most Western European countries, and, 
thanks to a unique mix of pre- and post-war historical circumstances and Christian 
democratic ideological preferences, became the driving force behind the process of 
European integration. 
As the final element of the analysis of political Catholicism in Poland, this chapter aims to 
provide a concise comparative overview of the development of political Catholicism in 
Europe and the movement’s position on European integration. As a result, I hope to 
compare the main features of political Catholicism in Europe with the findings concerning 
its Polish manifestation. To this end, this chapter presents short case studies of 15 different 
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European countries which met the following conditions: firstly, a high percentage (above 
60%) of Catholics among the population in 2010 (see Table 4 below), and secondly, a 
certain prominence of political Catholicism in a given country, as identified in the academic 
literature. The case selection also includes countries where the level of religious practice 
and membership in the Catholic Church significantly declined, but where political 
Catholicism was or still is an important part of politics. 
Table 4: Percentage of Catholic population in European countries in 2010 
Percentage of 2010 
population that declared 
Catholic faith 
European country 
Percentage of 2010 
population that declared 
Catholic faith 
European country 
> 99% Vatican City 33.9% Germany 
95.8% Malta 29.1% Netherlands 
92.3% Portugal 19.1% Latvia 
92.2% Poland 16.2% United Kingdom 
90.5% San Marino 8.7% Belarus 
88.5% Croatia 5.7% Romania 
88.4% Ireland 5.6% Ukraine 
88.2% Andorra 3.6% Montenegro 
83.2% Lithuania 3.2% Iceland 
83% Italy 2.3% Kosovo 
82.3% Monaco 2.0% Norway 
81.7% Liechtenstein 1.3% Cyprus 
75.3% Austria 1.2% Sweden 
75.3% Slovakia 0.7% Denmark 
75.2% Spain 0.7% Estonia 
74.8% Slovenia 0.7% Greece 
65.9% Luxembourg 0.5% Bulgaria 
62% Belgium 0.5% Russia 
60.6% Hungary 0.4% Republic of Macedonia 
60.4% France < 0.1% Finland 
43.9% Switzerland < 0.1% Moldova 
35.4% Czech Republic   
Source: Pew Research – Religion & Public Life Project data, available at: 
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/table-christian-population-as-percentages-of-total-population-by-
country/, accessed on 20.04.2015  
 
In line with the stated criteria, the selection of comparative cases is as follows: Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland. For the sake of clarity, the countries 
will be discussed in the context of their geographical region, divided into Western Europe 
and Central and Eastern Europe, as geographical proximity often determined the history of 
political developments and the shape of the institutional environment, particularly after the 
Second World War. 
This selection offers a broad range of cases in which political Catholicism demonstrated its 
influence by decisively affecting the shape and functioning of states, societies and 
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economies. The set contains countries which have been engaged with the integration 
project since its very beginnings (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands), but 
also those which have joined the EU fairly recently (the 2004 enlargement included 
Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia) or decided to stay out (Switzerland). In terms of the 
role of Catholicism, my selection contains cases in which secularisation led to a significant 
decline of religious practice (Belgium, France), but also those in which the Catholic Church 
and Catholicism still hold an important position in society (Croatia, Malta, Slovakia). 
Geographically and politically, this chapter discusses established democracies of Western 
Europe, but also countries from Central and Eastern Europe where the democratic system 
was introduced only in the 1990s. Finally, I included cases in which political Catholicism 
lost much of its former influence (Italy, France, Switzerland) and others in which it still 
occupies an essential position in politics (Austria, Germany, Malta, Belgium). 
The analysis of each case study is based on scholarly literature and primary sources (e.g. 
election manifestos, public statements or programmatic documents), examined and 
reviewed in the following manner: the first section of a case study presents the historical 
development of political Catholicism and the influence it had on society and politics, while 
the second section focuses on analysing political Catholic attitudes to European integration 
and the EU. As a result, this chapter offers a comprehensive description of political 
Catholicism, including its similarities and differences across Europe, and will be the basis 
for the comparison of Polish political Catholicism with other manifestations of the 
movement. 
This chapter will argue that there are five main differences between manifestations of 
political Catholicism in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Firstly, in terms of 
political significance, political Catholicism in Western Europe has played a much more 
prominent role in shaping political, economic and social systems, while in Eastern Europe 
its influence has remained fairly limited in most cases. To this is tied another difference, the 
apparent lack of successful Christian democracy in most Central and Eastern European 
countries, which was replaced by a form of political Catholicism that is much more focused 
on national issues such as sovereignty and the protection of national interests. Thirdly, 
there is a contrast between the development of political Catholic movements in Europe. 
While in Western Europe political Catholicism developed as a result of the 
church/government cleavage described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), where the movement 
was essentially a defence of Catholicism against liberalisation attempts, in Central Europe it 
170 
  
grew out of the fusion of religion and national identity, which matured during struggles for 
independence of the countries presented in this analysis. Fourthly, Central and Eastern 
European manifestations of political Catholicism have always been different from Western 
European ones; however, the gap has grown even wider with the gradual departure of 
Western European political Catholic parties from making direct references to Christian 
values, which is not the case in Eastern Europe. Last but definitely not least, this chapter 
will show how the majority of political Catholic groupings support the process of 
European integration, while only in two cases – Poland and Slovakia – political Catholicism 
has acquired a clear Eurosceptic trait. The key question in the context of this study is: Why 
did political Catholicism in Poland (and Slovakia) become Eurosceptic, while it remained 
largely pro-EU in other countries, where the development of the movement bears strong 
resemblance to the Polish case (e.g. Ireland)? 
 
6.2 Western Europe 
6.2.1 Austria 
Political Catholicism in Austria 
As was the case in many Western European countries, political Catholicism played a major 
role in Austrian politics. The political Catholic movement in Austria originated in the late 
19th-century Catholic social movement initiated by Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang. His 
newspaper Das Vaterland was highly influential in developing and popularising Catholic 
social teaching. Building on von Vogelsang’s ideas, the Christian Social Party 
(Christlichsoziale Partei, CS) was established in the run-up to the 1891 elections of the 
Reichsrat (Boyer 1981). It was a confessional party supported by large parts of the Catholic 
petit bourgeoisie, the rural population, but also the aristocracy thanks to its backing of the 
Habsburgs’ rule. It included a large number of priests among its ranks, e.g. Ignaz Seipel, 
who became Austrian chancellor twice in the 1920s. The Christian Socials were a dominant 
element of the Austrian political scene, being among the largest three parties. In 1934, the 
party set up an authoritarian Austro-fascist regime and was merged into the Patriotic Front 
(Müller and Steininger 1994). It officially ceased to exist after the 1938 Anschluss. 
The political Catholic movement was reborn after the Second World War, when in 1945 
the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) was founded. The party was 
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eager to claim that it was completely new, but in reality, it was a successor of the interwar 
Christian Social Party, as it appealed to the same constituency, recruited its leadership from 
among former Christian Social Party ranks and accepted the ideological heritage of its 
predecessor party. However, as was the case in other countries, it did drop the confessional 
label and decided to woo a broader electorate (Müller and Steininger 1994), which was 
largely interpreted as a departure from traditional political Catholicism in favour of a 
broader people’s party. The Austrian People’s Party was hugely successful in the post-war 
years, remaining a senior coalition partner until 1966 and governing Austria alone until 
1970, when the party lost power and moved to opposition for the following 16 years. In 
1987, it re-entered the government in a grand coalition with the socialists, which continued 
until the late 1990s. In the 1990s, the party suffered a significant electoral decline (from 
41.3% in 1986 to 26.9% in 1999). In 2000, it formed a highly controversial coalition with 
the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), which caused 
widespread outrage in Europe. Following some programmatic shifts, in which the party 
‘sharpened’ its image and repositioned itself more to the right by underlining its liberal-
conservative traditions, it was able to double its electoral support, reaching 42.3% in 2002 
and taking over half of the former Freedom Party of Austria voters (Fallend 2004). In 
2008, the party entered a grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ). 
Austrian political Catholicism and European policy 
The Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) can be characterised as the most 
pro-European party of the Austrian political system. Although Austria did not take part in 
the creation of the ECSC and the EEC, the Austrian People’s Party played an important 
role in establishing transnational networks of Christian democratic parties in post-1945 
Europe (Kaiser 2007) and gradually built up an image as the ‘European party’ of Austria 
(Fallend 2008). The Austrian People’s Party had periods during which its support for 
European integration decreased, most notably during the 2000-2002 coalition government 
with the Eurosceptic Freedom Party. Heinisch (2010) noted that during this period, the 
Austrian People’s Party was significantly less pro-European, while its Chancellor Schüssel 
became increasingly assertive on EU policy, particularly in the areas of enlargement and 
access to the Austrian labour market (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013). However, the party 
quickly returned to its unequivocal pro-EU stance, stating on its website that ‘Europe is 
deeply rooted in our DNA’ (ÖVP 2014). It made the following points key elements of its 
2014 European elections manifesto: support for a more powerful European Parliament, 
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backing of further enlargements and a stronger internal market, support for EU-wide 
referendums on key issues and establishment of a new Convention on the Future of 
Europe (ÖVP 2014b). 
One should also mention two smaller parties that strive to protect Christian values in the 
public sphere in Austria and are Eurosceptic: the Christian Electoral Alliance (Christliche 
Wählergemeinschaft, CWG) and the Christian Party of Austria (Christliche Partei Österreichs, 
CPÖ). The Christian Electoral Alliance opposed the EU on many grounds, including its 
alleged negative impact on Austrian sovereignty, neutrality, democracy, agriculture, security, 
etc., but it also declared its concerns about the departure from a religiously led, Christian 
life and the growing agnosticism in the EU (CWG 2014). The party won 1.5% in the 1999 
European elections. The Christian Party of Austria fought for the role of Christian values 
in society and politics. For the 2014 European elections it joined the Reform Conservatives 
(Die Reformkonservativen, REKOS) – an electoral alliance which opposed the centralisation of 
the EU, and advocated a renewal of Europe based on its Christian roots and rallied for 
social justice on the basis of Catholic social doctrine (CPÖ 2014). The alliance won 1.18% 
in the 2014 European elections. 
6.2.2 Belgium 
Political Catholicism in Belgium 
Belgium was at the centre of political Catholic activities in the 20th century (Conway 1996). 
The country was leading the development of political Catholic trade unionism, with such 
organisation as the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Confédération des syndicats 
chrétiens, CSC), established in 1904 (current name as of 1923), which in 2010 was still the 
largest trade union in Belgium (ETUI 2014), and the Young Christian Workers (Jeunesse 
ouvrière chrétienne, JOC), which eventually spread worldwide with more than 60 national 
movements (ICYCW 2014). 
The first electoral success of the confessional Catholic Party (fr: Parti catholique, nl: Katholieke 
Partij) in 1884 was a reaction to anticlerical policies of the liberal government (Conway 
1997). Thanks to the dominant position that the party occupied from 1884 until 1918, 
there was no other country in Western Europe where Catholicism and the Catholic Church 
enjoyed as principal a role in shaping not only religious, but also social and political life as it 
did in Belgium. Indeed, politicians representing parties of a political Catholic nature were 
members of Belgian governments continuously since 1884, with a brief break from 1940 to 
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1944 (German occupation) and short periods in opposition between 1945 and 1947 as well 
as 1954 and 1958 (Conway 1996). Up until 1999, Christian democrats were the leading 
political force that set the agenda and ran the country (Beke 2004). 
Following the Second World War, the confessional Catholic Party remodelled itself into a 
more modern Christian democratic party – the Christian Social Party (fr: Parti social-chrétien, 
nl: Christelijke Volkspartij, PSC/CVP). In 1968, the party split along linguistic lines. The 
Christian Social Party remained the largest Flemish party until 2014 (share of votes varying 
from 60.4% in 1950 to 20.5% in the 2014 regional elections), with the exception of the 
period between 1999 and 2004 when the Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Vlaamse 
Liberalen en Democraten, VLD) took over the lead. In 2001, the CVP changed its name to 
Christian Democrat and Flemish (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, CD&V). The Walloon 
Christian Social Party performed worse than its Flemish counterpart, winning second or 
third place in regional elections (21.6% in 1995, 16.1% in 2009), behind the Socialists and 
Greens (De Winter 1990). The French-speaking party is also one of the best examples of a 
trend among political Catholic parties in Western Europe to tone down the religious basis 
of their programmes. In an attempt to renew itself and attract non-Catholic voters, it 
removed references to Christianity from its name and in 2002 became the Humanist 
Democratic Centre (Centre démocrate humaniste, CDH). It did, however, remain the party 
attached to Christian values values, ‘offering an alternative to individualism and 
libertarianism in Belgian politics and society’ (Beke 2004: 158). One should also mention 
Christian democratic parties in the German-speaking community of Belgium: the Christian 
Social Party (Christlich-Soziale Partei, CSP), which secured 27% of votes in the 2009 regional 
elections, and ProDG (Pro Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft) with 17.5%. 
Belgian political Catholicism and European policy 
Belgium is one of the six founding members of the European Community. Initially, 
however, Belgian political Catholicism’s interest in European integration was only limited. 
It was not until the 1950s, when the ECSC and the EEC were formed, that the Christian 
Social Party developed a strongly pro-European line. Since then, most of the party’s 
members have remained supporters of European federalism, with Belgian politicians 
playing a major role in the European Christian democratic network (Lamberts 2004). At 
the same time, the salience of the European issue in Belgian politics had been traditionally 
very low. There was a lack of serious public debate about the integration process during 
national elections, while European elections tended to be debates between supporters of 
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the EU and even stronger supporters (Deschouwer and Van Assche 2008). Nonetheless, if 
party support for the ratification of consecutive European treaties is considered a proxy for 
the grouping’s position on Europe, the pro-European stance of Belgian political 
Catholicism becomes obvious. The treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon were 
supported by Christian democratic parties present in the Belgian national parliament. The 
situation was somewhat different in the case of the Nice Treaty. It was backed by the 
Flemish Christian democrats, but to the surprise of many, the Francophone Christian 
democratic party became its main challenger. The party argued that the treaty did not 
advance the preparations for the upcoming enlargement and did not maintain a balance 
between large and small member states. It also believed that the treaty benefited the 
Council of the EU at the expense of other institutions. However, Deschouwer and Van 
Assche (2008) pointed out that the Walloon Christian democrats’ position did in fact not 
differ from the opinion of other parties that voted in favour of the Nice Treaty, and that its 
unexpected opposition to the treaty was driven by government-opposition dynamics (the 
party was in opposition at that time). Following the change of the name, the Christian 
Democrat and Flemish party increasingly used Flemish ‘nationalist’ rhetoric as a response 
to growing pressures from the nationalistic New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, 
N-VA). Hence, it focused more on how the EU benefited Flanders and not necessarily the 
whole of Belgium, without, however, turning to Euroscepticism. 
6.2.3 France 
Political Catholicism in France 
Initially, at the turn of the 20th century, most French Catholics were characterised by their 
strong conservatism and support for the French Action (Action Française) – a royalist, anti-
republican, anti-Semitic and nationalist organisation. Following Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum 
Novarum in 1891, numerous social Catholic initiatives were created, most notably the 
French Catholic trade union movement. Politically, France saw the emergence of different 
Christian democratic parties, but there were never any confessional Catholic parties. The 
People’s Liberal Action (Action Libérale Populaire), formed in 1901, perhaps came closest to 
the notion of a Catholic party. It represented Catholic supporters of the republic and, as 
many others in Western Europe, aimed at combating anticlerical legislation introduced by 
the left in the early 20th century (McMillan 1996). In 1924, the Popular Democratic Party 
(Parti démocrat populaire, PDP) was established as a blend of Christian democracy, social 
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Catholicism and liberal Catholicism. It was, however, quite limited in terms of political 
influence – its electoral support never exceeded 3% (Delbreil 2004). 
The post-war period witnessed the most successful political Catholic party in France, 
namely the Christian democratic Popular Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain 
Populaire, MRP). The party was the first politically effective force of the Christian 
democratic family in French history (in 1946, it won 28.2% of votes in parliamentary 
elections, becoming the strongest party in France) (Béthouart 2004). It played a major 
political role until the late 1950s, when the creation of the Fifth Republic by de Gaulle and 
the increasingly polarised political scene led to its decline. Ever since, the French Christian 
democratic movement has gradually withered. Since the late 1960s, the strategy of French 
Christian democracy has been one of alliance, starting with the merger of the incumbent 
MRP with the Democratic Centre (Centre démocrate) into the Centre of Social Democrats 
(Centre des démocrates sociaux, CDS) (Elgie 1994). In 1978, the Centre of Social Democrats 
joined the coalition of centrists parties, the Union for French Democracy (Union pour la 
Démocratie Française, UDF), where it was one of the four founding parties. In 2002, many 
Christian democrats split from the Union for French Democracy and joined the pro-Chirac 
Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire, UMP), while more 
socially conservative politicians founded the Christian Democratic Party (Parti chrétien-
démocrate, PCD). 
French political Catholicism and European policy 
French political Catholicism was instrumental in the development of European integration 
in the late 1950s and 1960s. Largely as a result of the influence of Robert Schuman, who 
was French Foreign Minister in ten successive governments between 1948 and 1953, the 
Popular Republican Movement developed a vision of European integration based on 
Franco-German reconciliation. This became the party’s foreign policy goal, eventually 
resulting in the successful formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Economic Community (McMillan1996). The European question also became 
one of the key dividing elements between two right-wing parties, the Popular Republican 
Movement and the Gaullist movement. In fact, the Popular Republican Movement left the 
government it formed with de Gaulle’s party in 1962 as a result of the ‘Empty Chairs’ crisis 
in the Council of Ministers. French political Catholicism retained its markedly pro-
European stance, being in general ‘less Jacobin, more Eurofriendly and more liberal on 
both economic and societal issues’ (Evans 2003: 122). In later years, the Union for French 
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Democracy was one of the most cohesively pro-European parties (e.g. support for the 
ratification of the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam), although it suffered some internal 
splits over the European issue in the 1990s. As was the case with the Popular Republican 
Movement and the Gaullist movement in the 1960s, European policy also played a role in 
party competition between the main right-wing parties, namely the Union for French 
Democracy and the Union for a Popular Movement, in the following decades. Some 
commentators saw the Union for French Democracy’s pro-European stance as a way to 
differentiate itself from its hegemonic neighbour and to justify its separate existence (Evans 
2003). The Christian Democratic Party, formed in 2002, can be described as largely pro-
EU. It aimed to preserve the heritage of Robert Schuman and was against ‘the weakening 
of Europe’ (PCD 2014). At the same time, the party was in favour of intergovernmentalism 
and an increase in power of the Council of the EU. It also expressed its support for the EU 
to clearly recognise its Judeo-Christian roots (PCD 2014). 
6.2.4 Germany 
Political Catholicism in Germany 
Throughout the 19th and 20th century, German Catholicism was a significant political force. 
In the second half of the 19th century, German Catholics formed a strong structure of 
social organisations, including a confessional political party and trade unions, which 
integrated the group. Faced with the pressure from Protestant Prussia and the Bismarckian 
Kulturkampf, which was largely an opportunistic attempt to win over liberals by focusing 
hostility on a supposedly anti-nationalist Catholic minority, in 1870 Catholics formed the 
Centre Party (Zentrumspartei) (Conway 1997). Soon the party became a political 
representative of German Catholics, winning as much as 27.9% of votes in the 1874 
elections, which roughly equalled 80% of the Catholic vote (Lönne 1996). The 
Zentrumspartei survived the fall of the monarchy after the First World War, although in 1919 
the Bavarian People’s Party (Bayerische Volkspartei, BVP) split from the rest of the party to 
pursue a more conservative and Bavarian-centred policy. The Centre Party dissolved itself 
in July 1933, following increasing reprisals by Hitler’s government and a massive defection 
of members. 
The post-war period was marked by a general dissatisfaction with narrow, conservative and 
confessional parties, which had failed to resist Hitler. Therefore, two organisations were set 
up in 1945 – the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU) and its 
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Bavarian sister-party, the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU). Both were 
designed as ‘catch-all’ parties (Lees 2008). They have remained independent from each 
other organisationally, but at the federal level have cooperated closely, forming one group 
in the German Bundestag. The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union 
became key players in German politics, dominating the two decades from 1945 until 1969, 
when they first lost power to a social-liberal coalition of the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei, FDP). CDU/CSU returned to power from 1982 to 1998 under the 
leadership of Helmut Kohl. The party suffered an electoral defeat in 1998, but regained 
voters’ support in 2005, when it formed a grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party. 
In 2009, CDU/CSU formed a coalition with the Free Democratic Party. Following the 
2013 federal elections, CDU/CSU secured 41.5% of votes and set-up another grand 
coalition with the Social Democratic Party. 
Progressing social changes such as the transformation of traditional values and 
secularisation, resulting in a loss of confessional voters, put a question mark over how 
politically Catholic the Christian Democratic Union remained. Undoubtedly, until the 
1960s, both the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union were an 
expression of political Catholicism, even though they made some concessions to Protestant 
partners. Although the party was multi-confessional, its leadership was recruited from 
among the ranks of the Catholic Centre Party, while most of its members and voters were 
Catholic (Kaiser 2007). Since then, the Christian Democratic Union has slowly transformed 
itself into a genuine ‘people’s party’, resigning from making open references to Christian 
values or Catholic social teaching, even though it still remained broadly in favour of the 
social market economy (Lönne 1996). 
German political Catholicism and European policy 
The two parties – the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union – were 
the most pro-European mainstream parties in Germany and played a central role in the 
formation of the European integration project. The enthusiasm of German Christian 
democracy for European integration for many years remained undiminished (Broughton 
1994), which is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that Konrad Adenauer, one of the 
founding fathers of a united Europe, was a devout Catholic and a Christian Democratic 
Union politician (previously a member of the Centre Party). Undoubtedly, the strong 
support for European integration was a way for German Christian democratic parties to 
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stress their anti-Nazism, to pave the way for the redemption of past sins, but also to reduce 
Allied oversight of West German affairs by creating a free trade zone in Europe which 
German politicians expected to be beneficial for the country’s industry (Lees 2008). 
There were instances when both parties experienced phases of stronger scepticism toward 
the EU (e.g. for the Christian Democratic Union the 1996 crisis over subsidies to 
Volkswagen in Saxony, which were declared unlawful by the European Commission). 
However, it was the Bavarian sister-party Christian Social Union which displayed a more 
coherently sceptical position toward the integration process. The Christian Social Union 
had always been more conservative with a more nationalistic, Bavarian agenda, which the 
party promoted at the local level. This regional nationalism was built around the self-
perceived distinctiveness of Bavaria from other Bundesländer and a feeling of resentment 
toward fiscal transfers from richer to poorer states (Lees 2008). The ‘soft’ Eurosceptic trait 
in the party’s rhetoric came to light in the 2000s, when the Christian Social Union 
developed its own position on some key European issues, focused on limiting what was 
perceived as excessive interventionism by Brussels. At the same time, as Jeffery and 
Paterson (2003: 72) noted, ‘Bavarian thinking is about a rebalanced European federalism. It 
does not question the fundamental desirability of European integration. On the contrary, 
the Bavarian view can allow for further competences to be transferred to the European 
level (for example, on internal security) and even for strengthening of supranational 
institutions’. This found reflection in the common CDU/CSU position on Europe, which 
remained largely in favour of the EU with awareness of evident benefits of integration. 
This was, however, counterbalanced by clearly voiced concerns for German taxpayers’ 
money paid to the EU budget and a demand for the adequate representation of German 
citizens’ interests in EU institutions (Lees 2008). 
The Christian Social Union’s Euroscepticism grew particularly in strength after 2005 as a 
result of the Eurozone crisis, when the party began to send out Eurosceptic signals to its 
supporters, although it did remain pro-European. The party voted in line with the 
government’s position, but at the same time voiced strong criticism of bailout packages, 
argued in favour of excluding Greece from the eurozone and threatened to veto the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013). In the 2014 
European elections, the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union ran 
separate campaigns, with the CSU advocating some changes that its sister-party did not 
support, i.e. cutting the number of commissioners in half, introducing referenda in 
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Germany over the country’s European policy, limiting the freedom of movement to skilled 
workers and reducing the alleged exploitation of social security systems by immigrants 
(König 2014). Finally, the apparent difference between the regional and national level of 
the Christian Social Union’s activities needs to be stressed. The local reflection of the 
Christian Social Union tended to stress Bavarian uniqueness, while the party’s politicians at 
the national level toned down such rhetoric and were often very pro-European. As Taggart 
and Szczerbiak (2013) noted, ‘the Christian Social Union has always been a balancing act 
between being in a pro-European national government, and a Eurosceptic, regional party 
that criticises the central government.’ It is clear, therefore, that the Christian Social 
Union’s Euroscepticism was not connected to its Catholic roots or any deeper ideological 
concerns, but was rather a form of political strategy that was always a part of its political 
approach and is not restricted to European integration but is a much broader 
phenomenon. 
6.2.5 Ireland 
Political Catholicism in Ireland 
The role of Catholicism and the Catholic Church in Ireland was of particular importance, 
as throughout the 19th and early 20th century the definition of belonging to the Irish nation 
included belonging to Catholicism (Pulzer 2004). Similar to many Central and Eastern 
European countries and Malta, Catholicism became a symbol of Irish nationalism and the 
rejection of foreign domination (Conway 1997). However, following the 1921 treaty with 
Britain and the establishment of the Irish Free State, unlike many countries in continental 
Europe, there were no truly confessional parties established. The close relations of the 
Catholic Church with the two major Irish parties and the fact that members of the new 
government were Catholics made the creation of a confessional party appear superfluous 
(Keogh 1986). Indeed, the Church had such a strong position in Irish society and politics 
that the 1922 and even more the 1937 versions of the Irish constitution were an almost 
exact copy of the encyclical Rerum Novarum, and were described as ‘the perfect Christian 
democratic constitution’ (Pulzer 2004: 17). Therefore, it was not until 1926 that political 
Catholicism in Ireland was significantly boosted by Pius XI and his 1925 encyclical Quas 
Primas.8 As a result, the League of the Kingship of Christ (An Ríoghacht) was formed with 
                                                 
8 The encyclical Quas Primas restated the doctrine that Christ must reign temporally not only in the hearts of 
the faithful, but also in society and the state. 
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the aim to ensure the recognition of Catholic social principles in Irish public life and 
promote Catholic social action (Keogh and O’Driscoll 1996). 
When in 1932 the Fianna Fáil party came to power, many Catholic integralists hoped for 
the introduction of a confessional government policy, but they soon were disappointed. 
The leader of the party, Éamon de Valera, although a devout Catholic, also quickly became 
attracted to pragmatism and was not interested in rebuilding Irish society in line with the 
social teaching of the Catholic Church (Keogh and O’Driscoll 1996). Pragmatism remained 
at the core of Fianna Fáil, which became a centre-right, conservative ‘catch-all’ party. 
1933 saw the emergence of Fine Gael, which, together with Fianna Fáil, dominated the 
Irish political system. For many years, the party was overshadowed by Fianna Fáil, which 
governed Ireland for 61 out of 79 years between 1932 and 2011. Fine Gael described itself 
as the ‘progressive centre’ (FG 2014), although it was seen more as a traditional right-wing 
party, with analysts disagreeing on whether to classify it as Christian democratic. On the 
one hand, Madeley (2013: 17) as well as Kalyvas and van Kersbergen (2010) included Fine 
Gael in the Christian democratic family, while Hanley (1994) on the other hand noticed 
that Fine Gael had as many (or as few) Christian democratic features as Fianna Fáil. At the 
same time, it was Fine Gael which was admitted to the European People’s Party, while in 
2009 Fianna Fáil joined the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (beforehand, 
the party was a member of the conservative Alliance for Europe of the Nations). Perhaps 
the best solution to this issue was proposed by Pelinka (2004), who poignantly observed 
that both parties (FG and FF) were less Christian democratic and more Catholic-
nationalistic. Regardless of this slightly theoretical discussion, the fact is that Irish Catholics 
were finding political representation throughout the 20th century through both 
organisations (Keogh and O’Driscoll 1996). 
What is important to note is the fact that political Catholicism was always well represented 
by mainstream Irish parties, not only the two largest ones – Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael – 
but also through the Irish Labour Party whose long-term leader (1932-1960) William 
Norton was a devout Catholic with a very conservative political outlook (Brown 1980), and 
Sinn Fein. As a result, the Church never had to exert direct influence, as Irish politicians 
were inherently pro-Church (Private correspondence with M. Holmes 2014). 
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Irish political Catholicism and European policy 
Both main Irish political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, shared a pro-European 
approach, with the former developing a somewhat more Eurosceptic rhetoric in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, and the latter being one of the most pro-EU parties in Ireland (next 
to the Progressive Democrats) (Gilland 2008). Fine Gael supported the EU constitutional 
treaty, even though it was in opposition to the Fianna Fáil-led government, which also 
advocated the new treaty (Crum 2007). In its 2011 election manifesto, Fine Gael declared 
that the EU was a cornerstone of Irish economic recovery. It also supported an EU 
common security and defence system and carefully planned future enlargements, and in 
general was in favour of greater EU co-operation and integration on issues of mutual 
concern (FG 2011).  
In its 2014 European elections manifesto, Fianna Fáil stated that ‘it is committed to a 
stronger, simpler and more democratic European Union’ and described itself as pro-
European (FF 2014). When launching the party’s 2014 European elections manifesto, its 
leader, Micheál Martin TD, stated that ‘we [Fianna Fáil] absolutely believe that a strong, 
successful EU is in Ireland’s interests – and we believe that the only way to achieve this is 
to be active in the critical debates’ (FF 2014b). In reality, however, Fianna Fáil members 
started to display more Eurosceptic opinions. For example, then Cabinet Minister Eamon 
Ó Cúiv admitted that he voted against the Nice Treaty (Irish Times 2012), while Irish 
European Commissioner Charlie McCreevey called the initial rejection of the Nice Treaty 
‘a sign of healthy democracy’ (Irish Independent 2010). The only Fianna Fáil MEP, Brian 
Crowley, also voiced criticism of European integration based on the perceived conflict 
between Catholicism and the liberal values of the EU, and decided to move from the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats group in the EP to the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic European 
Conservatives and Reformists (Irish Times 2014). 
Nonetheless, what is particularly interesting in the Irish case is the role of civil society 
organisations in advancing Euroscepticism inspired by Catholicism. Most of these 
movements do not belong to political Catholicism, as they are mostly single-issue 
movements that do not try to advance a holistic political programme. However, their 
Euroscepticism based on concerns for the protection of traditional Catholic values is 
important in the context of this study. There have always been Catholic social groups in 
Ireland which participated in the ‘No’ campaigns in EU referendums. For example, a group 
called ‘Christian Family Action’ campaigned against the Single European Act in the 1980s 
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on grounds of rejecting abortion and divorce, although the efforts to mobilise Catholic 
anti-divorce groups to oppose European integration against a supposed tide of European 
secularism had little success (Gallagher 1988). Similarly, during the Maastricht Treaty 
referendum, the Pro-Life Action Campaign ran an anti-Maastricht campaign over the 
abortion question (Holmes 1993). 
The role of Catholic social movements grew even stronger when child abuse scandals, 
which started surfacing from the mid-1990s onwards, tore apart the public authority and 
influence of the Irish Catholic Church. This is why Catholic groups took over the role of 
mobilising Catholic opposition to European integration. Catholic traditionalists were 
always against the integration process, based on a belief that the Catholic basis of the Irish 
constitution and society were to suffer from the liberal values of a secularised Europe. 
They also objected to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which challenged 
some of the conservative Irish social laws. However, when faced with the clear benefits 
that the EU was creating for the Irish economy, including structural funds and farm 
subsidies, the opinion of these groups had almost no influence on public opinion. The 
situation changed with the dynamic growth of Irish economy, which meant that more post-
materialist concerns took a centre stage. 
In this context, Cóir, a conservative Catholic and Eurosceptic group, is particularly 
interesting. The movement was formed from various Catholic society groups, mostly anti-
abortion actors, specifically to campaign for a ‘No’ in the Irish referendum on the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2008. It campaigned against the treaty based on opposition to the introduction of 
abortion laws in Ireland and the defence of traditional Catholic values. The group also 
underlined its opposition to incorporating of some of the ECHR’s jurisprudence into the 
treaty (FitzGibbon 2013). It is debatable whether these social movements could be 
classified as part of Irish political Catholicism – in general, single-issue movements do not 
fulfil the criteria necessary to fall with this category, mainly because they do not form a 
holistic political action but rather focus on a limited numbers of topics. There is, however, 
a niche Eurosceptic movement in Ireland, which emerged as a result of protests against the 
liberalisation of Irish society and the ECHR conflated with European integration. It was 
led by social movements because of the low public authority of the Church’s hierarchy. 
Finally, it should be noted that the majority of Irish Euroscepticism does not stem from a 
political Catholic background, but is fuelled either by growing right-wing assertiveness, 
which sees the EU as a source of constraints on the market, or by resentments at the 
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bailout programmes and austerity measures introduced in Ireland following the economic 
crisis of the late 2000s (Private correspondence with M. Holmes 2014). 
6.2.6 Italy 
Political Catholicism in Italy 
The history of political Catholicism in Italy differs from that of other European states 
because of the pivotal role that the papacy played in the ideological and organisational 
setup of this movement and the long history of hostility between the Holy See and the 
Italian state. In effect, political Catholicism in Italy quickly became an agent in the papacy’s 
struggle with the liberal Italian state in the 19th century, when the Risorgimento significantly 
decreased the territorial sovereignty of the pope, as well as the legal privileges, land 
property and social influence of the Church on the Italian peninsula (Kalyvas 1996). One 
of the first movements created with the aim of defending the Church against the 
secularisation and liberalism of the modern Italian state was the formation of the Catholic 
Youth Association (Società della Gioventú Cattolica) in 1868 (Pollard 1996), a forerunner to the 
very influential Azione Cattolica Italiana, the Catholic Action, which in 1959 attracted as 
many as 3.5 million members (ACI 2014). 
The first political Catholic party was formed in the turbulent period after the First World 
War, as the Pope initially forbade Catholics to participate in national politics as a result of 
conflicts between the Vatican and the Italian state. The Italian People’s Party (Partito 
Popolare Italiano) was set up in 1919 with the approval of the Holy See and announced a 
political programme entirely in line with the papal teaching on issues such as the family and 
freedom of education. Almost immediately, it received broad support from many Catholics 
across the country, wining 20.5% of votes in the 1919 elections. The party underwent a 
significant crisis in the 1920s connected to the creation of a new pro-fascist Catholic party 
approved by the pope, and the defection of 14 MPs supporting Mussolini. As a result of 
the Vatican’s increasing support for Mussolini, who promised to solve the Roman 
Question (the issue of territorial sovereignty of the Holy See), the party was dissolved in 
1926 (Pollard 1996). 
Following the Second World War, Alcide De Gasperi formulated a programme for modern 
Italian Christian democrats and, as a result, a plethora of political Catholic groups created 
immediately after the war merged into the united Christian Democracy (Democrazia 
Cristiana, DC). The party played a major role in the establishment and development of the 
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post-war Italian republic, growing to become the largest Christian democratic party in 
Western Europe with more than 1.5 million members (Masala 2004). The party 
experienced unprecedented electoral success for almost 40 years, winning between 30% 
and 40% of votes (peaking at 48.5% in 1948) and saw only one brief period with a non-
Christian democratic prime minister (1981-1987), though the party itself participated in the 
government coalition. It all came to an abrupt end between 1992 and 1994, when the entire 
Italian political system collapsed following a corruption scandal (the mani pulite – clean 
hands). In 1994, the party dissolved into a number of smaller successor organisation, two 
of which claimed to be the real Italian Christian democratic party: the Italian People’s Party 
(Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI-DC) and Christian Democratic Centre (Centro Cristiano 
Democratico, CCD), which subsequently merged into the Union of Christian and Centre 
Democrats (Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Democratici di Centro, UDC) (Kalyvas and van 
Kersbergen 2010). 
It is also worth mentioning a lay Catholic movement, Communion and Liberation 
(Comunione e Liberazione, CL), which in the 1960s grew out of the Catholic youth association 
Gioventù Studentesca. The public role of the movement in Italy increased particularly during 
the 1974 referendum on the legalisation on divorce and the 1981 referendum on the 
legalisation on abortion. The Communion and Liberation created a political wing within 
the Italian Christian Democratic Party called Il Movimento Popolare, which had considerable 
influence during the 1980s and 1990s. Following the collapse of the Christian Democratic 
Party, the movement was supportive of Silvio Berlusconi and his party Forza Italia. It 
followed the Church’s stance on social issues, including its focus on the protection of life, 
opposition to stem cell research and same-sex unions. 
Italian political Catholicism and European policy 
For many years, Italian Euroscepticism was non-existent, as the country’s elites and public 
opinion were supportive of the integration process and the European Union, with Italian 
mainstream parties mirroring this widespread public support (with the exception of the 
Italian Communist Party before the 1970s, when the party displayed hostile attitudes to the 
then EEC). It was not until the 1990s, when the Italian political system underwent a 
complete makeover, that some Euroscepticism surfaced, mainly on the centre-right of the 
political spectrum (Quaglia 2008). 
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Among the mainstream parties, Christian Democracy, representing the political Catholic 
strand, was strongly pro-European. The Christian democratic party already in 1943 spoke 
out in favour of a European federation of free states with direct representation of citizens 
and dual European and national citizenships (Masala 2004). Indeed, its founder and leader, 
Alcide de Gasperi, is considered one of the founding fathers of the integration process, 
next to Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, with whom he met on a regular basis to 
discuss European policy issues. De Gasperi, who himself was born in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, was educated in Vienna and became an MP in the Austro-Hungarian 
Parliament, played an active role in the creation of the ECSC and in 1953 became the 
president of the Common Assembly of this organisation (EPP n.d.). In the following years, 
Italy under the Christian Democracy’s leadership supported closer integration in the field 
of security and defence and, in order to counterbalance the Franco-German tandem, was in 
favour of even greater institutionalisation of the integration process (Masala 2004). In fact, 
the party played a key role in ensuring a wide pro-EU stance of Italian parties, as it made 
support for European integration a prerequisite for entering the government, which 
imposed a favourable stance toward the EU (and NATO) on various coalition partners 
(Conti and Verzichelli 2012). 
The successor parties of the Italian Christian Democracy remained loyal to its traditional 
pro-European programme throughout the 1990s and 2000s, despite some criticism of the 
Constitutional Treaty’s omission of the Christian roots of Europe and resentment for the 
rejection of Rocco Buttiglione as EU Commissioner in 2004. Despite the emergence of 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism in the Italian party system in the mid-1990s, the country remained 
mostly a pro-European and pro-EU state, with high levels of public and party support for 
integration (Quaglia 2008). The situation started to change following the economic crisis of 
the late 2000s, with popular Euroscepticism steadily gaining ground. For example, in the 
2014 European elections the Eurosceptic Five Star Movement won 21.2% of votes. The 
opposition to the euro seems to particularly have grown in Italy: only 43% of Italians in 
October 2014 thought that having the euro was a good thing for their county, the second 
lowest result among eurozone countries, with a majority of 47% believing that it was a bad 
thing – the highest score among all the states using the common currency (FB 2014). 
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6.2.7 Malta 
Political Catholicism in Malta 
Catholicism and the Catholic Church have played an important role in Malta. The island’s 
Catholic heritage dates back to the Middle Ages and with no experience of Reformation, 
Christianity has been a continuous thread running throughout Maltese history (Cini 2002). 
In 1880, amidst the Anglicisation vs. Italianitá conflict, whereby the Italian language was 
identified with education, public affairs, liberty and religion, while English was seen by 
parts of society as a language of colonial domination, the Anti-Reform Party was set up 
(Frendo 1994). The party represented the pro-Italian elite of the island and opposed the 
British colonial authorities and measures to anglicise the educational and judicial system, 
strongly supporting the struggle for Maltese independence (Pace 2001). It also protected 
the Catholic Church’s influence and enjoyed its powerful support. In 1903, the party was 
renamed the National Party and in 1921 it was succeed by the Democratic Nationalist 
Party. In 1926, the party merged with the Maltese Political Union to form the modern-day 
Nationalist Party (Partit Nazzjonalista, PN). Since Malta was granted independence in 1964, 
its political scene was dominated by two parties: the Maltese Labour Party (Partit Laburista, 
PL) and the Nationalist Party, with the two organisations alternating in government. The 
modern Nationalist Party is Christian democratic in nature, but also increasingly neo-liberal 
(Fenech 1988), and was traditionally perceived as a party of the middle class, business and 
the Church (Cini 2000). 
Maltese political Catholicism and European policy 
The Nationalist Party was consistently in favour of European integration and Maltese EU 
membership. Closer cooperation with European communities and the EU was seen by the 
party as a way to enhance economic growth, internal stability and security, but above all, to 
consolidate Malta’s identity and recently established statehood (Pace 2002). Not 
surprisingly, it was the Nationalist Party that signed the association agreement with 
European communities in 1970 and filed an application to join the EU in 1990. Contrary to 
the Nationalist Party, the Labour Party assumed a more Eurosceptic position, and when it 
was in power, it would shift the Maltese policy towards neutrality at the expense of closer 
relations with the EU. When in 1998 the Nationalist Party won a victory over the Labour 
Party, it was able to lead Malta through the accession negotiations, culminating in full EU 
membership in 2004. 
187 
  
6.2.8 The Netherlands 
Political Catholicism in the Netherlands 
The importance of the Protestant (Calvinist)-Catholic religious cleavage for the 
Netherlands in the late 19th century and early 20th century cannot be overstated. It was one 
of the key elements leading to the ‘pillarisation’ of Dutch society – a division into several 
groups, namely Protestants, Catholics, and the two secular ones, liberals and socialists (Van 
Kersbergen and Becker 1988). Each group, or ‘pillar’ (nl: zuil), had a separate set of social 
organisations such as trade unions, political parties, churches, occupational associations, 
schools, universities, sports clubs, youth clubs, cemeteries or hospitals. As a result, the 
religious cleavage largely shaped Dutch politics and determined the key role of Christian 
and Catholic parties in the Dutch political system (Van Kersbergen 1995). 
Roman Catholics were the second minority, after Protestants, to start organising 
themselves politically. Originally, Catholic politicians and members of parliament 
cooperated closely with liberals, whose support for freedom of religion was more appealing 
to them than cooperation with Protestants, who instituted a number of discriminatory 
policies against Catholics during the Dutch Republic period (16th to 18th century). At the 
end of the 19th century, liberals and Catholics began to grow apart, following the liberals’ 
opposition to the institution of religious (Catholic) schools. In 1904, the General League of 
Roman Catholic Caucuses (Algemeene Bond van Roomsch-Katholieke Kiesverenigingen) was 
founded as a federation of Catholic caucuses and parliamentarians. Relatively soon, the goal 
of obtaining public financing for religious schools led to the creation of a Catholic-
Protestant coalition, which resulted in a number of coalition governments, particularly after 
1917, and the introduction of universal male suffrage as well as the system of proportional 
representation (Ten Napel 1997). 
The first Catholic confessional party was created in 1926 under the name of the Roman 
Catholic State Party (Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij), which in 1945 became the Catholic 
People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP). The Catholic People’s Party was a permanent 
member of all post-war Dutch governments from 1945 until 1977, winning around a third 
of votes until the late 1960s. Similar to other countries, the 1960s marked a significant 
social change in the Netherlands and the beginning of the secularisation process, which led 
to the demise of ‘pillarisation’, prompting the ultimate decline of electoral support for all 
confessional parties. In response to this trend, a federation of three confessional parties 
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(the Catholic People’s Party, the Protestant Anti Revolutionary Party, and the Protestant 
Christian Historical Union) was established in 1975, and in 1980 a unified party – the 
Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl) was founded (Duncan 2007). The 
new party was multi-confessional and became more distinctively Christian democratic than 
its predecessors (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). This meant that the party lost its 
exclusively Catholic character, but continued to represent Catholic voters (in 2002, 66% of 
practicing Catholics voted for the Christian Democratic Appeal, compared with 53% of 
practicing Protestants (Andeweg and Irwin 2002)). In 1994, the Christian Democratic 
Appeal suffered a setback in national elections and lost a third of its seats in the parliament, 
which meant that for the first time since the introduction of male suffrage in 1917 (and 
universal suffrage in 1919), no party with a strong Catholic representation would be part of 
government. Since then, the party has enjoyed a rather mixed track-record. It regained 
some of its support in the 2000s, following organisational and programmatic changes, 
which introduced a more communitarian social approach at the expense of the market-
centred policies pursued in the 1990s (Duncan 2007). In 2010 and 2012, the Christian 
Democratic Appeal again suffered significant electoral defeats, falling to the fifth place in 
the Dutch parliament and remaining outside of the government coalition – for only the 
second time in its history. 
Dutch political Catholicism and European policy 
Initially, Dutch political Catholicism in form of the Catholic People’s Party was quite 
reserved about the idea of European integration. This was mainly due to an inward focus 
of politicians of the older generation that dominated the party’s leadership until the 1960s. 
However, the situation changed in 1960 with a new generation taking the lead and 
advancing European integration, when the party began to support supranational 
cooperation and international solidarity, taking a markedly pro-European stance (Bosmans 
2004). After the formation of the multi-confessional Christian Democratic Appeal, the 
party remained strongly pro-integrationist, e.g. it supported the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty, despite a wide gap between the opinions of the people and their 
parliamentary representatives with 47% of the Christian Democratic Appeal supporters 
voting ‘No’ in the Dutch EU Constitution referendum (Crum 2007). Following its electoral 
defeat in 2010, the Christian Democratic Appeal established the so-called Strategic Council, 
which worked on redefining the party’s key policies. As a result of its work, the council 
advised inter alia to maintain the pro-European policy of the party. At the same time, the 
Christian Democratic Appeal and other mainstream parties in recent years sounded less 
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Europhile, in line with the growing Dutch public discontent with the EU. In the 2014 
European elections campaign, the party took a more pragmatic approach to the integration 
process, stating that Europe should focus on core issues and not overly interfere with 
policies that can be best developed at national and local levels (van Kessel 2014). 
It should be noted here that a Protestant Christian democratic party, the Christian Union 
(Christen Unie), displayed ‘soft’ Eurosceptic opinions, believing that the Netherlands should 
remain an independent political entity in the European Union (for more on Protestantism 
and Euroscepticism see: Vollaard 2006). 
6.2.9 Portugal 
Political Catholicism in Portugal 
The story of the Catholic Church in Portugal is one of long-standing close relations to the 
monarchy and authoritarian regimes, which impacted significantly on the 
(under)development of political Catholicism in this country. The Church was the 
institution most closely associated with the monarchy before the 1910 revolution and the 
creation of the First Portuguese Republic. As a result, it found itself in a precarious 
situation when it was identified as the easiest one to penalise for the wrongdoings of the 
ancien régime (Gallagher 1996). The new republic did not only separate the Church from the 
state, but instituted anticlerical legislation on a grand scale, including nationalisation of all 
Church property, restrictions on worshiping and freedom of movement of the clergy, 
prohibition of religious teaching in schools and closing down of faculties of theology 
(Conway 1997). This led to the establishment of Centro Academica da Democraçia Cristão 
(CADC) in 1912, – a pressure group designed to reinstitute the Church’s influence and 
protect Catholic interests. Oliveira Salazar, who later became dictator of Portugal and 
dominated political life in the country for almost 40 years, was the leading figure of the 
movement. In 1917, an explicitly Catholic movement was established, the Centro Católico 
Portuguesa (CCP) (Gallagher 1996). 
Following the 1926 coup d’état and the 1928 rise to power of Salazar, Portuguese political 
parties slowly disintegrated. The Church, in return for the protection by Salazar’s 
authoritarian state, did not encourage any political movements or parties that could claim 
Catholic inspiration, thus, when political freedoms were returned in 1974, there were no 
foundations for the development of strong political Catholicism – ‘the time for advancing a 
Christian democratic alternative to the left or to secularism had long passed’ (Gallagher 
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1996: 129). As a result, political Catholicism remained a minority movement in Portugal, 
also because the Catholic Church stayed away from direct intervention in political affairs. 
The Democratic and Social Centre (Centro Democrático e Social – CDS) was set up in 1974 by 
conservative politicians with links to the old regime and received support from areas where 
the Church still had a strong influence (Corkill 1993). Originally, the party subscribed to 
Christian democratic values, but it underwent some programmatic shifts in the 1990s, 
which moved it more to the centre of the political scene. It participated in the 1979, 1980 
and 2002 coalition governments, with average support of around 8% to 10%, although it 
did suffer a significant loss of votes at the end of the 1980s, when its support fell to 4.3% 
in 1987. Madeley (2013: 17) also identified the Portuguese Social Democratic party as 
Christian democratic, because of a faction within it that subscribed to some aspects of 
Christian democracy.  
Portuguese political Catholicism and European policy 
During the mid-1970s, following the transition to democracy, all major political parties in 
Portugal, apart from the communists but including Democratic and Social Centre (CDS-
Partido Popular, Democratic and Social Centre-People’s Party as of 1993), adopted a pro-EU 
stance. EU membership held the promise not only for rapid economic development, but 
perhaps more importantly, of firmly anchoring Portuguese politics and the state within a 
network of Western pluralist democracies, preventing the return of authoritarian 
governments. However, the situation changed in the 1990s, after the Democratic and 
Social Centre-People’s Party suffered a significant outflow of its supporters to the Social-
Democratic Party (PSD) (the CDS-PP share of votes fell from ca. 16% in 1976 to 4.3% in 
1987). Following a change in leadership, the party decided to differentiate itself more on 
the political scene and capitalise on the economic recession and growing discontent with 
Europe. It declared its opposition to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and made it a 
major campaign issue (Magone 2003). Ultimately, this led to the expulsion of the party 
from the European People’s Party. The Democratic and Social Centre-People’s Party 
abandoned its Eurosceptic position in the second half of the 1990s, when it became 
apparent that its new anti-EU stance was making it increasingly difficult to enter into 
centre-right coalitions, in particular at the local level, where the party was pushed out of 
power in many Portuguese cities. Since then, the party either played down its 
Euroscepticism or reformulated its position on European issues into a generally pro-EU 
stance, such as its renewed commitment to the European single currency. This was made 
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easier by the low salience of European issues in Portuguese politics, where most parties 
either converged on Europe or remained silent (Lobo and Magalhães 2011). The party 
supported the adoption of the treaties of Amsterdam (with some MPs defecting) and Nice. 
It also voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty. 
In addition, the Portuguese Social Democratic Party proclaimed its support for European 
integration, advocating for closer cooperation at the EU level. Its manifesto stated: ‘The 
historic deeds already achieved by the European communities, such as securing lasting 
peace on the continent, overcoming aggressive nationalisms, constituting a large space of 
prosperity, freedom, tolerance and respect for human rights, together with the defence of 
cultural diversity and of solidarity between peoples, strengthen us in our commitment to a 
more united Europe’ (PSD 2014: 11). 
6.2.10 Spain 
Political Catholicism in Spain 
Ties between Catholicism, the Spanish state and society were always very strong. Disputes 
about the role of the Church in Spain formed a central element of often violent conflicts 
between liberal and republican anticlericalists on the one side and Catholic monarchists on 
the other (Conway 1997). At the same time, the construction of a uniformly Catholic 
Spanish society was the ambition of many intellectuals, preachers, politicians and the 
Church hierarchy. The first decades of the 20th century saw the development of political 
Catholicism in Spain in the form of trade unionism, which was particularly successful in 
agrarian areas, e.g. the National Catholic Agrarian Confederation (Confederación Nacional-
Católica Agraria, CNCA), founded in 1917. Another influential organisation was the 
National Catholic Association of Propagandists (Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, 
ACNdeP) – an elite Catholic lay organisation, which played a significant role in pre-civil 
war Spain (Vincent 1996). 
The 1920s marked a new beginning for Spanish political Catholicism. With the 
advancement of mass politics, the first Spanish political Catholic party, the People’s Social 
Party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP) was formed in 1922. However, the party never 
attracted large support, as for many Catholics the idea of a uniform, monarchist and 
Catholic Spain was incompatible with pluralist politics, represented by the People’s Social 
Party. The party fell into disarray following the 1923 military coup of General Miguel 
Primo de Rivera (Conway 1997). At the time, many Catholics and political Catholic groups 
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welcomed the military dictatorship, hoping it would ensure the privileged position of 
Catholicism in the state. Following the fall of the monarchy and the defeat of the 
monarchist parties in 1931, Catholics instituted a new organisation, the National Action, 
soon renamed Popular Action (Acción Popular, AP). The party was formed to protect 
Catholic interests and was a vehicle for those who campaigned against the republic, which 
in 1931 passed a new constitution that disestablished the Catholic Church and prohibited 
religious orders from engaging in education. The Popular Action later became a key 
element of an umbrella electoral organisation, the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous 
Right-wing Groups (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, CEDA), whose aim was to 
bring the Spanish Catholic right into mass politics. The ‘principal aim and fundamental 
reason for its existence’ was to work for ‘the empire of the principles of Christian public 
law in the governance of the State’ (Programa votado por el primer congreso de la CEDA (febrero-
marzo de 1933): Conclusiones aprobadas in Vincent 1996). At the beginning of the Spanish Civil 
War, very few Catholics remained loyal to the republican government (mostly from 
regional Basque and Castilian Catholic parties). In 1939, most Catholics welcomed Franco’s 
victory, but paradoxically it brought an end to Catholic parties, as they were banned, 
similarly to all others. At the same time, Franco recognised the privileged position of 
Catholicism in Spain, which further strengthened the connection between religion and the 
state (Vincent 1996). The effect of Franco’s era was so strong that in fact it marginalised 
other definitions of Spanish national identity that did not include religious references, but 
rather drew on the Enlightenment traditions. 
Spanish political Catholicism went through significant changes in the post-Franco era, 
transforming itself from a minority party on the far right to a political party of the centre, 
occupying a major position in Spanish politics. As of the 1970s, the Spanish Catholic 
Church consciously chose not to interfere in party politics and decided not to promote any 
parties that would be based on Catholicism and Catholic social teaching. This meant that 
there was no direct link in Spain between the Church and Catholicism on the one hand and 
the party formation process on the other. 
In 1976, following Franco’s death and the gradual transition to parliamentary democracy, 
members of the pro-reformist bloc in Franco’s regime created the People’s Alliance 
(Alianza Popular, AP) and the Union of the Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático, 
UCD), both containing Christian democratic factions. In 1982, the Union of the 
Democratic Centre suffered a split, which resulted in the creation of a Christian democratic 
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People’s Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Popular, PDP). The party began cooperating 
closely with the People’s Alliance, which started to take over the significantly reduced 
electoral base of the Union of the Democratic Centre and in 1989 merged with its allied 
parties (among them the PDP) into the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) (Matuschek 
2004). The People’s Party first came to power in 1996, only to lose again to the Socialists in 
2004. Finally, in 2011 it won a clear victory in national elections with 44.6% of votes. The 
party could be described as a pragmatic, catch-all right wing party at times. However, it 
aligned itself with the Church on some policy issues and supported the political 
mobilisation of Catholics, e.g. on issues of abortion law or gay marriages. In modern-day 
Spain, two more parties can be included in the political Catholic group – both regional, 
Christian democratic organisations: the Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Democràtica de 
Catalunya, UDC) and the Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, EAJ). In fact, the 
Basque Nationalist Party in its earlier days was a clerical, pro-Catholic and pro-Church 
party. 
Spanish political Catholicism and European policy 
Spanish mainstream political parties have traditionally been regarded as pro-European. This 
reflected public opinion in Spain, where citizen’s support for EU membership has almost 
always maintained levels above 50%, with a brief period below this threshold between 1994 
and 1995. The Spanish People’s Party, representing political Catholicism on the Spanish 
political stage, took a strongly pro-integration stance, including during the time of the 
Socialist government, when the party was in opposition (Gómez-Reino et al. 2008). Before 
accession, EU membership was perceived by the public and political parties alike as a 
historical opportunity for Spain on its way to the modernisation of economy and to ensure 
increased political safety in the post-Franco period. Following EU accession, despite 
growing controversies surrounding the newly launched EMU, Spanish political parties, 
including the People’s Party, increasingly backed the integration process. When the 
People’s Party took power in 1996, it exhibited the highest share of positive discourse on 
the EU out of all national Spanish parties, remaining at the same time opposed to the 
federalisation of the EU (Ruiz Jimenez and Egea de Haro 2011). Nevertheless, the entry of 
Spain into the eurozone in 1999 was presented as one of the greatest achievements of the 
People’s Party government. The party also supported the Constitutional Treaty during the 
2005 Spanish referendum (Crum 2007). It declared, however, that the EU should remain a 
union of national states, where national sovereignty should be a key element, with no need 
for federal constructs to be developed (García et al. 2010). Despite supporting the Church’s 
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opposition to the liberalisation of abortion law or the introduction of gay marriages, the 
party has never criticised the EU based on moral-cultural issues, and continued to perceive 
Spanish EU membership positively because of its beneficial influence on the modernisation 
effort, particularly in the sphere of economy. The other two parties traditionally associated 
with political Catholicism, the Basque Nationalist Party and the Democratic Union of 
Catalonia, also belonged to the pro-EU camp. 
6.2.11 Switzerland 
Political Catholicism in Switzerland 
The political Catholic movement in Switzerland originated in the 19th century, amidst the 
Swiss Kulturkampf and the civil war of 1847 – the clash of the anticlerical, radical liberals on 
one and the clerical-conservative Catholics on the other side (Geissbühler 1999). Political 
Catholicism started emerging essentially as the parliamentary representation of the losers of 
the civil war, i.e. seven Catholic cantons which became the heartland of Catholic 
conservatism in Switzerland. Initial attempts to create national political Catholic parties 
failed, mainly because of the differences between the seven Catholic cantons and Catholics 
in other places around the country, which were more progressive. Finally in 1912, the first 
successful nationally united political Catholic party was founded under the name of the 
Swiss Conservative People’s Party (Schweizerische Konservative Volkspartei, SKVP). It attracted 
quite divergent social groups, sometimes with competing economic interests, but the party 
was bound together by the common foundations of Catholic social teaching and fierce 
anti-socialism as well as strong anti-liberalism (Rölli-Alkemper 2004). The Conservative 
Party’s strict course of opposition to the federal government forced the ruling liberals to 
include a member of the party in the Swiss Federal Council (a Swiss collective head of state 
organ); and as of 1919, the party occupied 2 out of 7 seats in the council. Throughout the 
1950s, the party enjoyed high levels of public support, culminating in 23.4% of votes won 
in the 1963 elections. Following a number of name changes, in 1970 the party adopted its 
current name, Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland (Christlichdemokratische 
Volkspartei der Schweiz, CVP). This was a sign of the party’s attempt to open itself up 
confessionally, as a response to social changes, and to win elections in traditionally non-
Catholic urban centres. Despite this, the Christian Democratic People’s Party remained a 
distinctly Catholic party (Gees 2004). In the decades following the breakup of more secular 
Catholic support networks, the support base of the party eroded, with only 15% of 
Catholics declaring their attachment to the Christian Democratic People’s Party, compared 
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with 20% in the 1980s (Geissbühler 1999). The situation was aggravated by competition 
from the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), which demanded a second 
seat in the Bundesrat. Following the vote in the federal assembly, one of the two Christian 
Democratic People’s Party members of the Federal Council, Ruth Metzler, was not re-
elected, and was replaced by Swiss People’s Party member Christoph Blocher. Since then, 
the Christian Democratic People’s Party maintained support of 12 to 14% of the electorate 
(14.6% in the 2007 national elections). 
Swiss political Catholicism and European policy 
Switzerland is a country with strong Euroscepticism, which tended to overshadow pro-EU 
opinions. The country is neither a member of the EU nor of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). In the 2001 referendum, the Swiss rejected the possibility to commence accession 
negotiations (Favero 2013). The Christian Democratic People’s Party stance on Europe 
could be described as somewhat ambiguous. In 1998, in an attempt to attract new voters, 
the party demanded Swiss entry in the European Union. Then, following a national drift 
away from considering accession to the EU, it toned down its rhetoric and began stressing 
its support for cooperation with the EU through bilateral agreements (Gees 2004). Since 
then, the party remained pro-EEA, but took no stance on the issue of Swiss membership 
in the EU (Schwok 2009). In its 2013 programmatic document called ‘The path of 
Switzerland in Europe’ (‘La voie de la Suisse en Europe’), the party declared that ‘Switzerland 
needs to strengthen its ties with the EU’ via bilateral agreements in the fields of energy, 
public health, safety of food, registration of chemical substances and products and an 
emissions trading scheme, among others. The party supported the agreement on free 
movement of people and the cooperation with the EU in security and defence, underlining 
at the same time the need to maintain Switzerland’s neutrality. Reflecting the political 
reality, the party stated that ‘the accession to the EU is not on the agenda’ (CVP 2013) and 
did not take a stance on this issue. Taking into account that Swiss lukewarm attitudes to the 
EU are mostly affected by voters’ attachment to neutrality and fear of the negative 
consequences EU membership could have for the Swiss economy (Christin and Trechsel 
2002), the party’s ambiguous position on Europe seems to be an attempt to adjust to 
political reality, where Swiss support for EU membership remained at low levels. 
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6.3 Central and Eastern Europe  
6.3.1 Croatia 
Political Catholicism in Croatia 
The roots of political Catholicism in Central and Eastern Europe are often different to 
those of Western European countries, where the political mobilisation of Catholics 
originated in the 19th and early 20th century as a way to oppose hostility or open persecution 
of Catholics and the Catholic Church. Many of the political Catholic groups in CEE made 
their name by associating themselves with national liberation movements and advocating 
national sovereignty (Grzymala-Busse 2013), as was the case in Croatia. 
Political Catholicism in Croatia took an organised shape in 1900 with the establishment of 
the Croatian Catholic Movement (Hrvatski katolički pokret). Similar to other political 
Catholic groups of the time, the Croatian Catholic Movement was a lay organisation 
focused on defending and promoting Catholicism in public life. In 1919, a political branch 
of the movement was created – the Croatian Popular Party (Hrvatska pučka stranka). The 
party originated from grievances of the Croat population over the policies of the central 
government in Belgrade and the growth of Serbian influences within the common 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but it was not as successful as its counterparts in 
other European countries (e.g. Slovenia). It lost the 1920 elections for the constitutional 
assembly and the 1923 general elections to its rival party, the Croatian Peasant Party 
(Hrvatska seljačka stranka), which presented a more radical, pro-independence programme 
(Conway 1997). After King Alexander implemented his dictatorial rule in 1929, the party 
was dissolved. From 1941 to 1945, Croatia’s fascist movement, Ustaša, successfully enlisted 
some of the more radical Croat Catholics, which left a mark on Croatian Catholicism and 
remained a sensitive issue for decades (Biondich 2007). In fact, many parish priests and 
Catholic nationalist organisations enthusiastically supported the Ustaša state, while the 
authorities were eager to stress the Catholic character of the new country by nominating 
clergy to prominent posts and passing laws against freemasonry, contraception or 
blasphemy (Conway 1997). 
Following the fall of communism in 1990, the Croatian political scene saw the 
establishment of a number of parties that related to Christian democratic principles, most 
notably the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), the Croatian 
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Christian Democratic Party (Hrvatska kršćanska demokratska stranka, HKDS) and the 
Croatian Democratic Party (Hrvatska demokratska stranka, HDS). The latter two merged in 
1992 to form the Croatian Christian Democratic Union (Hrvatska kršćanska demokratska 
unija, HKDU), but it remained fairly unsuccessful, securing only one seat in the parliament 
in the 1995 and 2000 elections. 
The Croatian Democratic Union was the party that dominated much of the post-
communist Croatian political scene. It ruled Croatia under the undisputed leadership of 
President Franjo Tudjman. After his death in late 1999, the party suffered significant losses 
in the 2000 elections, but returned to power in 2003. In 2011, the party moved to 
opposition after 8 years in government. There is a certain controversy regarding the 
inclusion of the Croatian Democratic Union among Christian democratic parties, e.g. 
Grzymala-Busse (2013: 340) stated that ‘the party was largely the electoral engine of 
President Tudjman until his death in 2000, without espousing Christian democratic 
doctrine.’ Perhaps in the 1990s, it was possible to classify it as nationalist, but since the 
death of Tudjman, who had heavily influenced the party’s programme and policies, the 
organisation underwent a significant reorientation, calling itself a modern Christian 
democratic and conservative party (Šedo 2010). Madeley (2013: 17) included it among his 
list of Christian democratic parties in Europe, and in July 2013, when Croatia joined the 
EU, the Croatian Democratic Union became a full member of the EPP. Regardless of this, 
the party can be included in the political Catholic movement, as it portrayed itself as the 
defender of Catholicism and enjoyed the strong support of the Catholic Church, which 
helped the party to return to power in 2003 (Perica 2006, Iveković 2002). 
The fundamental role of the Catholic Church in the construction of the Croatian nation is 
an important one, particularly in the context of this study. Indeed, as Perica (2006: 312) 
noted ‘the Church was one of the nation’s co-founders’, and in order to emphasise its role, 
it adopted the semi-official title ‘Church of the Croats’ (Crkva u Hrvata). The role of 
Catholicism for state and nation building was so strong that Catholicism became a state 
religion de facto, with many elite members during Tudjman’s period presenting their 
Catholicism as a patriotic duty and the Church advancing an agenda of building a Catholic 
Croat nation (Perica 2006). Similar to Poland, the Church in Croatia ‘rather actively sought 
(political) power’ (Jakelić 2010: 67). It established a close alliance with President Tudjman 
and the Croatian Democratic Union. It is also important to note the apparent split of the 
Croatian Church between liberal reformers inspired by the Second Vatican Council and 
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conservatives, who believed that the council was a mistake. The liberal-conservative split, 
which became more clearly visible after 1989, meant that the Church maintained an 
ambiguous position on the EU integration process (Stojić 2006), although the liberal wing 
of the Church played a supportive role in Croatian EU accession. 
Croatian political Catholicism and European policy 
During the 1990s, Croatia was in unofficial international isolation, left outside of European 
integration, and thus EU membership was not an immediate goal of the ruling Croatian 
Democratic Union (Stojić 2006). In addition, because of the instability following 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its 
nationalistic programme, the Croatian Democratic Union put the European integration 
issue aside and pursued a ‘go-alone’ policy (Ashbrook 2010). After the 2000 electoral defeat 
and its return to power in 2003, the party became a strong supporter of Croatian EU 
membership (Stojić 2006). Indeed, the number one priority for the Croatian Democratic 
Union government of Ivo Sanader (2003-2009) was full Croatian EU membership 
(Ashbrook 2010). At times, the opposition even blamed the Croatian Democratic Union 
government for neglecting domestic problems and focusing instead on one card – the EU 
(Stojić 2006). The 2014 European elections manifesto of the Croatian Democratic Union 
continued to state that Croatian EU membership was the priority: ‘We understand Europe 
as a continent whose peoples, in spite of all their national, political, cultural and economic 
differences, joined in a common historical heritage, common lived present and work 
together on unifying the future’ (HDZ 2014). 
6.3.2 Lithuania 
Political Catholicism in Lithuania 
All Baltic States experienced a similar history. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for centuries 
changed hands between Russian, German and Polish rulers. Following the dissolution of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century, most of Lithuania 
became incorporated in the Russian Empire. It was at that time that the Catholic Church, 
similar to Poland, became a key actor in upholding Lithuanian national identity and 
preserving the language, when throughout the 19th century the Russian Empire tried to 
suppress it, replacing it with the Cyrillic script (Bruce 2002). Naturally, the role of the 
Catholic Church was more complex. On the one hand, the clergy were an instrument of 
gradual Polonisation of Lithuania for centuries, but on the other hand, it was the key actor 
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opposing the tsarist government’s attempt to strengthen Orthodoxy, which was used as a 
way to assimilate the Lithuanian peasantry into Russian culture (Valantiejus 2002). 
The political organisation of Catholics in Lithuania started at the turn of the 20th century. 
The first political Catholic organisation, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union 
(Lietuvių krikščionių demokratų sąjunga, LKDS), was established in 1905. The collapse of the 
German and Russian Empires at the end of the First World War gave the Baltic States, 
including Lithuania, an opportunity to gain independence. In this new environment, the 
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (Lietuvių krikščionių demokratų partija, LKDP) was 
founded in 1917. Its representative entered the Lithuanian Council, which declared the 
country’s independence in 1918. The party was the largest political organisation from 1918 
until 1926, winning 35% of votes in elections to the constituent Seimas in 1920. Similar to 
other parties in the region, it was perceived as a key nation-building force in the interwar 
period, displaying strong nationalistic sentiments based on anti-Polonism (Grzymala-Busse 
2013). The multi-party system came to an abrupt end with the 1926 coup d’état led by the 
Nationalist Union (Krupavicius 1998). 
Following the Second World War, Lithuania was incorporated into the Soviet Union and 
non-communist political activity was banned. As was the case in Poland, the Catholic 
Church became a haven for people opposing the regime, with many dissidents not 
distinguishing between their national and religious feelings (Senn 1997). After the collapse 
of communism, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party reconstituted itself in 1990 and 
in 1996 the party became the second-largest force in Lithuania with 10.4% of votes, 
entering a coalition government with the Homeland Union (Tėvynės sąjunga, TS). This meant 
it became one of the most successful Christian democratic parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, the coalition became quickly unpopular as a result of its programme of 
continued austerity policies, which resulted in a slump in support and a split of the party 
(Grzymala-Busse 2013). In 2001, the remaining core merged with the Lithuanian Christian 
Democratic Union (Krikščionių demokratų sajunga, KDS) to form the Lithuanian Christian 
Democrats (Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai, LKD). The party ran in elections in 2004 and 
2008 in coalition with the Homeland Union, with which it merged in 2008, creating the 
Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos krikščionys 
demokratai, TS-LKD). The new party won the 2008 elections with 19.7% of votes, but lost 
four years later, when its support fell to 15%, which meant it was consequently excluded 
from government. 
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The members who opposed the merger of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party with 
the Christian Democrats Union in 2001 created a new Lithuanian Christian Democratic 
Party (Lietuvos krikščioniškosios demokratijos partija), which merged in 2010 with the Christian 
Conservative Social Union (Krikščionių konservatorių socialinė sąjunga), another party that broke 
away from the Homeland Union in 2000. Together they created the Christian Party 
(Krikščionių partija, KP), which won 1.2% in the 2012 elections. 
Lithuanian political Catholicism and European policy 
Similar to other Central and Eastern European countries, there was a strong consensus 
among Lithuanian elites on foreign policy aims, including the country’s accession to the 
EU. According to a 2006 expert survey, all main Lithuanian parties ranged from moderately 
to very pro-EU, with conservatives (which according to the methodology of the study 
included Christian democrats) at the top of the range on the pro-EU scale (Duvold and 
Jurkynas 2006: 115). The elite consensus remained largely unchanged even after accession, 
although several parties introduced more Eurosceptic elements in their manifestos. Despite 
this, in 2004, 2008 and 2011, all main parties continued to sign four-year agreements on 
foreign policy goals, approving of Lithuania’s EU membership and sharing a similar view 
on how the country could benefit from it (Pigeonnier 2012). 
In the pre-accession period, the Lithuanian Christian Democrats displayed its support for 
EU membership, favouring a rapid integration of the country with the EU and NATO. In 
fact, in the 2014 European elections the party stated that during 24 years of Lithuanian’s 
independence, it had been a driving force behind the country’s ambition to become a full-
fledged member of the Western world (TS-LKD 2014). In the late 2000s, the party 
remained supportive of the EU, although in the 2012 elections manifesto it defined its 
European policy as seeking ‘[i]ntegration while maintaining a prudent balance’. It also 
declared its opposition to a ‘two-speed’ Europe and supported strengthening European 
institutions with an aim to ensure balance between smaller and larger member states. In 
addition, it stated that ‘[i]n matters relating to the statehood, national heritage, cultural and 
traditional values, it is necessary to protect the independence of Lithuania. Our goal [is] a 
united, but not unified Europe” (TS-LKD 2012). 
Apart from political parties, which remained largely pro-EU, it is possible to identify a few 
social movements in Lithuania that opposed the EU, mostly on the grounds that it may 
threaten the traditional family. The Citizens’ Union for Honesty and the Nation (Piliečių 
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Sąšauka ‘Už dorą ir tautą’, PSDT) was a movement that united people willing to defend 
traditional (Christian) family values, and who were also very sceptical about the 
advancement of LGBT rights, which they saw as being promoted by the EU. The 
Grunewald National Resistance Movement (Žalgirio nacionalinio pasipriešinimo judėjimo, ŽNPJ) 
was a Eurosceptic movement focused on protecting Lithuanian sovereignty and defending 
traditional values. They were mostly concerned with sovereignty issues, but supported 
Catholic views on the family and strongly opposed legislation on same-sex marriages. 
6.3.3  Slovakia 
Political Catholicism in Slovakia 
Unlike the Czechs, who emerged after the period of communism as one of the least 
religious societies in Central and Eastern Europe, their long-term compatriots, the Slovaks, 
remained more faithful to the Catholic religion (Froese 2005). The history of political 
Catholicism in Slovakia, similar to Croatia, was one of interconnection between 
Catholicism and nationalism. After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, both nations, 
Croats and Slovaks, became parts of the largely non-Catholic states of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Czechoslovakia. The Catholic identity of both nations as 
well as the Church played a central role in their struggle for autonomy (Conway 1997). At 
the same time, it should be noted that a substantial Protestant minority was also politically 
active (e.g. leading the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) and engaged in 
the Slovak autonomy movement. 
A key moment in the history of political Catholicism in Slovakia were the early 1900s, 
when the Slovak People’s Party (Slovenská ľudová strana, SLS), also called Hlinka’s Slovak 
People’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, HSLS), was formed under the leadership of 
Andrej Hlinka, a Catholic priest. In 1925, the party won 34.3% of votes in Slovakia and 
began advancing Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia (Suppan 2004). One of the 
party’s main reservations about the Czechoslovak state was the perceived secularism of the 
Czechs, in particular their elites, which contrasted a solid Catholic outlook of Slovakia’s 
rural territories (Henderson 2001). The party was significantly compromised when Hlinka’s 
successor – Jozef Tiso, also a Catholic priest – led the creation of an authoritarian, pro-
fascist government, which ultimately transformed Slovakia into a German Nazi puppet 
state (Grzymala-Busse 2013). The party was disbanded in 1945. 
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After the fall of communism, the Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické 
hnutie, KDH) was set up in 1990. From the very beginning, religion was central to the party, 
with most of its members in initial years recruited from among Catholic, anti-communist 
lay people and activist priests (Bugajski 2002). The leader of the Christian democratic 
Movement, Ján Čarnogurský, stated that Christianity was ‘the source of our internal 
stability, the inspiration for our decisions, and the source of our supporters’ (Haughton 
2005 in Grzymala-Busse 2013). In the late 1990s, the party suffered a split when the more 
fundamentally Catholic wing of the party refused to merge with its electoral coalition 
partner, the liberal Democratic Union (Demokratická únia, DU). As a result, some of the 
Christian Democratic Movement’s members for whom religion did not play such an 
important role in policymaking moved to the newly established Slovak Democratic and 
Christian Union (Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia, SDKÚ), while the Christian 
Democratic Movement became more fundamentally Catholic and moved closer to the 
Catholic Church. These events ultimately led to a decline in the Christian Democratic 
Movement’s electoral support – in the 2006 elections, the party won only 8% of votes, 
compared with 15% for the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, which ran a campaign 
surrounding economic reforms and support for EU membership. The Christian 
Democratic Movement tried to moderate its policy, but the change was perceived as not 
credible by voters and the party maintained its 8% support in the 2010 and 2012 
parliamentary elections (Grzymala-Busse 2013), while the Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union won 15% in 2010, but experienced a significant electoral defeat in 2012, winning 
only 6% of votes. 
There is a disagreement as to the classification of the Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union as Christian democratic. Madeley (2013) included it in his indicative list of 81 
European Christian democratic parties, but others have pointed to the fact that over time, 
the party has profiled itself as liberal (Private correspondence with K. Henderson 2014), 
with an emphasis on maximising elements of direct democracy, gender equality and 
opposition to discrimination of single-parent families (Hloušek and Kopeček 2010: 125). 
Madeley (2013) additionally identified the Party of Hungarian Community (Sl: Strana 
maďarskej komunity; Hu: Magyar Közösség Pártja, SMK-MKP) as a Christian democratic party. 
It was set up in 1998 and represented the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia, focusing 
on protecting and strengthening Hungarian minority rights. 
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Slovakian political Catholicism and European policy 
Throughout the 1990s, the Christian Democratic Movement was a strong supporter of 
European integration and Slovakia’s EU membership. To this end, the party was taking 
advantage of its good relationships with other Christian democratic parties in Western 
Europe. However, following the creation of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, 
the Christian Democratic Movement moved to a more traditionalist position, becoming 
more prone to ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, characteristic for rural Catholic voters of Slovakia. 
The party’s scepticism toward the EU resulted from a sensitivity to Russia and a belief that 
there was a cultural clash between Western values and the more traditional values of the 
Slovak nation (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001). In its criticism of the integration project, the 
party focused on protecting Slovak national identity based on traditional family values, with 
opposition to the Council of Europe’s recommendation on the registration of same-sex 
partnerships. The Christian Democratic Movement also joined other Christian democratic 
parties in Europe in demanding that Christian values as a source of European civilisation 
be inscribed in the European Constitution (Henderson 2008). 
The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union was unequivocally pro-European. In fact, in 
the 2002 elections campaign, it projected itself as the sole guarantor of Slovakia’s admission 
to NATO and the EU and made this issue a key element of its positioning on the political 
scene (Haughton and Rybář 2004). In its 2012 programme, the party declared that it 
‘believed in the efficiency and future of the EU’ (SDKU 2012: 33), supported the 
participation of Slovakia in common efforts to protect the euro, and was in favour of EU 
polices that increased the Union’s cohesion (SDKU 2012). 
6.3.4 Slovenia 
Political Catholicism in Slovenia 
Similar to other Central and Eastern European countries, political Catholicism in Slovenia 
emerged in an environment where Catholicism became a key element in the formation of 
national identity and struggle for self-determination. The first political Catholic party to 
emerge in Slovenia was the Catholic National Party (Katoliška narodna stranka) established in 
1892. Initially, it was a confessional, conservative party, focused on promoting traditional 
values. It slowly evolved into a mass party, paying greater attention to the evolving Catholic 
social teaching and support for workers and farmers. This was marked by the change of the 
party’s name to the Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, SLS). The SLS became 
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the largest Slovene party, advocating greater autonomy for Slovenia in the Habsburg 
Empire (Pulzer 2004). Following the First World War, the party suffered a significant 
decrease in electoral support (down from 87% to 36%) in the 1920s national elections, 
although it remained the largest political organisation in the country. However, in order to 
regain popular support, it changed its rather pro-Yugoslav policies and started advocating 
greater Slovene autonomy within the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, by supporting stronger federalisation of the state (Morawski 2013). In the years 
before the Second World War, the party suffered a significant outflow of members and 
supporters as a result of its cooperation with the dictatorship instituted by King Alexander 
in 1929. The party was banned in 1945, after the Communist Party of Yugoslavia took 
power. 
The Slovene People’s Party was re-established in 1988 as the first non-communist political 
organisation in Yugoslavia. However, it was the newly created Slovene Christian 
Democrats (Slovenski krščanski demokrati, SKD) that attracted more voters in the 1990s. In 
2000, both parties merged to form the SLS+SKD party. Following a split in the newly 
merged party, however, a new organisation called New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party 
(Nova Slovenija – Krščansko ljudska stranka) was formed the same year and renamed in 2013 
to New Slovenia – Christian Democrats (Nova Slovenija – krščanski demokrati, NSi). 
The post-1989 Slovene Christian democratic movement never regained the interwar 
Slovene People’s Party strength, with an average vote share between 1990 and 2008 at the 
level of 9.7% (highest: 14.2% in 1992) (Grzymala-Busse 2013). In the 2014 parliamentary 
elections, the SLS won only 3.98% of votes and narrowly missed the 4% threshold, thus 
losing its representation in the Slovenian parliament. New Slovenia – Christian Democrats 
experienced its largest success in the 2004 European elections, when the party won 24% of 
votes (2 out of 7 Slovene seats in the EP). In the national arena, it performed much poorer, 
with support ranging from 9% (2004) to 5% (2014). In the 2014 European election, the 
party ran in an electoral coalition with the Slovene People’s Party and received 16.56% of 
the vote. 
Slovenian political Catholicism and European policy 
The Slovene People’s Party presented a pro-EU and pro-integration approach. In July 
1997, it signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Accession Process with the EU, 
together with other parliamentary parties (except for the Eurosceptic Slovenian National 
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Party – Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka, SNS) (Krašovec and Kustec Lipicer 2008). The party 
advocated the intensification of relations with other European countries, Slovenia’s 
accession to the EU and Slovene membership in NATO. At the same time, the party 
emphasised the need for thorough economic preparations for accession to the EU (Adam 
et al. 2002). It remained broadly pro-EU, declaring that ‘as a member of the EPP, one of 
the things that we appreciate most is our contribution to prosperity and peace in Europe, 
and our synchronous acting with our sister parties from other EU member countries’ (SLS 
2014). 
In its 2009 manifesto, the New Slovenia – Christian Democrats declared their support for 
the European Union, stating that the country’s membership would enable greater social 
security and prosperity for all people. At the same time, it stressed that it saw the EU as a 
voluntary community of states, based on the principle ‘United in Diversity’, which 
supported the development and consolidation of national identity, culture and language. 
The party also emphasised its commitment to the maintenance of Slovenia as a sovereign 
state, and support for an equal status of EU member states (NSi 2009). 
 
6.4 Comparative analysis 
Development and role of political Catholicism 
Looking at the cases presented above, it is possible to draw the following comparative 
conclusions regarding the development of political Catholicism in Europe. 
Firstly, in a significant majority of countries, political Catholicism played a crucial role in 
politics, shaping countries’ socio-economic setup, in particular immediately after the 
Second World War, when Christian democracy dominated Western European politics in 
most states (e.g. Germany, Italy, Belgium, France [until the 1960s] or Austria). At the same 
time, it is important to note the apparent difference between Western European states and 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where post-war politics were overshadowed 
by communism. As the functioning of non-communist parties was either banned or strictly 
limited, political Catholicism could not play a significant role in the political life of those 
states and, in many cases, it failed to regain its interwar strength following the fall of 
communist regimes (e.g. Slovenia). In the case of Spain and Portugal, where Catholicism 
was often perceived as a supporter or beneficiary of authoritarian regimes, it took either 
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decades for a political Catholic movement to rise to power (Spain) or it has remained 
crippled since (Portugal). 
Secondly, in terms of the development and role of political Catholicism in European 
societies, there is another important difference between most Western European and 
Central European states. In countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland, political Catholicism developed at the turn of the 20th 
century with the aim of protecting the interests of Catholics and the Catholic Church in 
conflicts with Protestants or as a response to secularisation attempts conducted by states’ 
authorities. They were, as Hanley (1994: 3) called them, ‘essentially parties of religious, that 
is Catholic, defence’. One of the key elements in this respect was the matter of the right to 
confessional Catholic education, which became the main breeding ground of conflicts and 
an issue mobilising the Catholic agency. However, when it comes to CEE countries like 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania or Croatia, the genesis of the political Catholic movement is 
different, as Catholicism there grew into a key component of national identity, leading to 
an interconnection between nationalism and religion. Following the First World War, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia became parts of non-Catholic states (Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes and Czechoslovakia), where Catholicism developed into a 
fundamental identity element in their struggle for autonomy or independence. In this 
regard, Ireland and Malta are also similar cases, where the definition of belonging to the 
Irish and Maltese nations included belonging to Catholicism and where Catholicism was a 
symbol of nationalism and the rejection of foreign (British) domination. 
Thirdly, the more recent developments in the history of the political Catholic movement 
also show a differentiation between Western and Central and Eastern Europe. In many of 
the analysed cases, e.g. Belgium, Germany, Spain or France, political Catholicism in the 
form of Christian democracy gradually moved away from making direct references to 
Christianity in their policymaking and programmes – with the most telling example being 
the Belgian Christian Social Party, which changed its name to the Humanist Democratic 
Centre. By contrast, in CEE the fusion between Catholicism and nationalism meant that 
many parties continued to evoke Christian (Catholic) values as the basis of their manifestos 
(e.g. the KDH in Slovakia or Law and Justice in Poland). 
The development of political Catholicism in Poland bears significant resemblance to other 
CEE countries. Throughout the 19th and 20th century, the Polish Catholic Church became 
one of very few institutions across the partitioned country that helped to uphold Polish 
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national identity, traditions and culture in opposition to the Russification and 
Germanisation attempts of foreign powers. The Church and Catholicism further grew in 
their role in the post-war years, when it provided shelter for anti-communist opposition. 
This meant that the fusion of two elements, Catholicism and the idea of belonging to the 
Polish nation, developed in a very similar manner as in other CEE countries like Croatia, 
Slovenia, Lithuania and Slovakia, which all experienced periods of struggle for 
independence or autonomy within non-Catholic states. As a result, the Central European 
brand of political Catholicism has always differed from its Western European counterpart, 
which focused on transnational cooperation and reconciliation, without any references to 
the compromised idea of nationalism. In fact, this difference has grown even greater with 
traditional Christian democracy in Europe refraining from making direct references to 
Christianity. 
Another element worth noticing is the failure of Christian democracy to develop a strong 
position in Poland and other CEE countries (except from Lithuania) after the fall of 
communism. In the whole region, support for Christian democracy averaged at 6.6% 
between 1990 and 2010 (and this is only in countries where Christian democratic parties 
competed electorally), which stands in stark contrast to the success of this movement in 
Western Europe, where the average vote for Christian democracy reached 28.6% over the 
same period (Grzymala-Busse 2013). Bale and Szczerbiak (2008) noted that only one of 
seven factors identified as crucial for the development of Christian democracy was present 
in Poland (a substantial practicing Catholic population), while Grzymala-Busse (2013) 
suggested that the historical reputation for nation building, acquired by some Christian 
democratic parties in the interwar period, provided a weak basis for the development of 
strong Christian democratic parties after 1989. Indeed, many political Catholic parties in 
CEE regarded Christian democratic ideology as too rigid and restrictive, preferring instead 
to retain a strategic flexibility. However, what is interesting is that unsuccessful Christian 
democracy in CEE appeared to have been replaced by a form of political Catholicism that 
exhibited a significant Catholic-nationalistic trait, with Irish political Catholicism showing a 
similar characteristic. In countries, where Catholicism played such an essential role in state 
formation and the struggle for independence, and where belonging to a nation equalled 
belonging to Catholicism, a Christian democratic model based on transnational cooperation 
and lack of nationalistic references proved unattractive. Instead, it was replaced by a 
mixture of Catholic-nationalist elements, giving rise to different forms of political 
Catholicism in CEE. In fact, two of the analysed countries – Croatia and Slovenia (the 
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Croatian People’s Party in the 1920s, the Croatian Christian Democratic Union and the 
Slovene Christian Democrats) – demonstrate that if Christian democratic parties in CEE 
attempted to stay true to their ideology, they could fail to win significant electoral support, 
which was also the case in Poland. 
Political Catholicism and European integration 
Turning to the issue of political Catholicism and its attitudes to European integration, the 
presented cases unequivocally show that political Catholicism in most countries was 
strongly in favour of European integration and a clearly pro-EU movement. Certainly, it 
played a pivotal role in the development of the integration project with such political 
Catholic politicians like Adenauer, Schuman or De Gasperi regarded as the founding 
fathers of a united Europe. Among all the presented cases, there were no instances of a 
‘hard’ Eurosceptic stance displayed by parties of political Catholic provenance. In 12 out of 
15 countries, parties assumed a strong pro-EU and pro-integration position. Naturally, in 
some cases, the pro-EU stance can be more nuanced, for example in France and Spain, 
which saw less enthusiasm for the integration process in the form of opposition to any 
federalisation attempts. In other instances, i.e. Portugal, Belgium and Austria, political 
Catholic parties had brief periods of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, but these were only temporary 
effects of government-opposition dynamics or an attempt to regain falling electoral 
support, after which parties returned to their original pro-EU positions. 
Only two cases displayed some more significant Euroscepticism – the Slovakian Christian 
Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU). The 
Christian Democratic Movement became more prone to ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, 
characteristic of rural Catholicism in Slovakia, when it repositioned itself trying to secure 
support of Catholic voters in the face of increased inter-party competition. The party’s 
scepticism toward the EU resulted from a sensitivity to Russia and a belief that there was a 
cultural clash between Western values and the more traditional values of the Slovak nation. 
The Euroscepticism of the Christian Social Union was different in nature. It was strongly 
rooted in regional nationalism and based on utilitarian concerns for ‘tax payers’ money’ and 
objections to transfers from richer states to poorer ones (e.g. the party voiced strong 
criticism of bailout packages, argued in favour of excluding Greece form the eurozone and 
threatened to veto the European Financial Stability Mechanism). However, the apparent 
difference between the local and federal levels of the party’s activity is noteworthy. The 
local reflection of the Christian Social Union tended to stress Bavarian uniqueness, while 
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the party’s politicians at the national level toned down such rhetoric and were often very 
pro-European. In general, the Christian Social Union’s position allowed for further 
competences to be transferred to the European level (for example, on internal security) and 
even for the strengthening of supranational institutions (Jeffery 2003), which regularly 
found reflection in the common CDU/CSU pro-EU position at the federal level.  
In the context of political Catholic Euroscepticism, Croatia also needs to be mentioned, 
where even though the key party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), adopted a pro-
European stance, the Church remained split over the issue along its long-standing division 
between a liberal wing and a more traditionalist one. However, as the Church aligned itself 
with a pro-EU political force, its position never fully turned to Euroscepticism and stayed 
rather ambiguous. 
Finally, the specific circumstances of Swiss politics, particularly a very strong attachment of 
Swiss voters to the notion of the state’s neutrality, meant that the position of the Swiss 
Christian democratic People’s Party on Europe was more ambiguous. The party was in 
favour of close cooperation with the EU via bilateral agreements, also in areas which could 
seem controversial and were at the very core of the integration project, like free movement 
of people. At the same time, the CVP refrained from taking any position on Swiss EU 
membership, claiming that the point was not on the agenda. However, looking at evidence 
from the past, when the party expressed support for the EU, it seems safe to assume that 
in a different political environment, the party would be more openly in favour of 
Switzerland joining the main integration stream.  
We also need to note that the level of support for the EU differs between Central and 
Eastern European and Western European occurrences of political Catholicism. Political 
Catholicism in CEE, although supportive of integration, usually does not advocate 
European federalism. As a result of its Catholic-nationalist trait coupled with the fact that 
Central and East Europan countries only recently regained their full sovereignty, political 
Catholic groupings in Eastern Europe underline their scepticism about transforming the 
EU into a federal European state.   
The key question emerging from this analysis is: Why did the Polish manifestation of 
political Catholicism adopt a Eurosceptic stance, while in the overwhelming majority of 
other cases the movement remained strongly pro-EU? In this context, the case of Ireland is 
particularly pertinent. There are evident similarities between Ireland and Poland in terms of 
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political Catholicism, its role in society and politics, while its position on Europe differed. 
Both countries experienced parallel developments in their history, wherein Catholicism 
became an essential part of the idea of the Polish and Irish nationalities, in opposition to 
religions of foreign forces, i.e. Protestantism of the British and Prussians and Russian 
Orthodoxy. As a result, in both countries Catholicism and nationalism became entangled, 
with the Catholic Church playing an important role in the struggle for independence. 
However, that is where similarities end. Political Catholicism in Ireland has never 
developed such a significantly Eurosceptic stance as its Polish counterpart. What is the 
reason for this difference? A comprehensive answer would require an in-depth analysis of 
the Irish case. It is, however, possible to propose certain hypotheses. Both in Poland and in 
Ireland, Catholicism helped to clarify the idea of belonging to the nation by offering a clear 
differentiation between ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’, an alien force: the British in the case of 
Ireland, and the Russians and Prussians in the case of Poland. In other words, Catholicism 
helped to underline the distinctiveness of the Irish and Polish from their powerful and 
dominating neighbours. The situation evolved after the Second World War, when the role 
of Irish Catholicism remained largely unchanged, but Catholicism in Poland became an 
element guaranteeing distinctiveness from the communist regime and its secular, foreign 
nature. In the 1990s, the Polish Church emerged very strong from the communist era, 
while Catholicism continued to co-define Polish national identity. With progressing 
European integration, secular Europe and the EU gradually became the new ‘Other’, 
helping to maintain the distinctiveness of the Polish nation against Western, liberal culture. 
In the case of Ireland, there was no need to redefine the ‘Other’ as the historical 
circumstances did not change significantly. In addition, the European integration process 
was not perceived as a threat to Irish Catholicism, but rather as a way to further strengthen 
independence from the UK. During the first 15 years of its EU membership, until the late 
1980s, religiosity in Ireland remained at a very high level. When finally Church attendance 
started rapidly falling from above 80% to below 60% (19 percentage points between 1991 
and 1998) (Hirschle 2010), the Irish Church was already deeply affected by a series of child-
abuse scandals. So even if there had been attempts to link the growing secularisation with 
the integration process, the Church lacked authority to present this explanation as a viable 
option. This is why Irish political Catholicism remained largely pro-EU, while it were only 
Catholic social movements that began to oppose European integration on the grounds that 
it would impact adversely on some aspects of Irish legislation like abortion or euthanasia. 
The fact that the ‘Other’, against which Catholicism helped to define the Irish and Polish 
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nations, remained unchanged in Ireland (the British) but in Poland first changed to secular 
communism and then to a secular, Western culture, and the relative strength of the Polish 
Church compared with the increasing weakness of its Irish counterpart provide possible 
explanations for the non-emergence of Eurosceptic political Catholicism in Ireland. 
There are also other cases, namely Malta, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, where 
Catholicism was closely connected with national identity, but where political Catholicism, 
even though displaying Catholic-nationalistic traits, did not adopt a Eurosceptic stance. 
Firstly, it should be noted that for these smaller countries EU membership was often 
perceived as a way to consolidate their newly regained independence (Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia) and shore up their identities against the ‘Others’ which were perceived as 
a possible threat or foreign element (e.g. in case of Lithuania the Russians and Poles, in 
Slovakia the Czechs, in Slovenia and Croatia other Yugoslavian nations like Orthodox 
Serbs and Muslims). In these cases, the EU, and to a larger extent NATO, were perceived 
as guarantors of security and further national development, necessary to maintain strong 
national sovereignty. Secondly, in the case of Lithuania and Slovenia, political Catholicism 
was slightly closer to traditional Western European Christian democracy than that in 
Poland (e.g. Grzymala-Busse (2013) identified Law and Justice as overtly nationalist and the 
League of Polish Families as too clerical to be classified as Christian democratic, while 
including the Lithuanian LKD and Slovakian KDH, SDKU, SDK in her analysis of Central 
Eastern European Christian democracy). This meant that these parties were more likely to 
feel at ease with the idea of cross-national integration and supranationalism, just as other 
parties of this political family. Finally, for the Croatian Christian Democratic Party (HDZ) 
its strong pro-European stance could have been a way to mark a discontinuation between 
the time when the party was led by Franjo Tudjman and the country faced informal 
international isolation, and its new opening following Tudjman’s death. 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
Political Catholic parties were among the most successful political actors in 20th century 
Europe. This stems from the often overlooked fact that Catholicism, for decades, was the 
main religion of many European populations, having an immense influence on their daily 
lives. It is, therefore, surprising how little scholarly attention political Catholicism has 
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attracted, especially when compared with a vast body of research data on other movements 
and ideologies of the last century like Nazism, liberalism, socialism or communism. 
This chapter aimed to provide a concise comparative overview of the development of 
political Catholicism and its stance on European integration in 15 European states. The 
short case studies were selected based on the size of Catholic populations and an important 
historical role that the political Catholic movement played in each country. As a result, the 
chapter presented a broad collection of cases, varying in terms of the size of population 
(from the least-populous country in Europe, Malta, to the largest one, Germany), 
participation in European integration (founding member states like Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, the 2004 entrants Slovakia, Slovenia or Croatia, as 
well as non-members, i.e. Switzerland), state-Church relations (secular France, authoritarian 
regimes that stressed Catholicism as a key element of their identity, e.g. Franco’s Spain, or 
countries were Catholicism became an important element in the self-identification of 
nations and their struggle for independence like Ireland, Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia). It 
looked at multi-confessional countries (Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands), but also 
very homogeneous, Catholic societies like the Maltese, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian ones. 
In addition, all the selected countries fostered strong political Catholicism that impacted 
their development and a history of attitudes to European integration. 
My analysis of the development of political Catholicism, particularly in Western Europe, 
showed the crucial role of the church-government cleavage described by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967). The opposition to state-induced persecution was a trigger that helped the 
first confessional parties to grow. This chapter also confirmed the model of ‘revival-
reaction-politicisation’ developed by Altinourdu (2010), according to which a successful 
religious party could emerge when a major religious revival led to a social counter-
mobilisation and state repression, followed by the process of religion politicisation. The 
model offered a more comprehensive approach to explaining the emergence of religious 
parties than alternative concepts, like Lepsius’ (1966 in Atinordu 2010) ‘social-moral’ milieu 
theory, which claimed that religious parties (the German Centre Party in that case) emerged 
simply as ‘action committees’ of social-moral groups, holding common, distinct religious 
values. The story of political Catholicism in Western Europe proved the revival of religion, 
which in case of Catholicism happened in the 19th century, is a prerequisite on the way to 
successful establishment of a religious political party, as it leads to a counteraction of the 
state (oppression), followed by the politicisation of religion. 
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This chapter also revealed five main differences between movements of political 
Catholicism in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Firstly, in Western Europe 
political Catholicism played a much more prominent role in shaping political, economic 
and social systems than in Central and Eastern Europe. This also contributed to the second 
difference, the apparent lack of successful Christian democracy in most Central and 
Eastern European countries. What is particularly remarkable is that traditional Christian 
democracy seems to have been replaced in CEE by a form of political Catholicism that 
displayed nationalist traits. As a result of the role Catholicism played in the struggle for 
independence in many CEE states and its fusion with the notion of national identity, 
Central and East European political Catholicism became more inclined to refer to ideas of 
sovereignty, national interests and patriotism than its Western European counterpart. 
Thirdly, political Catholicism in Western Europe developed mainly as a response to 
secularisation attempts of authorities, while in Central Europe it grew out of the fusion of 
religion and national identity in countries which struggled in the 19th and 20th century for 
independence. Fourthly, Western European political Catholicism since the 1960s has 
steadily withdrawn from making direct references to Christian values as a source of its 
programme, which contrasts with Central and Eastern Europe, where the role of 
Christianity in social life is often stressed. Finally, this chapter clearly showed that political 
Catholicism is supportive of the process of European integration, with two exceptions – 
Poland and Slovakia, where political Catholicism acquired a clear Eurosceptic trait. 
The key question in the context of this research is: Why did political Catholicism in Poland 
become Eurosceptic, while in other countries, where the development of the movement 
bears strong resemblance to the Polish case (e.g. Ireland), it remained largely pro-EU? A 
detailed answer to this discussion requires more in-depth analysis. However, I hypothesised 
that the changing role of Catholicism in helping to define the ‘Other’ – in the Polish case a 
liberal, secular Europe became the new element clearly differentiating ‘Polishness’ – could 
be the key explanation of this phenomenon. In addition, the fact that during the first 15 
years of Irish EU membership the levels of religiosity remained at high levels could also 
have played a role in limiting the Euroscepticism observed in the case of Irish political 
Catholicism. There are elements of Irish Euroscepticism that are inspired by Catholicism – 
as described above some civil society organisations opposed on different occasions new 
EU treaties on the grounds that they threaten Christian values. However, this 
Euroscepticism was fairly limited in its scope and influence, and could not be compared to 
the systemic opposition to Europe by Polish political Catholicism. In addition, these single-
214 
  
issue movements do not meet the criteria to be fully classified as political Catholicism, 
because they do not constitute a holistic political action. 
The presented cases prove that Polish political Catholicism is very distinct in its 
Euroscepticism. Almost all the parties of the same family in other European countries were 
markedly pro-European and had been advancing the integration process from its outset. 
Of the two cases where political Catholic parties adopted a more Eurosceptic position – 
Slovakia and Germany (Bavaria) – only the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement 
(KDH) bore some similarity to the Polish case: the KDH’s sceptic position on Europe 
stemmed from the perceived cultural clash between traditional, Catholic values of the 
Slovak society and liberal, secular values of Western Europe. At the same time, the KDH’s 
Eurosceptic position followed more tactical considerations. The party attempted to 
differentiate itself from its splinter-party, the SDKU, which assumed a strongly pro-EU 
stance. There are also certain traces of Euroscepticism in the case of Ireland and even more 
limited in Croatia. However, they never reached the levels of opposition to Europe present 
in Poland, with political Catholic parties in these countries remaining firmly in favour of 
the EU.  
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7 General conclusions and implications 
 
The aim of this study was to deepen our understanding of the relationship between religion 
and politics in the modern world, where there is a clear lacuna of knowledge. Decreasing 
levels of religiosity and church attendance, particularly in Western Europe, made it easy to 
conclude that religion lost much of its former influence and hence, the study of the role of 
religion in politics did not enjoy a great deal of attention from scholars. However, in the 
decades following the Second World War, religion, especially Catholicism, continued to 
play an important role in shaping the social and political reality of Europe. Catholic social 
teaching and the experiences of the inter-war confessional Catholic parties gave rise to the 
post-war phenomenon of Christian democracy – a political Catholic movement which, as a 
distinct political family, was one of the most important players in Western European 
politics well into the 1960s. Since then Christian democracy has experienced decreased 
levels of support and some episodes of crisis. However, those who announced the end of 
this political movement were soon proven wrong by its remarkable re-birth. Christian 
democracy regained much of its power in countries like Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands, with the European People’s Party becoming the largest political group in the 
European Parliament in 1999 for the first since the first direct elections to this assembly 
held in 1979. 
In this context, it is not surprising that the limited scholarly debate about religion 
(Catholicism) and politics in Europe was mostly devoted to analysing the Christian 
democratic movement. However, political action that found inspiration in Catholicism, 
political Catholicism, was not only restricted to Christian democracy, but was a much 
broader phenomenon, also geographically, including divergent political movements, often 
with significant political influence. 
The aim of this study was to deepen our understanding of political Catholicism by 
describing its nature and role in European politics. It sought to answer three research 
questions: firstly, what is the nature of political Catholicism and how does its Polish 
manifestation differ from the Western European one; secondly, under what circumstances 
does political Catholicism adopt a Eurosceptic stance; and, thirdly, to what extent is Polish 
political Catholicism the main driver of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland?   
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In answering these questions, this study provides an original contribution to the existing 
body of research in at least three ways. Firstly, it analysed the largely under-researched 
phenomenon of political Catholicism, providing a more robust conceptualisation of the 
phenomenon than those developed by scholars so far. Secondly, this thesis is the first 
systematic empirical examination of Eurosceptic political Catholicism. Based on primary 
sources, it significantly develops our understanding of how religion and politics interact in 
contemporary Europe, and contributes to the discussion regarding the causality of party-
based Euroscepticism. Thirdly, this study compared the distinctive Eurosceptic 
manifestation of the political Catholic movement in Poland to other Central, Eastern, and 
West European cases. As a result, it adds to our knowledge of the development of party 
systems in Europe, particularly in post-communist states, by explaining the different roles 
political Catholicism has played on the continent.    
The nature of political Catholicism and its Polish manifestation 
The point of departure for this study was the examination of the nature of political 
Catholicism. In doing so, this thesis presented a concise definition of political Catholicism 
and identified a set of primary and secondary features of this movement. This is an 
important, original contribution to the body of knowledge concerning the intertwined 
relations between religion and politics, as so far political Catholicism has remained largely a 
vague term, often used as a synonym for Christian democracy. This thesis showed that 
political Catholicism was a broad social and political movement, which drew on the 
principles of Catholic social teaching and aimed to enshrine them in law in order to make 
them binding for all members of society. The strong inspiration from Catholic social 
teaching and activity in the public sphere are the key features of political Catholicism. 
Those could be complemented by a number of second-order characteristics such as: its 
multi-faceted character, independence from the Church hierarchy, anchoring in sub-
national local and regional politics coupled with the ability to form transitional networks, 
and, in Europe, support for the integration process based on the ideas of supranationalism 
and reconciliation. Last but not least, one of the secondary features was its ability to extend 
beyond a simple group of individual Catholics who were active in politics, in order to build 
an institutionalised political action with Catholic inspiration, based on Catholic social 
teaching. 
All these features made it possible to classify political Catholicism as a distinct political 
movement, capable of constructing a coherent worldview based on such values and ideas 
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as solidarity, a focus on the family, the protection of human life and personalism – which, 
in opposition to liberalism, seen society as composed of persons, social beings focused on 
co-operation within communities (the family, work place, church or nation). This 
distinctive approach translated into a ‘third way’ between capitalism, liberalism and 
socialism, perhaps best exemplified by the post-war idea of the social market economy: a 
commitment to capitalism combined with a readiness to correct its social and cultural 
deficiencies via a social policy designed as a safety net protecting those threatened by 
market forces (van Kersbergen 1994). At the same time, I refrained from describing 
political Catholicism as a fully-fledged political ideology – it was defined more as a set of 
coherent principles, but principles that were open for interpretation, leading to divergent 
translations into political action. 
This initial description of the nature of political Catholicism led to an important discovery, 
namely the apparent difference between West European political Catholicism and the 
Polish manifestation of the movement. In contrast to the changing face of West European 
political Catholicism – which, in many cases, since the 1980s gradually abandoned its 
religious labels and direct references to Christianity – political Catholicism in Poland, 
reborn after the 1989 fall of communism, continued to be closely and openly attached to 
Catholic values. It also remained eager to protect the role of the Church and religion in 
public life. 
The detailed analysis of Polish political Catholicism, its historical development and role in 
contemporary Poland, found the sources of its divergent nature in the unique role that 
Catholicism played in Polish history, with the Catholic religion developing through 
centuries into a distinct socio-cultural system strongly influencing all major aspects of life in 
Poland. In fact, Catholicism in Poland became a civil religion – a set of religiopolitical 
symbols and rituals regarding a nation’s history and destiny (Morawska 1984), so that 
religious symbolism fused with civil national traditions, leading to a gradual entanglement 
of Catholicism and Polish national identity and making belonging to Catholicism an 
apparently essential part of being Polish. As a result, when Polish political Catholicism 
emerged in the interwar period, it was in the form of a Catholic-nationalist Endecja 
movement (National Democracy), which declared its passionate attachment to Catholicism 
and readiness to defend the rights and role of the Church. This fusion of Catholicism with 
nationalism soon became a defining element in Polish politics, whereby the right headed up 
by Endecja favoured a homogenous Polish nation state based on Catholic values, while 
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those represented by the Sanacja movement, led by Piłsudski, supported a more multi-
cultural society and the separation of state from religion. This difference of approaches 
resurfaced after the 1989 democratic breakthrough and continues to impact on Polish 
politics and society until this day. 
Perhaps one of the best examples of the distinct nature of Polish political Catholicism 
described in this thesis is Radio Maryja – a Catholic broadcaster with a remarkable ability to 
build a highly loyal, engaged and devoted group of supporters. Religiosity promoted by this 
influential organisation, which combined the Catholic faith with the feeling of ‘Polishness’ 
and care for the state, was exemplary of the Catholic-nationalist trait of Polish political 
Catholicism, which was driven by strong feelings of nationalism and affirmation of national 
identity, mixed with religious values. In this approach, religion and faith are inextricably 
linked with Polish national identity, which means care for religion equals care for Poland 
(Krzemiński 2009) and stands in opposition to other (neo-)liberal values. 
This Catholic-nationalist trait of Polish political Catholicism stands in stark contrast to the 
post-war Western European manifestations of this movement, which subscribed to such 
ideas as supranationalism and international co-operation. Indeed, Polish political Catholic 
actors themselves were keen to underline the difference between Polish and West 
European political Catholicism which, in their view, became an ideologically empty vessel – 
a movement that departed from its Christian roots – while its Polish counterpart remained 
firmly rooted in Christian values and did not refrain from evoking religious elements in its 
programme. 
The fact that political Catholicism has been an important actor in Polish politics may have 
been often overlooked because of one of its surprising features: the lack of successful 
Christian democratic parties in Poland and much of Central and Eastern Europe. This is 
yet another feature standing in stark contrast to Western Europe, where Christian 
democracy became almost a synonym for political Catholicism. The non-existence of the 
Christian democratic movement in Poland and other post-communist states attracted some 
attention from scholars, who tried to understand this surprising phenomenon. For 
example, Bale and Szczerbiak (2008) concluded that only one of seven factors necessary for 
the successful development of Christian democracy, namely a substantial and practicing 
Roman Catholic population, was present in Poland, with other factors being either absent 
or very limited. Although this study does not contradict Bale and Szczerbiak’s findings, it 
discovered that the fusion of Catholicism and nationalism so characteristic of the Polish 
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case meant that traditional Christian democracy based on co-operation, conciliation and the 
characteristic distaste for extremism could not attract significant electoral support when 
faced with the Catholic-nationalist Endecja. This was the story of the interwar Polish 
Christian Democratic Party, which did not find its place in the highly polarised Polish 
politics of the period, as it was torn between Endecja and Sanacja. The more radical 
Catholic-nationalist programme of Endecja related more closely to the existing strong 
connection between Catholicism and Polish national identity, thus eliminating moderate 
Christian democracy. This trend continued in contemporary Poland, defining the Polish 
party system. This finding is more in line with Grzymala-Busse’s (2013) conclusion that 
Christian democracy succeeded in Central and Eastern Europe when it was perceived more 
as a nation-building force rather than an agent of clericalism. The Catholic-nationalist trait 
of the most successful political Catholic organisations in CEE meant that their support for 
national independence resonated better with the electorate than traditional Christian 
democracy, which proved to be too rigid a formula to develop successful political action. 
It is in this context of the Catholic-nationalist trait of Polish political Catholicism that the 
study arrives at another major feature of Polish political Catholicism, namely its markedly 
visible Euroscepticism. Indeed, the Eurosceptic stance of Polish political Catholicism was 
the other major focus of this thesis. I tried to understand why a movement, which typically 
was a driving force behind European integration and felt at ease with supranational 
authority, adopted a Eurosceptic position in Poland. After all, the country was not only the 
largest of the new post-communist EU member states, but also the one that had the most 
prominent and electorally successful Eurosceptic parties (the League of Polish Families, 
Self-Defence and Law and Justice) which, until 2007, had formed a government coalition 
and one of whom (Law and Justice) subsequently enjoyed substantial support as the largest 
opposition party in the Polish parliament. 
The causes of Eurosceptic political Catholicism in Poland and its role in driving 
party-based Euroscepticism  
Having described the nature of political Catholicism and established how its Polish 
manifestation differed from the typical, Western European one, this study turned to the 
remaining two research questions. It discussed the circumstances that caused the Polish 
political Catholic movement to adopt a Eurosceptic stance and analysed to what extent 
Polish political Catholicism was the main driver of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. 
In doing so, this research looked at the general phenomenon of Euroscepticism in the 
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Polish party system. By tracing its development and discussing key Eurosceptic political 
actors, I was able to identify two important features of party-based Euroscepticism in 
Poland. 
The first one was the fluid nature of Euroscepticism, whereby some Polish parties changed 
their attitudes towards European integration quite decisively. In particular, I noted the 
apparent difference between the pre- and post-accession periods. Before Polish accession 
to the EU, there was an overwhelming consensus not only among Polish elites but also 
among ordinary citizens about the need for Poland to join the Union. The situation 
changed in the immediate pre-accession period, when the debate on Poland’s EU 
membership gained momentum, resulting in growing Euroscepticism among the public. As 
a result, for the first time since 1993, ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties – the League of Polish 
Families and Self-Defence – entered the Polish parliament. Gradually, Euroscepticism 
found its permanent place in Polish politics, with almost all parties resorting to some form 
of Eurosceptic rhetoric. Only the communist successor Democratic Left Alliance seemed 
to have remained unequivocally Europhile, while the Polish Peasants’ Party was the only 
one to move from a ‘soft’ Eurosceptic position to a more pro-EU one. 
Secondly, the analysis of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland showed that it became 
dominated by political Catholic parties. This study found that the strongest and most 
ideologically-rooted current of Polish Euroscepticism could be identified among such 
parties as the League of Polish Families, the Christian National Union, the Movement for 
the Reconstruction of Poland or the Polish Agreement. All of them were characterised by a 
strong attachment to Christian values as a key element of Polish national identity and 
supported the strong position of the Church in Polish society, displaying a strong Catholic-
nationalist trait. 
In looking for the answer to the research question regarding the circumstance under which 
Polish political Catholicism adopted a Eurosceptic stance, I concluded that it stemmed 
from two main factors: firstly, the aspiration to protect Polish sovereignty, and secondly, 
the perceived cultural struggle between the ‘liberal West’ and ‘Catholic Poland’. 
The preoccupation of Polish political Catholicism with securing the sovereignty of the 
Polish state was a surprising feature for a movement of this type. West European political 
Catholicism refrained from using nationalistic rhetoric or even referring to the protection 
of national interests in too obvious a way. What is also worth noting is the very traditional 
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approach of Polish political Catholicism to the idea of a state’s sovereignty, understood as 
exclusive supremacy over a territory and formal equality between states in the international 
arena. Unsurprisingly, the strong focus on national sovereignty and the role of states in 
international relations meant that Polish political Catholicism was also distrustful of 
supranationality and had a strong preference for intergovernmentalism. 
Concerns about the impact of EU membership on the traditional character of Polish 
society, based on Christian values and respect for the authority of the Catholic Church, 
formed another important element driving the Eurosceptic position of Polish political 
Catholicism. The movement perceived the Catholic Church as an institution crucial to 
upholding Polish national identity, and Christian ethics as the only viable basis for the 
proper functioning of Polish society. At the same time, it saw the EU not only as being 
based on liberal and secular values, but also quite often as an active promoter of these 
values. In other words, Polish political Catholicism perceived a certain incompatibility 
between the European integration process and the identity and values of Poles. 
Naturally, both elements – the aspiration to protect national sovereignty and the concern 
for a cultural clash between the liberal, secular values of the EU and the traditional 
character of Polish society based on Catholicism – lead back to the Catholic-nationalist trait 
of Polish political Catholicism and the fusion of Catholicism and Polish national identity. 
The idea of political Catholicism in Poland – that care for the interests of Poland is 
synonymous with care for the Church – and that Christian values provide the only viable 
framework for the social order, is an underpinning theme of this study and something that 
clearly differentiated Polish political Catholicism from other instances of this movement in 
Europe. 
The fact that political Catholic parties dominated party-based Euroscepticism in Poland did 
not mean that there were no Eurosceptic actors of other ideological provenance. Nor did it 
mean that the entire political Catholic movement in Poland was equally Eurosceptic. 
Among the Eurosceptics that were not connected to political Catholicism it is worth noting 
the parties led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke – the Union of Real Politics and the Congress of 
the New Right. These political entities presented ‘hard’ Eurosceptic views with a 
consistency un-matched by other parties in Polish politics. Korwin-Mikke’s opposition to 
the EU stemmed from the party’s libertarian values and focused very much on the 
economic aspect of the integration process. Based on the party’s support for maximised 
personal liberty and, non-intervention of the state, not only in the economy but also in 
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many other aspects of the social order, it opposed the EU, which it perceived as 
bureaucratised, ‘socialist’ and over-regulated. Nonetheless, the party always remained on 
the fringes of Polish politics with minimal, if any, influence on public policy and public 
opinion. Consequently, it was the much stronger and influential movement of Polish 
political Catholicism that became the main driver of Euroscepticism in Poland. 
Non-Eurosceptic political Catholicism was an even more ephemeral phenomenon. In this 
context, one should look at Civic Platform, which included a faction of politicians claiming 
strong attachments to Catholicism who did not display any Euroscepticism. However, they 
also refrained from attempts to enshrine Catholic social teaching in the body of law, which 
puts a question mark over the party’s classification as part of the political Catholic 
movement. The approach of this group could be characterised by a separation of its 
(Catholic) beliefs from its activity in the public sphere, focusing instead on areas where the 
EU had direct decision-making power, leaving the moral-cultural sphere out of politics. 
There was also the ‘Universal Weekly’ (Tygodnik Poszechny) and a small pocket of Catholic 
intellectualist clustered around it. Although, the Weekly presented a pro-EU approach, 
supporting quick integration of Poland with the EU, its influence on Polish politics and 
(Catholic) public opinion was quite limited. Thus, Euroscepticism remains the dominant 
trait within Polish political Catholicism and it cannot be matched in strength and 
importance by pro-EU opinions, which became marginalised.     
Verifying the hypothesis and additional explanatory factors 
The hypothesis of this research assumed that political Catholicism was a distinctive political 
movement whose Polish manifestation differed significantly from that seen in Western 
Europe because of its Euroscepticism and its role as the main driver of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Poland. According to the hypothesis, the Eurosceptic stance of Polish 
political Catholicism resulted from the intrinsic ideological feature(s) of the movement. As 
a result, the EU came to be perceived as an entity based on the concepts of ‘secularism’, 
‘individualism’, and ‘materialism’, which in turn endanger the core values of Polish national 
identity. 
The key findings outlined above confirm this explanation, but they also draw our attention 
to the particular importance of the close relationship between Catholicism and nationalism. 
It was the Catholic-nationalist trait of Polish political Catholicism that drove the 
Euroscepticism of Polish political Catholic actors in the first place. Without this element, 
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even the existing perception of the EU as an organisation promoting secular, liberal values 
and endangering Christian values would probably not have led to such strong opposition to 
the EU. It was the fusion of faith and national identity, as well as the belief that the 
development of Polish society depended upon maintaining the role of Christian values in 
public life, that drove Euroscepticism within Polish political Catholicism. 
It is also important to note the role of the Polish political Catholic movement in driving 
party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. In fact, other forms of opposition to the EU, such 
as those focused on more utilitarian, economical concerns as represented by the parties of 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke (the Union of Real Politics, the Congress of New Right), were 
marginal in the Polish party system, and did not significantly impact either the EU policy of 
Polish governments or public opinion. 
This study also assumed that a number of strategic/tactical factors already described and 
analysed by other scholars may drive the Euroscepticism of the Polish political Catholic 
movement. These additional explanatory factors (AEF) specified that a Eurosceptic stance 
may be a result of attempts by parties to distinguish themselves in the political scene or as a 
result of government-opposition dynamics (AEF1), expand their support base (AEF2), or 
limit political space for the emergence of competitive parties (AEF3).  
The evidence presented above confirmed that the Eurosceptic stance of Polish political 
Catholicism is mostly driven by an intrinsic ideological feature, namely, its Catholic-
nationalist characteristic. As such, this thesis supports cleavage theory, which argues that 
parties are not simply empty vessels into which policy positions are poured in response to 
electoral pressures, but are organisations with embedded ideologies. This study showed that 
there was a limited electoral reward for a party that would like to adopt a Eurosceptic 
position in order to make itself distinctive in the political scene or to expand its support 
base. I also discovered that short-term electoral tactics have a certain influence on the 
Euroscepticism of Polish political Catholicism, such as, for example, the toning down of 
Eurosceptic rhetoric by Law and Justice during its time in government or attempts to 
ensure the support of Radio Maryja. 
However, it is clear that strategic and tactical considerations were not the main reason for 
political Catholicism in Poland to adopt a Eurosceptic stance, but rather that they 
influenced the intensity of its Eurosceptic rhetoric and the distribution of emphasis within 
the established political discourse. This finding is in line with the conclusions of Szczerbiak 
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and Taggart’s (2008b) comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism in Europe. 
Szczerbiak and Taggart stated that, in the case of policy-seeking parties, underlying party 
positions on Europe should be distinguished from how parties use this issue in inter-party 
competition. A party’s long-term policy on the EU is determined by a blend of ideology 
and what it perceives the interests of its members to be, while the extent to which it 
highlights its (Eurosceptic) position in inter-party competition is a matter of short-term 
electoral strategy or tactics. This study proved that Polish political Catholicism is a 
movement with a strongly embedded ideology and has had a long-standing Eurosceptic 
agenda. Any modulations in the strength of its Eurosceptic rhetoric, such as its weakening 
during Law and Justice’s time in government or its strengthening during electoral 
campaigns, should not be confused with fundamental policy changes. 
The comparative perspective  
This study also provided a concise comparative overview of political Catholicism and its 
attitudes towards European integration across Europe. This allowed us to draw 
conclusions which may have broader implications for the study of relationships between 
religion and politics in contemporary Europe, particularly in comparing the post-
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe with the well-established democracies of 
the West. I found five key differences between the countries of Western and East-Central 
Europe in terms of the development and role of political Catholicism and its stance on 
European integration. Firstly, in a significant majority of West European countries, political 
Catholicism played a crucial role in politics, shaping their socio-economic set-up, in 
particular immediately after the Second World War when Christian democracy dominated 
European politics in many states (e.g. Germany, Italy, Belgium, France [until the 1960s] or 
Austria). This was not the case in Central and Eastern Europe mainly as a result of 
communist rule, which made the (re)development of political Catholic movements 
impossible after the Second World War. 
Another striking difference was the unsuccessful Christian democracy movement in post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe, a phenomenon documented and described by 
other scholars. In the whole region, support for Christian democracy averaged 6.6% 
between 1990 and 2010 (for countries where Christian democratic parties competed 
electorally), which stood in stark contrast to the success of this movement in Western 
Europe, where the average vote for Christian democracy reached 28.6% over the same 
period (Grzymala-Busse 2013). What was, however, most interesting is the fact that 
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Christian democracy in Central and Eastern Europe appeared to have been replaced by a 
form of political Catholicism that exhibited a significant Catholic-nationalist trait. In 
countries where Catholicism played an essential role in state formation and where 
belonging to the nation was perceived to be synonymous with belonging to Catholicism, a 
Christian democratic model based on transnational cooperation and lack of nationalistic 
references proved unattractive. Instead, it was replaced by a mixture of Catholic-nationalist 
elements, giving rise to different forms of political Catholicism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
This lead to the third factor differentiating West European political Catholicism from its 
Central and East European counterparts. In Western Europe, political Catholicism 
developed essentially as a movement in defence of Catholicism, the Church and the faithful 
in conflicts between Protestants and Catholics or as a response to secularisation attempts 
conducted by state authorities. However, in CEE countries like Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Croatia or Poland, the genesis of the political Catholic movement was different, 
as Catholicism there grew into a key component of national identity, leading to an 
interconnection between nationalism and religion. Consequently, a Catholic-nationalist 
political Catholicism became much more focused on protecting the state’s sovereignty and 
national identity from the external ‘Others’ than was ever the case in Western Europe. 
This also meant that there was an apparent gap between political Catholicism in Western 
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. They both grew out of different historical 
circumstances, so the difference between them was always apparent. However, with the 
nature of West European political Catholicism changing, leading to Christian democratic 
parties departing from making direct references to Christianity and Catholic social teaching 
which used to form the basis of their political programmes, the gap between the two 
groups became wider. In countries like Poland or Slovakia, political Catholicism remained 
firmly attached to Christian values, Catholicism and the Church. The manifesto of the 
biggest political Catholic party in Poland – Law and Justice – openly stated the inspiration 
it drew from Catholic social teaching and declared the party’s intention to protect the role 
of the Catholic religion in public life. 
The final element of the comparative analysis, to which much of this study was dedicated, 
was the issue of European integration. This study confirmed that political Catholicism in 
most countries was strongly in favour of European integration and a clearly pro-EU 
movement. It played a pivotal role in the development of the integration project with such 
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Catholic politicians like Adenauer, Schuman or De Gasperi regarded as the founding 
fathers of a united Europe. It was only in the case of Poland, Slovakia, and to a certain 
extent Bavaria, that I found Eurosceptic political Catholic movements. 
However, this raises the key question for this research: to what extent is Polish political 
Catholicism a deviant case, as argued in the title of this study? The comparative analysis 
confirmed that indeed it is very distinctive as a result of its Euroscepticism. Almost all 
political Catholic parties in Europe were markedly pro-EU and, in the case of Western 
Europe, had been advancing the integration process from its outset. Of the two cases 
where political Catholic parties adopted a more Eurosceptic position – Slovakia and 
Germany (Bavaria) – only the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) bore some 
similarity to the Polish case: the KDH’s sceptic position on Europe stemmed from the 
perceived cultural clash between traditional, Catholic values of the Slovak society and 
liberal, secular values of Western Europe. At the same time, the KDH’s Eurosceptic 
position followed more tactical considerations. The party attempted to differentiate itself 
from its splinter-party, the SDKU, which assumed a strongly pro-EU stance. There are also 
certain traces of Euroscepticism in the case of Ireland and even more limited in Croatia. 
However, they never reached the levels of opposition to Europe present in Poland, with 
political Catholic parties in these countries remaining firmly in favour of the EU. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the Polish case of political Catholicism is deviant in 
the set of unique historical, social and political circumstances that produced the outcome, 
that is: political Catholicism which adopted a Eurosceptic stance. This study found out that 
these circumstances do not replicate in exactly the same manner, although they did appear 
to a different degree in other countries, mostly Central and East European. At the same, in 
none of the analysed cases did the circumstance lead to the emergence of Eurosceptic 
political Catholic movement, whose opposition to the EU would be underpinned by 
deeply-rooted ideological features, such as the Catholic-nationalist characteristic.   
Broader implications of the study and areas of further research 
Apart from developing an in-depth understanding of the Polish case, this research also has 
broader implications for the study of religion and politics, party politics, and party-based 
Euroscepticism in particular. Firstly, it clearly shows that studying religion and its influence 
on politics can be helpful, and sometime necessary, to understand the programmes, policy 
preferences and origins of political actors in contemporary Europe. Faith and religiosity 
can shape party and voters’ behaviours, including the mobilisation of voters, while the 
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Catholic Church and its organisation can be essential elements of party or coalition 
formation processes (e.g. Radio Maryja). The study also demonstrated that religion 
remained an important element that should be taken into account by political analysts, 
despite what was expected by the supporters of the theory of secularisation, which 
predicted the withering of religion and its influence in public life. 
Secondly, this thesis developed a more robust definition of political Catholicism – a term 
that so far was vaguely characterised and quite often used as a synonym for Christian 
democracy. This study showed that political Catholicism was a distinct political 
phenomenon, which could be clearly contrasted with other political ideologies. At the same 
time, despite offering a wide ideological framework for political activism, it could not be 
qualified as a full-fledged ideology, mainly because it was not specific enough and prone to 
differing interpretations leading into divergent political programmes.  
Thirdly, this thesis revealed that under specific circumstances – that is when Catholicism is 
fused with national identity as a result of its role in struggles for independence and 
autonomy, in which it provides an essential element of belonging to the nation and 
defining the ‘Other’ – political Catholicism becomes markedly more nationalistic, 
concerned with the protection of sovereignty, national interests, identity and traditions built 
around Christian values and the role of the Church. This was the case in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, namely Poland, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
where a more Catholic-nationalist form of political Catholicism either fully replaced 
traditional Christian democracy – with its characteristic dislike of ‘extremism’, its 
acceptance of supranationality, support for transnational cooperation and reconciliation – 
or mediated these characteristic features by displaying more vocal concerns for preserving 
national sovereignty and identity. This also shows how a history of nation and state 
building can affect the development of political movements, providing an essential 
framework for political activity in contemporary Europe. 
Fourthly, this study contributed to the academic discussion on the causality of party-based 
Euroscepticism, which in general was focused on the ‘strategy vs. ideology’ issue. Is party-
based Euroscepticism more a matter of deeply entrenched ideological predispositions, and 
hence cannot be easily changed, or is it more a matter of strategic and tactical 
considerations and the party position on Europe can be conveniently adjusted in line with 
short- or medium-term political calculations, intra-party competition or coalition-
participation considerations? This issue is even more pertinent in the light of the apparently 
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fluid nature of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland. What this research found was in line 
with Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2008b) distinction between the long-term underlying party 
position on Europe, which is shaped by a party’s wider ideological profile and the 
perceived interests of its supporters, and whether or not a party uses the European issue in 
inter-party competition, which depends on electoral strategic and coalition tactical factors. 
Thus, it is crucial not to mistake temporary, strategic or tactical changes in party rhetoric – 
as in the case of Law and Justice, which toned down its Euroscepticism during its 2005-
2007 government because it could have handicapped its policy initiatives at the European 
level – and a long-term party position on Europe – which in the case of Law and Justice 
was Eurosceptic, and shaped mostly by the intrinsic features of Polish political Catholicism 
and the intertwined relationship between Catholicism and national identity. 
Before concluding this thesis, it is worth briefly outlining the avenues for possible future 
research that stem from this study. An obvious one here would be a more detailed binary 
comparative analysis of the Polish and Irish cases of political Catholicism. The comparative 
section in this study showed a clear resemblance between Ireland and Poland in terms of 
the relationship between Catholicism and national identity. In both cases, belonging to 
Catholicism became an essential element of belonging to the nation. The Catholic religion 
helped to define the boundaries and accentuate the differences between the Polish or Irish 
nationalities and the ‘Other’ – the British in the case of Ireland, and the Russians, Prussians 
and communists in the case of Poland. However, despite the similar intertwined relations 
between religion and national identity, political Catholicism in Ireland did not start to 
perceive the EU as a liberal, secular organisation, which may threaten Irish national 
identity, and consequently did not develop a Eurosceptic stance like its Polish counterpart. 
I have hypothesised that this was caused by the fact that the ‘Other’ against which 
Catholicism helped to define the Irish and Polish nations remained unchanged in Ireland 
(the British), while in Poland it moved first to secular communism and then to the secular, 
Western culture. Additionally, the relative strength of the Polish Church compared with the 
increasing weakness of its Irish counterpart may also account for the development of 
Eurosceptic political Catholicism in Poland. However, deeper analysis of the Irish case is 
necessary to prove or disprove this theory. 
The case of Poland also offers several areas for additional research. Firstly, the milieu of 
Radio Maryja could be analysed further to better understand the formation of its opinion 
on the EU and to assess its real influence on political Catholicism and the political scene 
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overall. So far, there has been only a small number of analyses of this phenomenon, most 
notably the monograph by Krzemiński (2009). This is because the milieu is quite closed 
and distrustful of anyone coming from the outside. However, this study proved that it is 
possible to engage with groups that may be rather unwilling to provide access to 
information out of fear of being manipulated or misrepresented (e.g., some of Law and 
Justice’s politicians). More studies could improve our understanding of how Radio Maryja 
interacts with political parties and how it shapes its opinion on the European issue.  
Secondly, more research into the opinion of the Polish Catholic Church regarding 
European integration could provide additional useful insights. This study briefly described 
how the opinion of the Church on the EU has evolved; however, within the Polish 
Episcopate there are diverging views about the integration process. Given that the last 
large-scale study of Polish clergy and their attitudes towards the EU was conducted in 2003 
(see Kolarska-Bobińska 2003), a new, detailed, quantitative study could improve our 
understanding of how the Church differs internally in terms of its attitudes towards the 
EU, and how it influences the opinions of the faithful in this respect.  
The role of political Catholicism in contemporary Europe and its influence in driving 
opposition to European integration remain a largely under-researched topic with a clear 
lacuna for further scholarly analysis. This study contributed to our knowledge of this 
important political phenomenon, helping us to understand the nature of political 
Catholicism and its role in driving Euroscepticism in Poland. Thus, this research not only 
explored the broad issue of the intertwined relations between religion and politics in 
contemporary Europe and enhanced our understanding of the important concept of 
Euroscepticism in a large, comparatively new EU member state. It also shed more light on 
a fairly new aspect of Euroscepticism, that is: its relationship with religion, proving that 
even in modernised and industrialised states one should not too easily discard religion as an 
unimportant element in shaping society and politics.  
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